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CHAPTER ONE 
KARL MARX 
Introduction 
 This dissertation is situated between the modern critique of religion as ideology, 
on the one hand, and the postsecular turn to theology in contemporary theory and politi-
cal philosophy, on the other. If we hope to more clearly define the relation of ideology 
critique to political theology in this matrix, it is important to first discuss Karl Marx’s po-
sition on the relation of theology to ideology.1 After all, it is Marx who identifies theol-
ogy as a constructed response to social antagonisms that yield human consciousness, 
while simultaneously being produced by the selfsame realities. Marx’s accusation that re-
ligion is ideology was instrumental in stimulating the modern suspicion of theology, and 
it is the spirit of this position that still animates critical theory’s allergy to it. In this con-
text, it is important to understand Marx’s critique of religion as ideology as a political ob-
jection, and so I argue in this chapter against the common position that defines ideology 
in Marx
                                                
1 In what follows, it is important to clarify the differences between Marx’s own views (‘Marxian’) and 
those of his subsequent readers and interpreters (‘Marxism’) who attempt to think in and through his leg-
acy. While there may indeed be some overlap between the Marxist legacy and the Marxian perspective, my 
concern in this chapter is strictly limited to how Marx envisioned the relation between theology and ideol-
ogy, and so can be taken as Marxian analysis. To complicate matters further, the most perspicuous texts 
where the concept of ideology is featured hardly use the term at all, and those who do have a complex and 
varied scholarly reception. 
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as “false consciousness.”2 Marx understood ideology as that which produces ‘false con-
sciousness’ in political subjects. It is the mechanism of socio-political control used by 
ruling powers to maintain their dominative and oppressive hold on the social relations of 
production. An important question about Marx’s theory of ideology is whether a central 
criterion of the Marxian critique is that ideology is made up of false, illusory, mythical, 
and distorted accounts about social reality3 — a criterion for ideology that even non-
Marxist theorists use.4 Others try to either retain the distorted or illusory character of ide-
ology while avoiding the epistemological issues with the claim that ideology is defined 
by ‘falsehood’ or reject the idea that falsehood was a central definition characteristic of 
ideology altogether, contending that Marx interpreted as ideological any claim that its 
ideas were absolutely and universally valid, a kind of claim usually made in service to 
                                                
2 The literature that tries to represent Marx’s position is as deep as it is wide. There are numerous examples 
of interpretations of Marxian ideology critique that identify “false” or “distorted” thought as a constitutive 
element. Prominent among them are Michael Rosen, On Voluntary Servitude: False Consciousness and the 
Theory of Ideology (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996); and Christopher Pines, Ideology 
and false consciousness: Marx and his historical progenitors (SUNY Press, 1993); David Miller, “Ideology 
and the problem of false consciousness,” Political Studies 20.4 (1972): 442-444; and Jorge Larrain, The 
Concept of Ideology (London: Hutchinson, 1979), 40ff. The specific aspect of the position(s) that I am dis-
puting is simply the often-inherent and implicit claim that in identifying theology as ideology, Marx is ar-
guing that theology is false, as in ‘not factually true’, usually assuming some corresponding theory of truth. 
Pace this construction, I do not believe that for Marx, ideology is an epistemological matter, but rather a 
political one. By this, I simply mean that I do not believe that ideology critique belongs to that analytic 
philosophical work committed to questions of belief, truth, and justification; it is not a discourse that deter-
mines whether ideas are true or false, but rather how certain ideas function within social reality. 
3 For a survey of influential attempts to define and categorize ideology, see Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a 
Critical Theory (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 4-25; and Martin Seliger, The Marx-
ist Conception of Ideology: A Critical Essay (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). 
4 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia; An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (London: K. Paul, 
Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd, 1936), 49-51; Paul Ricoeur, “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology,” in 
Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, ed. John B. Thompson (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981), 71-88ff. 
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economic interests of specific social class at the expense of another.5 
  I consider the term ‘false consciousness’ to be too epistemological a term and as 
such, it misses the political point Marx tried to make in his ideology critique. ‘False con-
sciousness’ typically refers to the idea that political subjects misapprehend their social lo-
cation and so fail to fully understand or realize their real material interests within social 
relations and productive forces of capitalism. ‘False consciousness’ causes politics actors 
to fail to recognize themselves in states of inequality, oppression, or exploitation because 
the ruling ideas have been naturalized and universalized, and as such, there are little rea-
son and motivation to challenge them. People under ideology prehend social reality in an 
illusionary and misleading fashion and so are unable to act on their own behalf against 
the dominative and exploitative practices and policies of the ruling powers. Political sub-
jects who live under ideology act out of a ‘false consciousness’ wherein they mistake ap-
pearance for reality; this is politically insidious due to the effect that false representation 
and distortion of the social reality has on the legitimation of power relations. 
 This original reading of Marx’s theory of ideology as that of ‘false consciousness’ 
has become a controversial issue in the theory of ideology, leading many even within the 
Marxian framework to abandon ideology critique on account of the many epistemology 
problems it appears to present - even to the Marxist critique itself. Indeed, one of the rea-
sons for the eclipse of ideology critique in political theology is that its definition as ‘false 
consciousness’ implies that there exists some space ‘beyond’ or ‘outside’ ideology, some 
                                                
5 For a more extensive discussion of these issues, see Joe McCarney, The Real World of Ideology 
(Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980), 95ff; and Bhikhu Parekh, Marx’s Theory of Ideology (Baltimore, MA: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982). 
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objective and scientific gnosis, gained from a privileged, non-ideological vantage point 
that becomes the subjective position from which all critique of ideology proceeds. To in-
terpret ideology in this way is to ultimately miss the full force of Marx’s materialist ob-
jection to the way that theology malforms subjects by concealing and suturing the eco-
nomic contradictions that operate with social realities, in service to the political-economic 
interests of the ruling classes. In fact, it is the long association with the idea of “false con-
sciousness” that has led to the dismissal of ideology critique as a viable political resource 
by contemporary theory. It seems to be dependent on the mind/body dichotomy that pro-
duces the appearance/reality confusion endemic to the idea of false consciousness.  
 This chapter advocates for a reading of Marx that deemphasizes the epistemologi-
cal focus of ideology as ‘false consciousness’ and opts instead for a more directly politi-
cal reading that helps clarify not so much the theory of ideology in abstract, but in rela-
tion to his critique of religion and theology. To do this, I start with how Marx’s perspec-
tive develops in contradistinction to the so-called “Enlightenment” critique of religion, 
not in coincidence to it. This way we are able to avoid both overdetermining the role of 
Marx’s atheism in his critique of religion and restricting Marx’s critique of religion to his 
critique of ideology, which extracts it from broader themes in Marx’s thought, especially 
in the so-called “early” periods. Given the enduring effect of Marx’s legacy on critical 
theory and ideology critique today, it is crucial that its position on what is wrong with re-
ligion and theology is brought into clear relief. These characterizations succeed only in 
obscuring the fundamental problem(s) posed by ideology — and theology, for that mat-
ter.  
5 
 
 To avoid this, we must situate Marx’s critique of theology as ideology outside of 
the traditional Enlightenment critique of religion, which Marx himself considered to be 
insufficiently materialist. The critique of religion is not about theology, but about the so-
cio-political conditions that give rise to religion in the first place and make it possible.6 
The critique of religion as ideology is not about exposing its claims to be illusory; it is 
about abolishing the social relations and productive forces that prevent political subjects 
from prehending their actual situation: “the abolition of religion as the illusory happiness 
of the people is the demand for their real happiness. To call on them to give up their illu-
sions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illu-
sions.”7 Marx’s critique of ideology animated his early humanist and materialist objec-
tions to the deleterious effect of theology on the political order — and its subjects. He 
saw it effectively concealing and suturing the socio-economic contradictions which form 
along the class fault-lines in the capitalist social order. When he speaks of religion as ide-
ology, Marx is concerned about what religion does to human social actors and how it in-
teracts with social relations and productive forces, inevitably in support of capitalism. 
                                                
6 Within our current intellectual climate, we are accustomed to carefully parsing out the complex relation 
between religion and theology upon their mention, to what extent is this effort relevant or important for un-
derstanding Marx on the relation between theology and ideology? Does Marx distinguish between theology 
and religion in his work, and do they function differently in his view? If so, what does he understand each 
of these terms to mean? A full answer is way beyond the scope of this chapter, but suffice it to say that 
Marx’s use of terms like religion and theology do not have the technical specificity of contemporary usage. 
It is quite clear that he uses these terms quite interchangeably, with little care or consideration for any real 
or apparent differences between them. Within Marx’s historical context, the religious traditions of Judaism 
and Christianity were dominant, and the theology of the latter was characterized heavily as Lutheran con-
fessionalism by the Prussian state. He did not distinguish between the cognitive, experiential, confessional, 
or practical aspects of religious faith, and their corresponding theological beliefs; this illustrates my overall 
position that Marx knew and cared little about theological particulars, and was far more interested to cri-
tique the way it functioned within capitalist socio-economic dynamics as an ideology. 
7 Karl Marx, “Toward a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction,” in Karl Marx: Selected 
Writings, trans. Lawrence Hugh Simon (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994), 28. 
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The point of ideology critique is not to mark the difference between appearance and real-
ity or to expose the content of particular truth claims to be false per se, but to identify 
ideology as a function of ideas as class-driven, bourgeoisie techniques of resistance to the 
processes of proletarianization; they make sure that things just keep on running smoothly, 
that nothing ultimately changes. Insofar as religion contributes to this, it is ideological. 
All too often, the atheist elements of Marx’s objections to religion overshadow his more 
political concerns with the way that theology has deleterious impact on social reality. 
Marx’s critique of theology as ideology affords him the opportunity to show that “‘the re-
ligious sentiment’ is itself a social product”, the humanist thesis at the center of his nas-
cent social theory.8 Ideology is not about ideas being true or false (or how it is that ideas 
can be either, both, or neither), but about the material conditions that give rise to political 
subjectivity and so determine the materialist practices of human labor. 
Marx famously argued that “the ‘criticism of religion’ is the conditional premise 
of all criticism”9, the purpose of which is to uncover the material reality of the human 
condition, which is often concealed under ‘the illusionary sun’ of theological ‘niceties.’10 
Religion, says Marx, is symptomatic of problems within these material conditions and is 
paradigmatic of the whole ideological structure. To critique theology as ideology is to ex-
plain what theology does to human social actors, not to argue that the content of theology 
                                                
8 Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” in The German Ideology (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 19980, 
574.  
9 Karl Marx, “Toward a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction,” in Karl Marx: Selected 
Writings, trans. Lawrence Hugh Simon (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 28. 
10 Marx, “Toward a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction,” 28. 
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is false.11 The aim of the critique of religion as ideology is to emancipate the proletariat 
from the debilitating effect of ideologies - the masking and concealment of the real con-
tradictions at the base of all relations and forces in capitalist economic life and to clear 
the way for political subjectivization.  
At first, Marx’s critique of religion itself seems to radicalize the Enlightenment’s 
rejection of classical Christian theological beliefs and the legitimacy of religious author-
ity in public life. He was averse to Christianity specifically, which he considered to be 
historically complicit in the alienating and reifying effects of capitalism on the working 
and producing classes: 
For a society of commodity-producers, whose general social relation of produc-
tion consists in the fact that they treat their products as commodities, hence as val-
ues, and in this material form bring their individual private laborers into relation 
with each other as homogeneous human labor. Christianity with its religious cult 
of man in the abstract, more particularly in its bourgeois development, i.e. in Prot-
estantism, Deism, etc, is the most fitting form of religion.12  
 
Yet, while it is clear that Marx is not a sort of crypto-theologian, recent studies on his cri-
tique of religion complicate his position on the relation of theology to ideology that com-
plicates the Marxist allegation of theology as ideology.13 Despite its structural atheism, 
                                                
11 Jon Elster, An Introduction to Karl Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), ch. 9. 
12 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Vol.1, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin 
Books, 1990), 172.  
13 Roland Boer, Criticism of Heaven: On Marxism and Theology (Leiden: Brill, 2007); Alberto Toscano, 
“Beyond Abstractions: Marx and the Critique of the Critique of Religion,” Historical Materialism 18 
(2010): 3-20; Andrew McKinnon, “Reading ‘Opium of the People’: Expression, Protest, and the Dialectics 
of Religion,” Critical Sociology 31.1-2 (2005): 15-38.  
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the Marxist legacy finds it quite difficult to discount the formal and normative signifi-
cance of theology.14 But lest we think that it is possible to extract the moral and ethical 
values of Christianity from its more scandalous theological particulars or its economic 
moorings, Marx famously resisted the idea that ‘the social principles of Christianity’ 
could be counted on to promote or generate social liberation or economic justice: 
The social principles of Christianity preach the necessity of a ruling and op-
pressed class, and for the latter all they have to offer is the pious wish that former 
may be charitable… The social principles of Christianity are sneaking and hypo-
critical and the proletariat is revolutionary. So much for the social principles of 
Christianity!15 
 
It is also important to note, at the outset, that specifically theological debates 
serve as the immediate intellectual and political context for the early stage of Marx’s cri-
tique of religion and his concept of ideology. I will reconstruct Marx’s theory of ideol-
ogy, not exhaustively, but as it concerns the critique of theology, thereby pinpointing its 
place within Marx’s theory of ideology at large. Strangely enough, the question of theol-
ogy is often overlooked in Marx’s concept of ideology; it is usually considered to be a 
footnoted example, a specific form of a more general type. While it is widely accepted 
that Marx dismisses religion as ideology, one often finds that when reconstructing Marx’s 
account of ideology itself, the place of religion in that account is far more than a marginal 
or negative one. Religion is indeed the paradigmatic case of ideology for Marx, at least in 
his early ‘philosophical’ stage, and becomes the measure for his structural analysis of 
                                                
14 For differing perspectives, see Merold Westphal, Suspicion and Faith: The Religious Uses of Modern 
Atheism (Grand Rapids, Mich: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co, 1993); Robert C. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in 
Karl Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961).  
15 Karl Marx, “The Social Principles of Christianity,” in Marx on Religion, ed. John Raines (Philadelphia, 
Pa: Temple University Press, 2002), 185-186. 
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capitalism in his later ‘scientific’ stages. Many descriptive forms of relations such as 
commodification, fetishization, money, and the value-product are described as and by 
theologies in Marx’s ideology critique of the capitalist social order.  
Marx and the Critique of the Theological Critique of Religion  
 What concerned Marx about religion — and how did this concern differ from pre-
ceding critiques? My point here is to situate Marx’s early use of the term ‘ideology’ as 
contextualized within particular theological debates amongst nineteenth-century inter-
preters of Hegel. The context has important interpretative implications as it is directly re-
lated to Marx’s theories of abstraction and of historical materialism, which have constitu-
tive roles in the articulation of ideology critique in Marx’s early humanism philosophy. 
The concept of ideology was germinated in Marx’s critical reception of Hegel in and 
through the critical inversion of German idealism in the work of Ludwig Feuerbach, a 
turn lodged within the community of ‘Left’ or ‘Young’ Hegelians.16 Feuerbach repre-
sented a decisive turn from the traditional critique of religion through epistemology and 
metaphysics to a French and British inspired materialist critique of religion that inter-
preted theology as an inverted anthropology.17  
                                                
16 Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, 73-94. Marx never understood himself to be departing in any 
significant way from what he took to be the core intuitions of Hegel himself. Marx never left Hegel. In-
stead, his breakthrough came as a matter of his departure with the particular Hegelianism that eventually 
characterized the theological approach of Bruno Bauer, Ludwig Feuerbach, and others. Marx opposed the 
‘theological Hegel’ insofar as he was read as such by idealists who were still waging a theoretical attack 
against religion, whose theological blows were abstract, superficial, and so woefully ineffective insofar as 
they were satisfied with merely exposing “the secular basis” of theology itself. 
17 Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, 83 and 85-94. Tucker outlines this in his masterful recount-
ing of Feuerbach’s interpretation of Hegel which turns metaphysics into an ‘esoteric psychology.’ Feuer-
bach’s point was to say that “Hegelianism is the traditional Christian theology spelt by dialectic. Hegel’s 
10 
 
 In so doing, the ‘ideologists’ were set firmly within the confines of the traditional 
Enlightenment critique of religion. In response, Marx takes up the vague term of ‘ideol-
ogy’ in this context, which at this time had a very short history, and utilized it as a matter 
of social scientific critique, directed towards those ‘ideologists’ whose inadequately ma-
terialist interrogation of religion uses the ‘transformative method’ of inversion in order to 
demonstrate the secular or psychological basis of theological belief. Marx argued that this 
approach was fatally flawed for its abstract character that led them to largely misunder-
stand the relation between being and consciousness and between subject and object. This 
resulted in highly abstracted and idealist conception of the relation between the individual 
social actor and society, between the state and the civil discourses of social action, all of 
which comes back to the overtly theological character of their critique of the inverted 
character of religion and its self-alienating effects on the human being.  
The immediate context for the relation between theology and ideology is Marx’s 
early departure from Hegel along Feuerbachian lines, followed by his subsequent parting 
from the Young Hegelians on account of their “idealist” materialism. This is best illus-
trated in their theological critique of religion, which according to Marx, deals only with 
the highest of ‘abstractions’. Their approach takes on religion from the ‘abstract’ theolog-
ical side, leaving the material conditions uninterrogated as if religion and its theological 
content was not itself a social product. As an abstraction, it is neither sufficiently dialecti-
cal nor historical (and so not sufficiently ‘Hegelian’), and so leads to contradictions and 
                                                
picture of a self-alienated God simply brings into focus what was always present in religious conscious-
ness, and in traditional theology as its theological transcript," meaning that in Hegel, we find a ‘rational 
mysticism’ that serves as the ‘last rational support of theology.’ 
11 
 
antagonisms at the social and economic level. Marx defines an abstraction as an undevel-
oped unity of identical aspects of a representation (‘as if’) of a thing (‘as such’) in isola-
tion from other aspects, whereas concrete applications are a developed unity of the di-
verse aspects of said representation. Practical abstraction is a contributing factor to social 
contradiction. Consider, for example, Marx’s critique of Feuerbach in the sixth and sev-
enth theses:  
Feuerbach resolves the essence of religion into the essence of man. (sic) But the 
essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual…Conse-
quently, Feuerback does not see that the ‘religious sentiment’ is itself a social 
product, and that the abstract individual which he analyzes belongs in reality to a 
particular form of society.18  
 
 The early 1840s were the critical period in which Marx was most engaged on the 
link between theology, politics, and as such, ideology. Marx approached the question of 
ideology and religion in his early years, while distancing himself in the German Ideology 
from the ‘critique of religion’ of the “young” or “left” Hegelians, favoring instead a ma-
terialist parallelism that formulates its critique of religion as an “immanent critique of an-
tagonism”, or clearer still, the sources of social contradiction itself.19 It is important to 
clarify the historical and intellectual context in which Marx first took up the question of 
‘religion’ as a theological matter, essentially changing the site, the battleground, upon 
which the struggle against religion must be waged. In other words, it is important not to 
                                                
18 Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” 573-574.  
19 Robert J. Antonio, "Immanent Critique as the Core of Critical Theory: Its Origins and Developments in 
Hegel, Marx and Contemporary Thought,” British Journal of Sociology (1981): 330-345; Jan Rehmann. 
“Can Marx's Critique of Religion Be Freed from Its Fetters?” Rethinking Marxism 23.1 (2011): 144-153. 
12 
 
parse the referent ‘religion’ in Marx to the point that it becomes abstracted from the dis-
cursive context in which Marx takes up the question, a context in which the most im-
portant questions for philosophy were indeed explicitly theological.20 The Young Hegeli-
ans that Marx criticized in The German Ideology were actively involved in a whole range 
of theological debates, not because of their particular interest in theology per se, but be-
cause the very theological nature of Hegel’s argument led to that being the primarily bat-
tleground. Theology was the discursive site in the political struggle to resolve open di-
lemmas in German idealism, and so Marx’s nascent theory of ideology emerges within 
this crucible. This explains at least in part why the early mentions of ideology always 
seem to be in close proximity to this critique of religion.   
What motivated Marx’s critique of religion was not his atheist theological com-
mitments, but rather a materialist and humanist objection to ways that religion produced 
and sustained the very social contradictions, which causes the real needs that human so-
cial actors attempt to resolve in theology. In this way, Marx’s initial analysis of theology 
takes the form of a critique of the theological critique of religion as undertaken by the 
Young Hegelians, who like Feuerbach, thought the problem of inversion lie with false 
ideas about God, and so the critique of religion was a matter of changing consciousness 
by demonstrating those ideas to be false, i.e., an affront to nature, freedom, and reason, 
even while these arguments lie within the field of theological discourse. The use of anti-
                                                
20 Warren Breckman, Marx, the Young Hegelians, and the Origins of Radical Social Theory: Dethroning 
the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).  
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theist arguments and rationalist epistemologies would be sufficient to change the con-
sciousness of human persons and so resolve the problems with the political use of reli-
gion, or so they thought. Marx thought otherwise. His materialist concept of history as 
human work explored the conditions that produce religion, and critique those who were 
convinced that changing the world required only the pedagogy of theological inversion: 
God as the projected effect of self-alienated ‘essence’ of humanity.  These, says Marx, 
are the ‘ideologists’: those who fail to interrogate “the secular basis” of religion and fail 
to encounter the material ground upon which ideas are formed and so function. Against 
Max Stirner, to whom he attributes the idea “that thoughts, which have become independ-
ent, objectified thoughts – ghosts – have ruled the world and continue to rule it, and that 
all history up to now was the history of theology”21, Marx will argue that ideologists 
combat religion on theological terms and so takes on the faults of such a register: inver-
sion, abstraction and contradiction, the marks of ideology.  
The real problem with religion is not theological particulars about matters such 
God, freedom, or the immortality of the soul. It is, rather, the social reality in which it is 
rooted and the material conditions it serves.22 Or to be more precise: it is the contradic-
tions produced within that social reality, the origins of which lie with the division of labor 
                                                
21 Marx, The German Ideology, 173. 
22 Though to be sure, Marx has theological disagreements with the core beliefs of the major religion tradi-
tions, namely Judaism and Christianity, the Protestant variety in particular. It is not that Marx did not con-
sider the theological dictates of religion such as the existence of God, the belief in life after death, or the 
existence of the human soul to be false or unreasonable. Only that this line of questioning, ‘the critique of 
heaven’, left the ‘the inner strife and intrinsic contradictoriness’ of the materialist base of religion uninter-
rogated. This was the line of questioning most important for understanding the various forms of political, 
and eventually, economic alienation plaguing the workers and producers suffering under capitalist society.  
14 
 
and privatization of property which not only produces alienation (in its tripartite form), 
but also furthers and endorses class struggle by setting the interests of the individual over 
that of the social good. These contradictions give rise to various forms of consciousness. 
Ideology is that specific type of consciousness, which attempts to resolve contradictions 
through negation or concealment. Whether by design or by effect, it is ideologists such as 
those whose critical appraisal of religion served as Marx’s point of departure from the 
Feuerbach’s emphasis on critique as inversion, which treated contradictions as something 
that could be resolved through a change in thinking. Rather, Marx wants to take on the 
different modes of abstraction and contradiction, and so he begins to categorize and ana-
lyze various responses to them, the most trenchant of which is ideology.  
Taking a stand against the Young Hegelians (Bruno Bauer, Feuerbach, and Max 
Stirner), Marx contends that the traditional critique of religion is inadequate, in that the 
use of a baldly atheist critique of religious authority and the role of religion in legitimat-
ing the state only elevates the discursive stature of Christianity. His entrée into the debate 
on religion and politics is summarized in his materialist parallelism: Marx wants to aban-
don the ‘criticism of heaven’ and take up a ‘criticism of earth’ in its place. This requires 
that critical philosophy abandon its operation against religion and engage rather a critique 
of the fraught relations between the state and civil society as a matter of sociological and 
economic analysis. In a letter to Arnold Ruge, Marx writes,  
Religion should be criticized in the framework of political conditions [instead of 
criticizing] political conditions … in the framework of religion …; for religion in 
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itself is without content, it owes its being not to heaven but to earth, and with the 
abolition of distorted reality, of which it is the theory, it will collapse of itself.23  
 
To make this point, that religion is ‘the theory of the world,' Marx must disentangle the 
Young Hegelian’s political critique from the traditional critique of religion. To do this, 
Marx must enter into the theological fray and as a result, his early diagnosis of ideology 
is characterized by its link to theology, both contextually and materially. It was not 
enough to unveil theology as an abstraction by showing it to be an inverted project of hu-
man self-alienation. Contrary to the traditional critique of religion, Marx, rather than dis-
missing religion as either a priestly conspiracy to manipulate human persons or a mere 
delusion, recognizes religion as a form of consciousness that functions politically to or-
ganize and produce collective life, and so must be engaged, not at the level of abolishing 
it politically or dismantling it theologically, but critiquing it materially.  
 To illustrate this, allow me to give two examples: first in the important although 
frequently overlooked, early text “The Leading Article”, Marx reprimanded the German 
papers who attacked the “religious trend in philosophy” and called for the abolition of 
Christianity from the political state.24 Marx disagrees, arguing that this amounts to a po-
liticization of religion, which actually aids the critique of religion, in that the religious le-
gitimation of politics actively “secularizes it”, making it an “object of political discourse 
and disputation.” Again in “The Jewish Question," Marx faults Bauer, for whom the 
                                                
23 Karl Marx, “Marx to Ruge, November 30 1842,” in Karl Marx, Frederick Engels: Collected Works, vol. 
1 (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 393-395.  
24 Karl Marx, “The Leading Article of No. 179 of Kolnische Zeitung,” in Marx on Religion, ed., John 
Raines (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2002), 34-35.  
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question of religion should be transposed into a question about the secular state. Pace 
Bauer who thinks that the State should abolish religion, Marx says this will neither effec-
tively end religion’s hold on social and political life nor will it actually contribute to hu-
man emancipation.25 The political emancipation from religion (restricting its political in-
fluence by privatizing and confining it to civil society) does little for human social actors 
who are struggling to recover their ‘species-being.’ What Marx desired instead was the 
establishment of social relations and productive forces that are appropriate to human 
species-being and that promote the practical life-activity, of the real individual human ac-
tor. The mere political dismissal or theological rejection of religion accomplished very 
little in this regard. The register upon which religion is to be dismantled is at the material-
ist level of history, understood by social actors as the product of their natural freedom and 
instinctive creativity. This is not only an early position that Marx eventually sheds, but 
rather one that he reiterates in this line in Capital: 
The religious reflections of the real world can, in any case, vanish only when the 
practical relations of everyday life between man and man, and man and nature, 
generally present themselves to him in a transparent and rational form. The veil is 
not removed from the countenance of the social life-process, i.e., the process of 
material production, until it becomes production by freely associated men, and 
stands under their conscious and planned control. This, however, requires that so-
ciety possess a material foundation, or a series of material conditions of existence, 
which in their turn are the natural and spontaneous product of a long and tor-
mented historical development.26 
  
                                                
25 Karl Marx, “The Jewish Question,” in Marx on Religion, ed., John Raines (Philadelphia, PA: Temple 
University Press, 2002), 64-69.  
26 Marx, Capital, 173.  
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This path Marx took in critiquing the traditional critique of religion as abstract and ideal-
ist on account of being overly theological was to amplify the social basis of the religious 
forms of abstractions and to remove the material contradictions at their secular basis. This 
goes hand in hand with Marx’s departure from Feuerbach, signaled in the fourth ‘The-
ses’:  
His work consists in resolving the religious world into its secular basis. He over-
looks the fact that after completing this work, the chief thing still remains to be 
done. For the fact that the secular basis lifts off from itself and establishes itself in 
the clouds an independent realm can only be explained by the inner strife and in-
trinsic contradictoriness of this secular basis. The latter must be understood in its 
contradiction and then, by the removal of the contradiction, revolutionized.27 
 
To put it rather bluntly, Marx was less interested in defeating religion through a theologi-
cal critique of its constitutive claims, as the Young Hegelians had attempted, but rather 
located the critical-materialist struggle against religion “neither in the “essence of man, 
nor in the predicates of God, but in the material world, which each stage of religious de-
velopment finds in existence.”28 It is not that religion is false and therefore ideological, 
but rather that religion functions in collective life in such a way that it engenders and en-
acts a social logic that alienates humanity from itself and assumes an autonomous charac-
ter, as if its ‘independent realm’ was somehow beyond, or abstracted from the real life 
processes of historical practice. This, says Marx, names theology’s ideological function; 
this is why it must be ruthlessly critiqued.  
                                                
27 Marx,“Theses on Feuerbach,” 573. 
28 Marx, The German Ideology, 172.  
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So it is in the context of theological debate that Marx’s analysis of ideology de-
velops as a part of a sustained critique of the critique of religion that gestured towards 
what would eventually become the materialist conception of history in The German Ide-
ology and the Theses on Feuerbach. In the years following 1843, Marx would go from an 
‘eliminative materialism’ in The German Ideology to a full-blown historical-materialist 
understanding of religion, applied to capitalist economic forms in Capital, where one is 
able “to develop, from the actual relations of life, the corresponding celestialised forms of 
those relations.” For Marx, the critique of theology as ideology goes beyond simply con-
necting the autotomizing and divisive activity of theological belief and practice to its 
‘secular’ or material basis. Marx thinks that it is essential that the critique of theology un-
cover the social and historical necessity and rootedness of the ‘phantoms’ and ‘subli-
mates’ in the specifically theological form of ideology. Ideology is a social-scientific 
concept that expresses the economic and political task of critique, and so it names theol-
ogy not merely as a fantastical psychological illusion or a bourgeois political conspiracy 
that is carried out by religious authorities in order to console or trick human social actors. 
Theology as ideology is indeed a socio-economic problem because it is integral to the 
success and endurance of capitalist forms of political economic that arranges human ex-
istence, and social life. This calls for a structural study of its material bases, realities 
known in Marxian parlance as the value-product, abstract labor, commodity-fetishism, 
and money-relation, to name a few. But first, we must clarify the use and description of 
ideology critique as a critical and negative concept in relation to theology, (section two) 
in order to better locate the place of ideology within Marx’s general critique of theology 
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(section three). This allows us, then, to explore the theological descriptions given to its 
more specifically capitalist economic forms (section four). 
The Use of Ideology in Marx’s Critique of Religion  
 David McLellan notes that the term “ideology” was birthed out of historical up-
heaval: the rise of democratic government, mass political movements, and a society 
marked by rapidly developing plurality.29 Tied to the breakdown of the medieval world, 
and as such, the hierarchical structures of metaphysics and cosmology that sustained that 
world, the term ‘ideology’ was first coined by French revolutionary philosopher Antoine 
Destutt de Tracy in 1797, who argued for a “new science of ideas” which would study the 
rational and natural origins of all ideas.30 In the beginning, ideology was the positive and 
constructive name for this new descriptive field of inquiry. It was given its negative and 
critical sharpness when taken up by the European emperor Napoleon, who pejoratively 
titled his critics ‘ideologues’: those who “by subtly searching for first causes, wishes to 
establish on this basis the legislation of peoples” through a “cloudy metaphysics.”31 The 
short history of the term ‘ideology’ and the thin, ad hoc manner in which Marx uses it 
makes it difficult to give a thorough reconstruction of the concept, especially in relation 
to other more developed themes and trajectories in Marx’s writings. Finally, his theory of 
ideology is closely related to his theory of alienation and labor as is his critically appre-
ciative reception of the method of inversion in Feuerbach. It is not easy to stay focused 
                                                
29 David McLellan, Ideology (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 2-8. 
30 McLellan, Ideology, 10.  
31 As cited in McLellan,. Ideology, 5.  
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on the trimmed down question of the ideology/theology link without getting drawn into 
the larger questions.  
 There were other historical factors that produce misconceptions about Marx’s the-
ory of ideology and complicate its interpretation in relation to theology, especially in the 
context of the postwar United States. I mention the context and reception history in the 
US in particular because it is important to note that the more humanist writings of the 
early Marx are translated relatively late, meaning that Marx has been read in the US as 
purveying a strictly ‘scientific socialism’ that was easily (albeit grossly and mistakenly) 
transposed into a “Bolshevik” state ideology first, and proto-Soviet Communism, last.32 
The anti-Communist bias in Marx scholarship came of age in the US (1950s-1990s) 
within anti-Communist political climate and a neotraditionalist return to religion within 
the civil and social order. This largely overdetermined how Marx’s concept of ideology 
was interpreted, especially in relation to his critique of religion. The correlation between 
his atheism and his communism is thus overdrawn and is an effect of the defense of civic 
religion in American politics which considers religion to be of significant political value, 
if not moral necessity. The emphasis on Marx’s atheism as the constitutive reason for his 
critique of religion as ideology overlooks both the ambiguity and ambivalence of Marx’s 
assessment of religion and the complexity of his analysis of ideology, especially in later 
                                                
32 Of course, the mainstay text on Marxist history that influenced this interpretation is Leszek Kołakowski’s 
Main Currents of Marxism: the Founders, the Golden Age, the Breakdown (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Co, 2005), which erroneously argued for a direct genealogy of knowledge between the materialist writings 
of Marx and the tyrannical monstrosity of Stalin. For more on the US reception of Marx and Marxism, see 
Paul Buhle, Marxism in the United States: Remapping the History of the American Left (London: Verso, 
1987) and David McLellan’s landmark Marxism After Marx: An Introduction (New York, NY: Harper & 
Row, 1980).  
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more ‘economic’ texts such as Capital and Grundrisse, including its 1859 “Preface.” 
It is common to think of Marx’s theory of ideology as a kind of paranoid conspir-
acy theory, whereby the sinister bourgeois invent or fabricate ideas (say, theological 
ones) that are then used in various social and economic forms (e.g., commodities, money, 
labor) in order to manipulate and regulate workers and producers under a capitalist eco-
nomic regime. Contrarily,  Marx does not think that ideology is an intentional or purpose-
ful invention by the bourgeois for the expressed intention to manipulate or misrepresent 
social reality for the proletariat; ideology is not invented by the ruling class, but rather in-
sists that it has a real materialist base.  
Essential Features of Marx’s Concept of Ideology  
 Despite the many interpretative difficulties and common mistakes, it is important 
to clarify exactly what Marx means by ideology, specially as in consort to other difficult 
concepts like inversion, contradiction, abstraction, and alienation, and to make clear its 
relation to and identification with, theology. Marx does not give a detailed or thick de-
scription of ideology, but rather displays what he means by the term in how he uses it. To 
say that a particular idea is ideological is to name the way it functions in relation to con-
tradictions in social life, in such a way as to appear to resolve the contradictions while 
only distorting and concealing their real material base. For Marx, ideology is defined as 
the specific practice of an idea, in the historical context of class struggle, which generates 
and reproduces misrepresentations of material social contradictions (from which the ideo-
logies themselves stem) by attempting to resolve them, either by negation or conceal-
ment. Marx uses the term ‘ideology’ as a diagnostic assessment of how the formation of 
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ideas interacts with essential contradictions that work within social consciousness to cre-
ate, but also to conceal, alienating disparities in the social division of labor. This is the 
scaffolding that props up the enduring economic power of the bourgeois capitalist. Yet, 
for our purposes, this general definition is not enough. It needs to be defined in relation to 
theology, which means we must determine the use of theology in and as ideological argu-
ment, the purpose of this section. We must also examine exactly what Marx means by re-
ligion and theology, and how ideologies forms take on theological descriptions in their 
economic capitalist forms, the subject of coming sections.  
 First, let me condense the position in a few theses, which will be explained further 
in the course of the chapter’s argument. First, ideology is a critical and negative concept 
for Marx. The term expresses a certain kind of problem that originates from real social 
contradictions, the effect of which is alienation in its various forms: religious, political, 
and economic. Ideology as inversion responds to and is produced by an ‘inverted world’ 
that is already acting upon human actors in the form of an ‘inverted consciousness.’ Se-
cond, ideology gets its ‘inverted consciousness of the world’ from the ‘inverted world’ 
itself, the effect of specifically capitalist economic forms and disciplinary mechanisms. 
The implication here is that ideology is a secondary concern for Marx, who is far more 
interested in interrogating the causes of ‘the inverted world’ than he is in eradicating reli-
gion as ‘the theory’ of this world, the alienating effect of which is symptomatic of the de-
fect. Third, ideology as a function of social consciousness gives human persons an inade-
quate and distorted picture of the contradictions that exist in social reality, either by ig-
noring them or misrepresenting them, making their effects quite politically problematic. 
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Fourth, these social contradictions call for a revolutionary form of material practice to un-
cover the ways that ideologies misrepresent or otherwise conceal ‘the real relations and 
activities’ of human persons. Ideologies are the results and effects of the ‘limited material 
mode of activity.’ To critique ideology is to name endemic limitations in the historical 
conditions of human life and work. These conditions as products of history can only be 
only transformed by putting in motion an alternative material practice that produces an 
altogether different future. Fifth, ideologies are a political  concern because they neces-
sarily serve the interests of the ruling class, even if that class has not produced them. As 
historical products, ideas might come in and out of ideological status, based in large part 
on the ruling class and material conditions of history. Ideologies are techniques used by 
the ruling classes to suppress and confuse the working and producing classes and to cover 
up the material conditions that contribute to their further alienation and oppression. Ideo-
logies are a problem for Marx because they resist the processes of proletarianization. 
Their social impact is the primary object of critique.  
It is important to identify ideologies as social products of material practice. They 
are not inventions or mere illusions to be corrected by persuasive argument or change in 
cognitive perspective. Nor are they inert or passive reflections of some external reality 
that they have no real role in reproducing. Marx makes his arguments about the character 
of ideology along the way to making a much more critical point about the nature of con-
sciousness viz a viz the idealism and materialist polarity. It is interesting to note that it is 
at this juncture — the intersection of consciousness and material practice — that ideology 
and theology are brought into bold relief. Marx put it this way in The German Ideology:  
24 
 
The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly inter-
woven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men — the lan-
guage of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men at this 
stage still appear as the direct efflux of their material behavior. The same applies 
to mental production as expressed in the language of the politics, laws, morality, 
religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people. Men are the producers of their concep-
tions, ideas, etc., that is, real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definitely 
development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to 
these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can be never anything else than con-
scious being and the being of men in their actual life-process.33  
 
Ideologies are indeed produced through the material process by the very limitations of 
practical activity itself, namely the propensity to reinforce pre-existing social contradic-
tions and create new ones, identified later as the ‘objectifying power’ of alienation in the 
division of labor and the privatization of property. In other words, ‘practice’ is the name 
that Marx gives to that ‘conscious and sensuous activity’ whereby human actors produce 
their own material existence and the constitutive relations of their life within the context 
of nature, society, and history. Social reality is dynamically produced by the practical ac-
tivity of real human actors in history. Rather than being outside or simply a passive re-
flection of it, ideology is grounded in this social reality and so cannot be dismissed as a 
kind of an inverted image of the real thing. It is essentially part and parcel of this social 
reality and so an interrogation of its ‘secular basis’ is required in order to undermine and 
dismantle its economic reproduction. Human consciousness is neither independent from 
nor a passive reflection of the real-life processes in material conditions. Again, Marx in 
his own words: 
In direct contrast to German philosophy, which descends from heaven to earth, 
here it is a matter of ascending from earth to heaven. That is to say not of setting 
out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, 
                                                
33 Marx, The German Ideology, 42.  
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imagined, conceived in order to arrive at men in the flesh; but setting out from 
real, active men, and on the basis of their real life process demonstrating the de-
velopment of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process.34 
 
In the German Ideology, Marx’s social account of consciousness describes the 
ideological function of theology by linking it to material practice directly, thereby illus-
trating both the nature of ideology and what it says about theology’s defects: 
The phantoms formed in the brains of men are also, necessarily, sublimates of 
their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material 
premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, and all the rest of ideology as well as 
the forms of consciousness corresponding to these, thus no longer retain the sem-
blance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, devel-
oping their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with 
this their actual world, also their thinking, and the products of their thinking. It is 
not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness.35  
 
One is given the sense, at least from this assemblage of text, that the problem with theol-
ogy that ideology names does not refer directly to its content, but instead its function, its 
effect on and within material practice itself. Theology could be other than ideology, in 
other words. In fact if theology were in fact to submit itself to the material life processes, 
if it were to abandon their ‘semblance of independence’ and so be altered along with the 
actual world, as a product of [human] thinking, perhaps its effect on social life might be 
as an alternative to ideology. To get a better sense of whether or not this works in Marx 
himself, we will need to investigate further about the place of ideology in Marx’s critique 
of theology.   
The Place of Ideology in Marx’s Critique of Theology  
                                                
34 Marx, The German Ideology, 42. 
35 Marx, The German Ideology, 42.  
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So far I have argued that Marx originally developed ‘ideology’ as a negative and 
critical response to the ‘young’ Hegelian’s critique of religion, which remained within the 
sphere of theological discourse, mistaking the ‘halo’ for ‘the vale of tears’ and neglecting 
to interrogate the ‘secular basis’ in the criticism ‘of earth,' ‘of law,' and ‘of politics.’ This 
is the set of materialist theses in the early Marx that defines the descriptive relation of 
theology as ideology. In this case, ideology works in society to mask or mystify the real 
basic origin of social existence from the human being, wrecking havoc on the creative 
and reproductive practices of human labor. He sought to reorient the critical direction of 
post-Hegelian political thought from ‘a critique of heaven’ to a ‘critique of earth,' that is 
to move out of abstract discussions about theology to materialist and historicized expla-
nations of the conditions which constitute the real, life processes of human social actors, 
or as Marx would later explain it, ‘the critique of the political economy.’ The question re-
mains: what place does theology have in Marx’s ‘critique of earth’? 
Interpretative Difficulties in Marx’s Critique of Religion 
 The ‘Marx on religion’ discussion has a long and coiled history. For most, it is 
simply enough to catalogue the various citations in the 1844 ‘Introduction’, the 1859 
‘Preface,' with a smattering of citations from On the Jewish Question, Capital, and of 
course, The German Ideology and Theses on Feuerbach in order to establish the basic pa-
rameters of Marx’s analysis of religion as a socially constructed form of consolation. It is 
in these citations that we see Marx first agreeing with Feuerbach’s inversion critique of 
religion, and then departing from it to a more trenchant political critique, and then finally, 
taking up an economic analysis of the faults of religion viz a viz its place in capitalist 
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forms.36 In this account, it is often enough to recount Marx’s apparent identification of 
religion as an illusion, a form of false consciousness that aids and abets capitalism, a po-
sition that seems cemented by his frequent, though haphazardly scattered, use of meta-
phors such as ‘opium of the people’, ‘phantoms’, ‘camera obscura’, and the ‘sigh of the 
oppressed creature’ to describe the social impact of religion. Marx’s use of theology as 
metaphor for the mystifying effect of ideology intimates that he regarded religion as a 
false, epistemological construal of socio-economic problems in the sense that they are in-
verted, illusionary, and do not cohere to reality.  
 But as I argued in previous sections, this is not the full story. In fact, this account 
of Marx is very close to the position that Marx identifies with the ‘ideologists’ who 
sought through the traditional Enlightenment critique to abolish religion by defeating the 
reasonableness of its theological arguments through various strategies, all of which were 
designed to defeat religion as its own theological ambit, while never actually properly in-
terrogating its ‘secular basis.’ My point here is that it is not enough to simply list the met-
aphors that Marx uses to describe the social comportment of religion if we are to under-
stand the relation between ideology and theology in Marx. Upon careful consideration, 
these metaphors appear to be more ambivalent and ambiguous than they appear. So are 
the positions and arguments they apparently illustrate. They are not easily reduced to an 
analysis of religion's ideological character as a form of false consciousness that is com-
plicit in propping up economic relations that alienate and oppress the human social actor 
                                                
36 Jorge Larraín, Marxism and Ideology (London: Macmillan, 1983), 40ff.  
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through depersonalizing and reifying capitalist economic procedures such as commodifi-
cation, fetishization, money, labor, value-form, etc.  
Common Mistakes in Interpreting Marx’s Critique of Religion  
 The complexity of Marx’s position(s) on theology can result in many common 
mistakes. For example, there were many, especially in the postwar years which were 
dominated by anti-Communist suspicion, who thought that Marx’s critique of religion 
merely replaced traditional forms of religion with an atheist critique that was nevertheless 
religion ‘by-another-name’: “a new dogma.”37 These readers think Marx simply redefines 
religion in a humanist vein that explores the basis of the moral commitments of society 
with the ultimate goal of realizing a utopian eschatology.38 Even still, other interpreters 
contend that despite its structural atheism, Marxian positions retain a “religious” charac-
ter, keeping intact the central “religious” spirit of the Ultimate, as evinced in the utopian 
commitments of his humanism.39 For proponents of this reading, Marx is far from the 
vulgar atheist reductionist that wants to abolish religion on theological grounds (e.g., 
"this is all there is"). This perspective emphasizes the role of Marx’s humanism, not its 
empiricism or atheism. Marx, contrary to Feuerbach, refuses to allow secular atheism to 
be the final word and this point stresses the differences between Feuerbach’s atheist theo-
                                                
37 Reinhold Niebuhr, “Introduction,” in Marx and Engels on Religion (New York: Schocken Books, 1964).  
38 Denys Turner, Marxism and Christianity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).  
39 Alasdair C. MacIntyre, Marxism and Christianity (New York: Schocken Books, 1968). 
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logical critique of religion as inversion and Marx’s materialist economic critique of reli-
gion as ideology.40 
 Others will try to emphasize Marx’s apparent, albeit critical, appreciation of the 
existential value of religion and its impulses to express and protest suffering and oppres-
sion, while also sustaining the search for the purpose of human life and thought beyond 
critique and interruption.41 Certainly, they say, Marx’s dialectics kept him open to evolv-
ing and progressive forms of religion that were appropriately sensitive to his critiques and 
so found ways to transform the contradictions they too often neglected, negated, or con-
cealed as ideologies. As Denys Turner surmised, “A Christianity – indeed any religion — 
that itself … is able to transcend the dichotomized Feuerbachian problematic [between 
human and divine], would at least evade the indictment that it is a necessarily ideological 
mode of thought and practice.”42 These readings are often meant to either draw Marxism 
and Christianity closer together, especially during and after the dawn of liberation theol-
ogy, or to definitively arrange them as diametric opposites, as was the case by most post-
war theological readers concerned about the orthodox Marxist legacy of communist and 
totalitarian governments.43 
 I try to avoid these mistakes by describing Marx’s negative and critical position 
                                                
40 “I desired there to be less trifling with the label ‘atheism’ (which reminds one of children, assuring eve-
ryone who is ready to listen to them that they are not afraid of the bogy man), and that instead the content 
of philosophy should be brought to the people.” Karl Marx, “Letter to Arnold Ruge” in Karl Marx: The Se-
lected Writings, 2nd edition. ed. David McLellan. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 28.  
41 Westphal, Suspicion and Faith, 121-140.  
42 Denys Turner, “Religion: Illusions and Liberation,” in The Cambridge Companion to Marx, ed. Terrell 
Carver (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 337.  
43 Turner, “Religion: Illusions and Liberation,” 325.  
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on theology as ideology as motivated by its specific relation to and interaction with social 
relations and economic forms, not by any of Marx’s (uninformed) theological disagree-
ments. Again, my goal here is not to somehow save religion or theology from Marx’s 
ideology critique. Instead, I find it important to say that Marx is rather disinterested in the 
Feuerbachian dualism of god/human and heaven/earth, and the whole point of this early 
critique of the young Hegelians was that they were too interested in defeating religion 
through theological disputations. Marx used his materialist conception of history and the 
application of this conception in his late analysis of capitalist economic forms to sidestep 
that problematic altogether, and get straight to social contradictions and their economic 
points of origin. Clarifying this point helps to contextualize, assemble, and interpret 
Marx’s scattered comments about religion, a topic about which he knew little and cared 
even less.44 The theological content of religion per se is not the fundamental object of 
Marx's ideology critique. Instead, Marx takes up the specifically contradictory forms of 
reality that are responsible for the conditions in which religion happens. How religion 
acts — in other words, its social impact — in relation to these forms of reality is what 
makes Marx identify religion as ideology, which again, is not the same thing as arguing 
that religion is false, which Marx does do but is not the significant trajectory of his ideol-
ogy critique of religion.   
 
 
Essential Features of Marx’s Critique of Religion   
                                                
44 Turner, “Religion: Illusions and Liberation,” 336.  
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 I have been arguing Marx’s ideology critique of religion centers on his materialist 
and humanist objections to religion’s effects, not a theological critique of religious beliefs 
themselves. Marx is less concerned with indicting religious authorities, much less reli-
gious believers, with political conspiracy or sinister intentions than he is with showing 
how religion negates or conceals the economic and social contradictions, to great detri-
ment to the human social actor. This is made clear in the opening words of the ‘Introduc-
tion,' which orients the object of Marxian criticism away from theology. For Marx,   
The profane existence of error is compromised as soon as its heavenly oratio pro 
aris et focis [“speech for the altars and hearths”] has been refuted. Man, who has 
found only the reflection of himself in the fantastic reality of heaven, where he 
sought a superman, will no longer feel disposed to find the mere appearance of 
himself, the non-man [“Unmensch”], where he seeks and must seek his true real-
ity.45 
 
As such, Marx allows for no confusion as to what position the historical materialist must 
take on religion, when viewed through the lens of ideology critique. Marx is only inter-
esting in taking up religion as an ideological problem insofar as it contains within itself 
helpful and illustrative elements that clarify the essential features of ideology and its so-
cial impact, most notably on alienation and labor. Ideology critique identifies religion, 
not as the cause of alienation (that he saves for capitalist social relations) but as a form of 
it. The task of criticism then, as a means of political denunciation, must first unmask hu-
man self-alienation in its holy form (i.e., religion) – and then proceeds through criticism 
to take it up via material force in unholy, or ‘earthly’ forms (i.e., political and eventually, 
economic). Marx makes this point again in the ‘Introduction’ when speaking about why 
                                                
45 Karl Marx, “Toward a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction, ” in Karl Marx: Selected 
Writings, ed, Lawrence Hugh Simon (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 28.  
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ideology critique gets more to the historical point of what is materially wrong with reli-
gion than theological critique does: 
It is, therefore, the task of history, once the other-worldly truth has disappeared, to 
establish the truth of this world. The immediate task of philosophy, which is in the 
service of history is to unmask human self-alienation in its unholy forms once it 
has been unmasked in its holy form. Thus, the criticism of heaven turns into the 
criticism of earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of law, and the criti-
cism of theology into the criticism of politics.46 
 
The critique of ideology as a “criticism of heaven” is unsatisfactory to Marx. This stays 
well within the ambit of theological talk and so misses the point. The critique of religion 
and theology as ideology fails unless it pushes itself further to that of law and politics, ra-
ther than conceding the site of struggle. Marx’s critique of theology as ideology is far 
more socio-political and economic, which Marx considered to be the decisive factor in 
social life; it concerns the social impact of theology on human social actors, namely as a 
potentially alienating and dehumanizing force that imprisons human persons to their re-
productive activity, rather than liberating them to revolutionary practice. To illustrate 
this, I will continue with the 1844 ‘Introduction’:  
The foundation of irreligious criticism is: Man makes religion, religion does not 
make man … Criticism has plucked the imaginary flowers on the chain not in or-
der that man shall continue to bear that chain without fantasy or consolation, but 
so that he shall throw off the chain and pluck the living flower.47   
 
Marx’s ideology critique levies a materialist and humanist objection to the way religion 
mystifies the human from itself, alienating it from its spontaneous creativity and external-
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izing its productive power (‘bearing that chain’), so that the world and its historical cir-
cumstances confront the human social actor as a strange and distant entity, rather than as 
the natural result of its reproductive practice. Marx’s ideology critique of religion is 
meant to clear a way forward for a revolutionary humanity to come to greater knowledge 
of itself as a creative and productive force, liberating it from the oppressive effects of 
economic contradictions forced upon it by a capitalist economic system: to ‘throw off the 
chain and pluck the living flower.’ The point of ideology critique is to cease and reverse 
is the negative effect that religion and theology has on the process of proletarianization of 
the working classes, the perquisite for any revolutionary praxis, aimed at undermining the 
bourgeoisie economic system. Ideology critique is never about truth or falsehood, but al-
ways about the formation of the political subject. Theology is a problem only because it 
is deemed an obstacle to this endeavor rather than an ally. The goal of ideology critique is 
to lay bare these effects (‘the imaginary flowers’) as they are found in the cracks in the 
social system: the contradictions enacted by the various division and separations in labor, 
value, class, et cetera that imprison the human person and preclude her/his full realization 
in history. Marx names religion directly as an object of this critique in the next few lines, 
putting his humanism in clear display: 
The criticism of religion disillusions man, so that he will think, act, and fashion 
his reality like a man who has discarded his illusions and regained his senses, so 
that he will move around himself as his own true Sun. Religion is only the illusory 
Sun which revolves around man as long as he does not revolve around himself.48 
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Since ideologies, as Marx describes them, are ‘theories’ with a basis in the real social 
world, the condition that gives rise to these ‘theories’ call for further materialist consider-
ation. This question produced the major argument of The German Ideology, which seeks 
to clarify the idea of inversion through an analysis of history as produced by human at-
tempts to respond to their material needs, with recourse to the natural world, which is 
transformed by human work. For Marx, it is important to unveil the character of labor, for 
it is in rediscovering the true nature of human work that humanity recognizes itself as the 
‘sun’ around which history revolves, and as such bears responsible for the pathological 
contradictions that manifest themselves in oppressive and exploitative ways in the on-go-
ing class struggle. As such, alienation and labor are at the forefront of Marx’s metaphori-
cal link between ideology and theology, in that the experience of alienation is caused by 
the very economic contradictions that ideology by definition attempts to conceal and ne-
gate, a matter of practical concern given Marx’s humanist account of labor and practice.  
 At the center of this humanist critique lies religion, which as ‘fantasy or consola-
tion’, has precluded humanity from freeing itself from the circumstantial determinations 
that once produced by reproductive practice of social actors, end up antagonizing and en-
slaving them. as the material practice that constitutes social economic orders, instead ac-
cepting their estranged state as the natural state of things that cannot be otherwise. The 
critique of religion is a humanist objection to how religion mystifies human social actors 
from the real, life power of their collective material strivings in and though nature and 
history, particularly in the form of labor, a thesis still important for Marx to reiterate in 
the first volume of Capital:    
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Labor is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate, 
and in which man of his own accord, regulates, and controls the material re-ac-
tions between himself and Nature. … By thus acting on the external world and 
changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature.49 
 
Combine this humanism with Marx’s basic premises of his materialist concept of history: 
“the real individuals, their activity, and the material conditions of their life … which can 
be verified in a purely empirical way”50, and you get the basic structural parameters for 
the link between alienation, theology, and ideology. For “all human history is, of course, 
the existence of living human individuals” who “distinguish themselves from animals as 
soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by 
their physical organization. By producing their means of subsistence, men are indirectly 
producing their material life.”51 In this way, “what they are," says Marx “therefore coin-
cides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. 
Hence, what individuals are depends on the material conditions of their production.”52  
The product of this human striving in history through nature is society itself. In-
deed, the labor process, otherwise known in Marxian vernacular as ‘material practice" is 
the basic activity proper to the creativity of the human being, and as such, is the site of 
where contradictions happens, the very ‘stuff’ from which ideologies both emerge and 
simultaneously conceal. A study of ideology then is the study of contradiction, and to 
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study religion as ideology is indeed to study the dialectical ways in which theology inter-
acts and responds to contradictions and the problems they produce for material existence, 
the most central of which, in Marx anyway, is alienation.  
Theology and its Social Impact 
 In “the Introduction”, Marx famously describes religion, in properly materialist 
form, as ideology in terms of its negative, social impact, particularly on human subjects. 
The textual context of the ‘Introduction’ proves helpful here. Marx wrote these remarks 
in an introduction to a planned work on Hegel’s political philosophy, and so the ‘Intro-
duction’ also includes extensive commentary on the current state of Germany’s political 
struggle, and what must now be done, given that the criticism of religion has been “essen-
tially completed” by the materialist concept of history, which shows to the human social 
actor ‘his true identity’, rather than “the reflection of himself in the fantastic reality of 
heaven where he sought a supernatural being.” Marx goes on to say that in light of these 
humanist gains,  
The struggle against religion is therefore indirectly the struggle against that world 
whose spiritual aroma is religion. Religious suffering is the expression of real suf-
fering and at the same time the protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh 
of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, as it is the spirit of spirit-
less conditions. It is the opium of the people.53 
 
Marx never wrote a full treatise on religion as did so many of its 19th century critics. Ra-
ther he approaches religion in a rather oblique and indirect manner, with a scattering of 
references, allusions, and metaphors, the most notable and infamous are present in the ci-
tation above: religion as the expression of, and protest against, suffering is the ‘sigh of 
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the oppressed creature’ and  the ‘opium of the people.’ It is not entirely clear how they 
are to be read, either separately as oppositional statements, or together as the dialectic at 
the core Marx’s take on religion and its social impact as ideology. Theological readers of 
Marx often rush to the these explicit statements about religion as an opening within 
Marx’s analysis for a more charitable take on the social value of religion as a prophetic 
witness to human misery, exploitation, and abuse at the hand of ruling and oppressive 
classes, while critics of religion will site the negative and critical aspects of opium as an 
expression of religion’s illusory and medicinal effects on humanity. Yet, the way that re-
ligion interacts with suffering is directly tied to its social impact as an ideology.  
The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for 
their real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condi-
tion is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The criticism 
of religion is, therefore, in embryo, the criticism of that vale of tears of which reli-
gion is the halo.54 
 
These metaphors help  us recognize the ambivalence and ambiguity at the heart of 
Marx’s understanding of religion, and helps set the stage for the way the critique of reli-
gion as ideology turns into a critique of fetishism as idolatry. To critique religion, then, is 
to critique that which religion sacralizes, or as Marx will tell us later, fetishizes; it is to 
critique religion as idolatry. For Marx, religion works in consort with “a vale of tears” by 
concealing or denying the oppressive economic conditions that give rise to suffering, 
thereby sanctifying these conditions of real suffering through its claims to afford human 
persons forms of illusory and/or ‘otherworldly’ happiness. In Marx’s hands, ideology cri-
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tique interprets religion as a response to appropriately identified antagonisms and contra-
dictions in social reality. It is however a ‘false’ reaction, not in it mistakes appearance for 
reality, but insofar as it prevents the emancipatory subjectivation that precedes the subject 
and so composes the revolutionary possibility of change.55 
In the ‘Introduction’ quote cited above, Marx calls religion the “opium of the peo-
ple”, but he also recognizes the polyvalence of religion by saying it is both the “expres-
sion of ”, and the “protest against” suffering, It attests to and arises from a complex set of 
material realities that conditions economic exchange that produces ‘real suffering’. Reli-
gion represents (‘as if’) the oppressed creature whose struggle against the spiritless condi-
tions of the heartless world attests to “that world whose spiritual aroma is religion.” 
These references suggest that Marx considers religion to be a testament to the human per-
son’s resilience in the face of miserable conditions and economic exploitation, the mate-
rial basis for all criticism, as a means of denunciation of that “condition that requires illu-
sions.” 
My point here is that Marx makes it clear that in his ideology critique, his struggle 
is not with religion per se, but with “that world” which not only gives rise to religion, but 
“that world” for which religion seems to be responding to, albeit with adverse social im-
pact. Emphasizing the social dimension within which religion is always producing and 
being produced, Marx interprets religion as the testimony of the proletariat’s experience 
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of economic oppression, the consequence of various contradictions at the core of the pro-
ductive forces and social relations, operative in the economic base of human experience.  
So since religion is both the ‘expression’ and ‘protest’ of a certain social situation, 
it attests to and arises from a complex set of material realities that condition the patterns 
of economic exchange that produce ‘real suffering,' but also exists in an ideological rela-
tion to these conditions, namely that it attempts to sublate and conceal their inherent con-
tradictions. When Marx critiques religion in order to explain the material conditions that 
give rise to the need for religion as well as its specific forms, he nevertheless recognizes 
that religion does in fact arise out of real, actual need. Even though religion is an illusion, 
it nevertheless does have a real social basis. As such, the critical question for Marx is 
why must people have illusions, and more specifically, why do people need religious illu-
sions? How do religious illusions operate in response to these needs, and how might a 
materialist critique of political economy better satisfy these needs, doing away with the 
need for religion altogether? 
The opiate analogy is the well-known attempt by Marx to answer this question. 
Interpreting Marx’s use of this analogy is complicated as this ambiguous and polyvalent 
opiate metaphor makes it difficult to argue, as it is customary, that religion is merely the 
medicinal remedy for those who are unable to handle the harsh realities of their material 
existence, or as a mechanism by the ruling classes to dull the senses of the working clas-
ses to avoid insurrectionary activity. For in Marx’s day, the use of opium was contermi-
nous with both the protest and suffering of the working class under capitalist conditions. 
Andrew McKinnon says it rather well,   
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In the nineteenth century, opium expressed the immiserization of the people. 
Opium use increased with declining conditions for the working class: more health 
problems, and the outbreaks of epidemics such as cholera. As Engels, for exam-
ple, pointed out in The Condition of the English Working Classes (1845), declin-
ing health was directly related to the ravages of capitalist relations. Opium thus 
‘expressed’ in an indirect way the ravages of capitalism on the health and well be-
ing of the population, but most particularly the workers.56 
 
Most will suggest that the opium analogy is Marx’s way of saying that while religion 
console and comfort those who suffer, it nevertheless is false and imaginary, and actually 
paralyzes human social actors from actively resisting those who exploit and oppress 
them. So, yes, while as an atheist Marx clearly considered religious belief to be false, it is 
nevertheless important to draw a distinction between Marx the atheist (who claims that 
religions are false) and Marx the materialist and the humanist (who claims that religions 
are ideologies), the latter of which makes the most theologically (and I will argue, politi-
cally) important point. Religion is the medium of social illusions, but the need for these 
illusions is real. Religion has a clear social basis in reality. The fact that ruling classes 
benefit from religion is not enough to explain its pervasiveness among the oppressed. The 
explanation must be rooted in an investigation of the needs of the oppressed themselves.  
Religion is constantly referring to the real world that arises out of it, even if that way is 
indeed still illusory.  
Religion is ideological because, while it expresses real human needs, it greatly 
misconstrues those needs, misrepresenting through its beliefs, the real basis from which it 
comes. Take, for example, its appeal to divine transcendence, understood in nineteenth 
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century metaphysical terms as being opposed to the immanent sphere of material con-
cern. The problem with this is not, as some suggest, that religion causes human persons to 
live in an alternative world that is purely imaginary, a false ‘fairy-tale’, but rather that the 
primary effect of religion that causes it to rightly be identified as ideological is that it 
causes human person to relate to the real world falsely, so much so that it leads human 
actors to relate to their needs in the real world through the prism of that misconstrual, 
which in turn, leads them away from the historical register of their material conditions as 
they seek solutions to their alienation and misery in an illusionary world beyond matter.  
Denys Turner calls this the ‘recursive nature’ of religion, namely that it feeds 
back to the selfsame social basis from which it arose, causing human actors to live their 
lives in the real world in distorted form.57 Religion does not promote a distorted world, 
but instead a distorted life in the real world. If religion as ideology is to be considered 
‘false’, it is due to the fact that it both conceals and reinscribes a series of contradictions 
between social-practical activity and the material conditions that serve as the context for 
that activity; instead of exposing the antagonisms in a critique of the contradictions in 
material conditions, it leaves these conditions unchanged. These conditions give rise to 
social and economic forces that aid and incite religion in its ideological efficacy.  
But why must religion always be ideological? Why is it proper to the structure and 
function of religion to be ideology? Religion is ideological because it alienates, and once 
it ceases to do so, it also ceases to be religion. Marx assumes that the most basic theologi-
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cal thesis necessarily places God in direct opposition to the human being. For all his criti-
cal talk about the danger of the dualities insisted on by the Idealists, Marx himself affirms 
a rather strong antimony between the human and divine, the materiality of this world and 
‘other-worldly’ transcendence, metaphysics and history. In Marx’s judgment, this divi-
sion, organized loosely as a dichotomy between sacred and secular, is essential to Chris-
tian theology and plays directly into its ideological character.58 The oppositional logic on 
display here fractures the individual human person and her interests from those of the col-
lective Subject, resulting in a politics of retreat and a blind economic endorsement of cap-
italist society.  
The incompatibility between revolutionary practice and religion in Marx’s view 
of critique is stark. Revolutionary practice seeks to disclosure and overthrow the very re-
alities that religion as ideology conceals, sutures, and ratifies. The theological essence of 
religion is such that it cannot be otherwise. But as I argued in section 1, Marx is not so 
quick as to rubber-stamp Feuerbach’s critique of religion as a kind of atheist theological 
reversal, as he thought it makes the same structurally ideological mistake as religion 
does: 
Since the real existence of man and nature – since man has become for man as the 
being of nature, and nature for man, the being of man has become practical, sen-
suous, perceptible – the question about an alien being, about a being above nature 
and man – has become impossible in practice. Atheism as the denial of this unre-
ality has no longer any meaning, for atheism is the negation of God and postulates 
the existence of man through this negation, but socialism as socialism no longer 
stands in any need of such a mediation. It proceeds from the practically and theo-
retically sensuous consciousness of man and of nature as the essence. Socialism is 
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man’s positive self-consciousness, no longer mediated through the annulment of 
religion.59   
 
The world as envisioned by socialist revolution is not one wherein human actors are com-
pelled to accept the antimonies of thought, which are essential to religion, and decide for 
one side of the duality or the other. In the distancing himself from Feuerbach, Marx 
wants to avoid thinking and acting in the world as mediated through the problematic of 
religion altogether. Theological ideas are ideological, not because of their religious con-
tent (e.g., theories about the divine, the sacred, the transcendent or other classically ‘reli-
gious’ ideas such the life after death, the existence of the soul), but because its content 
conceals within material practice the true reality of the human as the creative force.   
The argument I have been making up to now is that Marx critiques religion for 
being ideological, and at the same moment, leaves it behind, as if to say that Feuerbach’s 
critique has allowed us to see what religion does, and so we should forward to take up 
‘the secular basis’ on which religion stands, the capitalist social relations characterized by 
alienation, commodification, and fetishization. To critique religion, then, is to dismantle 
that which religion as ideology sacralizes, usually by exposing the banal materiality of its 
idols. Ultimately, Marx’s critique of ideology is a materialist critique of theology as fet-
ishism, which as I will argue, has strong ties both a biblical critique of idolatry, which 
Marx uses to critique commodity-fetishism as a theological practice of idolatry. What this 
apparent connection between ideology and idolatry in Marx means for interpreting what 
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difference the relation between ideology and theology makes for the task of political the-
ology today has yet to be seen.  
The Place of Theology in the Critique of Capitalist Ideologies  
I have been arguing that Marx’s critique of religion as ideology is paradigmatic for his 
critique of ideology in general. Marx makes analogical use of theology as he progres-
sively develops a more ‘scientific socialist’ analysis of capitalist economics and bour-
geois social relations. As such, we see substantial references to theology in several 
places: his critique of money, of law, of the modern state, of the alienation of labor, and 
finally, of the “fetishism of the commodity.” I hope to illustrate the centrality of theologi-
cal metaphors in Marx’s theory of ideology, not only as its paradigmatic example, but as 
a structural metaphor for how ideologies function politically.  
Alienation 
 We start first with Marx’s critique of theology as alienation, closely linked to his 
critique of theology as ideology. This concept runs throughout Marx’s political and eco-
nomic thought, and is central to his analysis of what economics does to social relations 
and productive forces in the context of human struggle, especially when practiced in capi-
talist conditions.60 In “Estranged Labor”, Marx’s analysis of the self-alienation of human 
social agents within and by the political economy points straight to the relation of labor 
and labor-product itself. The human laborer invests herself into her products only to have 
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those products turn against her, threatening the creative power of her life activity and 
confronting the human person as an alien and independent objective power that stands 
external to the human worker outside her creative and productive control. Marx says it 
this way: “the more the worker by his labor appropriates the external world, sensuous na-
ture, the more he deprives himself of means of life … the worker becomes a slave of his 
object.”61 This dichotomization of the human person whereby her consciousness is sepa-
rated and divided from its proper source, origin, and condition by the antagonistic mate-
rial conditions in which she works. Labor becomes individuated work rather than collec-
tive practice, turning the agent against her fellow worker in a relation of competition and 
self-preservation, and commodifying the products of their collective work through the 
fetishistic process of transferral. 
The existential trauma of alienation is highlighted all the more when one remem-
bers the basic materialist premise is that “what [humans] are therefore coincides with 
their production both what they produce and with how they produce.”62 In alienated pro-
duction then, something has gone terribly wrong with humanity itself. The human worker 
is not only herself, but is an-other altogether: 
The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labor becomes 
an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him, independently as 
something alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its own confronting him; 
it means that the life which he has conferred on the objects confronts him as hos-
tile and alien.63  
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Furthermore, not only does estranged labor turn the worker’s relation to the products of 
her labor (her very identity) against her, but also alienates her from her own productive 
activity, the very materialist practice that makes her life human. Production itself is alien-
ation whereby labor becomes external to the worker, acting ‘as if it belongs to another.’ 
Marx explains the ideology within this externalizing effect of labor-product with an ana-
logical use of theology so as to clarify the way that labor acts upon, rather than acts on 
behalf of, the worker:    
The external character of labor for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his 
own, but someone else’s, that it does not belong to him, that in it he belongs, not 
to himself, but to another. Just as in religion the spontaneous activity of the hu-
man imagination, of the human brain and the human heart, operates independently 
of the individual – that is, operates on him as an alien, divine or diabolical activity 
– in the same way the worker’s activity is not his spontaneous activity. It belongs 
to another; it is the loss of his self.64 
 
For Marx, the ‘commodity-fetish’, a direct labor-product of economic alienation, is the 
primary culprit of the social contradictions that religion as ideology is charged with try-
ing to conceal, negate, and abet. And so, alienation is the object-cause of the “inner strife 
and inner contradictoriness” of political systems that Marx says Feuerbach’s critique of 
religion left untouched.65 The economic base analysis of alienation reveals a “fundamen-
tal cleavage” perpetuated by the dualism apotheosized in religious claims (e.g., 
heaven/earth, law/grace, individual/society, god/human), a non-dialectic polarity that is 
same in structure and function as that instituted by capitalist economic forms between la-
bor and capital, mental and manual labor, creativity and production, even between human 
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actor and human actor, and especially between the human actor and the spontaneity and 
sensuousness of her creative and social nature. Alienation, while perpetuated by eco-
nomic forms of relations, and abetted by religious ideas about transcendence, is essen-
tially political. It can only be resolved by recapturing the integral character of the active 
subject, the condition of possibility for human emancipation itself.66  
 But how is all this relevant to properly locating the place of religion in Marx’s 
ideology critique? Alienation is the social impact of religion as ideology, a point which is 
clarified in the description of ‘estranged labor’, theology/religion is used as the paradig-
matic example of ideological impact on human labor. It stems from the ‘more/less’ for-
mula at the heart of both inversion and alienation, both of which Marx identified as the 
specific ideological effects of theology in relation to contradictions operating within so-
cial reality. He explains his dynamic through a host of metaphors and analogies, not only 
in order to explain the social impact of religion, but as using theology as a descriptor for 
economic procedures in capitalist society.  
 The theory of alienation is birthed from an analysis of what happens to labor, pro-
duction, and distribution of power under capitalist economic relations. Marx explores the 
anatomy of alienation by employing an analogy between human work and religion. He 
articulates the basis structure here, and when read in light of Feuerbach’s theory of reli-
gion, the resemblance is made clear:  
The worker becomes all the more poorer, the more wealth he produces, the more 
his production increases in power and range. The worker becomes an every 
cheaper commodity the more commodities he creates. With the increasing value 
of the world of things proceeds in direct proportion the devaluation of the world 
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of men…The product of labor is labor which has been congealed in an object, 
which has become material; it is an objectification of labor. Labor’s realization is 
in its objectification…So much does the appropriation of the object appear as es-
trangement that the more objects the worker produces the fewer can he possess 
and the more he falls under the dominion of his product, his capital.67  
 
Throughout Marx’s writing, it is expressed in a kind of ‘more/less’ formula, which ex-
presses the humanist core of Marx’s critique of alienation in religion, specifically as it re-
lates to ideology. As ideology, religion acts not only to conceal capitalist contradictions , 
but also directly alienates human social actors in much the same way as labor.  Marx de-
scribes this ‘more/less formula’ here again in the early “Manuscripts”:  
The laws of political economy express the estrangement of the worker in his ob-
ject thus: the more the worker produces, the less he has to consume; the more val-
ues he creates, the more valueless the more unworthy he becomes, the better 
formed his product, the more deformed becomes the worker, the more civilized 
his object, the more barbarous becomes the worker; the mightier labor becomes 
the more powerless becomes the worker, the more ingenious the labor becomes, 
the duller becomes the worker, and the more he becomes nature’s bondsman.68 
 
This ‘more/less’ account of alienation originates in Feuerbach’s theory of religion, which 
argues that religion alienates the human being from itself through its acts of psychologi-
cal projection. For Feuerbach, religion is a problem because it alienates deprives human 
actors of their true nature, and so precludes them from actualizing their fullest creative 
and productive potential. The object of Christian theological inquiry, the biblical God, is 
nothing but as an imaginative construal of human ideals and aspirations, projected out-
ward into a transcendent sphere. But how does this result in self-alienation of the human 
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person? The answer lies in the creation of a ‘Being above beings’ that is made in the im-
age of the ideal human perfections. This effect of this false ‘creation’ is that by investing 
‘god’ with human attribute, it inverts the human relation to nature and to itself, which im-
poverishes it, estranging it from what properly is its own powers, attributes, and possibili-
ties, and further diminishes itself by worshiping its own creation, to its detriment. This 
externalization and projection of the human into the divine (this is the theological act of 
religion tout court) fabricates what is properly human into an ‘objective power’ that lays 
outside of itself. Unlike Feuerbach, the alienation of religious projection lead Marx to ar-
gue that ‘religion’ has no content of its own, but is indeed only a social act, whereby hu-
man persons divest their species-being of those crucial elements and characteristics that 
most properly and constitutively human: love, goodness, wisdom, creativity, and power, 
and thus depriving it of the ability to actualize its ‘life-activity.’ Take, for example, how 
Marx compares the alienation of labor to the self-divestment accomplished by theology in 
religious projection: 
The worker is related to the product of his labor as to an alien object. From this 
premise it is clear that the more the worker spends himself, the more powerful the 
alien objective world become which he creates over-against himself, the poorer he 
himself — his inner world — becomes, the less belongs to him as his own. It is 
the same in religion. The more man puts into God, the less he retains in himself. 
The worker puts his life into the object; but now his life no longer belongs to him 
but to the object. Hence the greater this activity, the greater is the worker’s lack of 
objects. Whatever the product of his labor is, he is not. Therefore the greater this 
product, the less he is himself.69 
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This appears to be modeled precisely on Feuerbach’s structural account of the the-
ological essence of religion. Marx follows Feuerbach in arguing that theology, in an irra-
tional reversal, externally projects what is properly and immanently human and abstracts 
it into a transcendent sphere apart form the material reality of human life. Theology per-
forms this same operation: alienating human from its immanent properties by displaying 
them as belonging to transcendent being and named as the divine life. Marx uses this 
theo-logic to explain the capitalist process whereby the product of labor gets alienated 
from human workers, not only in the production, but also in the market forces of distribu-
tion and consumption. Like in religion, wages, rent, and capital alienate the human being 
from labor as her life-activity, instituting money and value as the ‘gods’ of the religion of 
everyday life. Marx’s critique of religion as ideology becomes a critique of capitalism as 
religion, rendering capitalism as a religion, structured as ideology. More specifically, the 
place of religion in the critique of ideology is as a critique of fetishism as idolatry, illus-
trating the quasi-religious structure of ideology in general. 
To claim, as Marx does, that religion is ideology is to say that religion acts, that it 
functions, in a certain way with a particular kind of social impact. More specifically, to 
critique religion for its effects, namely human self-alienation, is to name it as a symptom 
of the base problem of economic alienation, and these effects are ideological in the sense 
that they mistake the historical with the natural, the contingent with the primordial. 
Drawing a parallel between the political economists and the theologians, Marx insists: 
Do not let us go back to a fictitious primordial condition as the political economist 
does, when he tries to explain. Such a primordial condition explains nothing; it 
merely pushes the question away into a gray nebulous distance … theology in the 
same way explains the origin of evil by the fall of man, that it assumes as a fact, 
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in historical, what has to be explained. We proceed from an actual economic 
fact.70 
 
For Marx, religion, by projecting what is properly human outside of itself, dam-
ages human self-relation and self-knowledge, while also establishing conditions of privat-
ization and competition that set the interests of the individual over and against those of 
the concrete social whole. One can see why this has significant implications on the devel-
opment of a working class consciousness, or an emancipatory political subjectivity, spe-
cially in the mid 1840s at the rise of revolutionary organization and mass political move-
ments, most of which sought to topple monarchial governments (who had long used op-
pressive conditions of labor as instruments of oppression) for the sake of liberal and con-
stitutional democracies, or in the case of Marx/Engels, a communist society. Religion is 
ideology because of the way it conceals contradictory social relations by concealing and 
incubating patterns of alienation. It is symptomatic of what revolutionary practice must 
overcome in the course of proletarian struggle, but it is not a primary target.  
While Marx adopts loosely with Feuerbach’s “religion as human self-alienation” 
thesis, he disagrees that a critique that produces the abolition of religion will produce the 
(conditions for the) emancipatory subject. As Marx/Engels makes clear in The Com-
munist Manifesto, even as it seeks an end to “eternal truth, to abolish religion, and all mo-
rality, instead of constituting them on a new basis”, nothing can be accomplished without 
the “total disappearance of class antagonisms” where “the free development of each is the 
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condition for the free development of all.”71  For Feuerbach, the solution was a theologi-
cal liberation of humanity from religion whereas for Marx, the problem lie with how the 
political economy occludes the self-realization of the human as a collective social actor: 
Every emancipation is a restoration of the human world and of human relation-
ships to man himself…Human emancipation will only be complete when the real, 
individual man has absorbed into himself the abstract citizen; when as an individ-
ual man, in his everyday life, in his work, and in his relationships, has become a 
species-being; and when he has recognized and organized his own powers (forces 
propres) as social powers so that he no longer separates this social power from 
himself as political power.72 
 
Commodity-Fetishism 
 The concept of the fetish appears as a key element in Marx’s critique of the eco-
nomic structure of capitalism. Accounts of fetishism vary greatly, but in Marx, it is di-
rectly connected to the deleterious and oppressive effect that the capitalist economic sys-
tem has on the subject. Strictly speaking, fetishism is the procedure that attributes or 
transfers an improper or artificial value (often categorized as mythical or ‘religious’) to 
inanimate, manmade objects. It is a truly affective relationship to an object; that is, fetish-
ism is usually associated with extreme or excessive forms of value: obsession, mania, ob-
session, and irrational fixation are all common cognates. In Marx, fetishism refers to a 
particular ordering or structuring of desire that affords us insight and analysis of central 
economic processes, many of which he critiqued under the general rubric of ideology. 
Fetishism explains how it is that capitalism is able to evoke and sustain patterns of desire 
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and consumption so effectively. It produces a desire for an object that is based on an ex-
cessive or disproportionate attribution of value, the larger and more politically salient ef-
fect of which is synecdochic — the part is taken as the whole. Capitalist social processes 
— accumulation, privatization, rent, wealth disparity, the rise of wage labor, etc — are all 
contingent upon human workers being transposed into consumers whose excessive desire 
for objects turns them and their relations into commodities. Fetishism converts the artifi-
cial power of the commodity into the logic of exchange-value, which cyclically produces 
the surplus-enjoyment experienced by the consumer that gets invested back into the ob-
ject itself. 
 This is accomplished through a transferral process that Marx calls “fetishism," a 
term with a complex religious genealogy and political history. In his late analysis of capi-
talist ideologies, Marx turns to the value-form of commodity-fetishism and elaborates its 
theological structure. As described in that well-worn section in Capital, entitled “The fet-
ishism of the commodity”, the commodity-form is an inverse relation between human 
workers and the products of their labor, structurally analogous to that relation in religion 
between human beings and their self-alienation in the theology of God.73 As a theological 
product, fetishism alienates human persons through techniques of externalization and rei-
fication, taking what is properly their own (as the direct products of their labor) and then 
deploying them as ways so that they function as instruments of their domination and op-
pression. In the state of labor within capitalist social relations, human workers are alien-
ated from their products as they become ‘reified’ by economic processes that invests 
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these products with an enchanted and inverted value that makes them “appear as autono-
mous figures endowed with the life of their own.”74 Fetishization transforms both the 
products of labor and their constitutive social relations, both of which belong naturally to 
the human worker as part of their life-activity, into ‘things’ that are then exchanged and 
transacted in the market as commodities, “whose movements within society has for them 
the form of a movement made by things, and these things, far from being under their con-
trol, in fact control them.”75 
  Fetishization as the commodifying procedure is described by Marx as an eco-
nomic practice whereby the creative and productive powers of the human actor are trans-
ferred to an object, whose materiality and banality is overlooked and undermined, even 
while the human person is diminished and deprived, alienated from itself and others 
through this inverting transferal. In fetishization, human person’s social relationships, and 
the products created out of this life-activity, are objectified and reified as something vul-
garly transacted and mediated through money-relations. This conceals the fetishized 
product’s intrinsic use-value (e.g., that which meets human needs directly) and replaces it 
with an inflated exchange-value (e.g., what the commodity is worth in relation to other 
commodities). It takes away the sensuousness and the spontaneity essential to the creative 
productivity that is proper to human life and its material activity; this is its real transgres-
sion. 
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 In commodity-fetishism, products of human labor and human beings have in-
verted roles. It switches the qualities of human social relations with that of objects, con-
ferring upon them a transcendent, enchanted value, a mystification that finds its ultimate 
site in capital itself. Commodity-fetishes oppose and antagonize their producers ‘as if’ 
they stand external to them, beyond the control of their creative powers. It reverses the 
natural mode of production of objects, the positive relational connection the producer nat-
urally has with that which she creates for her own use, to meet her own needs. It does this 
by reifying the social relations of labor and transferring them to the products of labor ‘as 
if’ the relations exist between the products of labor, as commodities, and not between so-
cial agents, as is the case in nature: “the social character of men’s labor appears to them 
as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labor; because the relation of 
the producers to the sum total of their own labor is presented to them as a social relation, 
existing not between themselves but between the products of their labor.”76  
 Marx took up the concept of fetishism as a term replete with theological meaning, 
especially in the post Enlightenment studies of the history of religion and sociology of re-
ligion in the 18th and early 19th centuries, subjects that Marx studied thoroughly, but pub-
lished little on. Marx seems to have discovered this definition of fetishism during his re-
search on the history of religion and Christian art, wherein he came across the work of 
Charles de Brosses, one of many researchers in the late 18th century whose interest in the 
religion of colonialized peoples was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to understand 
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their resistance to early capitalist mercantilism.77 The ‘Fetish’ provided the colonialist 
with the conceptual vernacular to express that which the more classical term of idolatry 
could not, namely as Roland Boer describes it, “an account of the direct material effects 
of the fetish in terms of physical and psychological well-being. It also was seen to play a 
central role in social ordering.”78 The ‘Fetish’ described for the Portuguese colonialists 
the unique role that certain objects and practices around those objects played in the eco-
nomic and social life of indigenous people. Seen through this history of colonialism, the 
concept of fetishism takes on new political meaning. For many in Marx’s context, reli-
gion was analyzed within a historical scheme of progression where anthropological stud-
ies of ‘primitive cultures’ designate religion as an element of more savage, less developed 
human life. So fetishism as a descriptive category of indigenous communities, interpreted 
through a European colonialist perspective, expressed the ‘primitive’ and ‘savage’ char-
acter of the indigenous people in terms of their relationship to their material environment.  
Marx’s reception of this account is evident in his “Ethnological Notebooks” 
where he describes the various stages of religious development á la John Lubbock, who 
argues that rather than narrating history of religion as being progressively more atheist 
and less religion, the earliest human societies were atheists, namely because they were 
not yet mature enough to understand or develop religious ideas.79 The stage of idolatry is 
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an intermediate and more developed, yet still savage and primitive, stage of religious ex-
perience and expression. Marx seems to agree with Luddock’s conclusion, but interprets 
its critical significance differently: the onset of religion late in the process of human so-
cial development explained, not by the failure to understand religion, but by the presence 
of social and moral system of repression which developed the conditions upon which reli-
gion became a necessary result. While the modern European considers himself to more 
developed and mature than the primitive savage, it is indeed the savage who shows us 
how indeed primitive we are: how far we have regressed because of capitalist social rela-
tions. The indigenous societies, said Marx, are indeed better off, and so are more ‘mod-
ern.’ Indeed their atheism illustrates the lack of a need for religious consolation for and 
expression of suffering, and the presence of religion illustrates the endurance of such con-
ditions, pointing out the fact that what one would expect would have fallen off with the 
advance of history, the savage or primitive aspects of indigenous life, are indeed still 
alive and well us, despite our narrative of progress.  
For Marx, a fetish is a specific mode of commodity, “abounding in metaphysical 
subtleties and theological niceties”80 and as such, the (religious) problem with fetishiza-
tion is comparable to that the inverted structure inherent and operative in the alienation 
and reification of labor and capital. As such, fetishization is ideological in the same way 
as theology because it inverts the relation between the human laborer and the object of 
her labor, somehow making the object of labor more powerful and valuable than the hu-
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man laborer herself, and also conceals the more fundamental problem: the way that capi-
talist social relations enact this contradictory reversal in social reality for the benefit of 
ruling class power. Although it is described as an economic procedure, it has a deep theo-
logical structure, further illustrating the complex relation between theology and ideology, 
specifically in the context of capitalist ideology.  
Through the economic act of fetishization, where human attributes and social rela-
tions are externalized and reified to the products of human labor (which is itself an effect 
of capitalist ownership of the modes of production themselves, including religion), hu-
man social actors are left emaciated, powerless, and hallow. But for Marx, fetishization is 
also a theological practice, even when performed within the economic sphere; this sug-
gests a political link between economics and theology in Marx’s concept of ideology. For 
example, in “the Leading Article”, Marx remarks that “Fetishism is so far from raising 
man above his sensuous desires that, on the contrary, it is the ‘religion of sensuous de-
sire.’ The fantasy of the appetites tricks the fetish worshipper into believing that an ‘inan-
imate object’ will give up its natural character to gratify its desires.”81 Here he is suggest-
ing that the logic of ‘sacralization by inversion’ which lies at the theological core of reli-
gion is also inherent to the transferral act of fetishism. This ties fetishism most closely to 
the transferral definition of idolatry as the fantastical attribution of divine powers to an 
object, the transgression typically associated with the cultic practices that biblical critique 
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of idolatry singles out.82 This suggests a theological-political connection between idolatry 
and ideology that not often associated with Marx’s use of the concept of fetishism. 
What is interesting for me is the way that Marx’s sources incorporated this within 
a theological critique of idolatry as fetishism, complete with a host of biblical references 
and allusions that describe and illustrate examples of fetishes and fetishistic practice. 
Marx defined the concept of fetishism in much same way as de Brosses did (e.g., a sa-
cralizing process of inversion and whereby certain magical powers and enchanted attrib-
utes are transferred to objects with negative economic and social effects), as evinced in 
The Ethnological Notebooks whose references to fetishism tie it closely to religion 
through a host of biblical citations, even as he prepared to the concept for use in his polit-
ical and economic polemics on all forms of capital itself: modes of production, value-
product, the nature of money, machinery, and technology.83   
A number of recent studies have reminded us of the theological origins of Marx’s 
analysis of fetishism.84 For example, Roland Boer argues that the idea that Marx’s con-
cept of fetishism is theological (at least in history and structure) is supported by its fre-
quent mention in his unpublished notebooks and his study of world religions, replete with 
biblical quotations and theological allusions.85 The concept of fetishism comes to appear 
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in Marx after a long history, whereby the term was used to describe most primitive stage 
of religious belief and experience, most closely associated with colonialist assessments of 
religious life and experience of indigenous peoples. The primitive believers, due to their 
primitive beliefs about the magical, the mystical, and enchantment of natural objects, in-
vested transcendental meaning into banal objects that were fabricated, often by their own 
hands (Latin facticium, or facere, “made”), but gained power over their creators through 
the act of sacral worship. In this way, fetishism names that transferral process whereby 
human beings becomes unduly subordinated to objects of their own creation through the 
attribution of transcendent value or divine power. Fetishism is ideological because it fol-
lows the similar theological script. It functions within economic and political relations in 
similar ways to theology: concealing and suturing economic contradictions within capi-
talism through alienation and reification.  But Boer goes even further to suggest that 
Marx’s ideology critique of fetishism is derived from a biblical critique of idolatry. He 
qualifies this by saying that “the category of fetishism was initially developed over 
against the long theological elaboration of idolatry, which turned out to be ill-suited for 
dealing with the amulets and objects that Portuguese encountered in Africa. However, 
once the new category of the fetish had gained ground…it then subsumed idolatry within 
itself.”86 The critique of idolatry is sublated into the ideology critique of fetishism. Pre-
figuring my argument in chapter 4 on the relation between ideology and the biblical cri-
tique of idolatry, this way of relating the two critiques does not take the social origins of 
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biblical aniconism into account, misconstruing the similarities and presumed alliances be-
tween the critique of ideology and that of idolatry.  
In Marx, fetishism is not explained as idolatry; rather idolatry is seen as a specific 
form or example of fetishism. For example, in regards to another fascinating reference to 
the Ethnological Notebooks, Boer shows how Marx’s interchangeable use of the term fet-
ishism and idolatry illustrates their functional, if not analytical, equivalency: he refers 
specifically to biblical examples of idolatrous sacrifice and described them as instances of 
‘eating the fetish.’87 Perhaps Boer overstates the extent to which Marx takes up this rela-
tion in his own use of fetishism, but the point which is interesting and important for us, is 
that Marx seems to follow his sources  (i.e., de Brosses and Lubbock) in interpreting the 
concept of fetish as an economic category through the biblical theology of idolatry, which 
explains in part the consistent analogical references to religion and theology in and 
through his analysis of alienation, money, and capital. This modifies both fetishism and 
idolatry, moving the latter beyond the rather restrictive ‘religious’ meaning as the wor-
ship of gods in and through material objects, to include a more critical and negative anal-
ysis of how idolatry as fetishism both diminishes human beings and elevates everyday 
material objects, an inversion that directly effects social and economic orders. Perhaps 
this can be interpreted as a latent, albeit critical, theological materialism within Marx 
himself.  
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Nevertheless, the essential point here is that in truly materialist fashion, Marx’s 
analysis of fetishism as idolatry points out how basic, ordinary, and everyday the fet-
ishized idol is, regardless of whether or not it is natural or fabricated by human hands. 
But it is important to emphasize that Marx is not simply interested in debunking the idol-
atrous beliefs of fetishism as false, but instead seeks to disclose and explain its social im-
pact as it alienates and diminishes human beings, a political pattern quite familiar in his 
ideology critique of theology. In this way, Marx seems to use the theology of idolatry as a 
way into ideological critique of theology’s negative social impact. When it functions like 
a fetish, the idol is not innocuous and powerless, but indeed is profoundly destructive - 
not because it is false, but because of how it acts against the political subject and the con-
ditions of possibility for radical and collective proletarian politics.88  
Capitalist Economics and Theology  
 If Marx may be read as using fetishism to link ideology to idolatry, he also seems 
to link theology to economics through ideology critique. This illustrates the pattern of in-
version and transferral that is key to understanding the fetishism internal to theology that 
renders it ideological. This bears out upon close examination of Marx’s mature texts, es-
pecially in Capital, where his descriptions of capital, labor, money, and value are laden 
with references to theological and religious analogies. In light of what I have argued so 
far, while some might dismiss these mentions as merely ad hoc references, I find them es-
sential to understanding the relation of theology to ideology.  
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For example, in Capital Vol. 1, Marx explains the transferral characteristic of fet-
ishism operative in commodification that inverts the relation between the worker and the 
product and establishes a kenotic relation between them. To do so, Marx turns to a reli-
gious analogy to link the economic effects of commodity-form with its theological struc-
ture: 
As against this, the commodity-form, and the value-relation of the products of la-
bor within which it appears, have absolutely no connection with the physical na-
ture of the commodity and the material relations arising out of this. It is nothing 
but the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for 
them, the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to find 
an analogy we must take flight into the misty realm of religion. There the products 
of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their 
own, which enter into relations both with each other and with the human race. So 
it is in the world of commodities with the products of men's hands. I call this the 
fetishism, which attaches itself to the products of labor as soon as they are pro-
duced as commodities, and is therefore inseparable from the production of com-
modities.89 
 
Here, Marx shows us how theology often is performed as a fetishistic exercise. The rela-
tion that he draws here between ‘the misty realm of religion’ and ‘the world of commodi-
ties’ is sharpened by the direct analogy between capitalist political economists and theo-
logians: both attempt to explain the materiality of the social world with recourse to a sim-
ilar ideologic that happens to be theological. In another text, Marx plays on this analogi-
cal relation between theology and capitalist economics in order to expose its negative so-
cial impact and the various ideological strategies of capitalism, all of which share a com-
mon theological structure:   
Economists have a singular method of procedure. There are only two kinds of in-
stitutions for them, artificial and natural. … In this they resemble the theologians 
who likewise establish two kinds of religion. Every religion which is not theirs is 
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an invention of men, while their own is an emanation from God. When the econo-
mists say that present-day religions – the relations of bourgeois production – are 
natural, they imply that these are the relations in which wealth is created and 
productive forces developed in conformity with the laws of nature. These relations 
therefore are themselves natural laws independent of the influence of time. They 
are eternal laws which must always govern society. Thus there has been history, 
but there no longer any. There has been history, since there were the institutions 
of feudalism, and in these institutions of feudalism we find quite different rela-
tions of production from those of bourgeois society, which the economists try to 
pass off as natural, and as such, eternal.90  
 
From these texts, it is clear that Marx favors a strong analogy between capitalist econom-
ics and theology in that they both act as ideologies to naturalize, conceal, and de-historize 
social reality and economic processes. This clearly benefits the bourgeois political econo-
mists who have the upper hand in the labor process, and benefit from maintaining sys-
tematic dynamics that estrange the human worker from the productive process and the 
value of products. Theology is not only a phenomenal form of capitalist ideology, but 
also a social actor within it, fetishized by capitalism and deployed in favor of sustaining 
the very contradictions from which it comes, usually by emphasizing itself as central to 
the natural, universal, or self-evident social order.  We see this again in Capital, where 
Marx criticizes the reversal of labor and value relations, comparing it to the supersession-
ist theologies of Christianity: 
Political economy has indeed analyzed value and its magnitude, however incom-
pletely, and has uncovered the content concealed within these forms. But it has 
never once asked the question why this content has assumed that particular form, 
that is to say, why labor is expressed in value. And why the measurement of labor 
by its duration is expressed in the magnitude of the value of the product. These 
formulas, which bear the unmistakable stamp of belonging to a social formation 
in which the process of production has mastery over man, instead of the opposite, 
appear to the political economists’ bourgeois consciousness to be as much a self 
evident and nature-imposed necessity as productive labor itself. Hence the pre-
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bourgeois forms of the social organization of production are treated by political 
economy in much the same way as the Fathers of the Church treated pre-Christian 
religions.91 
 
One final theological example used by Marx to describe the religious structure of capital-
ist economic forms (identifying it therefore as ideological tout court) is the famous anal-
ogy between money and Christology.  Here we can see the theological structure of 
Marx’s theory of money. He models his critique of money on his critique of theology, 
both of which are animated by his materialist premise that money, like god, is a ‘social 
product’ of alienation and reification. Real human freedom depends on large scale, col-
lective emancipation from the logic of ‘abstract labor’ which is responsible for both ‘the 
division of labor’ and the ‘labor-product’. Marx continues to use theological analogies in 
his critique of James Mill, whereby he portrays money, like theology, as the representa-
tion or illustration of the domination of things over people.92 Money acts upon the politi-
cal subject, so as to alienate, in the act of labor, the worker from her product, effectively 
reducing social relations to property relations.  
 Marx describes money and the power of its social function (which is more im-
portant and interesting to Marx politically then its economic one) as a particular kind of 
mediating relation proper to theology. The more specific argument is that money func-
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tions in economics the way that Christ functions in theology: as a mediator that both al-
ienates and obscures what ought to be a direct and unmediated relation.93 Money, like re-
ligion, has no direct and immediate content of its own, but is constructed purely for the 
benefit of perpetuating capitalist relations, particularly through wages, capital, and la-
bor.94 Likewise, Christ, like money, alienates human persons from themselves through 
his mediating relation. For Marx, in theology, Christ ‘represents originally’, and thus is 
seen as the “ideal mediator.”95 The unique identity of Jesus Christ as “the divine and hu-
man natures united in one person” means that Christ represents human persons before 
God, represents God before human persons, but also, due to the Incarnation, also repre-
sents human persons to human persons.96 God only has value insofar as God is repre-
sented by and also itself represents Christ and the human person only has value to the ex-
tent that s/he represents Christ. 
 For Marx, money operates the same way. The very essence of money is its medi-
ating activity which self-alienates the human person, making her an Other to herself and 
making a god out of commodity.97 Money operates in capitalist society as a mediator of 
religious value. It is actively fetishized by its use in exchange relations, reifies social rela-
tions as a set of things moved about in transactions, and has turned productive forces into 
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rigid, given ‘things’ whose overly determined exchange-value, inflated and enchanted by 
its involvement in the ethereality of money, actively undermines the use value of prod-
ucts. This self-alienation actively dehumanizes the human person as a worker by exter-
nalizing that which is properly her own and setting it against her. Her own will, the prod-
uct of her labor, and those to whom she is constitutively related confront and threaten her 
in the mediating activity of the money-relation.  
This assemblage of examples instructs us that Marx is not simply referring to the-
ology as an example of ideology, but rather using theology as an operational metaphor 
that structures what Marx thinks ideology does and why it is politically problematic, 
namely that it obfuscates and precludes the emergence of the emancipated political sub-
ject. Ideology is not a marker of truth or falsehood, or appearance and reality, but rather it 
designates a particular function of an idea within material conditions of possibility for 
collective action. 
Conclusion 
 Myriad open questions await us here. Keeping the matter of ‘political theology’ in 
view, how ought theology respond to the Marxian critique of ideology? Beyond the accu-
sation of religion as ideology, what are the consequences of this Marxian critique of ide-
ology for theology? Certainly, theology can and should object to how Marx depicts and 
portrays theology, for it is widely acknowledged that Marx knew little about theological 
particulars and so often caricatures religion for the sake of his critical position. But the 
self-defense of theology against Marx’s portrayal of it misses the more crucial point that I 
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think remains, even if Christian theology was able to convincingly dispute the validity of 
Marx’s depiction of religion.  
 The Marxist critique of religion is broadly interpreted as calling for ‘the end of 
theology’, a consequence of overdetermining the epistemological aspects of ideology cri-
tique. This merging of Marxian critique of ideology with broader secularizing and atheis-
tic critiques of religion does a significant disservice, not only to theology, but also to sec-
ularization and atheism. On the other hand, if theology seeks to take the Marxian critique 
of ideology seriously, there are no want of options for how best to do so.98 Over the last 
thirty years, the “Marxism” question has repeated itself within theology with dubious ef-
fect. Prompted in large part by the onset of liberation theology, much of which was at 
least broadly informed by Marxian social analysis, even if that relation is wreaked with 
complexity99, the theological debate between theology and Marxism produced a series of 
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99 Michael Löwy gives the status of the question in reference to the Marxism of Liberation theology in 
Latin America, characterizes the type of usage as  “‘neo-Marxists’ — that is to say, as innovators who offer 
Marxism a new inflection or novel perspective, or make original contributions to it.” Examples include the 
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fetishism. Unsurprisingly, absent here is the concept of ideology. Michael Löwy, “Liberation-Theology 
Marxism” in Critical Companion to Contemporary Marxism, ed. Jacquet Bidet and Stathis Kouvelakis 
(Leiden: Brill, 2008), 225, 228.  
Yet, the relation of Liberation theology to Marxism has been characterized in various ways: con-
ceptual borrowing (which may or may not include political alliance), appropriation, and strategic common 
ground (i.e., critique of international economic development as the cause of exploitation and alienation). 
What is clear is that while there is not a strict adherence to Marxist categories, liberation theologians ap-
plied principles with a loose, almost ad hoc, flexibility. For some Vatican theologians, (such as the then 
Cardinal Ratzinger), even this goes too far, while for others, it is far from adequate. For Kee, liberation the-
ology is not Marxist enough. It must incorporate Marxism in radically self-reflexive way, rather than 
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responses to Marx’s critique of religion that attempt to align theological studies with its 
materialist and humanist proposals.100 How might theology meet these Marxist demands?   
Liberation theology, especially the Latin American variant, presents itself as an 
attempt, in turning to Marx’s critique of capitalism, to develop a critical distance between 
theology’s liberative roots in its biblical faith and its complicity with oppressive and ex-
ploitative economic and political systems. Liberation theology attempts rethink theology 
so as to produce or generate theological ideas that are considered revolutionary and liber-
ative, ridding theology of its ideological and oppressive aspects. In so doing, it positions 
Christianity in a critical relation to material conditions, governed by liberating praxis. 
The impetus for this is decisively Marxist in that it follows his critique of capitalism 
based on theories of class struggle and surplus value respectively, but not the critique of 
ideology as applied to religion.101  
                                                
simply “baptizing” its theory so as to fit its peculiar theological concerns and political aims. See Joseph 
Cardinal Ratzinger, Instruction on Certain Aspects of Liberation Theology (Vatican City: Vatican Press, 
1984), and Alister Kee, Marx and the Failure of Liberation Theology (Philadelphia: Trinity Press Interna-
tional, 1990). 
Defending liberation theology from the Vatican critique that it was too aligned with Marxism, the 
Boff brothers argue that Marxism is only helpful for liberation theology when “submitted to the judgment 
of the poor and their cause.” Its relationship is one of a “decidedly critical stance.” Since Marx can be a 
“companion, but not a guide”, it is treated as an ‘instrument’ and so liberation theologians “feel no obliga-
tion to social sciences for any use it may make, correct or otherwise, of Marxist terminology and ideas.” 
liberation theology “freely borrows from Marxism certain ‘methodological pointers’, one of which is “the 
mystifying power of ideologies, including religious ones.” Leonardo Boff and Clodovis Boff, Introducing 
Liberation Theology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1987), 28.  
100 David McLellan, Marxism and Religion: A Description and Assessment of the Marxist Critique of 
Christianity (New York: Harper & Row, 1987); Denis Janz, World Christianity and Marxism (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998). 
101 This has mostly taken up by Liberation theology. McLellan notes that Liberation theology, broadly 
speaking, interprets Marx’s critique of religion suggests that Christianity will eventually wither away since 
the relation of Christianity to capitalism is radically symbiotic, and that this argument amounts to a Marx-
ian a priori rejection of religion tout court. The idea that an a priori rejection of religion should be associ-
ated with and interpreted as properly Marxist is soundly rejected by Turner, 166-168 and more recently 
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 The responses to this challenge are often broad-based attempts to reform and rein-
terpret theology according to broadly Marxian standards, whether it meant critiquing 
Christianity’s alignment with capitalism, acknowledging the centrality of class struggle, 
or implementing various versions of materialism (most of which rarely were truly Marx-
ist forms).102 It was acknowledged that if theology were to respond to Marx’s critique of 
ideology, it would have to do so by securing its “oppositional status” in relation to its de-
termining pressures and material locations, rather than mooring itself as a “countering” 
discourse that seeks to intervene into social reality as a ready alternative.103  
 And yet, let us remind ourselves of the ideological function and role that religion 
and theology plays in frustrating and obstructing the formation of the emancipatory polit-
ical subject. The critique of ideology is not about the epistemological status of specific 
theological claims, but rather affords us an appropriate method for the political assess-
ment of religion and theology’s effects on social reality. The critique of religion as ideol-
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ogy is not a resource that frees theology to realize itself socially, politically, and other-
wise (now liberated from ideology), but rather is the immanent stricture to which political 
theology must be respond, should it hope to be more a false response to the antagonism 
and contradiction at the core of social reality. This turns the attention away from the ‘end 
of religion’ interpretation of ideology critique. Ideology critique of religion is not, as 
Marx will say, about investigating religion to see if it is possible to detect its internal fis-
sures or contradictions. This misses the critical point, which is to identify the particular 
types of economics and social relations upheld and supported by religion and theology, 
and to chart out alternative materialist possibilities, not only theological, but also political 
and economic. The ideologico-critical analysis of religion begins with material life and so 
rather than offer theological responses to the critique of religion, so as to secure the non-
ideological status of theology, the critique of ideology must direct and complete the criti-
cal, theological approaches to political life. What is required is not a direct theological re-
sponse to Marx’s critique of religion, but rather a critical-theoretical approach to political 
theology to be sketched out in proceeding chapters. 
 This 'critical theology’, developed in response to Marx’s critique of ideology, 
takes up political theology as its object in order to modify the immanent relation of the-
ory and praxis that prescribes actions and values, whether on the basis of specific theo-
logical commitments or political convictions, even so-called emancipatory ones. Marx’s 
critique of ideology shapes the relation of theory and praxis in political theology, leading 
to  a critical theology which chastens and subdues the way that Christianity uses the ma-
jor themes of justice, freedom, liberation, solidarity as the basis for political theology.  
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 Constructively speaking, one must start with the recognition that active political 
interests that are always already present and invested in theology and its use in various 
publics. The slogan “all theology is political” may be as cliche as it is nebulous, but so 
much theology remains seemingly absent of any self-conscious, critical perspective on 
the politics embedded within itself as a discursive practice. But how exactly does theol-
ogy come to this awareness? Undoubtedly, it becomes important to rethink theology 
against the critique of ideology that understands itself to be a certain kind of critical po-
litical project, not an epistemological one. 
 I do believe that the identity and relevance of political theology is at stake in the 
Marxian critique of ideology. I am with Peter Scott when he says that “the Christian 
claim to speak of a God of freedom is systematically undermined if the claim is produc-
tive, not of the knowledge of social structures and relations, but rather ideological strate-
gies whose effect is precisely to obscure such structures and relations.”104 And so, is 
Christian theology ideological, and if so, how might it become non-ideological? What are 
the criteria we use to assure ourselves that Christianity is not ideological - that is, that 
ideology critique immanent to theology has worked? Disagreements and confusion about 
what constitutes “political theology” notwithstanding, the legitimacy of political theology 
depends on recognizing its ideological elements and eliminating them. I do not wish the 
weight of my argument here to fall on the construction of a non-ideological theology; I 
have no intention of trying to develop such a project. But if the argument of the disserta-
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tion is that a sustained engagement with the critique of ideology is needed in order to se-
cure the identity and relevance of political theology as a critical theory, how ought theol-
ogy proceed with such an endeavor? In what way can political theology be thought as a 
Marxist theology? What might political theology mean, if interpreted as a Marxist prac-
tice? As Leonardo Boff reminds us, “it is absolutely insufficient to claim not to be ideo-
logical, or to wish not to be, in order actually not to be.”105  
 Marx’s critique of religion as ideology expresses a concern that is still relevant for 
much of western Christianity and its theologies as they are expressed and treated as a 
commodity-fetish in our contemporary culture. Theology and its ‘priestly’ practitioners 
economically benefit from the transferral procedure whereby religion is enchanted with a 
sort of transcendent and abstracted magic that increases its own marketability and its via-
bility as a commodity. Its exchange-value in relations of commodity-exchange, or as we 
would say today, its brand is constructed as an ideology.106 Fetishization is that exact 
transferal procedure whereby theology is transformed into ideology, and in this way, he-
ology is problematized as an economic product of the capitalist political economy. The-
odor Adorno describes the problem this way: “Religion is on sale as it were. It is cheaply 
marketed in order to provide one more so-called irrational stimulus among many others 
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106 To prefigure an argument from Theodor Adorno and the Frankfurt School, part of the economic problem 
with religion is that, as a brand, it is now the commodity-product of the Culture Industry, and as such, is 
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by which the members of a calculating society are calculatingly made to forget the calcu-
lation under which they suffer.”107 
 When theology gives attention to Marx’s critique of ideology, it raises the ques-
tion of whether theology can be de-fetishized as a question of immanent critique; this is 
often expressed by theology in the biblical and prophetic critique of idolatry, discussed at 
length in chapter four. The idol reoccurs as the ideological form that theology represents 
to itself, making the Marxian analysis of the fetish all the more politically and theoreti-
cally relevant. How might it avoid inadvertently colluding with the forces of domination, 
exploitation, and oppression by becoming truly critical, or what Geuss describes as, “a re-
flective theory which gives agents a kind of knowledge inherently productive of enlight-
enment and emancipation”?108 How does theology avoid ideology? Is it through idolatry 
critique? 
 This constructive perspective notes the interesting resonances between the rup-
tural and inaugural mode of the Marxian critique and that the immanent critique by bibli-
cal prophets like Amos, Hosea, and Isaiah, whose condemnation and indictment of Is-
rael’s unfaithfulness challenges its complicity, hypocrisy, and reticence in regard to the 
concrete realities of social and political conditions in the processes of ‘real, active life.’ 
My point is that Marx is not as interested in abolishing religion per se (because of theolo-
gical aspects he finds objectionable tout court) as he is in exposing and critiquing its ma-
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terialist base, surpassing the abstractions of theological Idealism, and refocusing the at-
tention of true criticism on the oppressive and dominating dynamics of social world. By 
advocating that religion interrogate its materialist base, Marx joins his voice with this He-
brew prophetic tradition, a link not made explicitly by Marx himself, but one that can be 
helpful in providing a theological reading of Marx’s ideology critique that make sense of 
his critique of religion without glossing over its ambiguity and ambivalence.  
 To do this, political theology must attain and secure its identity and relevance 
through a self-reflexive critique that affirms the material nature of theology itself and in-
troduces a critical posture that resists the immediacy of practical activities in the name of 
the liberating praxis of heteronomous acts, the conditions of which cannot be thought or 
known in advance; this is a politics ex nihilio which emerges from the contingent gaps in 
which the subject discovers the wounded core of her political subjectivity.109 Further dis-
cussion of this awaits us in future chapters, but we leave this chapter on Marx with a 
clearer sense of the effect that ideology critique has on theology: the recognition of the 
raw political interests always already invested in the theological, making the need to in-
terpret these interests critically all the more the urgent and pressing, even if, at this junc-
ture, what function critique may have in political theology is uncertain.  
 In this chapter, I have tried to suggest that the Marxian critique of religion had 
less to do with its substantive or material theological claims, and more to do with its dele-
terious function and impact on social and political life, specifically its fetishistic, alienat-
ing, and capitalist modes. “False consciousness” is inadequate for describing what Marx 
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finds objectionable about theology. To accuse theology of ideology is not the same as ac-
cusing it of being false. What is important to note is that while Marx defined religion 
through a critique of ideology, he is most interested in developing a materialist parallel-
ism that takes on the state and society that produces the conditions of and for religion it-
self as a site where social contradictions emerge and take root. While I am not suggesting 
that Marx is a sort of crypto-theologian, or that there is a religious remainder in Marxism 
itself, I do think it is important to state the extent to which the admittedly complex rela-
tion between theology and ideology is complicated by the fact that ideology is not an 
epistemological category in Marx, but a social-scientific concept. Sure, Marx’s critique of 
religion is an ideology-critique, but that is not the entire story of their relation, or even the 
most important part of it.  
 If much of modern philosophy after Marx has proceeded to cast aspersions on the-
ology in light of Marxist critique that it is ideological, that it contributes to ‘false con-
sciousness’ of human beings and so occludes their potential formation as emancipatory 
political subjects liberated into forms of life and ways of being commensurate with their 
flourishing and well-being, then it is truly surprising that the turn to theology and religion 
in philosophy has been motivated by an eagerness to use theology to think and act to-
wards the ethical and political imperatives of our day. The so-called “new visibility” of 
religion, then, has to do with the immanent relation of praxis to theory in political theol-
ogy; that is, it comes as a result of philosophy’s immanent critique which recommends 
religion and theology as an agent of ideology critique, rather than its object. This has as 
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much to do with concrete changes in the composition and arrangement of our social 
world as it does with challenges within philosophy and theology.  
 As such, it is less surprising than one might expect that political philosophers, in-
deed even Marxist ones, find themselves turning to theology as ideology critique and are 
doing so for mainly political reasons. Two prominent examples, British literary critic 
Terry Eagleton and Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek, both turn to theology at pre-
cisely that moment in their respective projects where one might expect them to eschew it: 
the intersectional nexus of theory, ideology critique, and politics. This leaves open the 
possibility of interpreting and deploying theology in non-ideological or anti-ideological 
ways, all within a Marxist conception of the idea. What is gained by theology in this sur-
prising turn to Christianity by ideology critique? It presents an opportunity for theology 
itself to return to the question of whether a non-ideological theology is possible. Such a 
version would afford political theology with the critique necessary to regulate its imma-
nent relation of theory to praxis, resisting the temptation of complicity while also direct-
ing how best to relate its theological commitments to material political realities. This pos-
sibility surfaces in political philosophy on the contemporary left in a variation of the “the 
return to religion” within contemporary theory. The following two chapters of the disser-
tation look at two differing contemporary treatments of theology as ideology critique, 
both of which do so in critical appreciation of the Marxist rubric.
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
TERRY EAGLETON 
 
Introduction 
 
 This chapter interprets Terry Eagleton’s theory of ideology’s critique in relation 
to his critically appreciative turn to theology. It situates Eagleton within two predominant 
trends: the theological or religious turn in political philosophy and critical theory, and the 
political turn in theology and critical research on religion. It is within this crucible that 
political theology is best interpreted, and so is the best conceptual space in which ideol-
ogy critique is understood and practiced. Insofar as the overall purpose of the dissertation 
is to inquire about the relation between ideology critique and theology, it is also im-
portant to take up the surprising reemergence of the use of theology in contemporary 
Marxist political philosophy. When speaking a broad-based ‘theological 
turn’ in general1, it is imperative to clarify both the nature of and the reasons for this 
‘turn’ in Marxist politics, represented by Terry Eagleton and - in the proceeding chapter - 
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by Slavoj Žižek. What kinds of theology are being taken up here and for what reasons? 
What difference does their respective use of theology make for their employment of ide-
ology critique and its political role in social and political change? Put differently, how 
might we characterize their use of theology as ideology critique? In an attempt to answer 
these questions, the present chapter examines how the Marxist literary critic Terry Eagle-
ton uses theology as ideology critique for the sake of radical politics. We find that the 
consistent appeal to theology immanent to their Marxist politics has to do with the cri-
tique of ideology, for theology is seen as the decisive catalyst for achieving human eman-
cipation, and so is called upon to inform, animate, and direct ideology critique itself. If 
the primary question that guides this research is “in the case of Eagleton, why is theology 
important for Marxist philosophy – especially given the Marxist legacy of religion as ide-
ology?”2 The chapter argues that Eagleton discerns within theology a particularly radical 
element that promises to challenge prevalent trends in contemporary political theory. The 
surprising answer is that the operative feature of this element is ideology critique. Eagle-
ton, I argue, uses theology as ideology critique, an intriguing development within Marxist 
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political philosophy given the aforementioned critique of religion as ideology in Marx 
presented in chapter 1.  
 Perhaps Eagleton furthers Marx’s point by affording us an alternative way of 
looking at the relation between ideology and theology. This helps us imagine a different 
kind of procedure, not in order to save theology or religion from the critique of ideology, 
but for the sake of a critical theological procedure that is better prepared to take on the 
negative dialectics of critical theory more thoroughly than it has up to this point. More 
explanation of that last point is required, but at this juncture, I am only interested in what 
Eagleton says about the role of critique in theology (and the form that theology must take 
as a result) and what he says about the role of theology in critique. Put simply, I aim to 
identify the critical form of political theology as it exists in Eagleton’s use of theology as 
and for ideology critique. While this appears to be a reversal of Marx’s critique, Eagleton 
shows it to be endemic to the Marxist position itself, bringing Marx (and us) into the con-
temporary debate itself.  
 Eagleton indicates a theologico-political way of relating ideology and theology 
that differs significantly from more standard views on ideology critique which do not in-
clude theology. He does so by critiquing postmodernism, secularity, and cultural studies - 
the approaches most commonly used to help rethink the relation of ethics, religion, and 
political practices in light of the contemporary critique of the secular.3 But what does Ea-
gleton mean by “radical politics”? The term “radical” has undergone considerable usage 
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by those eager to differentiate their perspective from other exiting alternatives, whether it 
be the post-Marxist agonist politics of ‘radical democracy’4 or readings of Continental 
philosophy of religion as ‘radical political theology.’5 By ‘radical’ politics, Eagleton 
means something else. Eagleton considers ‘radical’ politics to offer an ‘third way’, an al-
ternative to both ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ types of political thinking. The ‘radical’ has 
something to do with the formalistic constraints of the nature of the critical itself, bearing 
important resemblances to the Frankfurt School, especially Theodor Adorno. Eagleton 
describes it this way: “a radical politics can describe what must be done in order for this 
to occur, but it cannot prescribe the content of what must then be lived, for the content, as 
Marx says, goes beyond the phrase. All radical politics are thus in a profound sense for-
malistic.”6 For Eagleton, radical political thought is less about a social movement or a 
(set of) position(s) (e.g., Marxism, anti-colonialism, feminism, etc) but rather a critical 
sensibility that seeks to break with the established order in pursuit of the altogether new. 
It matters little then, for radical theory, to make determinate political prescriptions, and 
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instead, it seeks to demonstrate the contingency of the actual - that the world can and 
must be thought otherwise. The aim of radical theory is not to provide alternatives to so-
cial reality, but to rigorously establish the possibility that things can be different: it is to 
imagine the world otherwise. Radical politics is always essentially critical. It identifies 
and combats oppressive structures, but falls short of any prescriptive work. This is im-
portant because it is due to its radical character that Eagleton discovers something politi-
cally powerful about theology which contributes directly to the project of ideology cri-
tique in contemporary thought. Put differently, he considers theology to be radical only 
insofar as it is practiced critically. Whether the theology he offers is up to the task re-
mains to be seen. 
 It is notable at the outset that Eagleton opposes that idea that ideology critique 
somehow assumes or promotes a secular critique of religion, as if the materialist thesis of 
ideology critique (its affirmation of worldly immanence) is restricted or limited to an op-
position to religion tout court. This is problematic for a number of reasons, the strongest 
of which is the developing thesis that the secular is indeed a religious invention and does 
not fully escape the ambit of theology. The idea of the secular itself remains tethered to 
and mediated through the idea of religion as the foil against which Christianity and the 
category of religion both establishes itself.7 To appropriately understand the challenges 
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facing the secular today, we must not think it as detached or emancipated from religion or 
theology. I will return to the ongoing debate on the relation of religion to the secular, in-
cluding a due consideration of the so-called ‘postsecular condition’ in later sections of 
this chapter. First, however, it is important to make a case for how Eagleton takes up a 
Marxist style of ideology critique but interprets it theologically, while also insisting that 
this is not a departure from materialist or socialist commitments. This amounts to a “criti-
cal political theology” for the sake of radical politics, a characterization that situates criti-
cal questions about the secular/postsecular in a particular way. 
Eagleton and the Political Use of Theology 
 The idea behind moving so quickly from the nineteenth century Marx to the 
twenty-first century Eagleton (and Slavoj Žižek, in the next chapter) is not to avoid the 
unenviable task of making sense of the complex reception history of Marx’s thought in 
the twentieth century, especially as it relates to the meaning of theology as ideology. Ra-
ther, I am interested in a new assessment of the relation between theology and politics 
within ideology critique. The question of religion and theology was not abandoned by 
Marxist thought after Marx. Later Marxists like Gramsci, Lukacs, even Lenin, grappled 
with the challenge that religion (when interpreted as an ideology) posed for revolutionary 
politics and the development of the working class consciousness. It was clear to many 
                                                
34-59, respectively. Both Taylor and Habermas recognize the descriptive reality that religion has shifted in 
relation to the secular and this forces us to rethink of their relation, both historically and as a matter of prac-
tical reasoning.  Although they have meaningful differences about what this means for religion (and poli-
tics), it is important to note how they are both no longer interested in reading religion off of a secular back-
drop, but take it up as a sui generis matter.  
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twienth century post-war Western Marxists (or, arguably, post-Marxists) like Theodor 
Adorno, Ernst Bloch, Jacques Ellul, and Erich Fromm that religion was not going away, 
at least not at the accelerated rate that early modern critics once expected. Theology in all 
its messy conceptual and political particulars needed to be included within their social 
theory. Genuine critical social theory, they said, needs to explain theology, not just ex-
plain it away. As I have already discussed, this idea is central to the ideology critique of 
religion in Marx himself. Theology, Marx insisted, was a result, not a cause, of alienated 
social life that had a negative material impact as a fetishized and fetishizing ideology. 
Ideology was a detrimental obstacle to revolutionary practice because it got in the way of 
a working class consciousness, only benefiting those whose economic and political inter-
ests are the commodification of work, accumulation of capital, and controlling modes of 
production. 
 Eagleton follows Marx this far. His early theoretical work on literary criticism 
displays its Marxist inflection insofar as it is centered on working from the concept of 
ideology. His early bibliography lists titles such as Marxism and Literary Criticism, Criti-
cism and Ideology, and Ideology: An Introduction, as well as a pair of books on Marx.8 
When paired with more recent texts such as On Evil, Holy Terror, Reason, Faith, and 
Revolution, and Trouble With Strangers, it is clear that both Eagleton’s early theology 
                                                
8 Terry Eagleton, Criticism and Ideology: A Study in Marxist Literary Theory (London: Verso, 2006); Terry 
Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London: Verso, 1991); Terry Eagleton, Marxism and Literary Criti-
cism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976); and Terry Eagleton, Why Marx Was Right (New Ha-
ven: Yale University Press, 2011); Terry Eagleton, Marx (New York: Routledge, 1999). 
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and his latest ‘full circle’9 are motivated by broadly Marxist political concerns, as is his 
adaption of ideology critique for the sake of a political literary criticism.10 Likewise, Ea-
gleton’s critique of ideology is decisively Marxist in both its political and materialist ele-
ments, but he drops the ‘false consciousness’ label from ideology critique. He links ideol-
ogy critique thoroughly to the discursive practice of criticism, a unifying theme in his dis-
parate oeuvre.11 He firmly believes that what we need most today is a recovery of work-
ing-class resistance against identitarian nationalism, finance capitalism, and exploitative 
                                                
9 Terry Eagleton, Reason, Faith, and Revolution: Reflections on the God Debate (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2009); Terry Eagleton, On Evil (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010); Terry Eagle-
ton, Holy Terror (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Terry Eagleton, The Gatekeeper: A Memoir 
(London: Penguin, 2001);; Terry Eagleton, Sweet Violence: The Idea of the Tragic (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2003); Terry Eagleton, "Lunging, Flailing, Mispunching," London Review of Books (2006); Terry Eagleton. 
Jesus Christ: The Gospels (London: Verso, 2007); Terry Eagleton, Trouble with Strangers: A Study of Eth-
ics (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009); Terry Eagleton, "Religion for Radicals: An Interview with Terry Ea-
gleton," MRZine 61, no. 4 (2009); Terry Eagleton, “Monotheism and Violence,” in The New Visibility of 
Religion Studies in Religion and Cultural Hermeneutics, ed. Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward (London: 
Continuum, 2008), 88-98; Eagleton, “Tragedy and Revolution,” in Theology and the Political: The New 
Debate, eds. Davis, Creston, John Milbank, and Slavoj Žižek (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 8-
15. For a detailed review of this “turn” in Eagleton, see Roland Boer, Criticism of Heaven: On Marxism 
and Theology (Leiden: Brill, 2007) 275-333. 
10 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983); 
Terry Eagleton, After Theory (New York: Basic Books, 2003); Terry Eagleton, Figures of Dissent: Critical 
Essays on Fish, Spivak, Žižek and Others (London: Verso, 2003).  
11 Eagleton, Ideology, xxiii: “‘Critique’ is that form of discourse which seeks to inhabit the experience of 
the subject from inside, in order to elicit those ‘valid’ features of that experience which point beyond the 
subject’s present condition.” I agree with Eagleton that revitalizing critique is essential to the vibrancy and 
persistence of radical politics, which lost ground to a postmodern skepticism that is more interested in iden-
tity and culture than in materialism or class struggle. As goes critique, so goes theory. Eagleton follows the 
Kantian tradition of “critique” that affords “a standard by which knowledge can with certainty be distin-
guished from pseudo-knowledge”; this task requires both a negative moment and a positive criterion upon 
which to base the former adjudication - even if said ideal is both constructed, provisional, and thin. I. Kant, 
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. G. Hatfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 133–134. Eagleton develops this concept in his early work, starting with Marxism and Literary Crit-
icism, Criticism and Ideology, Walter Benjamin, or Towards a Revolutionary Criticism, and The Function 
of Criticism. The latter work advances an argument that locates the contemporary critic in a traditional role: 
“reconnecting the symbolic to the political, engaging through both discourse and practice with the process 
by which repressed needs, interests, and desires, may assume the cultural forms which could weld them 
into a collective political force.” (Eagleton, Function of Criticism, 123) Eagleton insists on a ‘revolutionary 
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labor practices. Eagleton is actively engaged in an intellectual effort to highlight the en-
during significance of Marx himself for contemporary political action and debate, over 
against the reception history of Marx in the tradition of Marxism.12 His consistent reha-
bilitation of Marx goes hand in hand with his reproach of Western liberal politics, whose 
bourgeois multiculturalism and beguiled postmodernism, he claims, lifts up a virtueless 
and vacuous world.13 Eagleton laments the state of critical theory today: it has failed to 
foster social emancipation and the intellectual and theoretical practices that should be 
counted on to help generate this are distracted by, complicit in, and otherwise rendered 
                                                
literary criticism’  (Eagleton, Walter Benjamin, 98) that is materialist in content, negative in form, but 
rooted in its ‘substantial social function’ as an immanent investigation of theory as it presents itself within 
“the symbolic process of social life.” (Eagleton, Function of Criticism, 124) 
12 Terry Eagleton, “Marxism without Marxism,” in Ghostly Demarcations: A Symposium on Jacques Derri-
da's Spectres of Marx, ed Michael Sprinker (London: Verso, 1999), 83-87; Terry Eagleton, “Where does 
postmodernism come from?,” in Marx Today: Selected Works and Recent Debates, ed. John F. Sitton (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
13 Eagleton’s dislike of postmodernism and poststructuralism is scattered through his writings, but the most 
interesting and representative loci include Eagleton, After Theory, p. 63-73, 103-117 as well as Terry Ea-
gleton, The Illusion of Postmodernism (Oxford (UK): Blackwell, 1996). The core of Eagleton’s disapproval 
with postmodernism is its political failings - and that it sees itself as an outgrowth of Marxist failures. Spe-
cifically, Eagleton criticizes postmodernism's suspicion of hierarchies, its praise for cultural relativism, and 
its silence on class analysis while linking race and gender to oppression. While postmodernism is often po-
litically oppositional, it is also economically complicit in its adherence to a moral and cultural relativism 
that eclipses the common good by placing individual rights above that of the community. In Illusion, Eagle-
ton faults postmodernism for its "cultural relativism and moral conventionalism, its scepticism, pragma-
tism, and localism, its distaste for ideas of solidarity and disciplined organization, its lack of any adequate 
theory of political agency…” (Eagleton, Illusion of Postmodernism, 134). He contends that the postmod-
ernist suspicion that anything resembling a grand narrative is a totalitarian gesture of power occludes any 
ability to speak critically about the state of the world: ”For socialist thought there has indeed been a grand 
narrative, and more's the pity. What strikes a socialist most forcibly about history to date is that it has dis-
played an almost remarkable consistency -- namely, the stubbornly persisting realities of wretchedness and 
exploitation.” (Eagleton, Illusion of Postmodernism, 51) 
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impotent by anti-theoretical cultural trends that have worked their way into everyday po-
litical life: anti-foundationalism, relativism14, and a post-political allergy for morality.15 
Eagleton’s answer is to return to a theory after theology, animated by a critique of ideol-
ogy. The task of this theory is to return to serious philosophical questions about morality, 
foundations, social cohesion, and virtue. He actively promotes (or more precisely, de-
fends) theology as a kind of “vanishing mediator” between this kind of critical theory and 
radical politics, one that he finds uniquely capable of generating the kind of political sub-
jects needed for oppositional and emancipatory movements. 
 Responding to those who deride his ‘theological turn’, Eagleton writes: “I would 
point out to my friends on the left that the politics implicit in the rather exotic talk [of the-
ology] are more, not less, radical than much that is to be found in the more orthodox dis-
courses of the left today.”16 For Eagleton, “there is something here which is in a certain 
interpretation far more radical than most of the mainstream political discourses that we 
hear at the moment.” Theology is “a science of discontent” that sheds lights on the mate-
rialist narrative of  human struggle - the sickness of evil, terror, oppression - but he also 
highlights “the capacity of religion to unite theory and practice, elite and populace, spirit 
                                                
14 Eagleton, After Theory, 50-55.  
15 Eagleton, After Theory, 71-74. 
16 Eagleton, Holy Terror, vi.  
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and senses, a capacity which culture was never quite able to emulate.”17 The radical poli-
tics of theology are of a different sort: rather than striving to vacate political space so as 
to fill it with alternative forms of thought, theology is at its radical best when it is critical: 
that is, when it calls for “a traumatic breaking down and remaking, for which the Chris-
tian term is conversion.”18 Theology also affords certain elements that have been missing 
in contemporary theory since postmodernism: a rational basis for moral judgements and a 
materialist account of universality, based on the love of strangers, solidarity, dependence, 
and equality, all of which provide the “vital precondition of human flourishing”, and the 
basis of genuinely critical self-reflexive spirit.19 
Eagleton’s Critique of Ideology 
 Terry Eagleton has generated a new wave of interest in his work, mostly in criti-
cal response to his ‘theological turn’20 a phrase that Eagleton uses himself to describe his 
political and ethical writings.21 I do not offer a thorough assessment of his theology here, 
                                                
17 Eagleton, Culture and the Death of God (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), ix. 
18 Eagleton, On Evil, 17. 
19 Eagleton, After Theory, 160-170 and 154.  
20 Eugene McCarraher, ”The Gospel According to Terry,” Dissent 61, no. 4 (2014): 132-137.; Ola Sigurd-
son, Theology and Marxism in Eagleton and Žižek: A Conspiracy of Hope (New York, NY: Palgrave Mac-
millian, 2012); G. Youzhuang, “Miracles and Revolutionary Reversals: Terry Eagleton's Theological 
Turn,” Literature and Theology 26, no. 3 (2012): 323-337.;; Ola Sigurdson,. “Emancipation As a Matter of 
Style: Humour and Eschatology in Eagleton and ŽiŽek,” Political Theology 14, no. 2 (2013): 235-251; 
Kenneth Surin, “Theology and Marxism: The Tragic and Tragi-Comic," Literature and Theology 19, no. 2 
(2005): 112-131. 
21 Eagleton, Reason, Faith, and Revolution, xii; Eagleton, Holy Terror, vi; Eagleton, Culture and the Death 
of God, viii; Eagleton, On Evil, 16-18; Eagleton, Jesus Christ: The Gospels, xxvii-xxx; Terry Eagleton, 
“Religion for Radicals” interview, The Immanent Frame: http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2009/09/17/religion-for-
radicals-an-interview-with-terry-eagleton/; 
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as I restrict myself to the nature of Eagleton’s critical appeal to theology on ethical and 
political grounds.22 Eagleton’s critical theory brings ideology critique and theology to-
gether cooperatively in order to face down and disassemble the political brinkmanship 
caused, in part, by the lack of sufficiently radical ideas circulating in contemporary politi-
cal thought and practice. Eagleton’s patently eclectic style, his unapologetic socialism, 
and his reuse of theological ideas from his early work as a “Left Catholic” theologian, all 
converge to afford us a theology for radical politics. I will chart out the points of nexus 
between ideology critique and theology, exploring how it is that Eagleton draws up the 
relation between theology and politics. My aim is to clarify both the use of ideology cri-
tique in Eagleton’s political theology and the use of theology in his distinctive version of 
ideology critique. 
Eagleton’s General Concept of Ideology 
  At this point, I want to outline his own distinctive concept of ideology, to explain 
its function in and relation to political theology, and clarify why both are so important for 
radical politics. First, why has the concept of ideology fallen away as an instructive and 
effective mode of critique? Eagleton blames the “end of ideology” on certain develop-
ments within postmodern theory, namely its critique of absolute claims to knowledge as 
                                                
22 For detailed discussions of Eagleton’s theological positions, see Roland Boer, Criticism of Heaven, 275–
333; James Smith, Terry Eagleton,  9-30 and 140-167., and Sigurdson, Theology and Marxism, p. 66-81, 
110-126, and 198-203; Boer, "Terry Eagleton and the Vicissitudes of Christology" Cultural Logic 8 (2005): 
http://clogic.eserver.org/2005/boer.html; Boer, “An Intrinsic Eagleton?,” Journal of Cultural and Religious 
Theory, 9.2 (Summer 2008), 1-17.; Boer, ”Toward Unethical Insurgency,” Rethinking Marxism 25, no. 1 
(2013): 38-51. 
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well as its dismantling of truth, objectivity, and morality, all of which are deemed “ideo-
logical” because they presuppose some privileged standpoint, some outside vantage. This 
seemingly advances the post-Kantian point that human beings as subjects are trapped, in 
a way, within the limits of knowledge, and thus only access the real as phenomenal. “Re-
ality” is always interpreted and as such, there is no direct knowledge of reality per se out-
side of subjectivity. Eagleton does not counter this familiar line, but rather disagrees that 
it means that ideology and its critique is obsolete or politically pointless. He hazards a 
post-critical and anti-foundationalist concept of ideology that is based on a theological 
perspective on human rationality, embodiment, and social interdependence. The predomi-
nant role of ideology in Eagleton’s model of critique (whether it to be political, social, or 
literary) may appear to be quite prosaic, outdated, or atavistic - if only because much of 
contemporary critical thinking has left the concept of ideology behind altogether, influ-
enced by the anti-Marxist sentiments of poststructuralist and postmodern theory.23 In his 
                                                
23 The apparent incongruences between Marxism and postmodernism are well documented. See Frederic 
Jameson, Postmodernism, Or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1991) for the classic account. But for Eagleton, his resistance to postmodern and poststructuralist theory is 
more theoretically specific - and more directly political. “What is projected by postmodernism as a univer-
sally valid reaction between knowledge and interests is in fact fairly specific to the bourgeois epoch…those 
who regard reason as no more than the instrument of interests, in at time-hallowed bourgeois tradition, 
sometimes seem to assume that it is self-evident what exactly our interests are.” (Eagleton Ideology, 173) 
He contextualizes the rise of poststructuralism within the defeat of the New Left and the disillusion within 
theory thereafter: “One advantage of the dogma that we are prisoners of our own discourse, unable to ad-
vance reasonably certain truth-claims because such claims are merely relative to our language is that…it 
also frees you at a stroke from having to assume a position on important issues…Since it commits you to 
affirming nothing, it is as injurious as blank ammunition.” (Eagleton Literary Theory, 125)  
  In After Theory, Eagleton argues that the cost of postmodern advances (‘the rise of cultural theo-
ry') was ‘critical language’. This brought on the loss of morality as a common human concern: the ability to 
raise ‘meta-questions’ about fundamental ends and means of human life (Eagleton, After Theory, 83), the 
task that Eagleton attributes to (the function of political criticism within) theory itself (Eagleton, After The-
ory, 74-95). Theology can bring to theory what culture has proven it cannot: it addresses key questions of 
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classic witty form, Eagleton writes that “If postmodernism is right, than Marxism is 
wrong – pace those brands of postmodern Marxism which bear about the same relation to 
classical tradition as guitar-toting vicars do to the Desert Fathers.”24 Certainly, the pre-
dominant culture of cynicism causes us to consider ourselves to be fully aware of what it 
is going on around us. We do not experience ourselves as deceived and fooled anymore 
by the forces at play in our social and political order. The idea inherent to ideology cri-
tique, that we are nevertheless experiencing a distorted or illusionary sense of being con-
scious in the world, seems quite out of place. There is no need for an “enlightened” point 
of view if there is no ideological state or subject from which one needs to be emanci-
pated; postmodern theory has already accomplished this with deconstruction. Addition-
ally, postmodern theory has convincingly argued that there is not an ‘outside’ position, 
there is no external point from which we are able to interrogate any standpoint - cultural, 
political, anthropological, etc. Any unique purchase that a critique of ideology might 
claim on the current situation seems itself to be rather naive, if not politically suspect. 
                                                
value and links them to the mundane aspects of everyday life. (Eagleton, After Theory, 99) 
  In Ideology, he enumerates his concerns with postmodernity as they affect ideology critique spe-
cifically: (1) the dismissal of ‘representation’, (2) the idea that ‘all thought is ideological’ (Eagleton, Ideol-
ogy, 165) means that all critiques are tantamount to absolutist claims to truth: “we cannot brand Pol Pot a 
Stalinist bigot since this would imply some metaphysical certitude about what not being a Stalinist bigot 
would involve.” (Eagleton, Ideology, xxi) Finally, (Eagleton, Ideology, 3) all rationality is insidiously in-
vested with interests and power, and so  “everything is a matter of rhetoric and power…talk of ‘facts’ or 
‘objectivity’ is merely a specious front for the promotion of specific interest”disqualifies the critique of ide-
ology as  “redundant.” (Eagleton, Ideology, 165) This does little more than “consecrate the political status 
quo.” (Eagleton, Ideology, 167) Eagleton routinely faults poststructuralism for “this stoicism in the face of 
an apparently all-pervasive power or inescapable metaphysical closure.” (Eagleton, Ideology, 146)  
24 Eagleton, ‘Introduction: Part 1’ in Marxist Literary Theory: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 15. 
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The idea that the critique of ideology is thought to be outdated and out of place is pre-
cisely why Eagleton believes it to be so important and relevant for our time. We need the 
critique of ideology all more as we have become blind to the ways in which ideology pre-
vents us from identifying its everyday role in our lives. 
 As such, it is possible to speak of ideology critique as “a continuous, if still rather 
anonymous resistance” that is made available to political subjects in and through their 
very embodiment.  All human life and thought is linked in and through the body. This is 
politically important because without ideology critique, we have no ability to identify 
what is wrong within our social reality, and more importantly, why it is wrong, and what 
we ought to do about it. There must a position from which to identify the difference be-
tween what is real and what is not, between ideology and non-ideology, for if we lacked 
this position, we would not be able to tell the significant differences between “loving God 
and loving Gorgonzola”25, nor would we be able to articulate why torture and terrorism is 
objectionable, or why defeating cancer is (or ought to be) a higher human priority than 
Manchester United winning the Premier League.26 The question, for Eagleton, is not 
whether this position exists, but rather how best to theorize and actualize it materially 
within the embodied conditions of human life. We must believe that political subjects and 
                                                
25 Eagleton, Ideology, 147. 
26 Eagleton, The Meaning of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 47: “It is sport, not religion, that 
is now the opium of the masses.” See also Terry Eagleton, “Football: A Dear Friend to Capitalism,” The 
Guardian, June 15, 2010: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/jun/15/football-socialism-
crack-cocaine-people  
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social institutions can be transformed, that there are alternative possibilities within soci-
ety that can animate the resistance necessary for thinking and making the world other-
wise. Althusser’s perspective on ideology is too resigned, bleak, pessimistic, and takes all 
the critical power and analytic strength out of ideology critique; this has drastic and dra-
matic negative implications for radical politics. It concedes the day to ideology, allowing 
it to both naturalize and universalize the alienated state of human life for the benefit of 
ruling interests without the annoying and noisy objections of critique. Indeed, it is exactly 
because Christianity is so annoying and noisy that Eagleton considers it to be promising - 
and potentially revolutionary - for ideology critique itself. 
Ideology and Literary Critique 
 While Eagleton’s early theology illustrates a rather exuberant Marxist humanism, 
Eagleton’s early literary work displays the deep and abiding intuition that reading and 
studying literature is always already a political activity, one that must always be properly 
oriented towards understanding what forces and interests are involved in the formation, 
redaction, and reception of literature.27 Literature is always a social and political act, and 
so literary criticism must always take shape in dialogue with political theories designed to 
help surface those aspects and elements. To read literature, one must be aware of the 
text’s place within a wider matrix of history, politics, and economic interests, and for this 
task, Eagleton wrote Criticism and Ideology wherein developed a Marxist literary theory, 
                                                
27 Eagleton, Literary Theory, 169-170.  
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so as to chart and organize the various levels and elements using a more “scientific” the-
ory of ideology critique.28 This signaled a decisive shift wherein Marxist critical theory is 
applied to literary studies, but it did not include theories of ideology specifically until 
Criticism and Ideology. The point of literary criticism is to surface the myriad ‘categori-
cal structures’ operative within a single literary text so as to explain their origin, source, 
and genetic conditions. The study of literature can have actual political impact by uncov-
ering the various political structures at play, identifying what these structures mean for 
overall aesthetic judgments about the relative merits or demerits of any given literary 
work. 
 Criticism and Ideology offers a “Marxist science of the text” that attends more 
specifically to ideologies in literature, not just genetic categorical structures. It is im-
portant to understand what goes into the textual production of literature in history. To put 
it differently, what are the various levels of ideology present in and active on the text, and 
how should we think about the relationship between any given text and its ideological 
status? For Eagleton, history enters into the textual production as history. Instead of 
thinking of the text as an expression of ideology, “the text, rather, is a certain production 
of ideology.”29 From a critical-materialist standpoint, literary texts matter for human life 
because they form us, they act upon us, “they make us think” and so we need to be aware 
                                                
28 Eagleton, Criticism and Ideology, 8-21.  
29 Eagleton, Criticism and Ideology, 64.  
  
 
95 
of the complex layers in the ideological matrix operative in both interpretation and pro-
duction. The purpose of ideologico-critical reading of a text is not to identify those places 
in a text where it leads to and facilitates ‘false consciousness’ in the reader, or where ide-
ologies work to cover up or conceal disarray, incoherence, and contradictions in a text, 
but instead to analyze complex, dialectical relations between the ideological factors and 
influences on the textual production of literature in its wide historical context and eco-
nomic circumstances.  
 Eagleton would eventually sharpen the political tone of this style of ideology cri-
tique, not by doubling down on narrow analytic or methodological attempts to design a 
complete theory of ideologies in textual production, but by moving towards an unique, 
pragmatic strategy whereby the search for strict argumentative rhetorical and polemical 
modes gave way to a more diffuse and pluralistic approach. The basic criterion for his 
radical critical pluralism is the ability to engender revolutionary modes of socialist think-
ing and acting, and so his initial interest in Marxism gave way to new attention to post-
structuralist, psychoanalytic, and feminist ideas; that is, “towards a revolutionary criti-
cism.”30 At this point, Eagleton became very interested in the role and function of criti-
cism in general, wondering aloud if ideology critique can contribute to the priorities of 
socialist politics in the context of postmodernism, cultural studies, and deconstruction. He 
concluded that a new critical practice was required in a context where most of what 
                                                
30 This direction is already present in Terry Eagleton, Walter Benjamin: Or, Towards a Revolutionary Criti-
cism (London: Verso, 1981) and Terry Eagleton, The Function of Criticism: From the Spectator to Post-
Structuralism (London: Verso, 1984).  
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called itself ‘criticism’ was merely liberal-humanism reworked in trendy conceptual garb. 
He found in the figure of Walter Benjamin a tradition of Western Marxism that prefig-
ured this concern and so provided resources for a style of ideology critique that was capa-
ble of bringing together the emancipatory impulses of poststructuralism and the radical 
political aspirations of socialism without falling prey to the the anarchic seductions of the 
Derrida fete of deconstruction. 
 Given that Eagleton’s major concern shifted to how the literary critic could ex-
pand her work into new modes of political engagement, Literary Theory is notable for its 
concern with linking political concerns with the study of literature. How and what litera-
ture is studied is mutually constitutive to the ideologies of the academy. The task of polit-
ically responsible criticism is to establish notions of literature and modes of analysis that 
both uncover the ways that literary theory reinforces these ideologies as “part of the ideo-
logical apparatus of the modern capitalist state.”31 But what did Eagleton suggest as an 
alternative? Surprisingly, he refused to offer a full-throated Marxist theory, opting instead 
to advocate for a eclectic approach of “using whatever one can.” The goal of literary the-
ory determines its methods, and so its goals, say Eagleton, afford us the opportunity to 
take up a radically pluralistic, pragmatic, and ultimately rhetorical, strategy of taking up 
and using whatever resources, ideas, and discourses will produce results that contribute to 
                                                
31 Eagleton, Literary Theory, 200.  
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“the strategic goal of human emancipation, the production of ‘better people; through the 
socialist transformation of society.”32 
The various interests of Literary Theory are consolidated into a broad political 
thesis that the study of literature must consider how it is itself directly implicated in and 
responsible for the function of ideology in social modes of power and dominance; it is, in 
this way, a critical discourse33 that resists political complicity in ideology by struggling 
to see how “repressed needs, interests, and desires may assume the cultural forms which 
could weld them into a collective political force.”34 But apart from some broad pointing 
and generic allusions to Althusser, it is not altogether clear what exactly Eagleton has in 
mind when referring to ideology in this early stage, other than that he does follow Al-
thusser’s rejection of George Lukács’ thesis who defined ideology as “false conscious-
ness” that functions as a cultural hegemonic power, which can and must be escaped if one 
is to apprehend the historical ‘Real’ upon which any truly effective revolutionary politics 
must be based. While in Criticism and Ideology, ideology seemed synonymous with the 
myriad cultural, political, and economic factors and forces that influence textual produc-
tion and reception in history, this very broad and unspecified sense in Literary Theory be-
comes more specifically politicized as Eagleton deepens his critique against postmodern 
theory.  
                                                
32 Eagleton, Literary Theory, 211.  
33 Eagleton, Literary Theory, 175-178.  
34 Eagleton, The Function of Criticism, 123.  
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His groundbreaking text Ideology takes up this argument at this intersection be-
tween postmodern theory and poststructuralist critique and highlights the relevance of 
ideology and foregrounds its relation to theology. Eagleton attempts in Ideology to reas-
sert the usefulness and political power of the concept of ideology, and to explain the his-
torical development of the idea. He argues that ideology is vital if we are to understand 
and properly analyze the varied, competing interests in an increasingly fractured, plural-
ized, and global geopolitical context, all the while also resisting the temptations of post-
modern theory to conflate ideology with something resembling ‘discourse’, turning poli-
tics into hermeneutics. True to form, Eagleton does not offer a unified theory of ideology 
here, but rather provides both a historical account of the term’s development and a help-
ful listing of six definitions. This strategy affords Eagleton the opportunity to illustrate 
and apply his critically aggregating approach. It must take a strategically pluralist ap-
proach in order to be successful: “all these perspectives contain a kernel of truth, but 
taken in isolation they show up as partial and flawed.”35  
However, in contrast to his earlier generic definition, ideologies are “something” 
in particular in that they describe a specific formation, a definite function. The critique of 
ideology is mounted in defense of the “objective interest” which allows us all to distin-
guish between what is most important, whose interests are most pressing, and whether or 
not certain material conditions and social relations are desirable. Eagleton argues that the 
radical potential of ideology critique rests understanding the dialectics of the oppressive 
                                                
35 Eagleton, Ideology, 222.  
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and emancipatory elements (and their historical context). In this way, Ideology is a study 
of the term and the concept that establishes ideology critique as a positive basis for a po-
litical solidarity in strong contrast to the identitarian approaches that use multiculturalism 
and globalized plurality as reasons and rallying points for sectarian and localist for-
mations for whom the goal of politics has gone from consensus and ‘the common’ to the 
airing of grievance and the continuance of conflict and dissensus, or a communitarian 
‘tribalism.’ 
 Eagleton insists that his theoretical preface for ideology critique is intended to di-
rectly counter the cultural theory which “has been shamefaced about morality and meta-
physics, embarrassed about love, biology, religion, and revolution, largely silent about 
evil, reticent about death and suffering, dogmatic about essences, universals and founda-
tions, and superficial about truth, objectivity, and disinterestedness.”36 Eagleton believes 
the most important reasons why we need to revitalize critique itself include the various 
shortcomings of the Marxist-Structuralist ideas about ideological interpellation37, the 
                                                
36 Eagleton, After Theory, 101-102. 
37 For more on Eagleton’s disagreements with an Althusserian concept of ideology critique, see Eagleton, 
Ideology, 18-21 and 143-153. He considers Althusser’s theory to be too generalized and too universal; its 
appeal (based in a rigorous dichotomy between ideology and scientific knowledge) to the ‘problematics’ 
inherent to the social interpellation process that governs and restrains ‘lived relations’ of the subject (Eagle-
ton, Ideology, 137) leads to a functionalist account that is void of any political criticism. Althusser is deeply 
pessimistic and bleak (Eagleton, Ideology, 144-146), in that he resigns the subject to an inevitable “self-
misrecognition” (Eagleton, Ideology, 142) that “mutes its potentially rebellious clamour, ignoring the ways 
in which may attain its allotted place in the social order only ambiguously and precariously.” (Eagleton, 
Ideology, 144) There is little chance for political resistance in Althusser’s theory - and this betrays the very 
point of critique itself, according to Eagleton.  
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“end of ideology” declarations made by liberal politics38 and the prevailing culture of 
cynicism, promoted by predominant trends in “critical” theory itself.39 This “pervasive 
political faltering” is just as much the responsibility of ideology critique (and its ‘would-
be’ leftist defenders) itself as it is the end-of-ideology theorists: “If the end of ideology 
theorists viewed all ideology as inherently closed, dogmatic, and inflexible, postmodern-
ist thought tends to see all ideology as teleological, ‘totalitarian and metaphysically 
grounded. Grossly travestied in this way, the concept of ideology obediently writes itself 
off.”40 For Eagleton, the problem is that contemporary theory ignores or marginalizes 
concerns about ideology, not by pretending it is not there, but by turning its presence in 
our lives into a natural, generic fact of subjective experience; in fact, it actively general-
izes ideology so that it appears to be so ubiquitous and inescapable part of the subject’s 
landscape, to the point that it absolutely saturates the subject and her world. She is unable 
(or not thought to be able) to evade or resist its deleterious effects on her knowledge and 
action. The idea that one cannot escape ideology makes ideology critique appear to be ra-
ther pointless.  
 Eagleton’s conception of ideology acts in critical response to these problematic 
trends and is precipitated by the acutely oppressive and alienating realities facing political 
subjects today, many of whom “continue to invest in their own unhappiness.” Even 
though they show that they are indeed aware of their situation, they consistently fail to act 
                                                
38 Eagleton, Ideology, xv-xix; xxi,  
39 Eagleton, After Theory, 41-73.; Eagleton, Ideology, 38-42.  
40 Eagleton, Ideology, xxi.  
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in ways that will rupture the normal flow and so inaugurate something new altogether. 
The value of ideology critique lies in the fact that “the critique of ideology, then, pre-
sumes that nobody is ever wholly mystified.”41 Eagleton faults theory (especially the cul-
tural and linguistic turns within postmodern and post-structuralist varieties) for the failure 
of criticism itself. Its suspicion of truth, virtue, objectivity, and reason has resulted in a 
spineless relativism that precludes the necessary conflict, struggle, and judgment required 
for any real emancipation from oppressive material conditions.42 Eagleton finds the the-
ory of ideology, and incidentally theology, to be helpful for thinking the world otherwise, 
highlighting those particular aspects of human existence (i.e., its embodied life, the rela-
tion of nature to culture, its rationality) that have been eclipsed by major aspects of the-
ory. Of course, we must be able to properly identify the common elements of human 
flourishing and discover how to actualize them materially. But is this not fully obfuscated 
by ideology itself? What must we do to get out from underneath the ideological mecha-
nisms that lead us to act in ways detrimental to our proper ends as human beings; in other 
words, on what basis do we hope to practice the critique of ideology? It is at this exact 
juncture that Eagleton turns to Christian theological ideas, and in so doing, comes back 
full-circle to his earliest days as a Leftist Catholic. The point now, the same as it was 
                                                
41 Eagleton, Ideology, xxiii.  
42 It is important to note that Eagleton’s dismissal of relativism is equally matched by resistance to a pre-
critical objectivity. Ola Sigurdson is right to say that his account of a ‘moderately rational’ human nature is 
indeed post-critical in the sense that he is eager to chart a way forward for critique beyond both the point-
less search for a ‘external standpoint’ and the resignation of ‘total mystification’. See Sigurdson, Theology 
and Marxism, 34-35.  
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then, is political. Returning to the classical theory of ideology, albeit in a new and up-
dated way, helps radical politics rediscover its critical spirit, and Eagleton finds in theol-
ogy a critical hermeneutic through which to do exactly this.  
 To overcome postmodern objections, Eagleton must give an account of ideology 
critique that differs substantially from the common understanding of ideology as “false 
consciousness.” Eagleton insists that human subjectivity is not completely illusionary and 
that “its moderately rational character” makes the critique of ideology possible. We are 
able to identify, for example, ourselves as existing in a state of oppression and also imag-
ine the world otherwise. While insisting that there is indeed no ‘external standpoint’ from 
which to offer an absolutized critique, it must still be possible, Eagleton maintains, to dis-
cern critically what is good for human flourishing and what it is not - the difference be-
tween emancipation and oppression. This illustrates the “moderately rational character” 
of human nature, which is indeed “perfected” by culture, rather than corrupted by it.43 No 
subject is so completely trapped within ideology that she is unable to discern and prehend 
herself as such and also be able to imagine and identify the possibilities of being un-
tapped and how to actualize that possibility. That is, in Eagleton’s favored Aristotelian 
terms, she is able to imagine herself “happy” - living unto that end proper to her nature as 
an embodied human being - and to actively invest (or not) in that happiness in an effica-
cious manner due to the “moderately rational nature of human beings.”44 The critique of 
                                                
43 Ola Sigurdson helpfully points out the structural affinity between Eagleton’s account of culture and na-
ture with Thomas Aquinas’ theology of grace as the perfection of nature. See Sigurdson, Theology and 
Marxism, 36-37.  
44 Eagleton, Ideology, xxiii.  
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ideology is made possible by the universality afforded us by our bodily conditions. If the 
subject is neither completely alienated by ideology, nor is the subject always in or under 
ideology, it is human embodiment that generates the practical reasoning form which we 
are able to develop a critical view of our situation - and so distinguish between ideology 
and non-ideology. Countering the postmodern dismissal of ideology critique as obsolete 
given our awareness of the mystification of the subject, Eagleton defends the concept of 
ideology on the basis of the bodily conditions of human existence45, a political theme that 
Eagleton explicitly interprets in theological terms.46  
 It is certainly always possible for us to be wrong, to be deluded about our exist-
ence, our social conditions, or the character of our acts and our beliefs. This is not neces-
sarily true to ideology, however. There is indeed a difference between illusion, mystifica-
tion, error, and ideology. For Eagleton, ideology is that specific political instance 
whereby the systemic distortion of knowledge forecloses real, authentic action, but never-
theless still exists as a constitutive part of political subjects and their lived relations: be-
liefs, assumptions about reality, and actions in and towards that reality. It is both an exis-
tential position and an intellectual perspective, which means that ideology can be false, 
                                                
45 Terry Eagleton, Holy Terror (Oxford: University Press, 2005), 1–41.; Terry Eagleton, “Peter Brooks on 
Bodies,” in Figures of Dissent: Critical Essays on Fish, Spivak, Žižek and Others (London: Verso, 2003), 
129-136; Terry Eagleton, The Significance of Theory (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1990), 24–28. 
46 Eagleton’s frequent use of the body as the universal basis for a materialist morality and a political soli-
darity typically intersects with his reference to a radical “Jesuanic” politics. See Eagleton, After Theory, 
152-173, especially 154-155.; Also, Eagleton, “Introduction,” in Jesus Christ, The Gospels, xvii-xix.; For 
more on how and why the relation of faith and reason to moral values are best understood in relation to the 
concrete realities of human bodily existence, see Eagleton, Reason Faith, and Revolution, 127–133. 
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but this does not mean that the subject who is shaped by ideology is indeed deceived 
about everything she believes that she knows about her social reality. Ideology can also 
be true in the descriptive sense, but still be “mistaken” or “erroneous” insofar as it func-
tions or relates to the current status of affairs in a certain kind of way. Ideology is this 
“certain kind of way” in that it animates and leads subjects to consistently “invest in their 
own unhappiness” despite their clear and demonstrated ability to do otherwise.47  
 This last point, “despite their ability to do otherwise”, is where Eagleton tries to 
overcome the culture of cynicism. The possibility of critique - not to mention even poli-
tics itself - depends on the fact that the human subject - and her cultural environs - is not 
ideological ‘all the way down.’ Otherwise, the subject can only be tragically passive and 
has no real recourse in the face of an objective social and political system that acts upon 
her. The moment we believe that ideology is inescapable is the moment that we have ac-
quiesced to it - and all emancipatory politics and ethics are foreclosed. Ideology works to 
conceal the possibility of the alternative. The belief in real, actionable alternatives to in-
justice, oppression, and the like is opened up by the patient practice of ideology critique, 
the aim of which is not to set the facts straight about reality, but to shift the coordinates of 
possibility within the material conditions that give rise to social thought itself.  
 In returning to ideology critique, which Eagleton insists is required if we are to 
have any hope for emancipatory kinds of political radicalism, we are not pitting value-
                                                
47 Eagleton, Ideology, xxii.  
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systems against each other (i.e., the ‘West’ vs. the ‘Islamic extremists’) nor are we level-
ing all cultural perspectives as relative to any other. To return to the critique of ideology 
is “to expose the material pre-conditions of such values and ideas and thus to defeat the 
most deadly brands of them by transforming the conditions which give rise to them.”48 
This sheds further light on where Eagleton thinks ideology resides and is generated: it is 
not, as Marx argued, at the level of the individual whose consciousness lead her to be-
lieve in certain ideas about the world or practice certain styles of ‘lived-relations.’ In this 
way, Eagleton departs in instructive ways from the structuralist Louis Althusser by refus-
ing to concede that ideology so completely saturates social institutions that interpellate 
the subject into being that it is utterly inescapable and cannot be overcome. For Eagleton, 
ideology exists and acts neither in consciousness nor social institutions, but rather be-
tween them.49 It is instead within the “complex systemic operations” between social insti-
tutions and the subject that are the sites where ideologies shape human existence. Instead 
of giving up on institutions as the location of ideology itself, Eagleton finds it important 
to revitalize these selfsame institutions for the work of ideology critique as sites of re-
sistance - including religious communities. 
Theology, ‘After Theory’? 
                                                
48 Eagleton, Ideology, xix. 
49 Eagleton, Ideology, 194. 
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 And with this, the stage has been set for Eagleton’s “full circle” back to theol-
ogy.50 He is motivated by a strikingly similar set of political concerns that animates his 
original interests in Left Catholicism: the defense of a radical theological project and an 
eagerness to think theologically both with and against leftist politics. Theology has al-
ways been about more than the ‘gods.’ In fact, Eagleton finds in Christianity something 
deeply akin to socialism. Theology is interesting to Eagleton because it expands the range 
and scope of radical political thought. He faults contemporary leftist politics for dismiss-
ing theology out of a “politically crippling shyness” and “an embarrassed silence.”51 
Quite the contrary, Eagleton quips 
In a world in which theology is increasingly part of the problem…it is also fos-
tering the kind of critical reflection which might contribute to some of the an-
swers. These are the lessons which the secular left can learn from religion, for all 
its atrocities and absurdities, and the left is not so flush with ideas that it can af-
ford to look such gift horse in the mouth.52   
 
However, Eagleton does not provide a distinctive, original, or constructive position on 
theology. Eagleton’s broad thesis is that Christian theology specifies an egalitarian ethic 
of love and justice for strangers and enemies alike that is indispensable for a socialist re-
sistance that combats the ideologies of capitalism and humanism at work within the late 
modern social order. He argues that the politics of Christianity are more radical than 
                                                
50 Eagleton, Holy Terror, vi.; “This book…belongs to the metaphysical or theological turn (or full circle) 
which my work seems to have taken in recent years, one welcomed by some but looked upon with alarm or 
exasperation by others.”  
51 Eagleton, Reason, Faith, and Revolution, xi-xii.  
52 Eagleton, Reason, Faith, and Revolution, 168.  
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other present options, even those coming from committed materialists or progressive po-
liticos. Rather than dismissing theology as ideological, political radicalism needs sophis-
ticated engagements with theological ethics and political theology, so as to learn from the 
virtues and rhetorics that Christian theology promises will overcome the evil and terror of 
modern life. The ethical vision of socialism has an inherently theological spirit, Eagleton 
argues, that mirrors in some ways that of Catholic liberation theology.53 Eagleton more or 
less adopts as axiomatic for this politics the Catholic “preferential option for the poor,” 
interpreting it as a political truth that is espoused in ethical terms by the figure of Jesus 
Christ in the biblical gospels54, but also echoed in the socialist imperative to enact a revo-
lution for the sake of “the wretched of the earth.”55 This revolutionary spirit has been be-
trayed on both sides: by an “ideological kind of Christian faith”56 which is “horrified by 
                                                
53 The core of Eagleton's theology is best expressed in Eagleton, Reason, Faith, and Revolution, 5-32. It is 
here that he notes the similarities between his own views and those of liberation theology, but insists that 
all theology which is authentic, is indeed “liberation” theology.  
54 Eagleton, “Introduction”, Jesus Christ: The Gospels, vii-xxx.; Eagleton, Sweet Violence, 34-37.; For evi-
dence of Christocentrism in his early theology, see Eagleton, Body as Language, 39-40, 47.; Eagleton, The 
New Left Church, 142f. For extended comments, see Boer, Criticism of Heaven, 276, 280, 301-309.  
55 This phrase comes from Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, Inc, 1965). 
Fanon’s now classic anti-colonialist text draws powerful connections between imperialism and systemic 
economic and psychological deterioration. Part of colonialist politics is the intent of degrading the human-
ity of occupied persons, so as to form them to be malleable, flexible, and dependent, so as to inoculate 
them, eliminating them as a threat to the powers.  
56 Eagleton, Reason, Faith, and Revolution, 57.  
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the sight of a female breast, but considerably less appalled by the obscene inequalities be-
tween rich and poor”57 and a rationalist “New Atheism” that knows as little about eman-
cipatory politics as it does about Christian theology, and unwittingly opposes them both 
for the same reasons.58 
 The secular left, by clinging to their orthodoxy, have kept themselves sealed off 
from ideas that are far more radical than anything currently circulating amongst them-
selves: prosaic, boring, and throwback ideas like sacrifice, love, morality and the suffer-
ing of the anawim. At this juncture, we should keep in mind that for Eagleton, theology is 
ideology critique insofar as it is always already a way of speaking about the human pre-
dicament today that challenges the present configurations of power and profit. Here, I  
will focus on Eagleton’s utilization of theological ideas as and for critiques of ideology, 
namely in how they work to explain how and why it is that human persons consistently 
invest in their own unhappiness, misery - why it is that they continually work towards 
their own downfall, and seemingly consent to their own oppression and domination. 
Why Theology? 
           Eagleton believes that theology, politics, and literature are linked by their ability to 
afford us a thick description of what it means to be a good human and to be good at being 
                                                
57 Eagleton, Reason, Faith, and Revolution, 55.  
58 Eagleton, Reason, Faith, and Revolution,168: “In a world in which theology is increasingly part of the 
problem…it is also fostering the kind of critical reflection which might contribute to some of the answers. 
These are the lessons which the secular left can learn from religion, for all its atrocities and absurdities, and 
the left is not so flush with ideas that it can afford to look such gift horse in the mouth.” 
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human together, or what Eagleton calls ‘the political.’59 All three function as theoretical 
reference points for Eagleton, and so a socialist-humanist account of human existence 
cannot foreclose the possibility that each mode of discourse is indeed correct – or at least 
politically useful. Terry Eagleton’s self-identified ‘theological turn’ emphasizes a series 
of concerns present throughout his work in its various stages; it is not something isolated 
to his late work or detached from his established literary and political commitments. His 
work on ideology critique and theology are motivated by the same political aspirations of 
socialism: namely the defeat of advanced capitalism through a systemic critique of the in-
justices and pathologies generated and perpetuated by ‘free-market’ economies. Insofar 
as Eagleton’s interest in theology is an important feature of that agenda, it is important to 
analyze closely how Eagleton is using theology, specifically in relation to his theory of 
ideology and ideology critique.  
The use of theology in “critical theory” on political grounds is not a late develop-
ment for Eagleton. His early theoretical and political early work was under the tutelage of 
radical Dominican Catholic theologians such as Herbert McCabe and Laurence Bright; 
resonant with the birth of “the Catholic New Left” in the wake of optimism surrounding 
Vatican II, Eagleton penned several articles for the theological journals Slant60 and later 
                                                
59 Eagleton, Literary Theory, 169-182. Eagleton explores his understanding of the ‘political’ in several dif-
ferent places: see Terry Eagleton, The Significance of Theory, 24–83; Terry Eagleton, “The Contradictions 
of Postmodernism,” New Literary History 28.1 (Winter 1997): 1–6.; For broad expository treatments of 
Eagleton on this subject, see David Alderson, Terry Eagleton (New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2004), 76–
82, and James Smith, Terry Eagleton: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), 77–85.  
60  For the history of Slant and Eagleton’s connection to it, see Smith, Terry Eagleton, 9-31. Also, Eagleton, 
The Gatekeeper, 28-40. The goal of Slant was to provide a “Catholic exploration of radical politics" 
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New Blackfriars, many of which were later collected into The New Left Church61, and his 
full length monograph Body as Language.62 The theology in Slant is overtly Marxist, ea-
ger to make the case to fellow leftists that socialism, theology, and the church can work 
together toward common materialist goals, even while he actively critiques the structures 
and patterns in Catholicism that he deemed to be antithetical or obstacles to a Marxist po-
litical agenda. This trajectory was expanded in the New Left Church, where he again 
takes up the themes of community, literature, and religion so as to establish an alliance 
between New Left ideas (British Marxist Raymond Williams, literary critic F.R. Leavis), 
contemporary philosophy (Sartre, Wittgenstein), and traditional Catholic theology 
(Thomas Aquinas). His major proposal was that community is the key to resolving the al-
ienation that plagues human existence, and that this requires an “existentialist” Christol-
ogy that sees Jesus Christ as “a ‘here-everywhere’, the constitutive unity of the 
group…the centre of the subjectivity of the other, and as the centre of their own subjec-
tivity.” Here we see Eagleton drawing on his Marxist predilections for human community 
                                                
through the philosophy of Marx and Wittgenstein. The Dominican theologian Herbert McCabe was in-
volved in this project and remains a central figure for Eagleton’s understanding of theology. See Terry Ea-
gleton, "The Roots of the Christian Crisis," in "Slant Manifesto": Catholics and the Left, ed. Adrian Cun-
ningham, Terry Eagleton, Brian Wicker, Martin Redfern and Lawrence Bright OP. London: Sheed & Ward, 
1966.; Eagleton, "The Slant Symposium," Slant 3, no. 5 (1967): 8-9; Eagleton, "Why We Are Still in the 
Church," Slant 3, no. 2 (1967): 25-8; Eagleton, "Language, Reality and the Eucharist (1)," Slant 4, no. 3 
(1968): 18-23; Eagleton, "Politics and the Sacred," Slant 4, no. 2 (1968): 18-23; Eagleton, "Language, Re-
ality and the Eucharist (2)," Slant 4, no. 4 (1968): 26-31; Eagleton, "Priesthood and Leninism," Slant 5, no. 
4 (1969): 12-17. 
61 Terry Eagleton, The New Left Church (London: Sheed and Ward, 1966). 
62 Terry Eagleton, The Body as Language: Outline of a 'New Left' Theology (London: Sheed and Ward, 
1970).  
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as the solution to the “fall into language” which is both creative and destructive for hu-
manity. The latter of which is more dominant in late modernity, where the turn to the sub-
ject manufactured the fateful division between individual and social interests, operative in 
the reification, alienation and commodification so prevalent in “what the Christian calls 
sin and the Socialist calls capitalism.” Again, the community of the Church can be a cata-
lyst for a counter way of life that privileged interdependency, care, and integration of the 
anawim into political life, but more importantly, Eagleton sees in Christology a political 
reversal.  
Although Eagleton’s early theology makes little mention of ideology, it is im-
portant for a number of reasons. First, the major concern in Eagleton’s early work in left 
theology is to show the radical potentials of Christian theology for in and socialist politics 
of the New Left.63 He sensed a common interest between them: to construct and establish 
an alternative kind of human community, an altogether different pattern for human life. 
He sought to leverage this link for thinking radical Christianity and Marxism with and 
against each other in order to display the ways that they can complement each other in the 
revolutionary effort to heal the social fractures and resolve economic contradictions that 
give rise to the conditions of human suffering.64 The key idea here is that in his early the-
ological work, Eagleton displays a hope and belief in the radically emancipatory potential 
                                                
63 Eagleton, Body as Language, ix.  
64 Eagleton, Body as Language, 12. “The struggle to transcend an era of destructive and illusory ‘freedom’ 
for the achievement of genuine communal liberation lies at the core of both Christian and Marxist belief.” 
See also Youzhuang, “Miracles, and Revolutionary Reversals,” 325-326.  
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of Christian theology, in consort with socialist change, to reform western Catholicism.65 
When comparing, for example, the early Body in Language to more recent texts such as 
After Theory, Sweet Violence, and Trouble with Strangers, the themes are resonant, if not 
directly repetitive: the late interest in tragedy, sacrifice, the preferential option for the an-
awim, and the revolutionary potential of virtue for reforming culture into a fully partici-
pative community, all make embryonic appearances in the early work, and are expanded 
and deployed politically in what Eagleton himself calls a “full circle” to more ‘metaphys-
ical or theological’ interests: morality, evil, sacrifice, ‘non-being’, and virtue.  
Eagleton wants to see the political Left move past its postmodern obsession with 
culture and identity and turn to metaphysical and theological themes such as evil, trag-
edy, sacrifice, violence, and love, topics that Eagleton believes will generate authentically 
revolutionary acts of protest, resistance, and change. This adds a critical density - an on-
tological depth - to what the political left says about how and why the current ideological 
system has emaciated individual and collective human life within an advanced capitalist 
society. Theology gives radical politics the sort of ethical sobriety that has been lost with 
the anti-metaphysical wanderings of an ethically empty postmodernism. This revolution-
ary trajectory of theology is an intrinsic critique of ideology because it, like socialism, 
has the rhetorical strength and ethical vibrancy to resist and disarm the ideologies of hu-
manism and capitalism. Certainly, there are religious practices and theological beliefs 
that are themselves ideological, but Eagleton is interested in recuperating their political 
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core and encouraging the political left to engage a radical Christianity and not wholly de-
ride and dismiss it as the secularist “new atheists” insist.66 To clarify how Eagleton uses 
theology, I turn here to some of the major theological and religious themes he politically 
develops: sin, Christology, the body, and the defense of God. The goal here is not to dis-
cuss or dispute theological specifics, but to show how Eagleton’s materialist theology 
fuels his ideology critique. 
Sin and Evil  
 Eagleton links his politics to his theology through his firm belief in the fundamen-
tal brokenness of humanity, a political concept that he explains with recourse to the theo-
logical concept of sin. Eagleton turns to evil in order to explain why human persons 
demonstrate an unwillingness or inability to attend justly and responsibly to each other in 
ways that prioritizes those who are suffering or are oppressed, those who are cast out at 
the margins, and that care for those who are assigned the highest levels of vulnerability 
and fragility. Eagleton makes the relation between sin and ideology clear: “original sin 
means that we are built for truth and happiness but have no spontaneous access to what 
they mean or how to attain them.”67 Sin explains what is wrong with human beings and 
how politics must be thought so as to ameliorate, rather than play into, the inherent flaws 
in the human condition: recalcitrant flaws like individual interest, self-regard, pride, dis-
order, corruption, and alienated desire. A theology of sin functions as ideology critique;  
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67 Eagleton, Holy Terror, 101.  
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that is, rather than teasing out the disaffected relations between an angry God and human 
depravity, it is a way of speaking about why we human beings are at odds with ourselves 
and each other, cut off from that which most makes us human - our embodied social rela-
tions with others. But Eagleton’s theology of sin is decisively materialist and so it has to 
do with the mundane, ordinary aspects of human intersubjective life - not with human-
ity’s abstract relation to ‘god.’68 “What the christian calls sin and the socialist calls capi-
talism”69 are united in their joint concern to identify situations and conditions of injustice, 
idolatry, and domination; both are based on the tragic interpretation of human nature.70  
 Eagleton highlights “self-centeredness” as a key political aspect of sin and so, of 
capitalism.71 To give an Augustinian spin to it (as Eagleton himself often does), there is 
something inherent to the structural constitution of human beings that leave them prone 
to disordered desires, leading them “to invest in their own unhappiness” in narcissistic 
pursuit of our ego-centric interests; in other words, to get entrenched in ideology. The re-
sultant effect is alienation, isolation, and misery, all of which frustrates and precludes the 
human person from recognizing and actualizing her relationality. It is social interdepend-
ency, not autarchic freedom, that is the foundation of the human political subject, and the 
                                                
68 Eagleton, Body as Language, 23-27.  
69 Eagleton, Body as Language, 52.  
70 Eagleton, “Language, Reality, and the Eucharist 1,” Slant 4, 3, 18-22.  
71 I strongly disagree with Boer who argues that “sin is the absent conversation partner in Eagleton’s work.” 
(Boer, 296). It is a featured theme in the early theological work in the final two chapters of Body as Lan-
guage, as well as on pages 40 and 52, which interpreted sin as alienation, reification, and the like. It is 
treated in more explicitly theological terms in later work as well. And yet, one direction that Boer picks up 
on - but that Eagleton does not take up himself - is the possibility of using Eagleton’s materialist reading on 
sin to explore the conjunction of reification and idolatry, themes that I develop further in chapter four.  
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modern quest for autonomy has had grave existential and political consequences, namely 
as ideology, insofar as it has contributed to the tendency of human persons to choose ego-
centricity at their own peril.  
 For Eagleton, sin is not only a theological concept, but is a way of speaking about 
the human predicament that makes political sense. It goes hand in hand with ideology cri-
tique insofar as it sheds light on the correlation between human self-understanding and 
on-going political investment in misery and alienation, all the while trying to explain how 
and why it is that human persons consistently work against themselves, making decisions 
and acting in ways contrary to their essential interests, their free, full flourishing. The 
devastating and destructive effect of sin comes from the fact that we are created in “pure 
liberty” and as such, are in fact “built for truth and happiness.” Eagleton’s Catholicity 
shines through here: depravity and perversity do not go ‘all the way down’, clearing the 
way for a redemptive (read: revolutionary) process of metanoia, which may be the closest 
theological analogue to ideology critique.72 
 Sin is hardly a matter of individual actors, but has to do with the “depth of the 
sickness that has to be cured.”73 It carries into the social world in which they live. Human 
persons demonstrate an unwillingness or inability to attend justly and responsibly to each 
other in ways that prioritizes those who are suffering or are oppressed, those cast out at 
the margins, and to care for those who are assigned the highest levels of vulnerability and 
                                                
72 Eagleton, “Tragedy and Revolution,” 8-15. In Eagleton, Why Marx is Right, 73, he describes this “not as 
a runaway train; it is the application of the emergency brake.” 
73 Eagleton, Why Marx Was Right, 73.  
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fragility. This is fundamentally a theological position that, as Sigurdson rightly points 
out, is closely linked to Eagleton’s belief that human persons are “moderately rational” 
and so are not wholly mystified by ideology. It is also how Eagleton tries to explain why 
we find ourselves investing in our own misery and calling it “free” acts of “self-inter-
est.”74 The ideologico-critical response to sin generated both in Eagleton’s theological 
reading of the poor as the biblical anawim, “the wretched of the earth”, on one hand, and 
the tragic vision of self-sacrifice in his theology of atonement on the other, both of which 
are refashioned as ideology critique. The goal of both is to restore to the political fore-
ground, commitments to solidarity, justice, and collective responsibility, all of which Ea-
gleton believes are at the critical core of both theology and ideology critique.  
 Perhaps it appears heterodox for a Marxist like Eagleton to speak of archaic moral 
categories like “sin”75, but his point is precisely that it is not, or at least that it should not 
be.76 Eagleton clearly discerns in Marx not only a secularization of eschatology (‘world-
revolution’) but also a politicization of morality that unites history, reason, ethics, and hu-
man flourishing. Socialists - at least the radical sort - must embrace moral (as distinct 
                                                
74 Sigurdson, Theology and Marxism, 69-70.  
75 Eagleton, On Evil, 8.  
76 Sigurdson, Theology and Marxism, 121-122. Eagleton is well aware of the pitfalls and is eager to distin-
guish his own ideologico-critical approach to evil from other ill-advised treatments. Shifting any materialist 
analysis to some abstract transcendent explanation, ending arguments (rather than furthering them), quickly 
casting blame and responsibility on the individual actor, rather than on social conditioning Eagleton is con-
cerned about making evil too interesting, as if its prevalence and ubiquity in social affairs isn’t mundane 
and prosaic. Evil is not mysterious, and we ought not to turn to evil as to explain human action. Evil is dis-
tinctly rational - it can be explained, explored, understood, and combatted.  
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from moralism77) thought, even if cultural theory has developed an ill-advised allergy to 
it, says Eagleton.78 To understand evil is to understand how and why it is that “people in-
vest in their own unhappiness.” As it turns out, the most adequate response to evil is ide-
ology critique - and for this, Eagleton finds theology to be the best recourse. Towards this 
end, Eagleton takes up the topic of evil as a political question, explored within a dis-
tinctly theological perspective because it has an unique way of facing into evil, even if 
evil presents the most daunting challenge to traditional theism.79 The issue of evil is of 
great critical importance insofar as it allows us to diagnosis the on-going material reality 
of injustice, domination, and alienation that befalls the human condition - and to address 
it critically without falling into the common traps of conservative or liberal tropes. 
 According to Eagleton, theology understands evil as privation, “not as something 
existent, but as a kind of deficiency of being.”80 Evil is the vacuity at the core of reality 
itself that suffers from “an incapacity for life rather than an abundance of it.”81 This does 
                                                
77 Eagleton, On Evil, 150: “The opposite of materialism here is moralism - the belief that good and bad 
deeds are quite independent of their material contexts.”  
78 Eagleton, On Evil, 13ff.   
79 Eagleton, On Evil, p. 131-159, especially 142-143.  
80 Eagleton, On Evil, 125.  
81 Eagleton, Trouble with Strangers, 282-283.  
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not make evil mysterious82 or extraordinary83, but insofar as it is “an attitude towards be-
ing”84, evil is a metaphysical force marked by its pointlessness85 and its ‘brute senseless-
ness.’86 When it comes to social reality, “evil would actually prefer that there was nothing 
at all.”87 Evil is about bringing death, and so is marked by “its uncanniness, its appalling 
unreality, its surprisingly superficial nature, its assault on meaning, the fact that it lacks 
some vital dimension, the way it is trapped in the mind-numbing monotony of an eternal 
recurrence.”88 In this way, evil is not independent of social conditions, but is a ‘malfunc-
tioning’ within human history that cannot be separated from its material realities. The 
goal of evil is to annihilate all being, an outgrowth of being unable to sublimate the 
deeply embedded desire to be pure nothingness that ushers from the terrifying non-being 
at your own core.89 Evil originates from the traumatic realization of human beings that at 
their core lies their own non-being. This abyssal haunting triggers the death drive and so 
surfaces in the ideological workings of “fetishes, moral ideals, fantasies of purity, the 
                                                
82 Eagleton, On Evil,  73. 
83 Eagleton, Trouble with Strangers, 283: “It is evil which is boring and brittle, not good, which is humor-
ous and high-spirited.” 
84 Eagleton, On Evil, 16.  
85 Eagleton, On Evil, 104.  
86 Eagleton, On Evil, 131.  
87 Eagleton, On Evil, 60-61.  
88 Eagleton, On Evil, 49.  
89 Eagleton, On Evil, 100 and 108. For more on the connection between evil and the death drive in Eagle-
ton, see Sigurdson, Theology and Marxism, 121-126.   
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manic will, the absolute state, the phallic figure of the Further”90 and the like. Evil re-
sponds by defying all this, attempting to stave off this truth by eradicating all being as an 
extreme form of self-assertion that is simultaneously creative and destructive.91 Evil fuels 
the death drive’s “orgiastic revolt against interest, value, meaning, and rationality”92 
which in the end is not so dramatic as it is banal, ‘mind-numbingly monotonous’, ‘life-
less’, and ‘without real substance.’93  
 This is not to underestimate the horrific force of evil in history, but rather to more 
precisely pinpoint how and why it acts so destructively, even out of its deficiency, its 
lack, to effect such horrifying results, such as death. There is nothing more evil (and also 
more banal) than death, for death is all around us; its introduction of nullity into vitality is 
terrifying in both its forcefulness and its vacuity.94 Paying attention to evil (as a theologi-
cal idea, if not a theological problem) is the ideologico-critical thing to do because we 
need a full, thick description of the metaphysical and theological aspects of evil in order 
to make sense of how it works within our material aspects of our social world to generate 
                                                
90 Eagleton, On Evil, 100. 
91 This has do with the relation between freedom and evil, namely that is the absolute freedom of human 
beings that gives rise to the possibility for evil. This rather Augustinian take again helps to explain the per-
sistence of ideology, or again, why human persons consistently act against their own self-interest. “There is 
something potentially self-thwarting or self-undoing about humanity” (Eagleton, On Evil, 30), says Eagle-
ton, for freedom while it can brings both liberation and hope, also brings its share of misery and exploita-
tion. A theological notion of evil helps radical politics explain why this is and what ought to be done about 
it; the goal is not just to understand evil, but to understand it in a way that it can be defeated. We must un-
derstand evil as both a materialist and metaphysical; it is not the property of individual behavior (Eagleton, 
On Evil, 152) but has to do with institutions, relations and forces. (Eagleton, On Evil, 150-151).  
92 Eagleton, On Evil, 109.  
93 Eagleton, On Evil, 122-124.  
94 Eagleton, On Evil, 127. 
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ideology. To understand the nature of evil is to confront its ideological effects on political 
subjects, many of whom seem unable to avoid investing in their own happiness. A theo-
logical account of evil, then, is conceived by Eagleton as an ideologico-critical way to ex-
plicate its persistence of evil, and its role in ideology, a matter that must be resolved if we 
hope to field a viable radical politics that counters the predominance of capitalism, terror-
ism, and death-dealing ways of oppression. 
Christology 
What appears at first glance to be a rather traditional Catholic “preferential option 
for the poor” turns into a more “radical” Christology, centered around a political-literary 
reading of tragedy that feeds a politics of self-sacrifice.95 This politics is geared towards 
critiquing what Eagleton calls the ‘Satanic’ image of God á la the “New Atheists” (whose 
understanding of theology is so lazy and misinformed that it is not worth rejecting). It 
counters this by establishing the ‘ontological depth’ of divine solidarity with the biblical 
anawim, the outcasted and exilic poor, who are tossed out of the social order because 
their "destitute and dispossessed”presence96  issues a damning indictment of idolatrous 
theologies of God that are consistent with and complicit in the “pragmatic needs and in-
terests of the status quo.”97 
                                                
95 Eagleton, Sweet Violence, 277-296; Eagleton, Holy Terror, 128-140.  
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97 Eagleton, After Theory, 175.  
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 Eagleton’s theological turn is animated by his political rehabilitation of tragedy as 
an ideologico-critical concept that directs radical politics to acts of self-sacrifice - the ex-
emplary model of which is Jesus Christ. Sacrifice is the key category for his political the-
ology of tragedy - but not in the typical profane sense of sacrifice as the attempt to ap-
pease and gain favor with angry and vengeful gods. The true political meaning of sacri-
fice is found in the tragic acts of Christ, whose life and death is interpreted in line with 
the biblical anawim, who as the poor and destitute “scum of the earth”, are seen as the an-
cient pharmakoi or scapegoats - who are banished outside the walls of the community be-
cause their unseemly appearance evokes a challenge to the injustice and alienation per-
petuated by the existing flow of things. The early theological Eagleton describes them 
this way: “These men -- the anawim of the old testament whom Christ speaks of in the 
beatitudes -- are the "dirt" which falls outside the carefully wrought political structures of 
society, those whom society cannot accommodate; as such they stand as a living chal-
lenge to its institutions, a potent and sacred revolutionary force.”98 
 The self-sacrifice of the scapegoat (of which Christ is the paragon) is tragedy in 
its purest form; it takes upon itself the products of the social order and wanders in the 
wilderness of dispossession, displacement, and exile; their very existence serves as a liv-
ing testament to social failure, human brokenness. and political oppression. In the present 
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conditions of capitalism, the marginalized anawim are the majority, more like the lump-
enproletariat than the ‘multitude.’99 Their self-sacrifices are not supererogatory acts of 
heroism, but by their very existence, they condemn the normal, smooth running of things 
that establishes this divide between what ought to be (and was created to be) an egalitar-
ian community of persons. Eagleton interprets anawim as pharmakoi and presents Christ 
as the exemplary figure whose ideology-critical acts of torture and crucifixion tie the the-
ology and political together in order to highlight the political point that radicals must go 
through the most hopeless and wretched conditions of human life if we hope to be able to 
imagine the world otherwise, before any political redemption is possible for the rejected, 
repressed, and banished anawim. Eagleton underscores the ideologico-critical character 
of the tragic sacrifice of Jesus Christ as anawim by concluding that “the destitute condi-
tion of humanity, if it was to be fully restored, had to be lived all the way through, 
pressed to the extreme limit of a descent into the hell of meaninglessness and desolation, 
rather than disavowed, patched up, or short-circuited.” Or, as Sigurdson aptly puts it: “the 
crucifixion is a kind of tragedy but not the kind of tragedy that ends in destruction but in 
                                                
99 While Eagleton himself ties the anawim to Marx's proletariat (Eagleton, Body as Language, 68 and Ea-
gleton, Sweet Violence, 288), he intentionally democratizes it in order to highlight the fact that the majority 
of the world are dispossessed by a capitalist system which has always been based on the exploitation of 
whole populations by a relative few. (Eagleton, Sweet Violence, 296) In this way, Eagleton’s reading of an-
awim differs significantly from other political readings of emancipatory masses such as Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri’s “multitude”, in that it more closely resembles the mocked lumpenproletariat described by 
Marx in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. 1852, ch. 5: “the vagabonds, discharged soldiers, 
discharged jailbirds, escaped galley slaves, swindlers, mountebanks, lazzaroni, pickpockets, tricksters, 
gamblers, maquereaux [pimps], brothel keepers, porters, literati, organ grinders, ragpickers, knife grinders, 
tinkers, beggars — in short, the whole indefinite, disintegrated mass, thrown hither and thither, which the 
French call la bohème.”  
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the sense that one must learn how to really die to be able to really live.”100 Eagleton inter-
prets the anawim as theological figures of ideology critique without aggrandizing or val-
orizing their destitute, poor or or tortured state. The condition of the anawim performs 
critique in that their sheer existence (and the hideous nature of this existence) brings ideo-
logies to light which would otherwise likely remain hidden in the darkness. The anawim 
are symbols and sites of ideology at work and it is the theological interpretation of their 
condition (“it is with them that Yahweh identifies”) that generates the critical dimension 
of radical politics that Eagleton finds promising.  
 The dereliction of anawim as scapegoats is not directly redemptive in the tradi-
tional substitutionary sense that immunizes the community through its suffering, but it 
can have liberating effect insofar as its self-sacrificial acts (martyrdom as the primary ex-
ample) afford us a model of what it looks like to give up ones life for the sake of a some-
thing more valuable - not just a Cause, or a Party, but in order to bring the present condi-
tion and its falseness into clear focus - to expose the extent of alienation and exploitation 
in our midst. The desperate struggle of the anawim just to survive, to persist in a socio-
political world not of their own making serves as an incessant condemnation of the com-
munity’s failures to include and care for the most poor, oppressed, and vulnerable of its 
members. The anawim are not heroes whose self-sacrificial yet tragic suffering is valor-
ized for saving the collective, but rather are “the dispossessed or shit of the earth who 
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have no stake in the present set-up, and who thus symbolize the possibility of new life in 
their very dissolution.”101 In the early Body as Language, Eagleton insists that: 
The anawim are the embodied negativity of each status quo, and as such focus its 
breaking-point; they are thus, themselves, a kind of contradiction: an expressive 
sign of human failure and limitation which yet, by pinpointing so exactly the lim-
its of a social order, the points where it tails off into chaos, offers a positive sym-
bol for the future. . . . The anawim -- the scum and refuse of society -- have, like 
all dung, a contradictory status: the more they reveal dissolution and decay, the 
more politically fertile they become.102 
 
Their very existence is a living testament to socio-political failure, “they illustrate what 
misery those powers must wreak in order to secure their sway.” They exist as starving, 
dying, and raging indictments of the community’s inability or unwillingness to adopt in-
clusive forms of life. Their atoning power does not come from the tragic nature of their 
suffering, or their self-sacrificial acts. It comes from the fact that they are “the useless, 
vulnerable, and discarded in whom the approaching kingdom is most powerfully prefig-
ured.”103 The anawim are not politically safe, they are undesirable, unpredictable, made 
unstable by their utmost abjection and desolation. It is because they are as potentially ex-
plosive and destructive as they are redemptive and liberating that Eagleton interprets the 
life and death of Christ as acts of identification with them - not merely with their plight, 
but with their identity and their critical function in relation to the powers: “In Christian 
terms, this is Christ's descent into hell after his scapegoating on the cross, the solidarity 
                                                
101 Eagleton, The Gatekeeper, 114.  
102 Eagleton, Body as Language, 67-68; Eagleton, The New Left Church, 21-22.  
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with human despair and destitution by which he 'becomes sin' for our sake.”104 Only in 
this way can the self-sacrificial suffering (modeled after the political example of Jesus as 
the crucified God) be atoning: as an act of political solidarity that simultaneously is a the-
ological disclosure of God’s identification with the the anawim (who are seen as scape-
goats only insofar as it is in their suffering that we are able to prehend just how desperate 
the situation is): “Christ’s descent into hell [is a] sign of his solidarity with torment and 
despair.”105 
 What are we to make of the political significance of tragedy in the crucified God, 
as it pertains to ideology critique? Solidarity with the anawim is Eagleton’s way of under-
standing Christ’s life and work as politically redemptive while avoiding theological dan-
gers of atonement. “It is the tragic which both Marxism and Christianity seek to redeem, 
but they can only do so by installing themselves at the heart of it.”106 The passion and 
death of Christ - his crucifixion and decent into hell - are interpreted - with recourse to 
the tragic - as an immanent critique of class society which dialectically “reclaims” the so-
cial order107 by model itself after “Christ's descent into hell after his scapegoating on the 
cross, the solidarity with human despair and destitution by which he 'becomes sin' for our 
sake.”108 This brings together the destructive and redemptive forces of revolution in the 
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105 Eagleton, Sweet Violence, 283, also 37.  
106 Eagleton, Sweet Violence, 40.  
107 Eagleton, Sweet Violence, 58.  
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person of Jesus Christ whose act of sacrificial love unites the deepest suffering and the 
highest exaltation in the same moment, which is typical of the paradox of the tragic it-
self.109 And so in this way, the sacrifice of Jesus is tragically atoning, not so much by rec-
onciling or redeeming humanity, but rather that it affords us all a reason for hope, the 
possibility of that something entirely new and liberative might still develop, but it is also 
a sobering reminder that there is the equal possibility of destruction and catastrophe. 
Writing about the relation of God to the anawim, Eagleton echoes his early comments in 
Body in Language: 
St. Paul refers to them rather colourfully as "the shit of the earth." The anawim 
are the dregs and refuse of society, its tragic scapegoats. They are the flotsam and 
jetsam of history who do not need to abandon themselves to be remade, since they 
are lost to themselves already. And it is with them that Yahweh identifies. He will 
be known for what he is, in the words of Luke 1:53, when you see the mighty cast 
down and the lower orders exalted, the hungry filled with good things and the rich 
sent away empty. The true sacrificial figure, the one which like the burnt offering 
will pass from profane to powerful, loss of life to fullness of it, is the propertyless 
and oppressed.110 
“And it is with them that Yahweh identifies.” Through the person of Jesus Christ, the an-
awim and the biblical god share the common trait of “non-being” which affords them the 
opportunity to expose ideological conditions: to be critical forces that identify the imma-
nent forces at work in social relations that malform and oppress political subjects. The 
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anawim are the ideal models for ideology critique; far from being valorized or romanti-
cized, their suffering does not have a juridically redemptive effect on the community.111 
Suffering that is tragic insofar as it is self-sacrificial is neither heroic nor aggrandizing. It 
is evil without qualification112, theologically expressed by the fact that in the biblical gos-
pels, Jesus is terrified and reluctant in his suffering and utterly abandoned at his death.113 
“Jesus plainly does not welcome his own impending torture and death, even though he 
seems impelled by an obscure conviction that such failure will prove the only way in 
which his mission will succeed”, Eagleton writes, underscoring the fact that “once suffer-
ing is conceived in this instrumental or consequentialist way, it ceases to be redemptive, 
rather as a gift class to be truly a gift when one is thinking of a return.”114 Far from a be-
ing “a cheap conjuring trick”, Christ’s passion and death are redemptive only to extent 
that it shows all of us the way out of our present failures.  
 The meaning of atonement is refashioned as ideology critique insofar as atone-
ment is really about the iconoclastic posture immanent to theology: it is through Christ’s 
self-sacrificial death and harrowed descent that he shows the dramatic extent of God’s 
identification with the anawim, shattering ideas of God as guaranteer of the powers or as 
“august metaphysical principle.” If we are looking for what the God of Christianity really 
                                                
111 Sigurdson and Boer are both right to point out that Eagleton is quick to distance himself from traditional 
theologies of the atonement that adhere to “the Satanic image of God as Nobodaddy, superego, or blood-
thirsty despot.” Cf. Eagleton, Holy Terror, 70, 40-41.  
112 Eagleton, Trouble with Strangers, 287-290.  
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114 Eagleton, Sweet Violence, 37. 
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means for the radical politics involved in ideology critique, we should look no further 
than the image of ‘Christ-crucified’: 
The only authentic image of this violently loving God is a tortured and executed 
political criminal who dies in an act of solidarity with what the Bible calls the an-
awim, meaning the destitute and dispossessed. The shit of the earth, the scum and 
refuse of society, who constitute the cornerstone of the new form of human life 
known as the kingdom of God, Jesus Himself is constantly presented as their rep-
resentative. His death and descent into Hell is a voyage into madness, terror, ab-
surdity and self-dispossession, since only a revolution that cuts that deep can an-
swer to our dismal condition. What is at stake here is not a prudently reformist 
project, but an epiphany of the absolutely new - of a regime so revolutionary as 
to surpass all image and utterance, a reign of justice and fellowship which for the 
Gospel writers is even now sticking into this bankrupt, depose, washed up 
world.115  
 
This ‘tortured and executed’ body that inaugurates the politics of ‘the absolutely new’ is 
not the self-proclaimed institutional body of Christ that is the church, but rather the 
Christological body of the anawim, cast out and despised by power, privilege, and postur-
ing. The ‘everyday’ body of the human person takes on this form under the ubiquitous 
oppression of capitalist forces, and so if the ‘suffering, mortal, needy, desiring body’ is 
indeed the site of politics and of critique, it is also the basis for a political solidarity. They 
are the constant testament to the fact that things are not as they should be. They establish 
the basis for critique itself as immanent critique of a theopolitical order in which nothing 
like this should ever happen.  
 
The Body and a Theology of Creation  
Eagleton critiques postmodernism for being politically vacuous and for clearing 
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the way for new reiterations of the same flawed liberal-humanism that is responsible for 
the problems caused by late advanced capitalism and the modern state that supports it. 
With these two concerns, the critical agenda of discrediting postmodernism and the posi-
tive agenda of revitalizing Marxist critical theory by suggesting it (and its politics!) as the 
only suitable alternative to postmodern theory, Eagleton returns to two thematic areas 
that were central to his early theological work and become even more prominent in his 
later political theology: ideology and the body. More specifically, he contends that a re-
turn to the body as a materialist site that reconnects the symbolic to the political is neces-
sary, and that this is only possible in and after a revitalization of ideology critique. Eagle-
ton contends that what was desperately needed in contemporary critical theory is to con-
ceptualize and mobilize political subjects to create and practice new modes of solidarity, 
while also revitalizing older Marxist ones left behind.  
 His two main themes in this materialist specification of ideology are aesthetics 
and politics, both of which were centered on the body. In Ideology and the Aesthetic, Ea-
gleton identifies the origin of the ideologies of bourgeois society with the creation of aes-
thetics. He identifies reasons behind the contemporary obsession with the aesthetic by ex-
ploring its susceptibility to ideology.116 In his narrative, aesthetics enacts a distinction be-
tween the corporeal and the immaterial, between objects and senses, and between the 
happenings of our creaturely life and that which belongs to the mind. When one speaks of 
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aesthetics in the historical moment of its inception and use, one is referring to the sen-
tient, affective, and sensuous aspects of somatic life: the sometimes banal ways our bod-
ies prehend and interact with the biological and natural aspects of fleshly being. It origi-
nated with the rise of the bourgeois society, argued Eagleton, who required a binding 
force to resist the trenchant fracturing of social life into individual interests, especially af-
ter the fall of the absolutist state: “The ultimate binding force of the bourgeois social or-
der in contrast to the coercive apparatus of absolutism will be habits, pieties, sentiments, 
and affections”117, a mode of social control that functioned by “inserting social power 
more deeply into the bodies of those it subjugates.”118 The aesthetic was deployed as a 
new mode of political power that used “the discourse of the body” (i.e., that particularly 
embodied way that human beings as political persons live, labor, produce, and struggle in 
socio-political life) to direct human persons towards specific forms of social control and 
disciplinary tactics, performing a “gradual modulation of the psyche” that guides the 
body back to cooperation.  
 Eagleton’s concern is that in aesthetics, the body becomes suppressed in its politi-
cal use, that its materialist character is overwritten, in many ways, by its aesthetic func-
tion in the modern social world. He notes how “a certain style of meditation on the body, 
on pleasures and surfaces, zones, and techniques, has acted among other things, as con-
venient displacement of less immediately corporal politics.”119 The postmodern, while it 
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seems obsessed with everything that has to do with the body, misses the body altogether 
because it has effectively anesthetized the body, rendering it both politically voiceless 
and socially peripheral by its ‘fetishism of style and surface’ and its ‘abandonment of cri-
tique and commitment.’ In this same gesture, in its quick announcement of the end of 
metaphysics, it has also declared that “truth is a lie; morality stinks; beauty is shit.” But 
just as the body can be decentered for the sake of the postmodern aesthetic, it can also be 
revitalized as the materialist ground of the politically Real that rises above and beyond 
the register of the ideological matrix: “all human beings are frail, mortal and needy, vul-
nerable to suffering and death. The fact that these transhistorical truths are always cultur-
ally specific, always variably instantiated, is no argument against their transhistoricality. 
For the materialist, it is these particularly biologically determined facts, which have 
bulked largest in the course of human history.”120 
 In Idea of Culture, Eagleton problematizes the priority of difference both within 
post-Marxist shifts (e.g., agnostic politics) and other forms of identity politics as ideolog-
ical. When critical theory embraces pluralism to the point that it loses any basis for a 
common culture, it loses the ground upon which political solidarity is possible, a neces-
sary condition for any kind of revolutionary political action. It turns the human body in a 
site of division and conflict, rather than that “the suffering, mortal, needy and desiring 
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body, which links us fundamentally with our historical ancestors, as well as with our fel-
low beings from other cultures.”121 He goes on to admit that, “Of course, human bodies 
differ, in their history, gender, ethnicity, physical capacities, and the like. But they do not 
different in those capacities – language, labor, sexuality – which enable them to enter into 
potentially universal relationships with one another in the first place.”122 
 The body is not just a theoretical site, but also has theological meaning for Eagle-
ton. A distinct feature of Eagleton’s theology (as refashioned into ideology critique) is his 
firm belief in the centrality of the bodily condition of human beings for critique. It stems 
from his literary appropriation of Marx whereby the most fundamental aspect of human 
being is its bodily conditions - its individuated existence as an embodied being and all 
this entails for its life and struggle. It should be clear that Eagleton is not interested in 
“discourses on the body” as taken up by postmodern theory and aesthetics, which Eagle-
ton directly faults for its ‘culturalism’ - its obsession with emphasizing the body’s con-
structedness. We must take up the body as it is, as it is present before us in social reality, 
and as it shapes and directs our place in the world as real, concrete, fleshly, vulnerable, 
and virile. It is the body that makes our social lives precarious, and that positions us in in-
terdependent relations with others. But it is also our bodies that connect and link us to-
gether, establishing symbiotic lives that are both the core of our hope and our trepidation.  
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Eagleton maintains that the body must be understood within a theology of crea-
tion that incorporates the power of religious belief with the communal vision of socialist 
politics.123 What is important for Eagleton about this theology of creation is its distinct 
social effect: democratization. A theology of creation is radically democratic: it makes 
the most important thing about human beings that which all human beings share: all hu-
man beings are created within the image of God, “placing each person in direct commun-
ion with the ontological ground that renders existence, life, intelligible.”124 The meaning 
of this life - and how to make life meaningful for those persons whose bodies have been 
made redundant and disposable by a capitalist order - is the theological question at the 
heart of Eagleton’s politics..  
A theology of creation need not depend on a traditional theism that sees God who, 
as the sovereign maker of the natural world, holds a ultimate monolog on freedom and 
creative agency. Eagleton turns to the doctrine of the imago Dei: the key idea of the crea-
tion of humanity in the image of the Creator. Eagleton finds creation useful because it is 
concerned with the ground of the possibility of both the existence and the interrogation of 
things, that is, answers to ‘questions such as why there is anything in the first place, or 
why what we do have is actually intelligible to us.’ Eagleton finds in theology of creation 
that political quality within all truly critical discourse: that it has something to say about 
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human flourishing and is universally applied to all human beings, irrespective of who 
they are. The beauty of human createdness is that being human is essentially pointless. 
The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo illustrates how it is that God creates out of freedom, not 
necessity125 and so graciously extends that radical liberty to creation: “to say of the world 
that it is ‘created’ is for classical theology to say that it is pointless. Like God, and like 
humanity, it exists for purely for its own delight…Creation is a scandal to the sharp-faced 
stockbrokers for home everything must have a point.”126 A God who creates ex nihilo is 
“pure liberty”, and so if all human beings (actually - all of creation) are thought to be cre-
ated in the divine image, they must share in and participate constitutively in that liberty. 
That the world is created “out of nothing, rather than out of grim necessity” says some-
thing about the way human beings are and the way they ought to be. This is the condition 
of possibility for critique, but also liberation and oppression, and Eagleton consistently 
finds theology to be on the side of the former: “All authentic theology is liberation theol-
ogy.”127 The important political aspect of this insight is that God is not transcendent to 
the material realities of human bodily concerns (the idolatrous God that is “out there”). 
Eagleton argues that if you are looking for the truth about God, “you shall know him for 
whom he is when you see the hungry being filled with good things and the rich being sent 
away.”
 
As it turns out, it is the bodily way of Christianity - the “all rather disappointedly 
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materialist, unglamorous, and prosaic” political way set forth and modeled by the biblical 
figure of Jesus Christ - that is most ideologico-critical precisely in the way that it perpetu-
ally challenges  attempts to suture or reconcile the social fissures and lacerations that ex-
ist in our social fabric due to the bodily conditions of our existence. Because we are bod-
ies, human persons experience profound and enduring limitations, dependencies, and fra-
gilities, and in Eagleton’s judgement, Christianity (or, at least the radical interpretation he 
prefers) is particular helpful in putting this forward.  
 Theology gives radical politics the language and categories to think and act in 
ways for which, at this point, it lacks the resources. Indeed, he argues in After Theory that 
“cultural theory as we have it promises to grapple with some fundamental problems, but 
on the whole fails to deliver. It has been shame-faced about morality and metaphysics, 
embarrassed about love, biology, religion and revolution, largely silent about evil, reti-
cent about death and suffering, dogmatic about essences, universals, and foundations, and 
superficial about truth, objectivity and disinterestedness. This, on any estimate, is rather a 
huge slice of human existence to fall down on.”128 The task of ideology-critique, then, is 
theological, in that the goal of Marxist theory and analysis - to reestablish a basis from 
which to approach questions of beauty, truth, morality, evil, etc., - are ideas that are diffi-
cult to think through adequately without some recourse to the theological. A critique of 
postmodern ideology is a rather constructive enterprise; it calls for a retheorization of the 
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body, one that accounts properly for the messy and historical particularities of human em-
bodiment, and to think about what solidaristic practices are necessary to care for and rep-
resent this body in light of the common openness to both truth and morality, but also 
death, evil, and ‘non-being.’ But what is even more intriguing (and infuriating for others) 
is Eagleton’s defense of God as an ideologico-critical concept. And it is here - from a 
Marxist perspective - that he takes up a defense of Christianity against its most vocal and 
public critics: the “New” Atheists. 
In Defense of God 
The question of God becomes an important topic in which Eagleton wrestles the-
ology away from its critics, both “the gnostic Left” and the “fundamentalist right” - both 
of which he faults for their arrogant, ignorant, and prejudiced harangues which are usu-
ally little more than “a worthless caricature of the real thing”: “it is as though one were to 
dismiss feminism on the basis of Clint Eastwood’s opinions of it.”129 Eagleton promotes 
instead a certain “radical” version of Christianity: the reading of it that makes the most 
“urgent human and political sense.” Many commentators will point out the Christocen-
trism in Eagleton’s theology, a feature that allows Eagleton to focus on the lessons that 
the political left (and all of us, really) should learn from Jesus Christ and the ethical and 
political conception of love, forgiveness, sacrifice, and freedom found in the New Testa-
ment gospels. However, Eagleton is just as interested in the question of God; it is here 
that Eagleton finds theology to be at its most material - and as such, its most ideologico-
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critical. Eagleton is not interested in promoting Christianity for its own sake. The impetus 
for taking up the question of God as he does is apologetic and critical; he is eager to op-
pose the rise of the New Atheists, contesting their theology, their atheism, and their poli-
tics.130 He does so by revising some of the dominant themes of his earlier theological 
work, marshaling Thomas Aquinas and Herbert McCabe together in defense of a Christi-
anity “worth rejecting.” He defends Christianity against “the enormous condescension” 
against it by those like “Ditchkins”131 who, due to their collective ignorance, arrogance, 
and sloppiness132, “fail to grasp the nature of a theological claim.”133 
This is not a nostalgic turn for Eagleton; it bears directly on the core of his critical 
work. It mirrors the approach he has taken repeatedly in reference to radical politics: the 
work of critical theory is to reclaim ideas, concepts, and terms as valid and relevant for 
political radicals in and through ideology-critique. Eagleton has longed criticized leftist 
theory for its political weakness and its critical reticence, caused in large part by its ob-
session with identity politics, preoccupation with categories of minority (class, race, gen-
der), and its unreasonable shyness about things that matter.  
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 He faults the New Atheists like Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens, and Sam 
Harris, for making a key ‘category mistake’ about the kind of thing Christian belief is. 
Contrary to the New Atheist’s mischaracterizations, Christianity is not ‘a pseudo-science’ 
that ‘dismisses with evidence’, but rather “Christianity was never meant to be an explana-
tion of anything in the first place.”134 He finds in Dawkins, Hitchens, and the like, an ac-
count of religion, Christianity specifically, that is grossly misinformed, poorly re-
searched, and narrowly interpreted: that is, a reading of religion as “false consciousness.” 
For Eagleton, “it is entirely logical that those who see religion as nothing but false con-
sciousness so often get it wrong since what profit is to be reaped from the meticulous 
study of a belief system that you hold to be as pernicious as it is foolish?”135 In their rush 
to dismiss ‘faith’ as the opposite of ‘reason’, Ditchkins entirely miss the point of faith: 
“faith is a commitment and allegiance - faith in something which might might a differ-
ence to the frightful situation you find yourself in… Christianity… is not primarily a mat-
ter of signing up for the proposition that there exists a Supreme being, but the kind of 
commitment made manifest by a human being at the end of his tether, foundering in dark-
ness, pain, and bewilderment, who nevertheless remains faithful to the promise of trans-
formative love.”136 Eagleton is eager to convince both fundamentalists and their lib-
eral/rationalist opponents of this interpretation - and its political implications.  
                                                
134 Eagleton, Reason, Faith, and Revolution, 7.  
135 Eagleton, Reason, Faith, and Revolution, 51.  
136 Eagleton, Reason, Faith, and Revolution, 37.  
  
 
139 
 Of course, what liberals, secularists, fundamentalists and rationalists have in com-
mon is that they routinely ignore this and turn a blind eye to the critical role that Christi-
anity has played in formation of liberal and secular society.137 In fact, the replacement of 
religion by culture is part of a broader attempt to suppress this dirty little secret138, com-
plicated by the fact that western postmodernism has at its root an extreme history of fail-
ure and loss that it has not yet come to terms with.139 The flip side of this “culturalism” is 
the attempt to replace politics with religion140 out of its own disillusionment with the for-
mer: “If politics has failed to emancipate you, perhaps religion will fare better.”141 It is 
this ‘sacred resonance to culture’ that authorized it as “the new absolutely, bottom-line, 
conceptual end-stop, or transcendental signifier.”142 But it has proven itself to be inade-
quate as a replacement for politics or religion143 and so there is space for theology to reas-
sert itself, not as a legitimation of culture or politics, but as an immanent critique of cul-
ture. It is clear that not all is right with religion, least of all theology: “what is distinctive 
about our age when it comes to religion, then, is not just that it is everywhere on the 
rise…it is also that this resurgence often seems to take a political form. Yet this reflects a 
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failure of politics proper rather than a reinvigoration of it…This is a religion that is once 
more prepared to agitate and kill.”144 
 And yet, not only does Eagleton defend theology, but also uses it as ideology cri-
tique. This has everything to do with Eagleton’s Marxism and his unmistakable disap-
pointment in its failures. The promise of Marxism, Eagleton says, has faced a “staggering 
political rebuff; and one of the places to which those radical impulses have migrated is - 
of all things - theology.”145 Eagleton finds the latest form of technological and finance 
capitalisms to be “inherently atheist. It is godless in its actual material practices…A soci-
ety of packaged fulfillment, administered desire, managerialized politics, and consumerist 
economics is unlikely to cut to the kind of depth where theological questions can even be 
properly raised, just as it rules out political and moral questions of a certain profun-
dity.”146 And so, the task of raising theological questions in such an economic and social 
context, “which tends to be secular, relativist, pragmatic, and materialistic”,147 turns out 
in itself to be both critical and ultimately materialist. Eagleton, in other words, under-
stands theology to be at its political best when it is fundamentally concerned with naming 
human conditions, which is precisely what Marx considered it unable to do – or at least 
not in the politically and economically proper way. For Marx, as for Eagleton, religion is 
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ideology precisely because it is the only kind of heart and soul that a heartless and soul-
less world can come up with: “it offers a refuge from the world, not a mission to trans-
form it.”148 As a “sigh”, religion is “a pathological symptom of what is awry with 
us…and expresses a thwarted desire which it simultaneously displaces…it therefore rep-
resents a protest against a spiritual bankruptcy with which it remains thoroughly com-
plicit.”149 The function of theology as immanent critique is sharpened into a political vi-
sion when it comes to the negative aspect of critique:  
The problem that theology confronts is the idea that the social order is “pretty 
well self-sufficient”, as being more or less as good as it gets, or at least as a spec-
tacular advance on what went before. It is hard to see what role faith could play, 
other than sheerly ideological one, in a Western world which some of its inhabit-
ants see it as nothing less than the very consummation of human history, lacking 
nothing but more of the same. How could such a form of life accept that there is 
something profoundly amiss with our condition - that it simply does not add up, 
that it is in several respects intolerable and that one of the chief signs of this inco-
herence and intolerability is the plight of the poor?150 
 
And so, coming back to Eagleton’s defense of theology as ideology critique, “the trouble 
with the Dawkins of this world, however, is that they do not find themselves in a fright-
ening situation at all…it is natural then that they have no use for such embarrassingly 
old-fashioned ideas as depravity and redemption.”151 The theology of Christianity, Eagle-
ton maintains, “represents a view of the human conditions which is far more radical than 
                                                
148 Eagleton, Reason, Faith, and Revolution, 41.  
149 Eagleton, Reason, Faith, and Revolution, 42. 
150 Eagleton, Reason, Faith, and Revolution, 45.  
151 Eagleton, Reason, Faith, and Revolution, 38.  
  
 
142 
anything Richard Dawkins is likely to countenance.” This “more radical” view is that of 
tragic humanism, which is another way of saying that “our experience of the world is a 
function of our bodily engagement with it”152, which turns out to be both profoundly 
Christian and radically materialist in that it believes that “only by confronting the very 
worst”, “only by a process of self-dispossession and radical remaking can humanity come 
into its own.”153 
 Eagleton rejects what he calls here the “Satantic” image of God proliferated by 
Dawkins, Hitchens, and their fellow critics: “a way of seeing God as a great bully”154 or a 
‘super-egoic’ image of God in Jesus.155 God is not a “mega-manufacturer or cosmic chief 
executive officer” and considers any “notion of God as a very large and powerful crea-
ture”, to be a “idolatrous” betrayal. Contrary to this, Eagleton presents God, in a thor-
oughly traditional fashion, as “the reason why there is something rather than nothing, the 
condition of possibility of any entity whatsoever. God is not a sort of entity, a being it-
self. God is rather non-being, a non-entity.”156 If one is to say that “God exists”, it dis-
plays a serious ontological misunderstanding both about the nature of God and existence. 
God is not that transcendental force that enslaves humanity but is the “the connection of 
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love and creativity”157 that generates human persons in “pure liberty.”158 “God is glori-
ously pointless, a kind of perpetual critique of instrumental reason.”159 Eagleton goes on: 
“For orthodox Christian doctrine, it is our dependence on God that allows us to be self-
determining….God, for Thomas Aquinas, is the power that allows us to be our-
selves…”160 Again, what is of interest to Eagleton here is the political point that this the-
ology makes: “if we are God’s creatures, it is in the first place because, like him, we exist 
(or should exist) purely for the pleasure of it. The question raised by…Karl Marx, is that 
of what political transformation would be necessary for this to become possible in prac-
tice.”161 
 When it comes to Jesus Christ, Eagleton argues that “Ditchkins rejects him for 
reasons which are both boring and politically disreputable.”162 Of course, what is most 
worth defending about Christian theology is its politics - and nowhere is this displayed 
more clearly than in the exemplary figure of Jesus Christ, whose “tortured and murdered 
body” tells the tragic story about the depravity of human persons and the cost of political 
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love:163 “Which is to say that those who are faithful to God’s law of justice and compas-
sion will be done away with by the state. If you don’t love, you’re dead, and if you do, 
they’ll kill you. Here then is your pie in the sky or opium of the people, your soft-eyed 
consolation and pale-cheeked piety.”164 Contrary to those who find Christian teaching in-
nocuous and atavistic, Eagleton insists that “God’s love and forgiveness are ruthlessly 
unforgiving powers which break violently into our protective self-rationalizing little 
spheres, smashing our sentimental illusions and turning our word brutally upside 
down.”165 Christianity is not to be mocked or scorned: it is in the serious political busi-
ness of critique. 
 Contrary to those who claim that the Christian ‘god’ has little to do with the mate-
rialist realities of the everyday, Eagleton underscores the primary thesis of liberation or-
thopraxis, which he considers to be the only authentic theological claim available to us:  
things are that God’s include working for justice, welcoming the immigrants, and 
humbling the high-and-mighty. the whole cumbersome paraphernalia of religion 
is to be replaced by another kind of temple, that of the murdered, transfigured 
body of Jesus….this body is dedicated in particular to those losers, deadbeats, 
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riffraff, and colonial collaborators, who are not righteous but flamboyantly un-
righteous-who either live in chronic transgression of Mosaic law or like the Gen-
tiles, fall outside its sway altogether.166 
 
Against the liberal and rationalist critics who see Christianity (and all religion, actually) 
as a threat to the autonomous workings of modern State, Eagleton agrees and so asserts 
Christianity’s ideologico-critical credentials: “The New Testament is a brutal destroyer of 
human illusions. If you follow Jesus and don’t end up dead, it appears you have some ex-
plaining to do. The stark signifier of the human condition is one who spoke up for love 
and justice and was done to death for this pains. the traumatic truth of human history is a 
mutilated body.”167 This is what the God of Christianity really means, and “Ditchkins” is 
simply unable to see it. Eagleton goes on: “The difference between Ditchkins and radicals 
like myself also hinges on whether it is true that the ultimate signifier of the human con-
ditions is the tortured and murdered body of a political criminal and what the implications 
of this are for living.”168 
 So what are the “implications of this for living” and for ideology critique? As I 
have shown, radical thought must start with the “lamentable state of humanity”, and of 
course, Christian theology is good for this as it points out the “the prevalence of greed, 
idolatry, and delusion, the depth of our instinct to dominate and possess, the dull persis-
tence of injustice and exploitation, the chronic anxiety which leads us to hate, maim, and 
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exploit, along with the sickness suffering and desire which Jesus associates with evil. All 
this is what Christianity knows as sin.”169 Of course, religion and its institutions have 
been and continues to be a significant factor in the persistence of these problems - Eagle-
ton is the first to admit this - and “yet it is from the standpoint of values which spring, 
among other places, from the Judeo-Christian legacy itself that we identify these failings 
in the churches - just as liberal civilization is, so to speak, its own immanent critique, as a 
culture which allows us to castigate its shortcomings by reference to its own commenda-
bly high standards.”170 In this way, Christian beliefs about the fallenness of human nature 
are an immanent critique of the predominant social order, acting as a sort of negative im-
age for the kind of political arrangements and affective attachments befitting the freedom 
and full-flourishing of human persons. “The Christian faith is absurdly, outrageously 
more hopeful than liberal rationalism, with its apparently unhinged belief that not only is 
salvation of the human species possible but…it has already taken place.”171 But here 
again, redemption looks a lot more like social justice than legal justification, a whole lot 
more like materialist transformation than spirituality:  
Salvation…turns out not to be a matter of cult, law and ritual of special ob-
servance and conformity to a moral code, of slaughtering animals for sacrifice or 
even being splendidly virtuous. It is a question of feeding the hungry, welcoming 
the immigrant, visiting the sick, and protecting the poor, orphaned and widowed 
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from the violence of the rich. Astonishingly, we are saved not by a special appa-
ratus known as religion, but by the quality of our everyday relations with one an-
other.172 
 
The resonance with ideology critique and Eagleton’s (selective interpretation of) Christi-
anity is made clearer here. Theology is shown to be rather materialist and materialism as 
rather theological, insofar as it is fundamentally concerned about the everyday workings 
of human social life and is eager to redirect and orient social relations and productive 
forces by “placing love at the center of its vision of the world”, which is also “the ethical 
basis for socialism.”173 While this is a liberation theology, Eagleton also considers it to be 
“thoroughly orthodox, scriptural and traditional”174: “one can be a fan of the New Testa-
ment but not of the Vatican.”175 The political benefit of theology is that it is “a lot more 
realistic about humanity…it takes the full measure of human depravity and perversity…at 
the same time, it is good deal bolder than the liberal humanists and rationalists about the 
chances of this dire condition being repaired.”176 Here, the materialism driving its critique 
comes into play: “It also believes that the very frailty of humanity can become a redemp-
tive power. In this, it is one with socialism, for which the harbingers of a future social or-
der are those who have little to lose in the present.”177 Eagleton assures us that many of 
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the theological claims of Christianity are undoubtedly not true, but even if that is so, “it 
may serve as an allegory of our political and historical situation.” He rigorously main-
tains “a distinction between a scriptural and an ideological kind of Christianity”, the pri-
mary criterion being that “any preaching of the Gospel which fails to constitute a scandal 
and affront to the political state is in my view effectively worthless.”178 It is in this way 
that theology can be critical rather than ideological, for even “the Enlightenment was 
deeply shaped by values which stemmed from the Christian tradition…it inherited its 
brave campaign against superstition partly from Christianity itself, with its rejection of all 
false gods and prophets, all idols, fetishes, magical rituals, and powers of darkness, in the 
name of human flesh and blood.”179 
Conclusion 
In the final chapter of Eagleton’s Literary Theory, he zeroes in what he consid-
ered to be the enduring contribution of the volume: the need to rethink the task of reading 
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anity as an kind of immanent critique of ideology (whether it be, of Marxism, culturalism, postmodernity, 
or fundamentalism), “namely because it has very little quarrel with its mighty ideals, but simply inquires 
with a certain faux naiveté about why whenever there is an attempt to realize them, they tend to twist by 
some inexorable logic into their opposites, so that freedom for some become exploitation for others, no-
tional quality generates real inequalities, and so on.” (Eagleton, Reason, Faith, and Revolution, 93-94) 
Again, “Marxism began…as a response to a Christian movement which had betrayed its origins and ended 
up in a whole sector of the globe doing much the same.” (Eagleton, Reason, Faith, and Revolution, 67) 
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literature as political criticism. This means, Eagleton proposes that it functions as a cri-
tique of ideology based in concrete political interests: radical human freedom, apprecia-
tion for the bodily conditions of human social life, and the need for developing solidar-
istic relations and affective attachments, based on said conditions.180 He called this task 
“political criticism”, something that was already taking place in many disciplinary forms 
because he wanted it to be installed at the core of what we all think we are doing when 
we read, when we interpret, when we try to make sense of text, reference, meaning, and 
significance. To read, or to interpret, is to be political - and so, it is to be critical. It is to 
directly consider fundamental questions about freedom, truth, and subjectivity. We must 
recognize that all that is written - indeed all that is - is not merely contextualized (that is, 
that has a context), but is indebted to all the messy particulars of that situation and all that 
this means for concrete human goals. The term ‘political criticism’ has to do with undo-
ing the pretense of disinterestedness, of impartiality, of neutrality, of relativism - of ex-
posing all this as idolatry. It is surprising that Eagleton includes the theological as the 
way of thinking most well suited to expanding this task beyond the literary. To do ‘politi-
cal criticism’ is to do ideology critique, and for Eagleton, to do ideology critique is to do 
theology. But what does it mean to do theology as ideology critique?  
The purpose of this chapter is to use Terry Eagleton’s perspective to explore one 
possibility for how to link between theology and ideology critique. His use of theology 
for radical politics is good example for how to start a new beginning for the the question 
                                                
180 Eagleton, Literary Theory, 169-177. 
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how ideology critique can and should be related to theology. I wanted to shed light on the 
political use of theology in philosophical versions of ideology critique, specifically those 
that are indebted to and are located within a Marxist legacy. If we are able to get a better 
sense for why Eagleton turn to theology in the name of its radical and emancipatory polit-
ical for critique, we are in a better position to understand the Marxist legacy of ideology 
critique as it relates to political theology. For Eagleton, his desire to articulate a material-
ist basis for universal solidarity and common culture leads him to adopt a critical strategy 
of ‘using what one can’, both to critique the ways things are and to articulate revolution-
ary possibilities for a different social future. The strength of Eagleton’s eclectic and stra-
tegic approach is that he is most concerned with how to pragmatically use theological 
ideas to critique ideology. This rings true to the Marxist critical tradition in which ideol-
ogy critique is about how ideas function in relation to both historical circumstances and 
relevant political concerns: ideology critique is really about politics and not so much 
about truth.  
Eagleton insists that Christianity can indeed function as ideology critique. Refus-
ing to dismiss theology as “false consciousness”, Eagleton celebrates its purported stress 
on and ethical commitments to the anawim and demonstrates how classical theological 
ideas are indeed compatible with Marxist theory and politics and so deserves to be taken 
more seriously by what he sees as an anaemic political left. It outlines in detail how Ea-
gleton develops and reinterprets traditional theological themes of sin, Christology, evil, 
the body, God, and salvation as ideology critique. For Eagleton, ideology refers to that 
specific political status of ideas in that are formed and deployed in ways that lose sight of 
  
 
151 
the various arrangements and practical positions of the human body, particularly in rela-
tion to other bodies, all of whom are connected by patterns of interdependency, and so ef-
fectively keeps human persons silent, reticent, and complicit in their own unhappiness. 
Eagleton finds in theology some ideas about love, evil, meaning of life, suffering, and 
community that do not conceal or cover that which is most important and crucial for hu-
man flourishing, but instead names it all in ways far more critical, radical and materialist 
than critical theory does today. Theology in this way sharpens the critical posture of the-
ory in relation to praxis. 
And yet, Eagleton is deftly aware that one cannot simply appeal to these critical 
theological ideas (love, justice, redemption, solidarity, community) as if it protects or 
screens praxis itself from the self-reflexivity of critique. These ideas have such uniquely 
transformative power insofar as they are immanently critical; that is, they engage and re-
spond to their own activity, their own usage, as vigorously as they critique their function 
in social and political life. When love, Christology, or justice, for example, are put to 
work, not just in reference to how political theology is actively shaping the social world 
according to “the emancipatory goals of transformative praxis” but as critical terms in the 
immanent relation of theory and praxis within political itself, what is the effect on politi-
cal theology itself? 
 And yet, political theology, in order to avoid betraying its revolutionary center, 
must itself turn to critique of ideology and to immanent critique in order to avoid betray-
ing its radical, revolutionary potential. In this way, Eagleton takes the Marxist point about 
  
 
152 
the critique of religion as ideology (that self-reflexive critique is necessary to truly under-
stand the “truth” of theology as its social impact in material realities) that was discussed 
in the preceding chapter, and so serves as an important example of what political theol-
ogy can learn from political philosophers who are turning to theology at the same time 
they reach for ideology critique. In the next chapter, we will explore yet another possibil-
ity in the work of Slavoj Žižek, who also argues that Christianity has enormous political 
potential as ideology critique, albeit when reconfigured as an atheistic theology of the 
‘death of God.’
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK 
Introduction 
 The present chapter analyzes Žižek’s theory of ideology as a political-theological 
perspective. It is curious why Christian theology plays in his critique of ideology and his 
political thought in general, and so I try to clarify the general parameters of Žižek’s polit-
ical theology of critique and then explore in implications for the relation of theory to 
praxis. Žižek’s critical engagement with Christianity plays a unique role in his philosoph-
ical and political work, which is made to appear even more strange by who acts as his pri-
mary theological guides: a unholy mix of Hegel, G. K. Chesterton, and St. Paul. Žižek 
discovers in Christian theology certain key elements that inform modes of critique, the 
Act, and social change, elements that usher forth critiques, not only of current political 
institutions and systems, but also of the failure of Christianity to be its critical self. 
Namely, he finds in Christianity an exemplary form of ideology critique, but does so 
through certain interpretation of the “death of God” theology that presents it as the ‘theo-
logico-political suspension of the ethical’, the core of the Christian position.  
 With this in hand, Žižek presents a negative politics of active refusal, an approach 
that differs considerably from Karl Marx and Terry Eagleton, but which presents theolog-
ical and political problems of its own. To address these, I will begin by discussing the 
way that Žižek rethinks the Marxist theory of ideology (discussed in chapter one) 
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along Lacanian lines. I pay particular attention to the place of the notion of the Big Other, 
cynicism, and belief, especially in terms of the role they each play in Žižek’s theory of 
ideology critique. I argue that what lies at the heart of Žižek’s attention to theology as 
ideology critique is the negative political effect of ideology critique itself.  While Žižek 
claims that this negativity about praxis opens up material conditions of possibility and 
clears the way for truly political Act, it is not clear that Žižek’s position fully explains the 
relation between critique and the practical demands to respond actively to the order we 
live in or why theology, even the radical revolutionary impulse of “its perverse core”, is 
absolutely necessary to address them. These problems notwithstanding, it is important to 
bring Žižek’s argument to the surface, and so I will reserve critical comments for the end, 
after first following his interpretation of Christianity as ideology critique as it relates to 
subjectivity and the political. 
Žižek’s Theory of Ideology  
 The relation between theology and ideology in Žižek’s critical theory is organized 
around three major ideas: his psychoanalytic critique of the big Other, his critique of cyn-
icism through unbelief, and his political understanding of the Act. While Žižek’s politics 
lack doctrines, he is motivated by a desire to provoke the authentic political Act and to 
explain its relation to the political subject.1 Žižek is responding to what he sees as the pri-
mary ideological trap of liberalism, multiculturalism, toleration, and so on, all of which 
tries to convince subjects of the inevitable success of capitalism and the impossibility of 
                                                
1Adrian Johnston Badiou, Žižek, and Political Transformations: The Cadence of Change (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 2009), 85-126.; Matthew Sharpe and Geoff Boucher, Žižek and Politics A 
Critical Introduction (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 60-86.  
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radical social change. This means that “the cadence of change” must be thoroughly prag-
matic and gradual - that large scale shifts in the prevailing order are simply not necessary 
or desirable.2 The whole point of Žižek’s theory is to inquire forcefully about the condi-
tions of possibility for revolutionary subjectivity, despite the current coordinates that de-
fine political life today incessantly repressing and stifling it. Thus, for Žižek, “ideology is 
always a field of struggle.”3 
 Žižek’s ideology critique is a ‘philosophy under the condition of the political’, 
and so is an attempt to produce and establish the kind of subject necessary for this work; 
in this way, Žižek’s theory of ideology is always a philosophy of the subject. An early in-
troduction to Žižek identifies three central areas of Žižek’s work (which has grown con-
siderably since, in both volume and breadth), the last of which was the defense of ‘the 
subject’4, and more specifically, the Cartesian cogito.5 Since the advent of postmodernity, 
the cogito has fallen on hard times and has more than its fair share of critics, most of 
whom are eager to decenter and disintegrate the subject, holding it responsible for “dam-
aged human life” caused by the instrumentalization of reason with modern society. That 
said, the Cartesian cogito has also been very important for nearly all post-Enlightenment 
                                                
2 Johnston, Badiou, Žižek, and Political Transformations, 23. 
3 Slavoj Žižek, First as Tragedy, Then As Farce (London: Verso, 2009), 37.  
4 Sarah Kay, Žižek: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2003), 26.  
5 Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject. The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London: Verso, 1999), 2; 
Tony Myers, Slavoj Žižek (London: Routledge, 2003), 31.; Slavoj Žižek, “Cogito, Madness and Religion: 
Derrida, Foucault and then Lacan.” http://www.lacan.com/zizforest.html. 
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emancipatory movements, Marxism included, and so Žižek finds it to be more worth-
while to rehabilitate the cogito rather than try to do away with it all together.6 And so, 
Žižek turns to Jacques Lacan, enlisting him in the effort to reactivate the more materialist 
and political aspects of modern subjectivity, as found within Kant and Descartes, and to 
save the Subject from the postmodernists and the left-liberal academy who are all too ea-
ger to announce its premature death.7 How Žižek interprets Lacan’s views on the subject 
is central to the relationship between the Event of the political act, ideology critique, and 
Christianity. Žižek is led by Lacan to argue that the prospect of critique starts and ends 
with the subject, since ideologies reside in how political subjects repetitively enact social 
reality. Ideology, then, acts within and as the fundamental contradiction, the Gap, be-
tween what the subject believes and how the subject acts. The aim of critique is not to re-
solve this antagonism or to uncover or reveal its true nature, but to own up to it, to 
acknowledge its inescapability, and to strive forward by struggling to think and establish 
new, unforeseen forms of collective life in spite of its brute facticity, 
 But how does this explain the importance that Žižek places on theology? Žižek’s 
aim in ideology critique is to identify the traumatic Gaps, the ‘non-All’ in reality where 
its utmost, fundamental antagonisms reside, in order to negatively clear an  ‘empty’ 
                                                
6 Razmig Keucheyan. The Left Hemisphere: Mapping Critical Theory Today, ed. Gregory Elliott (London: 
Verso, 2014), 183.  
7 Slavoj Žižek, “Preface: Burning the Bridges,” in The Žižek Reader, ed. Elizabeth Wright and Edmond Leo 
Wright (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), vii-x.  
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space, free from “any positively determined reality.”8 This is politically important be-
cause it is only when these spaces are cleared, when the gaps are negated, that subjectiv-
ity is made possible again, and with it, the authentic political acts which do not exist 
within the coordinates of currently available options. This means that critique must hold 
open the space of the pre-ideological kernel, which, as the traumatic gap that engenders 
subjectivity, is nothing less than ‘True Openness’ of revolutionary politics. This calls for 
a kind of apocalyptic thinking, such as that which Žižek finds in the structure of the 
Event.9 As it turns out, one of the foremost theorists of the Event, Alain Badiou, is also 
fascinated with the political import of St. Paul’s theology for rethinking revolutionary 
subjectivity.10 Žižek follows him there and in so doing, finds in Christianity, a “subver-
sive kernel” of materialist theology that lies at its “perverse core.”11 For Žižek, “what is 
revealed in Christianity is not just the entire content, but more specifically that there is 
nothing – no secret – behind to be revealed… what God reveals is not His hidden power, 
only His impotence as such.”12  
                                                
8 Slavoj Žižek, “The Spectre of Ideology,” in Mapping Ideology, ed. Slavoj Žižek (London: Verso, 1994), 
17.  
9 Slavoj Žižek, “Paul and the Truth Event,” in Paul's New Moment: Continental Philosophy and the Future 
of Christian Theology, eds. Creston Davis, John Milbank, and Slavoj Žižek (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 
2010), 76-87, 90; Slavoj Žižek, The Event: A Philosophical Journey Through A Concept (Brooklyn, NY: 
Melville House, 2004), 159-169. 
10 Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). 
For more on the link between Badiou's and Žižek’s theologies, see John Caputo and Linda Alcoff, ed., St. 
Paul Among the Philosophers (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009).; Douglas Harink, ed., 
Paul, Philosophy, and the Theopolitical Vision: Critical Engagements with Agamben, Badiou, Žižek, and 
Others (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2010).  
11 Slavoj Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity (Cambridge, Mass: MIT 
Press, 2003). 
12 Žižek, Puppet and the Dwarf, 127.  
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To prefigure the chapter a bit, Žižek’s argument is that Christian theology is ide-
ology critique at its best, most specifically in those places where one least expects it, 
places like the book of Job and the crucified Christ’s ‘cry of dereliction’, both of which 
express the single most important – and revolutionary – moment of theological truth: di-
vine abandonment. “Insofar as we conceive of ideology as the imaginary mitigating of a 
traumatic Real”, says Žižek, “the Book of Job provides what is perhaps the first exem-
plary case of the critique of ideology in human history, laying bare the basic discursive 
strategies of legitimizing suffering: Job’s properly ethical dignity lies in the way he per-
sistently rejects the notion that his suffering can have any meaning…and surprisingly, 
God takes his side at the end, claiming that every word that Job spoke was true.”13 This 
admission by God to God’s own impotence is the theological moment of ideology cri-
tique par excellence, leading Žižek to pursue its theoretical and political lessons. 
From Althusser to Lacan  
 To this point, I have been concerned with the newer philosophical interest in po-
litical theology coinciding with the resurgence of a heretofore submerged element within 
the Marxist legacy: the critique of ideology. But what is most unusual about this conver-
gence is not the theological interest, but rather the turn to ideology, especially in the wake 
of post-politics of the contemporary Left. It is not at all clear why the theory of ideology 
is so important, especially in light of the near universal consensus that our social, politi-
cal, and economic problems are not about ideology, but instead about discourse, power, 
narratives, bodies, and micro-politics - to name a few of the most common candidates. 
                                                
13 Žižek, Puppet and the Dwarf, 124-125. 
  
159 
For Žižek, the relevance of ideology critique for radical and emancipatory politics is in 
the way in which it exposes, in a traumatic and rupturing way, the uncontainable and un-
bearable gap between social reality and social possibility, or put differently, the way its 
opens up a “materialism without ‘materialism.’”14 For Žižek, “an ideology is really ‘hold-
ing us’ only when we do not feel any opposition between it and reality, that is, when the 
ideology succeeds in determining the mode of our everyday experience of reality it-
self.”15 To push back against the “post-ideological” and “post-political” spirit of the 
age16, Žižek employs key Lacanian concepts to explain the relevance of Marxist theory of 
                                                
14 Slavoj Žižek, Absolute Recoil: Towards a New Foundation of Dialectical Materialism (London: Verso, 
2014), 5; Slavoj Žižek, Less than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (London: 
Verso, 2012), 157.  
15 Slavoj Žižek, Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989), 49.  
16 For Žižek, this announcement of the end of ideology by critical sociology in the 1950-60s and then again 
by political theorists in the late 1980s (after the downfall of Soviet communism in Europe) signaled a new 
‘post-political’ era against which rationality. deliberation, and the processes of consensus-building were 
privileged, all in service to a global concord that accepted both the capitalist free market and the liberal 
state. This “post-political” era is also marked, in Žižek’s mind, by its claim to be “post-ideological” in the 
sense that it believes that the major political questions had more or less been resolved or had become irrele-
vant under the new modern agreement around western, liberal values and the rise of technocratic 
knowledge as the primary way of solving social and political problems. See R. Aron, “The end of the ideo-
logical age?,” in The end of ideology debate, C.I. Waxman, ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1968), 27-
48; Daniel Bell, The end of ideology (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960); Edward Shils, “The end of ideol-
ogy?,” in The end of ideology debate, C.I. Waxman, ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1968), 49-63.; Ed-
ward Shils, “The concept of ideology,” in International encyclopedia of the social sciences, D. Sills, eds 
(New York: Macmillan & Free Press, 1968), 66-75. For a critical examination for this literature, J.T. Jost, 
“The end of the end of ideology,” American Psychologist 61 (2006): 651–670.  
 For Žižek, all this establishes a “post-ideological” era that acts a systematic and strategic foreclo-
sure of politics for the sake of governmentality, discipline, and policing: supervision, administration, and 
technology overtook struggle, critique, and disagreement as political modes of life. Critique, Žižek argues, 
is necessary for reinstitution of the “properly political dimension” (which is inherently differential and an-
tagonistic) because critique is inherently oriented and structured by dissensus, rather the consensus model 
of liberal democracy. “Authentic politics…is the art of the impossible – it changes the very parameters of 
what is considered “possible” in the existing constellation.” (Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, 199) Žižek insists 
that a situation only becomes political when “a particular demand…starts to function as a metaphoric con-
densation of the global [universal] opposition against Them, those in power, so that the protest is no longer 
just about that demand, but about the universal dimension that resonates in that particular demand…What 
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ideology for contemporary questions and to advance its development by making serious 
updates to the Althusserian reading of Marx’s views on ideology and critique.  
 First, we must address the role of Lacanian psychoanalytic categories in Žižek’s 
ideology theory. Žižek’s theory of ideology is driven by his political interest in applying 
Lacanian terms to classical philosophical questions. From the beginning, Žižek identified 
ideology critique as his main philosophical interest for political reasons.17 At first, Žižek 
was eager to reassert the psychoanalytic theorist Jacques Lacan as a philosopher, arguing 
that he belongs in the same conversation with Descartes, Kant, and Hegel, and has been 
grossly overlooked in recent debates.18 Žižek connects the dots between Hegel and La-
can, primarily through Marx, which partly explains the significance of the theory of ide-
ology for his early philosophical project. This objective of this triangulation was to reha-
bilitate Lacan’s usefulness for radical Leftist politics during a time of significant up-
heaval and uncertainty after the significant defeats in the late 1980s. The shift from the 
‘New Left’ to the ‘post-political’ Left19 culminated in the early 1990s with the downfall 
                                                
post-politics tends to prevent is precisely this metaphoric universalisation of particular demands.” (Žižek, 
The Ticklish Subject, 171–244) 
17 Žižek, Sublime Object of Ideology, 12. 
18 Žižek, Sublime Object of Ideology, x-xi.  
19 When Žižek refers to the ‘post-political’ Left, he includes ‘agonistic’ political theorists such as Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, authors of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics (London: Verso, 1985). Žižek’s early work had more common with these “post-Marxist” voices 
than his later work, as represented in the dialogues published in Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj 
Žižek. Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (London: Verso, 2000). 
He will also cite Antonio Negri, Michael Hardt, and Simon Critchley as ‘opiners’ of the ‘post-political 
‘Left, in addition to naming, in a rather generic and vague way, social movements, such as feminism, anti-
racism, academic trends, like postcolonial and multiculturalist studies, as well as “the pseudo-radical aca-
demic leftists [whose] own radicality ultimately amounts to an empty gesture that obliges no one to any-
thing determinate.” He does not follow up with a specific list, leaving us all to wonder about and to whom 
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of the USSR, and was promptly followed by giddy announcements by western liberals of 
the “end of history”, who promised “the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and 
the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human govern-
ment.”20 Žižek, who came of academic age in the backdrop of the revolutions of 1989 
(the year that The Sublime Object of Ideology was published in English), believed it to be 
crucial that radical politics take center stage in theory, even if the vision of the Left 
seemed inconceivable within the established coordinates of contemporary political life.  
 Situated in the shadow of the resistance to the Yugoslavic communist regime, 
Žižek justifies the turn to Louis Althusser precisely because so many in academic circles 
considered him to be anemic and passé.21 To Žižek, their rejection showed that Althusser 
posed a threat to their political dominance. Althusser broadened the standard Marxist un-
derstanding of ideology (as described in chapter 1) to include not only how certain ideas 
are used to mislead political subjects in favor of the dominant economic system, as im-
posed by the ruling classes, but also how ideology resides within the concrete institutions 
and practices that give rise to these ideas: families, schools, and religious communities, as 
                                                
he is speaking. Cf. Slavoj Žižek, “Have Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri Rewritten the Communist Mani-
festo for the Twenty-first Century?,” Rethinking Marxism, Vol. 12.3/4 (2001): 190-198. 
20 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992), 3.  
21 Depoortere, Christ in Postmodern Philosophy, 95.; Kotsko, Žižek and Theology, 26. There is a pattern 
here: if something is trendy or in fashion, Žižek finds it incredibly suspect. If it is considered out-dated and 
irrelevant, this is a sign to Žižek that it may be of great theoretical and political value. Žižek’s motivation 
for engaging theology in a serious way is due, in some part anyhow, to this pattern, as is his commitment to 
doing politics out of ideology critique.  
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the key examples.22 In turning his attention to “the soft power” of these ‘Ideological State 
Apparatuses’ (‘ISAs’), Althusser argues that ideology is not directly based on the eco-
nomic system, but lives primarily within the concrete practices and habits of everyday 
life; it has a “material existence.”23 These practices are doubly ideological in the sense 
that they reinforce the “imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of 
experience”, but also are the very form in which the ideological system maintains the 
hold of this ‘imaginary relationship’ on the subject itself. This happens in the “interpella-
tion”, the call whereby the subject’s dependence on ideology is naturalized and universal-
ized as “the way things just are.” To make matters more troubling, this interpellation is 
the founding gesture of subjectivity itself; it is made clear to the subject that, as a subject 
tout court, she is subjugated to the ideological demands. It cannot be any other way. C’est 
la vie, or as Žižek says, “like love, ideology is blind, even if the people caught up in it are 
not.”24 The transition from Althusser to Lacan comes down to a cynical acceptance of 
ideology’s ubiquity rather than a relentless critique of it, based on the conviction that a 
state beyond or outside ideology is possible, necessary, even for effective political 
change. Once you follow Althusser, Žižek maintains, there becomes little reason to di-
rectly oppose ideology, and so critique becomes neutral rather than negative, strategic ra-
ther than suspicious.  
                                                
22 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus,” in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, 
trans. Ben Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1971), 127-188. 
23 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus,” 162, 165.  
24 Žižek, First as Tragedy, 37.  
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Žižek is clearly concerned about the political ramifications of a cynical theory of 
ideology that abdicates to the post-political milieu by thinking that it can so easily dis-
pense with the critique of ideology, as if it has no active political purpose, and so is not 
longer required. If we all know that we are duped by the ideological system, the critique 
of ideology (which purports to expose us to this fact) seems redundant and unnecessary – 
it simply tells us what we already know. But for Žižek, it is at this point that ideology is 
most dangerous and effective, for “an ideology really succeeds when even the facts which 
at first sight contradict it start to function as arguments in its favor.”25 The strongest case, 
in Žižek’s mind, for the urgent need to rehabilitate the theory of ideology for contempo-
rary political concerns, is the neutralization of ideology critique by admitting to ideol-
ogy’s pervasive ubiquity: “this denial of ideology only provides the ultimate proof that 
we are more than ever embedded in ideology.”26 It is when we claim to be most fully 
aware of ideology (but cynically enact it nevertheless through our social practices) and 
therefore no longer see the need for ideology critique, that we are at our most ideological 
point: “the stepping out of ideology is the very form of our enslavement to it.”27  
 For Žižek, Althusser’s mistake is that he fails to theorize ideology beyond the 
“critique of cynical reason”, whereby subjects are thought to be enlightened to their own 
false consciousness, even if that consciousness takes concrete form via the very practices 
                                                
25 Žižek, Sublime Object of Ideology, 49.  
26 Žižek, First as Tragedy, 37.  
27 Matthew Sharpe, Slavoj Žižek: A Little Piece of the Real (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 60.  
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that produce it.28 Traditional views of ideology are mistaken about where ideology hap-
pens and what it looks like, and as such, misdirects its critique. Ideology, for Žižek, hap-
pens not at the level of knowledge (pace Althusser and the cynics who dismiss the ideol-
ogy critique as passé), but at the level of social reality itself: “what the individuals are do-
ing, and not only what they think or know they are doing.”29 To correct this mistake, 
Žižek argues, we must turn to Lacan, whose understanding of the traumatic and unbeara-
ble gap between the Symbolic system and the order of the Real, clarifies precisely how 
and why ideology is so effective. Žižek relies deeply on Lacan’s work throughout his phi-
losophy, but the most important concepts have to do with the traumatic relations of the 
Symbolic and the Real, the ‘big Other’, and the role of all three in subjectivity. Žižek ex-
plores these connections through the interplay between cynicism, belief, and fantasy in 
reference to ideology and social reality, to which we will now turn.  
Ideology: the Symbolic Order and the ‘big Other’ 
 Žižek finds Laconian psychoanalysis to be indispensable for understanding the 
constraints of human behavior under ideological conditions, which is itself necessary for 
any attempt to rethink and rework political possibilities under the present system we live 
in. Among the most important of these concepts is the now infamous Lacanian triad: the 
relation between the orders of the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real.30 For Lacan 
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(and so, Žižek), it is the interaction between the Symbolic and the Real, or more pre-
cisely, the traumatic rupture or gap produced by the failure between them, that yields the 
insubstantial space of the subject. For Žižek it comes down to the way the subject ‘learns’ 
to respond to the founding Cut, the wound at the core of the subject, that stands in for its 
failed state: its non-identity. This non-identity is then written into the socio-structural fab-
ric of how and why political subjects act the way they do, or in other words, ideology and 
its alliance with the big Other.31  . 
 Ideology originates from the traumatic gap between the Real and social reality, as 
structured by the Symbolic order. The Real is the unbearable, abyssal “leftover” that the 
Symbolic cannot express or enclose within its system of signification. Žižek describes it 
this way: “the Real is simultaneously the Thing to which direct access is not possible and 
the obstacle that prevents this direct access; the Thing that eludes our grasp and the dis-
torting screen that makes us miss the Thing.”32 In this way, we must say that “the Real is 
not external to the Symbolic: the Real is the Symbolic itself in the modality of ‘non-
All’…and to step into the Real does not entail abandoning language, throwing oneself 
into the abyss of the chaotic Real, but on the contrary, dropping the very allusion to some 
external point of reference, which eludes the Symbolic.”33 But, since ideology belongs to 
                                                
31 Žižek’s theory of subject construction, developed with help from Hegel, Lacan, Marx, and Freud is 
highly complex, and will not be treated with the requisite specificity here. However, Žižek’s interest in the 
relation of ideology and theology is based on his theory of political subjectivity, and so it is important to at 
least sketch out how fantasy and ideology structures the subject and its acts, and how theology helps intro-
duce a critical negativity that shifts political possibility.  
32 Žižek, Puppet and the Dwarf, 77.  
33 Žižek, Puppet and the Dwarf, 69-70.  
  
166 
the Symbolic, it cannot be said that ideology critique frees the subject to grasp of the 
Real, namely because it cannot close the gap between the Symbolic and the Real, the 
deadlock is that the traumatic remainder of non-representation itself. The Symbolic order 
uses social reality to try shield us from the unbearable trauma of this, our founding gap. 
Subjectivity owes its incomplete and contingency, its Wound, to this primordial, found-
ing trauma.34 This abyssal Lack, this wound/cut has traumatic effects on the subject inso-
far as it is produced by the failure of the Symbolic to account for the whole of the Real, to 
contain its unpredictability of the Void’s ontological multiplicity and incompleteness. 
Žižek cautions us not to reify the Real, thereby glossing over its negativity: “the 
Lacanian Real is not another Center, a ‘deeper’, ‘truer’, focal point or ‘black hole’ around 
which symbolic formulations fluctuate; rather it is the obstacle on account of which every 
Center is always displaced, missed.”35 Speaking of the Real, “there is nothing outside it, 
no external limits, yet it is not all, it can break down.”36 Only when we come to terms 
with the ‘non-All’ character of the Real (and the traumatic impact of this on the subject) 
are we able to see how ideology emerges. The Real is both traumatic and unbearable to 
the subject because it wreaks havoc on the gentrifying and censoring gestures of symboli-
zation that constitute and stabilize the subject’s concrete acts in the world: “the Lacanian 
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Real – the Thing – is not so much the inert presence that ‘curves’ the symbolic space (in-
troducing gaps and inconsistencies in it), but, rather, the effect of these gaps and incon-
sistencies.”37 There is always an apocalyptic remainder, the harrowing kernel of the Real 
which is always missed by the Symbolic order, the inconsistency that haunts the subject, 
despite our repeated attempts to neutralize, sublate, and integrate it into the symbolic or-
der.38 
Žižek uses Lacan’s description of the Symbolic order which is based on the essen-
tially structuralist insight that language is a differential system of signifiers and as such, 
is self-reflexive, rather than referring directly to that which stands external to them, what 
is commonly referred to as ‘the real world.’ Ordering and stabilizing this chain of signifi-
cation is ‘the Big Other’, which, due to its tautological and auto-referential character, is 
useless as a signifier,39 despite operating as one. As the Transcendental master-signifier, 
the big Other justifies its place in the order by structuring the open-ended void of multi-
ple ‘floating signifiers’ into an united field with itself as “the nodal point”, that ‘pure sig-
nifying’40 force that creates and sustains the identity of the ideological field41 by holding 
together its differential and antagonistic elements.42 This point contains them and ‘quilts’ 
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them together43, so as to keep them from sliding out of place as part of this structure net-
work of meaning; in doing so, the big Other ‘fixes’ their meaning, however artificially, 
effectively holding off, if only for a time, the unbearable fact that the Void, the space that 
the big Other holds close, will eventually show itself again. This is, in fact, the ruptural 
Event sought by ideology critique: to hold up on the Void, the ‘non-All’ of social reality, 
long enough so as to produce and generate political subjects.  
 As the subject is thrown into the Symbolic order, this ‘nodal point’ takes up the 
role of the big Other as “the unquestionable authority which can impose limits”44, the 
master-signifier in the symbolic system that claims its authoritative function only insofar 
as subjects activate it by assuming its place and role as the guarantor of that virtual sym-
bolic order that structures social reality for us. For Žižek, the big Other is not a single 
subject, but rather a function of ideology filed under a plurality of names (i.e., God, the 
Party, Freedom, the People), all of which share the basic structure as the assumed guaran-
tee of the accepted social order, as the “rules of the game” that regulate the established 
field of possibilities for thinking and acting, and holds its all together in some semblance 
of intelligibility.45 
 Žižek will turn repeatedly to the function of big Other as the underwriter for the 
ideological fantasy, as that which promises to stabilizes the subject as it emerges from the 
traumatic experience in between the Real and the Symbolic orders, but at great cost: that 
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it must exist with ideology, “as if he had already chosen.” The results of the Real working 
underneath the big Other so as to topple and expose the ideological fantasies at work 
within social reality can be devastating for the subject, which is why the Big Other is in-
stalled and reinforced, so that it can resist the antagonistic Real trying to break through 
the Symbolic façade of the currently existing social bond. The big Other works to install 
peace, order, and coherence to what will otherwise be chaos, contradiction, violence, and 
upheaval. Politically speaking, the big Other, as the master signifier, imposes itself upon 
social reality in an effort to forestall the traumatic irruption of the Real and so produces 
ideology as such, making it appear to the subject as if it is inexorable as a ‘given’ charac-
teristic that governs and structures the field of (currently available) political options. This 
is why Žižek is so eager to topple the big Other, using ideology critique as a political tool 
of instigation, to bring this original condition, the pure multiplicity of the negative Void, 
back to the foreground of politics, as scary as this sounds. His primary reason, as we shall 
see, is to expand the field of currently existing political choices and options by reopening 
“the Communist hypothesis”46, the condition of possibility for political Acts themselves, 
acts that issue forth from the Real. 
 The big Other performs as ideology by totalizing the symbolic order, effectively 
screening the subject off from the radical multiplicity of the pre-ideological kernel of 
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Symbolic surplus, that traumatic gap from which subjectivity emerges that bares the un-
bearable truth of our contingency, our groundlessness, the arbitrary spontaneity with 
which we enter and exit the world. The big Other tries to objectify and occupy “the 
empty space”, the uncontainable remainder, after symbolization. Žižek describes it in ide-
ological terms as the point de capiton which reassures the subject of the veracity and reli-
ability of the Symbolic order, even while the symbolic order is itself dependent on the 
concrete practices of the subject: “The point de capiton is rather the word which, as a 
word, on the level of the signifier itself unified a given field, constitutes its identity: it is, 
so to speak, the word to which ‘things’ themselves refer to recognize themselves to their 
unity.”47 It is here that the ideological function of the big Other is most clear. It is not “a 
point of supreme density of Meaning, the kind of Guarantee which by, being itself, ex-
cepted from the differential interplay of elements, would serve as a stable and fixed point 
of reference.”48 It is quite the contrary, actually. It is indeed, nothing but “‘pure diffe-
rence’: its role is purely structural, its nature is purely performative – its signification co-
incides with the its own act of enunciation; in short, it is a ‘signifier without the signi-
fied.’”49 Žižek writes that “this dimension of the ‘big Other’ is that of the constitutive al-
ienation of the subject in the symbolic order: the big Other pulls the strings, the subject 
doesn't speak, he "is spoken" by the symbolic structure.”50 The cunning of the big Other 
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is that it is rarely questioned; it is highly invisible, naturalized, and universalized, not be-
cause everyone actually believes in it and is committed to its continuance, but rather be-
cause “nobody really knows what it means, but each of them somehow presupposes that 
others know, that it has to mean ‘the real thing’, so they use it all time.”51 Nevertheless, it 
is “the element, which represents within the field of Meaning, the agency of pure signi-
fier… as the point which ‘gives meaning’ to all the others and thus totalizes the field of 
(ideological) meaning.”52 
The danger of the big Other is precisely the same in psychoanalysis as it is in poli-
tics: “as kind of a transcendent guarantee, [it is] the element which only holds the place 
of a certain lack, which is in its bodily presence nothing but an embodiment of a certain 
lack which is perceived as a point of supreme plentitude.”53 It allows the subject to avoid 
the full interrogation of her conditions; it keeps the “error of perspective” alive, allowing 
us to think that there is really something there, some real kernel of truth about ourselves 
and the world to be found, if we can free ourselves from our fantasies and illusions. It 
keeps the subject from encountering herself as such; it precludes the subject from experi-
encing the void of multiplicity and contingency, through which the subject must navigate, 
if she hopes to live authentically. It is in owning up to the groundlessness of her lan-
guage, the failure of her attempts to identify with herself, that actual freedom, rather the 
forced choices of “mindfulness” or “democracy”, is made possible again.  
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The big Other is the truly ideological fantasy, not because it hides the truth from 
the subject, but because it is truth, and as such, effectively screens the subject off from 
her constitutive Lack. Žižek’s modification of the critique of ideology procedure is spe-
cifically designed to counter the big Other without at the same time replacing it. The ide-
ologico-critical project of “traversing the fantasy” of the big Other  is not to restore to the 
subject her immediate access to reality “outside of fantasy”, but as Žižek says, “to fully 
identify oneself with the fantasy, to bring the fantasy out…Once we do this, its hold over 
us is suspended - why?”54 It is only by ‘over-identifying’ with the fantasy, being brought 
into an deeply intimate relation with it, to be claimed by it more than ever, that we are 
able to disable it. It possesses operative strength only when it is able to act as the trans-
parent background to the subject’s experience of self and world.55  
Cynicism and Belief 
 What is missing at this juncture is the link between fantasy and the act, especially 
as that relation is structured through ideology. This connection is provided, at least provi-
sionally, by how Žižek theorizes the critical function of belief in the midst of cynical rea-
son. This sets the stage for the crucial role that religion, and ‘Pauline’ Christianity in par-
ticular, plays in elevating the place of ideology critique in Žižek’s political thought. The 
problem, as Žižek sees it, with ideology critique today is not that no one believes in it an-
ymore, but that we are all too certain that we are aware of and awakened to, their ideolog-
ical state. It is cynicism about ideology - the sense that we know we are being duped, but 
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do little about it - that troubles Žižek: “the very concept of ideology implies a kind of 
constitutive naiveté, the misrecognition of its own presuppositions, of its own effective 
conditions, a distance, a divergence between so-called social reality and our distorted rep-
resentations, our false consciousness of it.”56 It is our knowledge of and belief in ideology 
that will prove to be most ensnaring. Peter Sloterdijk argues for the end of ‘ideology’ talk 
by theorizing the contemporary mood of cynicism which problematizes the procedure of 
critique itself.57 Cynical reason, or “enlightened false consciousness” refers to how the 
contemporary subject can be quite aware that the ideological mask she wears conceals or 
obscures social reality, but nevertheless still wears the mask, even though she knows that 
it is obfuscating, distorting, and hiding the truth.58 She also knows that every subject 
around her also knows this (both that she is living in ideology, but is doing nothing dif-
ferently, and that they are too). They too know that she knows, but they all nevertheless 
opt to not behave differently, to act as if they do not know that they know what they are 
doing. The formula for ideology is no longer, “they do not know what they are doing”, 
but rather “they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it.” In the 
traditional view, ideology depends on naiveté in order to be effective, but as it turns out, 
ideology actually thrives on knowledge, on an ‘enlightened consciousness’ that is aware 
of its spuriosity, but rather than getting rid of it, actually maintains it. Cynical reason does 
not denounce ideology even though it is aware of it and its effects on the subject. Rather, 
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cynicism actively sustains it, reinscribing it willfully into the everyday acts and practices 
that shape human life. Indeed, for Žižek, cynicism is “an exact inversion of Marx’s for-
mula: today, we only imagine that we do not ‘really believe’ in our ideology – in spite of 
this imaginary distance, we continue to practice it.”59 
Cynical reason apparently challenges the necessity of ideology critique in a situa-
tion where we consider ourselves to be fully aware of ideology and the effects of its hold 
on us. Everyone knows that ideology is in place, that it is acting upon their knowing, their 
way of being, but they act as if they do not. How ideology acts - and the form it takes - in 
our world today is not as the shadowy specter who is present precisely in its absence, 
whose purveyors try to maintain its power on the subject by avoiding its detection, keep-
ing it and its effects hidden. In this cynical time, ideology has become bold and auda-
cious; it protects itself by not hiding at all. We all see it, we all know it, we all perceive 
ourselves acting and living into it, but its presence is so mundane and boring; it has be-
come naturalized. What good will ideology critique do if we are already disabused of ide-
ology’s presence and action in our social order? We do not need to be told ideology is all 
around us; we know that already. Everyone is aware that the ideas that support and legiti-
mate the social system that we participate in are ideological, and so ideology critique 
seems redundant in a situation where everyone is conscious of it. But Žižek argues that 
cynicism, rather than spelling the end of ideology, does not understand how ideology ac-
tually works in its current form. Ideology is not a matter of holding false beliefs, but is 
“an illusion, an error, a distortion which is already at work in the social reality itself, at 
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the level of what individuals are doing, and not only what they think or know they are do-
ing.”60 For Žižek, cynicism does not render the critique of ideology pointless, but rather 
helps us clarify how ideology is functioning, namely that subjects never fully go ‘all in’, 
that there remains some traumatic leftover, a point Althusser missed, but that Lacan made 
clear.  
In response to cynicism, the early (and more Marxist) Žižek departs from the tra-
ditional view of ideology critique that “the ideological is a social reality whose very ex-
istence implies the non-knowledge of its participants as to its essence, the social effectiv-
ity, the preproduction of which implies that the individuals ‘do not know what they are 
doing.’”61 The way to respond is to replace the binary of reality and appearance (which 
the culture of cynicism itself maintains) and reconnect critique with action instead of 
knowledge or belief. Rather than trying to convince the political subject that the reality 
that she accepts as real is actually false, ideology critique is about identifying “a certain 
fissure asymmetry, a certain pathological, imbalance…which subverts its own universal 
foundation, a species subverting its own genus.”62  
The political subject cannot escape, or somehow suspend, ideology or its effects. 
But critique is misguided if it considers its primary objective to be to show the truth of 
something, as if it it must reveal that one what believes to be true is actually not. The 
problem of ideology, as Žižek sees it, is a more fundamental and dialectical contradiction 
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between knowing and acting that always already precedes both. Since, for Žižek, “the 
fundamental level of ideology, however, is not that of an illusion masking the real state of 
things, but that of an unconscious fantasy structuring our social reality itself”63, the task 
of the critique of ideology, then, is to “[detect] a point of breakdown heterogeneous to a 
given ideological field and at the same time necessary for that field to achieve its closure, 
its accomplished form.”64 This ‘point of breakdown’ is synonymous with the reality it-
self, that aspect ‘in-itself’ whereby it simply dissolves, changes, and causes a shift in de-
sire, residing in yet another objet petit a, provided by ideology.  
The paradox is that ideology “can reproduce itself only in so far as it is misrecog-
nized and overlooked.’”65 Once we “see reality as it is”, it is no longer real. The misrec-
ognition of social reality is part of this reality itself. The constitution of social reality re-
quires ideological distortion, and so it relies upon fetishes, language, fantasies, and sym-
bols to sustain itself. However, the ideology of social reality does not require subjects to 
believe in it for it to exist, only that subjects act ‘as if’ they do. Ideology is not a dream-
like illusion that we build to escape an insupportable realty; it is a fantasy-construction 
which serves as a support for reality itself, an illusion that sutures the fundamental antag-
onistic gap enforced the insupportable, impossible kernel of the Real, “the traumatic so-
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cial divisions that cannot be symbolized, that cannot be contained in the system of signi-
fication.”66 Žižek contends that cynicism only helps to illustrate that ideology happens at 
“the level of what the individuals are doing”, their real social activity, rather than at the 
register of knowledge: “What they overlook, what they misrecognize, is not the reality, 
but the illusion which is structuring their reality.”67 This “illusion” is the fundamental an-
tagonism that exists between belief and action, a contradiction that is thoroughly political 
in form and psychological in structure, insofar as it resides within the subject itself.  
For Žižek, the political question becomes “why?” Why do even “cynically en-
lightened” subjects not act any differently, despite their awareness of ideology? What 
structures and supports this illusion of social reality, and how must the critique of ideol-
ogy shift itself, so as to encounter ideology more productively? Why do people, who as 
political agents are “the subjects who are supposed to know”68, consistently act directly 
counter to their own interests?69 We are no longer unaware that what we see, that what 
we are told is true, what we act in and towards, is not “that-which-is”; we know perfectly 
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well that the chimera presented to us as “the thing in itself” is indeed a fallacious repre-
sentation, full of manipulation, deceit, and caricature. The place of illusion proper to ide-
ology, then, is in the reality of activity, so that “they know that, in their activity, they are 
following an illusion, but still they are doing it.”70 This ‘enlightenment does not seem to 
lead to a different way of life, even when armed with the knowledge that things are not as 
the media or the market suggest them to be. In this culture of cynicism, ideology acts as 
the foundation to “belief before belief” that shapes the very activity that exhibits our ad-
hesion to the social order even as we are aware that it is neither natural, universal, or 
given.71 Žižek exaggerates when he writes: “nobody takes democracy or justice seriously, 
we are all aware of their corrupted nature, but we participate in them, we display our be-
lief in them, because we assume that they work, even if we do not believe in them.”72 In-
deed, it is obvious that Žižek is incorrect when he argues that “nobody takes democracy 
or justice seriously”, but I take his point being that the ideological state of political sub-
jects make it very difficult for them to really take upon themselves the radical demands of 
democracy or justice, or solidarity, love, and compassion, for that mater.  
If the traditional critique of ideology is the unveiling or exposure of the ‘false 
consciousness of a (social) being’, which illuminates to the subject the truth of her situa-
tion, and so makes authentic revolutionary praxis possible, the cynical critique of ideol-
ogy is to point out that the traditional critique of ideology is indeed ideological itself, 
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namely that its  view of critique as ‘deideologization’ of the social order is naive, consid-
ering how savvy we all are about knowing what it is we do not know. The pedagogical 
aim of this critique to teach subjects how to, in fact, act in the world otherwise; that is, to 
act like in light of what they know to be true. However, in Žižek’s mind, both the tradi-
tional and ‘cynical’ critique of ideology are inadequate because they do not understand 
the critical structure of belief: the way it traverses fantasy, through ironic stages of its 
own negation73, or what Žižek terms elsewhere its “fetishistic disavowal.”74 This is the 
position of cynical compliance or conformity in full knowledge and recognition that the 
particular order is false, absurd, or otherwise not credible. How does this work in ideol-
ogy? Žižek’s critical theory of belief is best described as an ‘over-identification’ with be-
lief that actively unveils the structure of critical disavowal itself. It renders clear “the way 
that a belief is a reflexive attitude: it is never a case of simply believing - one has to be-
lieve in belief itself.”75 It works in either direction: by believing and acting as if I do not, 
or by not believing, but sincerely acting as if I do.76 Either way, the ideologico-critical ef-
fect of this un/belief is the same: it “objectifies” and externalizes it, bringing to the sur-
face the precise manner in which belief is way of acting, and that we act into social real-
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ity ‘as if’ we believe in it. It is only by over-identifying with belief, by acting in our be-
lief, and doing so sincerely, that we are able to see what we believe in and why we be-
lieve, and thus able to get rid of our beliefs.77 The idea of belief as a strategy for unbelief 
explains why “those who actively try to prevent themselves from getting caught in ideol-
ogy by way of knowledge, who continue to doubt rather than believe, are the ones most 
likely to get wrapped up in ideology.”78 Put differently, “a cynic who ‘believes only his 
eyes’ misses the efficiency of the symbolic fiction, the way this fiction structures our ex-
perience of reality.”79  
Žižek’s Critique of Ideology 
 With this in mind, what does ideology critique achieve for the subject, and what 
are its political implications? Žižek turns to psychoanalysis as a model for its critically 
negative procedure. It “transverses the fantasy”, rather than uncovers the Real, and as 
such, it lays bare the fundamental Lack that accompanies the symbolic order - without 
covering it up again. It allows the subject to face into, to confront, the ‘Non-All’ of real-
ity without trying to explain it, contain it, or symbolize it in any way. Ideology critique 
frees the subject, not to see the way things really are, but to recognize this misses the 
point - and is ideological itself. To critique ideology is to renounce all attempts at filling 
out the void, or explaining it away; it is to admit that the Lack which establishes the coor-
dinates of desire and so is the origin, source, and condition of the subject, must remain 
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‘empty’. But this emptiness is not vacancy but negation, provided of course by the Hege-
lian dialectical process: it is a “materialism without matter.” The spirit of the ‘antimony 
of critic-ideological reason’ protects the Voided ‘empty place’, the gap or lack of the 
Other, through a dialectical movement that has no final closure, that offers no hope of be-
ing fully explained or completed. This surely wrecks havoc on the subject, eventually di-
viding it, leaving it destitute due to the unbearable pressure that comes with being thrown 
without choice into the contingency, openness, and sheer unpredictability of the primor-
dially repressed fact that ‘there is no Big Other.’ 
The goal of ideology critique is to to lay bare this empty place, this Nothing that 
undergirds subjectivity, and that renders reality incomplete, insubstantial, and truly open 
the possibility of the New. Critique itself is possible because of this primordial antago-
nism of social reality itself, that fact that reality can never be whole, that it can never be 
identified with itself. It is never “there” for the taking. So, the critical perspective on ide-
ology is not about acquiring the truth about reality, but to surface the repressed Real of 
the fundamental antagonism that social reality itself represses in service to the Symbolic 
order. The point here is not to point out and then resolve this antagonism, but to own up 
to it as the essential human condition. Like fantasy, what we are to do when faced with it 
is not to try to expose it, so that it can be erased, but rather to “over-identify” with it, for 
when we ‘pretend to pretend to believe’ in it, it disarms its effect on the subject.80 What is 
left to do after the critique of ideology is not to return that primordial kernel of the truth 
or the Real upon which we establish new norms, a better Law, a more adequate political 
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order, but rather to actively resist any and all efforts, no matter their aims or label, 
thereby objectifying this emptiness as the very act of exposure; it is to say “there is noth-
ing, but this nothing itself, the nothing that is the subject.”81  
Indeed, Žižek interprets all politics to be attempts to harmonize this inconsistency, 
to heal the rupture, to fill in the gaps with one suturing strategy or the other, so as to abol-
ish and eradicate this tension, and so secure the subject.82 The search for the original pu-
rity of the harmonious order, so as to recover or return to some original, non-alienated 
state, is not possible – there is no ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ ideology. Social reality itself is 
not possible without it. What the critique of ideology tries to get at, then, is not the libera-
tion of human knowers from false representation, erroneous beliefs, or a transformation 
of social practices and institutions whereby we are returned to an original condition, free 
of antagonism or repression. Rather, ideology critique concerns the material conditions 
under which the authentic political act is made possible. Put differently, ideology critique 
in Žižek’s vision is a theory of Event, a project in which theology plays a major role.  
 By attempting to “to detect beyond the dazzling splendor of the element which 
holds it together, this self preferential, tautological, performative operation”83, critique 
takes up the big Other as “the ideological edifice, as this phallic, erected Guarantee of 
Meaning” and “recognizes in it the embodiment of lack, the chasm of non-sense gaping 
                                                
81 Žižek, Sublime Object of Ideology, 195.  
82 Žižek, Sublime Object of Ideology, 21. 
83 Žižek, Sublime Object of Ideology, 109.  
  
183 
in the midst of ideological meaning.”84 Politically speaking, Žižek’s critique of ideology 
hopes to lay bare how ideology is our (experience of) reality; like Marx and Eagleton, he 
does not claim to strip from the subject all instances of its “false consciousness”. What 
we get “on the other side” of ideology critique is not an innermost, authentic self, but a 
traumatic Void of multiplicity whose negativity renders us entirely bereft of all guaran-
tees, all external limits. Ideology critique is not necessarily good news for the subject; by 
and large, the subject much prefers fantasy - and for good reason. Politics, theology, and 
psychoanalysis share a family resemblance as instances of ideology critique - they are all 
interested in showing the subject that “the big Other does not exist.” What  the critique of 
ideology does when faced with the fantastical operations of the big Other is to reassert 
the fundamental antagonism between the Symbolic and Real, reminding social reality 
(and political subjects, for that matter) of its traumatic origins. Only here can ideology 
critique hope to make a political difference. It does this by demonstrating the failure of 
social reality to heal or cope with this trauma, and so serves as a kind of Socratic psycho-
analyst, whose midwifery brings forth that apocalyptic “zero point”, the condition of ab-
solute freedom, which helps the subjects eschew “the forced choices”85 of merely ‘for-
mal’ freedom, opting instead for something altogether different, albeit New and as of yet, 
unseen.\ 
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The ‘Eventfulness’ of the Act 
In the essay, “St. Paul and the Truth-Event”, Žižek turns to St. Paul (through 
Badiou) in order to suggest that when “short-circuited”, both authors together present 
Truth as an Event that perverts the structure of Being and belongs to a wholly other regis-
ter, ‘the pure Multiplicity of Nothing.’86 “A true Event emerges out of the ‘Void’ of the 
situation”87, and so its radically undecidable and spontaneous activity has neither an onto-
logical guarantee nor a hidden content or agency.88 It attaches itself to that localized Void 
inherent in the inconsistencies and transgressions of every situation, making a new Sub-
ject visible and intelligible ex nihilo: it ushers in the Subject from the empty Void. This 
“Void” is the ontological incompleteness of reality itself, a point that Christianity makes 
particularly well (as we shall see). It is not the nihilist ‘nothing that is still something’, 
but rather the materialist ‘something that is nothing’, that truly terrifying and abyssal 
truth that is always already the site where consistent subjectivity is borne. While Žižek 
links the Event to subjectivity itself, “In this precise sense, an Event involves subjectiv-
ity; the engaged “subjective perspective” on the Event is part of the Event itself”89,  the 
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Event-structure of ideology critique is not good news for the Subject, for “the Event nec-
essarily appears as standalone, as an undesirable, chaotic intrusion that has no place in the 
state of the situation.”90 Žižek is clear that “what defines the subject is his or her fidelity 
to the Event: the subject comes after the Event and persists in discerning its traces within 
his and her situation.” If this is true, the Subject is clearly not good news either, not only 
for itself, but for the socio-symbolic order. It is imbued with all the Event’s characteris-
tics; its contingency, its partiality, its instability. It is here that Žižek describes ideology 
critique and subject formation in the same terms: “the truth-Event is simply a radically 
new beginning: it designates the violent, traumatic and contingent, intrusion of another 
dimension not ‘mediated’ by the domain of terrestrial finitude and corruption.”91 The 
question is what role does theology have in instigating this “new beginning” in a way that 
does not devolve into another ideology, but rather keeps the pure multiplicity of Void 
open? In what way does Žižek see Christianity as the Event?  
Žižek acknowledges that there are close similarities between Badiou’s notion of 
the subject viz a viz the Event and Althusser’s notion of ideological interpretation, noting 
in particular the central place that theology has in calling subjectivity forth from individu-
als.  For Žižek, as for Badiou, the biblical Paul is uniquely helpful for identifying this, in 
that he argues that Christ’s death clears the way for a subjectivity that eschews the marks 
                                                
90 Žižek, “Paul and the Truth Event,” 85.  
91 Žižek, “Paul and the Truth Event,” 93. 
  
186 
and conditions of individual and is based instead on “universal singularity.” Žižek fol-
lows Badiou in arguing that Christianity houses the paradigmatic truth Event in its attes-
tation to divine death and crucifixion92, in the way that “the truth Event is truth in itself 
for its agents themselves, not for external observers”, and so “truth is discernible only for 
the potential members of the new community of believers, for their engaged gaze.”93 It 
invokes the ultimate Impossibility (love, miracle, resurrection, and so on) that resets the 
parameters of what counts in the situation; it “unplugs” itself from the dictates of the ac-
cepted, putting into motion an universal power, a political work that mocks and shatters 
the predominant patterns, the stylized and scripted “quiet rooms”94 where the actual polit-
ical decisions are made.95 As an Event, the death of God becomes a truth-Event ‘after the 
fact’,  “that is, when it leads to the constitution of the group of believers, of the engaged 
community held together by the fidelity to the Event: the traumatic encounter with the 
Real in Christ’s death.”96 Christ’s death prepares the site for the Event by identifying God 
as humanity,97 but identifying oneself with Christ’s death and abandonment by God 
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means that one opts out of the ethical turn to real political decisions and the legislative 
and judicial arena of polices and policing, suspending its “stubborn attachments”, and 
choosing instead the liminal domain of the ‘Holy Spirit’, the social bond of love that links 
the revolutionary collective together amidst the radical absence of the big Other.98 
Speaking of the ‘eventfulness’ of Christianity, Žižek writes: “Christian revelation 
is thus an example (although probably the example) of how we, human beings, are not 
constrained to the positivity of being; of how, from time to time, in a contingent and un-
predictable way, a truth-Event can occur that opens up the possibility of participating in 
another life by remaining faithful to the truth-Event.”99 This is how theology is ideology 
critique. Structured as a truth-Event, it is the procedure that clears the way for political 
subjects who are capable of acting within this life. This “magical break” is accomplished 
by what Žižek terms the “theologico-political suspension of the ethical.”100 Here, Christi-
anity is thought to have dismissed the hold of the law on the subject, breaking the vicious 
cycle of law and transgression by instigating the death of the big Other, that quilting 
“nodal point” that dominates and regulates the subject’s life within the symbolic order: 
“there is no experience of the divine without such a suspension of the Ethical.”101 This 
marks the new beginning of and for the subject, who in the absence of the deadlock of 
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fantasy (rendered by Žižek as the ideological demands of the Ethical universal), is given 
the opportunity, in absolute freedom, to intervene into authentic political acts that gener-
ate Events, rather than Orders. 
Here we can see more clearly that, in Žižek’s view, ideology critique is guided by 
psychoanalysis, but is rerouted through Christianity. The proper relation to the “empty 
space” of the Void – that “true openness” which is leftover after ideology critique – is not 
to maintain our distance, but rather to view it as that through which we must tarry in or-
der for the subject to materialize. But the effect of the Void on the subject is not creative, 
but dialectic in that it empties the gap – rips open the sutures of social reality – with a 
negative force that assumes positive existence only as it is left open. Ideology critique 
clears the way for authentic political subjects by bringing out “the acceptance of the very 
fact that our lives involve a traumatic kernel, beyond redemption, that there is a dimen-
sion of our being which forever resists redemption-deliverance.”102 This “entails the ac-
ceptance and admission that all our discursive formations are forever haunted”, but that 
life must go on. “Christian materialism” seems uniquely positioned to disseminate this 
message, and to unfold its unrealized political implications, precisely because it models 
how best to “unplug” from the social order and confess the very antagonisms that the 
Symbolic order have been designed to resist and repress. Žižek’s interest in theology is 
clarified when one looks at its political utility in critiquing ideology, and not the political 
utility of theological ‘content’ itself, which is not operative for Žižek. The political sig-
nificance of Christian theology is second-order and derivative; it gains its political import 
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through its work as a negatively dialectical force that sets in motion a form of ideology 
critique that is both properly negative and materialist. It is a thought-form, a critical form 
of rationality that is unique in its enduring negativity, and so in theology, Žižek finds a 
political ‘kernel’ capable of setting the political subject free, not from ideology, but from 
the ideologico-critical fantasy itself. Only then is the Act possible.  
Žižek’s Theology as Ideology Critique 
 But is not theology yet another iteration of ideology? How is it not another, albeit 
more politically radical, fantasy that protects the Subject from its traumatic origins, from 
the pure negativity of the Lack at its heart? Even if one concedes to Žižek the ideologico-
critical dimension of theology, it is not altogether clear how it is that theology does not 
eventually “fold over” the ideological Gap, suturing the very openness and instability 
upon which Žižek’s materialist ontology (and so, his theory of the Act) is built. Žižek, 
however, seems quite convinced that there is something unique about the “perverse core” 
of Christian materialism that is worth fighting for.103 Žižek accounts for this unique con-
tribution through a Hegelian “death of God theology”, tied to the theology of divine suf-
fering and abandonment, and signaled in the crucified God’s “cry of dereliction” at his 
death. This event results in the formation of the ‘Spirit’ of love, the collective and democ-
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ratized social bond that lives and acts in the radical absence of the big Other, finally disa-
bused of and ‘subtracted’ from the “forced choices” of currently available political op-
tions.104 This clears the way for the authentic Acts of political subjects, acts that emerge 
from “absolute freedom” that makes real intervention and apocalyptic possible, acts that 
are discontinuous and transgressive of established political coordinates. 
 This kind of “unplugged” politics is made possible only by theology105, says 
Žižek, for its uniquely apocalyptic message is capable to instigating the conditions of 
possibility for revolutionary subjectivity without ceding to the sutures of ideology. The 
Christian declaration is the confrontation of the horrifying truth of the Lack: God has be-
come human, died, and was given new life in the new beginning of the collective, who 
must nevertheless strive forward, but are no longer beholden to “this” life. The Christian 
life is the political life of the liminal “undead.”106 In this way, Žižek interprets the cruci-
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fied Christ as the “vanishing mediator” between the law of the divine Father and the ab-
solute freedom of the Holy Spirit, and so in doing, narrates ‘the passage’ from Judaism to 
Christianity as one from “law to love.”107 This amounts to a ‘Christian materialism’ (the 
dialectical successor to current orthodoxy, which is itself a betrayal of Christianity’s rev-
olutionary Truth) that Žižek endorses as essential to the critique of ideology and the au-
thentic political Acts that follow. 
The Death of God Theology and the ‘Negation of Negation’ 
Key to understanding how and why Žižek reconfigures political theology as ideol-
ogy critique is his interpretation and use of the negation of negation, a key element of his 
engagement with dialectical materialism, which he believes, is best found in the work of 
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Hegel.108 Žižek is eager to defend the political usefulness of the Hegelian dialectical pro-
cess, specifically related to the confusing phrase, the “negation of negation.”109 For him, 
Hegelian dialectics is not a “vulgar evolutionism” whereby one finds the ultimate an-
swers by reconciling apparent opposites through a totalizing and harmonizing process of 
synthesis and resolution. Instead, the negativity of this dialectic, with all its disruptive 
power, “has a positive function” of coming upon the truth, and so requires a series of er-
rors – one must first make the wrong choice110 – but this wrong choice is not merely dis-
carded, but is sublated into the final truth (which not the same as a reconciliation or grand 
synthesis of with the prior error).111  
The ‘negation of negation’ is not ancillary to the essential nature of Spirit (which 
otherwise works to progressively raise something to a higher level), but is the core of dia-
lectics. Dialectics is the critical act which shows that the negation (the first move, ‘… of 
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the negation’) is indeed still entangled in the master-signifier, the ‘big Other’, and so it 
calls for a secondary move (‘the negation …’) that acts upon the first one. The effect of 
this procedure is the realization that nothing is beyond or outside the big Other and that as 
the master-signifier, the ideology of the big Other only serves to fill in the space of the 
‘non-All’ of social reality, so as to make the scripted life in social reality bearable. This 
“negation of negation”, while being purely negative (in the sense that it shows the Void 
to be void without replacing it), nevertheless becomes the basis of all authentic political 
acts insofar as it is the “loss of loss”: it is a “negation without a filling.”112 This negativity 
opens up the act itself so that it does not obey or submit itself to any pre-existing coordi-
nates of social consensus or political options, but rather actively mocks the symbolic or-
der by its self-enunciation as the “exception” to the big Other. 
 Žižek does not turn to Christian theology because of its present fashionable status 
in (some corners of) philosophy, but because he thinks it does something, namely that it 
represents a critical and dialectical ‘thought-form’ of negativity that clears the way for 
“authentic political acts.” For Žižek, Christianity is the properly materialist vector for any 
authentically political Act. Critical materialist thinking is as theological as theology is 
critically materialist.  He affirms the “direct lineage from Christianity to Marxism” in or-
der to marshal its resources to combat “the onslaught of new spiritualisms”: “the authen-
tic Christian legacy is much too precious to be left to the fundamentalist freaks.”113 While 
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he finds the “return of religion” to be “deplorable”, (he is as critical of Derrida’s “religion 
without religion” as he is of New Age spiritualisms)114, Žižek nevertheless finds in Chris-
tianity a unique kernel of truth, a ‘perverse core’ that incubates a political legacy and 
emancipatory logic that betrays its creedal repression.115 This, he is convinced, is essen-
tial for revitalizing truly dialectical critique in the Hegelian vein, so much so that “this 
kernel is accessible only to a materialist approach – vice versa: to become a dialectical 
materialist, one should go through the Christian experience.”116 This plays itself out in a 
number of ways in Žižek’s theological interpretation of Christianity, most distinctly in his 
elaboration of the death of God theology, of God’s response to Job’s suffering, the pas-
sage from Judaism to Christianity, and finally, the Spirit as a theology of the collective. 
 Žižek interprets Christian theology as ideology critique through the prism of a 
“death of God” theology. He does not claims to draw on the actual tradition of the death 
of God in Christianity, whether its instantiation in the 1960’s “radical theology” or its 
more classical, patristic, or biblical roots. Žižek casts his theology as a part of the “new” 
reading of Hegel117 as well as role that Hegel is playing in the reconsideration of Radical 
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and Secular currents in theology.118 These theologies, which originated in Paul Tillich’s 
theology of culture, gained some currency first in the 1960s ‘death of god’ theology and 
then reemerged in the 1980s ‘postmodern’ theology, but eventually faded in large part 
due to the success of the narrative and post-liberal trends in the 1990s and 2000s. The so-
bering geo-political events of the early 2000s and 2010s, as well as the return of religion 
in academic discourse more broadly, has caused many to question the localist, ecclesio-
centric, and sectarian aspects of those theologies, however. Radical theologies are well-
suited as alternative candidates because they are post-metaphysical and rely on social vo-
cabularies and cultural categories. Žižek’s atheistic theology perhaps best fits as a contin-
uation and elaboration of this tradition, something that he himself has readily admitted, 
even though Žižek has only minimally engaged this work.119  
 Instead, Žižek turns to the kenotic elements of Protestant theologia crucis, where 
God empties Itself into the divine Son through a traumatic death that, in Žižek’s recon-
struction, represents the death of the Big Other, performed expertly by Christianity. This 
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establishes a homological relationship between theology and ideology critique, between 
the Christian death of God and what Žižek stylizes as a Hegelian “negation of nega-
tion.”120 The death of God displays “the epochal political achievement” of Christianity 
itself, wherein the dialectics of the Incarnation, we discover the materialist immanence of 
theology ‘In itself’: “God Himself is Man, ‘one of us’”, meaning that “there is no mys-
tery, no hidden true content behind the mask (deceptive surface) of the other.”121 Žižek 
argues that “if, as Hegel emphasizes, what dies on the Christ is the God of beyond itself, 
the radical Other, then the identification with Christ (“life in Christ”) means precisely the 
suspension of Otherness.”122 
 Christianity testifies to the content of this experience in the crucified Christ’s “cry 
of dereliction”: ‘My god, my god, why have you forsaken me?’ Here we find God admit-
ting that God has abandoned God’s self and as such, left humanity to itself – incapable of 
serving as its ontological guarantee, the ground of its acts.123 By admitting to God’s self-
abandonment, and by virtue of the logic of the incarnation, the abandonment of humanity, 
Christianity “traverses the fantasy” and divulges itself as ideology critique by denouncing 
the big Other. This makes Christianity, says Žižek, the “first religion without the sacred”; 
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it does not long for an external or transcendental limit and instigates the ruptural, practi-
cal stance that follows.124 This is why Žižek insists that “the longing for a new exter-
nal/transcendent limit, for a divine agent who imposes such a limit, is profoundly non-
Christian.”125 Christianity, rather, possesses a kind of revolutionary courage, the courage 
of Christ’s ‘empty sacrifice’126, wherein ”it was God Himself who made a Pascalian wa-
ger: by dying on the Cross, He made a risky gesture with no guaranteed final outcome, 
that is, He provided us—humanity—with the empty S1, Master-Signifier.”
127 The incar-
nation is revelatory, but not in the sense that God shows himself to humanity as what God 
is to Godsself, but that God shows Godsself to God as what God is to humanity.128  
 And so, when Žižek says that “what dies on the Cross is not God’s earthly repre-
sentative-incarnation, but God of beyond itself”129, it is clear that the incarnation is can-
not be unambiguously good news for humanity, especially since it ends with God’s 
death.130 Christ’s death reveals God to Godsself, and that revelation is traumatic for God 
as God finds Godsself utterly abandoned, alienated from itself, which mirrors the human 
experience of the same. To take the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ seriously is to 
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know “Christ as the God who, in His act of Incarnation, freely identified Himself with 
His own shit.”131 And so, it is in the death of God that Christ is shown to be most human 
and where God is shown to be most divine, whereby “the radical gap that separates God 
from man is transposed into God himself.”132 It is here that shows us that “we are one 
with God only when God is no longer one with himself, but abandons Himself, ‘internal-
izes’ the radical distance with separates us from Him. Our radical experience of separa-
tion from God is the very feature which unites us with Him.”133 
 Recalling the earlier discussion on belief as critique, this confession by God is 
God’s own ‘fetishistic disavowal’ of belief134; The critical structure of belief is tied di-
rectly to the ‘negation of negation’, whereby we see that  
the properly Hegelian negation of negation is not the return to direct belief, but 
the self-relating fake: ‘I fake to fake to believe,’ which means: ‘I really believe 
without being aware of it.’ Is, then, irony not the ultimate form of the critique of 
ideology today - [the] irony …. of taking the statements more seriously than the 
subjects who utter them themselves?135  
  
 In short, this illustrates how and why Christian theology of God (namely, of 
God’s death) is indeed a critique of ideology. Christianity is at its critical best when it 
confesses, while talking about God, that ‘I pretend to pretend to believe’ (rather than ‘I 
do not believe’).  Žižek explains theological structure of this ironic unbelief this way: 
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“When Christ dies, what dies with him is the secret hope discernible in ‘Father, why hast 
thou forsaken me?’, the hope that there is a Father who abandoned me.”136 This is the 
moment of ultimate irony where God attests to God’s own atheism, not by denying or ne-
gating claims to God’s existence, but by calling out to Godsself in the moment of God’s 
non-identity.137 This stunning admission is the political ‘calling card’ of Christianity, and 
so becomes the key to thinking through the triangulation of theology, materialism, and 
ideology critique.138 
The political meaning of Christianity is not Jesus’ benevolent ministry, social vi-
sion in the synoptic gospels, solidarity with human suffering in death, or purported vic-
tory over death in resurrection, but rather is found in how Christian theology admits to 
the “negation of negation” that most clearly visible in the death of God in the crucified 
body of Jesus Christ. The theologic of the incarnation, which is then reinterpreted in the 
Event of divine death, shifts the perspective on the divine-human relationship. As such, 
Žižek’s thesis is that Christian materialism betrays its ‘orthodoxy’ by performing this ne-
gation as negation as ideology critique: namely, a critique of the ideology of big Other as 
the divine guarantee, the transcendental signifier that affords meaning, coherence, and 
sense to the world and human experience. Theology participates in “the same matrix of 
Hegelian paradoxical self-negating reversal” that is “also the fundamental procedure of 
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Marxian critique of ideology”139 that enacts “the radically negative break, rupture, with 
the old substantive order as the condition of a new universality.”140 
 And so, for Žižek, Christianity is ideologico-critical because it is “far from bor-
ing, humdrum, or safe”; it is indeed, “perilous”, “daring”, “subversive, even revolution-
ary”141, characteristics given to it by its most orthodox, but also ‘heretical’ aspects, most 
notably the doctrine of the Incarnation.142 For Žižek, “religion has two possible roles: 
therapeutic or critical. It either helps individuals to function better in the existing order, 
or it tries to assert itself as a critical agency articulating what is wrong with this order as 
such, a space for the voices of discontent—in this second case, religion as such tends to-
ward assuming the role of a heresy.”143  
Considering the ‘classic’ Marxist position on ideology, this appears as a startling 
reversal. For Žižek, “the point of Christianity as the religion of atheism is not the vulgar 
humanist one that the becoming man of God reveals that man is the secret of God (Feuer-
bach), rather it attacks the religious hard core that surfaces even in humanism, even up to 
Stalinism, with its believe in history as the “big Other” that decides on the objective 
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meaning of our deeds.”144 Žižek finds the theological structure of ideology critique to be 
politically important because it is negatively critical, not because the content of Christian 
theology is any way true. He does not think that even Christianity believes its declara-
tions about God to be true! Its own teachings are ironic disavowal, not by abandoning it-
self, but in clinging to itself evermore. That is to say, “what if one kneels down and prays 
not so much to regain one's own belief but, on the opposite, to GET RID of one's belief, 
of its over-proximity, to acquire a breathing space of a minimal distance towards it?”145 
And so, here we can see more clearly than before that the political thesis of 
Žižek’s ideology critique is that the lesson of Christian theology and Lacanian psychoa-
nalysis turns out to be the same: “the big Other does not exist.”146 Through this, the anal-
ysand (as the subject) accepts the absence of a guarantee and as such is able to access the 
obscenity of its core in the traumatic Void. The point is not to say how “truth” is defined 
as knowledge of the real state of things, but rather that it is the Real of the antagonism it-
self: “the fundamental feature of today’s society is the irreconcilable antagonism…it is 
that which prevents us from accessing the Thing directly is the Thing itself.”147 Put dif-
ferently, “If we can think our knowledge of reality (the way reality appears to us) as hav-
ing radically failed, as radically different from the Absolute, then this gap (between For-
us and In-itself) must be part of the Absolute itself, so that the very feature that seemed 
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forever to keep us away from the Absolute is the only feature which directly unites us 
with the absolute.”148 
The practice of ideology critique teaches the political subject, not only about the 
failure that conditions our knowledge, but also about the Absolute freedom that comes 
from recognizing that the traumatic Gap gives rise to political subjectivity in the first 
place. If, as Žižek claims, this is the lesson of ideology critique, “does not exactly the 
same shift happen at the very core of the Christian experience?”149 For Christianity, “it is 
the radical separation of man from God which unites us with God, since, in the figure of 
Christ, God is thoroughly separated from itself - the point is not to ‘overcome’ the gap 
that separates us from God, but to take note of how this gap is internal to God Him-
self.”150 This is accomplished in the person of Jesus Christ, in which the original negation 
(‘the Fall’) is shown via a subsequent negation (‘the death of Christ’) to be, in a startling 
reversal, “the emergence of freedom.”151 Žižek describes the fall as ‘redemption’ and 
‘freedom’ this way: “The explosion of freedom, the breaking out from which we fall, that 
is, it is in the very movement of the Fall that creates, opens up, what is lost in it.”152 Ide-
ology critique then is the “breaking out” whereby the shift in perspective activates the 
subject from the position of ultimate failure. Žižek puts it theologically this way: “this is 
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the key ‘Hegelian’ point of Christianity: the resurrection of the dead is not the ‘real 
event’ which will take place sometime in the future, but something that is already 
here.”153 That ‘something’ is God’s own fall from grace, God's kenotic admission to im-
potence, illustrated in the book of Job and performed by the crucified Christ, and it is this 
divine Fall is at at the very same time, our human redemption. 
Job, Jesus, and Divine Weakness 
 Job is the central theological figure that guides Žižek’s reading of Christianity 
through the death of God.154 Not coincidently in my opinion, the book of Job is also an 
extraordinary and exemplary case of ideology critique for Žižek.155 In Žižek’s telling of 
the biblical narrative, Job experiences immense suffering, and as the story plays out, 
struggles to understand and explain this suffering in various ways.156 Job’s three friends – 
the theologians! – eventually show up and spew “standard ideological sophistry” about 
divine justice and the harmony of history.157 Against them, Job asserts strongly “the ap-
parent meaninglessness” of this suffering158, and in a radical reversal of what one might 
expect to hear from God on the matter, Žižek argues, “God takes his side at the end, 
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claiming that every word Job spoke was true.”159 God shows God’s true self to Job, con-
trary to the witness of his theological friends, as “a God who acts like someone caught in 
a moment of impotence.”160 It is through the narrative of Job that we can properly inter-
pret the Crucifixion as a instance of ideology critique. Like Christ, Job instigates the 
death of the Big Other by calling attention to the facticity of divine impotence and aban-
donment. Job interrogates God and finds God to be powerless, unable to do much of any-
thing in the face of Job’s struggles - and God agrees. God is impotent, subject to the same 
radical contingency and openness that conditions human thought and action. God’s 
highly defensive and overcompensating reaction is shameful, as it only underscores the 
scandalous truth embedded (not so subtly) within the Hebrew narrative.161 Job's silent re-
sponse to God is one of embarrassment and solidarity: Job realizes that God stands in the 
same relation to the world as Job does, and when faced with divine flaccidity, Job rests 
his case against divine injustice.162  
 By Žižek’s reading, the book of Job displays the approach of the Jewish law’s 
“stubborn attachments” to the traumatic truth of divine impotence.163 Whereas Judaism 
repressed this truth and “refused to give up their ghost, to cut off the link to their secret, 
disavowed tradition,” says Žižek, seen most directly in the prohibition of graven images, 
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Christianity is the radical religion of revelation, in that it brings it all out in the open - it 
admits to its most guarded secret, or, what Žižek is fond of calling, “the matter most dark 
and awful.” In Christ’s crucifixion, God takes Job’s place in the narrative of revelation.164 
As the crucified Jesus, God has Job’s experience and encounters his own impotence, and 
confesses to it in the divine cry of dereliction: “My God, why have you forsaken me?” 
Žižek writes: “since we are dealing here not with the gap between man and God, but the 
split between God Himself, the solution cannot be for God to appear in all His maj-
esty…it is rather like a child who, having believed in his father’s powerfulness, discovers 
with horror that his father cannot help him.”165 
 It is here that Christianity divulges its own heretical core as ‘the religion of athe-
ism’166 wherein the disclosure of divine powerlessness amounts to the death of God, the 
admission that ‘the Big Other does not exist.’167 Žižek elaborates on this, saying 
The point of Christianity as the religion of atheism is not the vulgar humanist one 
that the becoming-man-of-God reveals that man is the secret of God (Feuerbach 
et al.); rather, it attacks the religious hard core that survives even in humanism, 
even up to Stalinism, with its belief in History as the “big Other” that decides on 
the “objective meaning” of our deeds.168  
 
 What happens to God in Christ’s death is that God is finally shown to be ‘just one 
of us’, is included in “the series of ordinary creatures’169, and so ‘traverses the fantasy’, 
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thereby linking the theological gesture of divine death to the political procedure of ideol-
ogy critique. This incarnational logic disavows the ideological fantasy of the big Other 
through the Event of the cross, thereby opening up new space, not to be filled up again by 
some substitute, but with excessive negativity that refuses suturing up the central void of 
our desire. God admits  to being human in Christ, to being impotent in the face of suffer-
ing: how do you come back from that? 
 This is how ‘the Christian breakthrough’ is, after all, ideology critique. The prin-
cipal theological lesson that Žižek learns from Christ's death is the fact that “the function 
of the obscene superego supplement of the (divine) Law is to mask this impotence of the 
Big Other.” In the crucified Christ, Christianity reveals this impotence and so “it is quite 
logically the first and only religion radically to leave behind the split between the official 
and public text and its obscene initiatory supplement; there is no hidden, untold story in 
it. In this precise sense, Christianity is the religion of Revelation: everything is revealed 
in it, no obscene superego supplement accompanies its public message…what is revealed 
in Christianity is not just the entire content, but, more specifically, that there is nothing - 
no secret - behind it to be revealed.”170 
 In their attestation to divine impotence, Job and Christ teach us how to ask “do we 
need God?” in new political ways. Put differently, it interjects into the political situation 
the properly Christian declaration that ‘the big Other does not exist.’ This means that 
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“there is no one to turn to, to address, to bear witness to, no one to receive our plea, or la-
ment.”171 This is Christianity’s gospel, its ‘good news’: “the miracle of faith is that it IS 
possible to traverse the fantasy, to undo the founding decision, to start one’s life over 
again, from the zero-point…”172 This is what Job’s narrative teaches us, by telling us that 
God in God’s self admits that Job is right, that there is no meaning to suffering, that there 
is no transcendent God pulling the strings, no big Other guaranteeing the coherence of the 
socio-symbolic order, and as such, “we, humans, are left with no higher Power watching 
over us, just with with the terrible burden of freedom and responsibility for the face of di-
vine creation, and thus of God himself.”173 It is through Job that we understand Christ’s 
suffering as equally meaningless, if “meaning” is that coded language for something that 
lies beyond or outside us that promises some stability and harmony as a part of the 
Whole. It is through Christ’s death that God “falls into” materiality, subjects Itself to the 
incompleteness, the Truly Open character of the Real, and shows itself to be “one of us”, 
rather the grand Master-Signifier: the big Other.174 And, while this is certainly a kind of 
atheism, Žižek maintains it is a distinctively Christian atheism, which is better named a 
‘materialist theology.’175 
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 This unlocks Christianity’s essential political truth: the perversality of Christ's 
death. A ‘materialist theology’, says Žižek “is a position that accepts the ultimate void of 
reality – the consequence of its central thesis on the primordial multiplicity is that there is 
no ‘substantial reality’, that the only ‘substance’ of the multiplicity is void.”176 But for 
Christianity to realize this materialist core, “it has to sacrifice itself – like Christ who had 
to die so that Christianity could emerge.”177 For Žižek, “the ‘death of God theology’ 
marks the moment when the only way to keep its truth alive was through a materialist 
heresy split from its main corpse.”178 This Christian materialism is the dialectical succes-
sor to Christianity insofar as it owned up to what the immanence of God as humanity, the 
transubstantiation of the divine as the human, tells us that, when it comes to reality, all 
we can say is that there IS only Nothing: that reality is in itself, non-All.”179 As a theolog-
ical position, it is ideology critique in that it teaches us that “the only true belief is belief 
without any support in the authority of some presupposed figure of the Big Other.”180 
Theology as critique of ideology, then, is shown to be “a kind of infinite negation, not so 
much “I believe in un-God” but rather something “unbelief”, the pure form of belief de-
prived of its substantialization – “unbelief” is still the form of belief, like the undead 
who, as the living dead, remain dead.”181  
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 What makes Christianity politically instructive is the way it inaugurates the apoc-
alyptic explosiveness of the Event; it makes no claims to the big Other, but quite the op-
posite. It puts it to rest, quite literally, in the Christ-Event whereby God dies as a purely 
negative matter of immanent critique. As such, “the ultimate horizon of Christianity” is 
that “there is no mystery, no hidden true content, behind the mask (deceptive surface) of 
the Other. The ultimate idolatry is not the idolizing of the mask, of the image, itself, but 
the belief that there is some hidden positive context beyond the mask.”182 Indeed, as 
Žižek continues elsewhere, “Christ’s death on the cross is the death of this God, it repeats 
Job’s stance, it refuses any “deeper meaning” that obfuscates the brutal reality of histori-
cal catastrophe.”183 This homology between Job and Christ is expressed in a “double ke-
nosis”: God’s self-alienation and the alienation of God from human persons overlaps at 
God's death, where “the distance of man from God is thus the distance of God from him-
self.”184 But what makes this kenotic self-emptying of God so politically important is that 
it allows political subjectivity to emerge:  
In order for (human) subjectivity to emerge out of the substantial personality of 
the human animal,…as the self-relating negativity of an empty singularity, God 
himself, the universal Substance, has to “humiliate” himself, to fall into his own 
creation, “objectivize” himself, to appear as the singular miserable human individ-
ual, in all its abjection, i.e., abandoned by God.185 
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The alienation of God from Godsself, evinced in both the death of Christ and the divine 
cry of dereliction, produces “the split, negativity, particularization, self-alienation” be-
tween God and humanity “must be posited as something that takes place in the very heart 
of the divine Substance, i.e., the move from Substance to Subject must occur within God 
himself.”186 This effects the situation of absolute freedom deemed necessary for the polit-
ical subject to take form in a political world, emptied of ‘the big Other.’187 This ideolog-
ico-critical clearing leaves room for the subject to act authentically, unconstrained by the 
‘forced choices' inherent to the dictates of ‘formal’ freedom.188  
The ‘Passage’ from Judaism to Christianity 
 Another theological area of interest to Žižek’s ideology critique is what he per-
ceives as Christianity’s radical “break” from Judaism.189 The origin-point of Christianity 
is in its dialectical sublation of law and its self-grounding in the democratization of politi-
cal love, which it cannot do without reference to Jewish law. Again, with law as with fan-
tasy, belief, trauma, and (as we are seeing) ideology, the proper stance is not to resist or 
supplement, nor to abolish or strike against it, but rather to accomplish, actualize, and re-
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alize it in full, even to excess, for the ‘Fall into law is precisely that which brings free-
dom.190 As Lacan points out in reference to the big Other, “one can get rid of it (ignore it: 
sen passer) on condition that one makes use of it.”191 
 Whereas pagan religion posits divinity as the “given spiritual essence”192, Jewish 
theology effectively “abolished any reference to the unapproachable, transcendent God, 
the absolute Master”193 through its iconoclastic prohibition.194 There is within Judaism, 
Žižek argues, a founding traumatic experience expressed in the “excessive violent nature 
of the very gesture of repressing the pagan universe and imposing the universal rule of 
the One of Law.”195 Judaism externalizes this haunting truth through the Law as a way of 
repressing this core, but even “as nonexistent, it continues to persist, that is, its spectral 
presence continues to haunt the living.”196 This gnaws at Judaism, and at times it threat-
ens to break out and to pierce the surface. Judaism is founded by its “stubborn attach-
ments to the unacknowledged violent founding gesture that haunts the public legal order 
as its spectral supplement.”197 Far from being anemic and banal, the power of Judaism 
stems from its disciplined response to this trauma: “this ‘repressed’ status of the Event is 
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what gives Judaism its unprecedented vitality…. They refused to give up the ghost, to cut 
off the link to their secret disavowed tradition.”198 Nevertheless, the pressure of maintain-
ing the appearance of the radical nómos is unbearable, not because of its transgressive 
presence, but because of its excessive absence: it cannot be accounted for. Its truth, its 
identification with itself, is unattainable since its own transgression, ‘the crime’, is writ-
ten into the ethico-legal aspect of law. 
 The political problem is in how the trauma of this theological truth acts upon the 
subject as “the indivisible remainder, the spectral ‘rest’ that resists ‘confession’, that can 
never be redeemed-delivered, laid to rest, pacified/gentrified.”199 Christianity enters the 
scene as the Event that finally accounts for this Lack (which is actively repressed by the 
very Law it transgresses) and so makes its enunciation finally possible. This frees the 
subject to finally come to grips with the horrifying secret; it follows Judaism’s example, 
in its ideologico-critical gesture of ‘unplugging’, by articulating the baselessness of 
Christianity: it lacks roots, is unbeholden to the dictates of the social order, and is able to 
be itself in an unmediated and universal way.200 This is the apocalyptic character of 
Christianity, not the sense that it brings out the “end of days”, but instead, through its vio-
lent revelation of what was previously spectral and absent within the Jewish penchant for 
Law. Žižek is fond of saying that “the secret to which the Jews remain faithful is the hor-
ror of the divine impotence – and it is this secret that is ‘revealed’ in Christianity. This is 
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why Christianity could occur only after Judaism: it reveals the horror first confronted by 
the Jews.”201 Christianity becomes ideology critique insofar as “[it] is the religion of con-
fession… they are ready to confess the primordial crime (in the displaced form of mur-
dering not the Father but the Christ, the son of God) and thereby betray its traumatic im-
pact/weight.”202 Furthermore, “it is the Jewish religion which remains an ‘abstract/imme-
diate’ negation of anthropomorphism, and as such, attached to it, determined by it in its 
very direct negation, whereas it is only Christianity that actually sublates paganism.”203  
 It is in the way that the political love in “Christianity” unplugs the political sub-
ject from the vicious cycle of Law and transgression in “Judaism” that Žižek finds the 
materialist principle guiding his political theology: “Christianity then goes a step further 
by asserting not only the likeness of God and man, but their direct identity in the figure of 
Christ: ‘no matter man looks like God, since the man (Christ) is God.’”204 The Incarna-
tion acts upon theology so as to show that “man directly is part of the Divine life, that is, 
because it is only man, in human history, that God fully realizes Himself, that He be-
comes an actual living God.”205 The materialist kernel that is so critically productive is 
the “direct identity of God and man” in the doctrine of the incarnation, which is precisely 
that repressed core that Judaism sought to repress, but Christianity - in the death of God - 
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admits to. Christianity brings divinity and humanity together through the doctrine of di-
vine Incarnation which teaches that “in the figure of Christ, God himself becomes 
man.”206 For Žižek, the distinctiveness of Christian theology lies in how it freely admits 
to “the very same perverse core”, that “spectral history” that Judaism is consistently 
working to anxiously repress and suture.  
 The point here is not that Christianity tells Judaism’s repressed truth for it, but 
that “in contrast to the Jewish religion of anxiety, Christianity is a religion of love.”207 
Lest we think Žižek to be turning sentimental on us, love is understood “in its dimension 
of fundamental deception: we try to fill out the unbearable gap of ‘che vuoi’, the opening 
of the Other’s desire, by offering ourselves to the Other as the object of its desire.”208 In 
this way, “Christianity is therefore to be conceived as an attempt to gentrify the Jewish 
‘che vuoi’ through the act of love and sacrifice.”209 The most notable example of this is 
how Christ sublates himself into love through his death, serving as the ‘vanishing media-
tor’ between the Law of the divine-Father and the Holy Spirit, interpreted politically by 
Žižek as the social bond of love that holds the revolutionary collective together, so that 
they are able to live and work after the death of the big Other is exposed. The real ideo-
logico-critical move made by Christianity in its passage from Judaism lies in how it faces 
up to its traumatic Origins through the intervention of agape, which, as it turns out, is 
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“the unheard of gesture of leaving behind the domain of the law itself, of ‘dying to the 
law.’ Christian redemption is not the rectification of its traumatic origins. It is in the anti-
nomian refusal to support the spectral power of the “vicious cycle of the Law and its 
founding Transgression.”210 Christianity is “a religion of Love”, because in love, one sin-
gles out and focuses on a finite temporal object, which means more than anything else, 
and chooses it as the universal, yet singular. For Žižek, this “universal singularity” marks 
the political space made possible through Christian theology’s unique willingness to con-
fess that which other religions ideologically suppress: “Christianity, far from claiming 
fully realization of the promise, accomplishes something far more uncanny; the Messiah 
is here, he has arrived, the final Event has already taken place, yet the gap (the gap which 
sustained the messianic promise) remains …”211 
 It remains highly questionable whether Žižek is as theologically supported in this 
argument by the dark trajectory of Christianity as he seems to think, especially since 
Christianity is stubborn in its commitment to the idea that redemption comes through pat-
tern of both life and death, that death only makes sense in life, and that death itself cannot 
be redemptive, for God, for humanity, or for the social world. Žižek argues that the death 
of God is a prime theological example of the ‘negation of negation’ central to any ideol-
ogy critique, and that it models the kind of thinking necessary for ideology critique to be 
effective in confronting the predominant ideologies of our time. In this way, the death of 
God is a “theologico-political suspension of the ethical”; that is, that it suspends actions 
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that are undertaken with the assumption of any ontological coherence, guarantee, or or-
der, and instead takes up critique as the effort to undercover the antagonisms, the contra-
dictions, the empty places between critique, action, and political change. 
 How, then, is this “death of God” theology operationalized as a critique of ideol-
ogy? Christianity’s supposed renunciation of the big Other in the theological form of the 
death of God generates what Žižek has termed (idiosyncratically borrowing from Kierke-
gaard)  “the theologico-political suspension of the ethical”212 or, as Žižek is fond of say-
ing, “if God does not exist, than everything is prohibited.”213 This opens up the political 
space for a new kind of collective, a new social bond, that relies not on some final guar-
antee, but is capable of matching the cruel world with an equally brutal realism, what he 
describes as “an ethics without morality”, but what might better be called, “a politics 
without ethics”, made possible in the negation of negation of ‘transcendence’ (which 
Žižek interprets as the ‘big Other’) by the double kenosis of incarnation and crucifixion. 
Žižek describes the interplay between ideology critique and the sublating ‘negation of ne-
gation’ as that which gives way to the revolutionary community of believers, whose  ke-
notic acts of love, sacrifice, conversion, and yes, even death, give rise to a new kind of 
subject, a new political community whose unique founding moment promises to bring 
something altogether different to the political landscape: “what is sublated in the move 
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from the Son to the Holy Spirit is thus God Himself; after the Crucifixion, the death of 
God incarnate, the universal God returns as a Spirit of the community of believers.”214 
“The Spirit”: A Theology of the Collective  
 So far, I have argued that, for Žižek, ideology critique accomplishes politically 
what psychoanalysis works to bring to the forefront for the subject: to disrupt the fantasy 
of the big Other. In this way, the power of Christianity lies in its Event-structure, its 
apocalyptic ‘revealing.’ But this is anything but good news systems and institutions, for 
“Christianity is the miraculous Event that disturbs the balance of the One-All; it is the vi-
olent intrusion of Difference that precisely throws the balanced circuit of the universe off 
the rails.”215 The death of God does not inaugurate a political nihilism or a celebration of 
the Nothing of the Void left after the death of God, but it is Christ’s death, says Žižek, 
that “designates a rupture with the circular movement of death and rebirth, the passage to 
a wholly different dimension of the Holy Spirit.”216 In so doing, Christian theology clears 
the way for a revolutionary kind of community that gains its revolutionary political char-
acter as “the community deprived of its support in the Big Other.”217  
 The ‘negation of negation’ of Christ’s death that clears the way for this collective 
subjectivity is internal to the very kenotic act of God in the Incarnation. God dies as the 
crucified Christ and “what emerges in its place is the Holy Spirit, which is not Other, but 
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the community (or, rather, collective) of believers”218, all of whom are “persisting only in 
and through their activity.”219 They are organized around the unconditional and brutal 
dictates of political agape.220 The political act of ‘God-becoming-human’ brings forth a 
new kind of subject, a new political community whose unique founding moment prom-
ises to bring something altogether different to the political landscape. The political payoff 
of Žižek’s use of Hegelian death of God theology is found in this collective social body: 
“with Christ’s incarnation, the externalization/self-alienation of divinity, the passage 
from the transcendent God to finite/mortal individuals is a fait accompli, there is no way 
back, all there is, all that “really exists”, from now on are individuals.”221 That “the finite 
existence of moral humans is the only site of the Spirit, the site where the Spirit achieves 
its actuality”222 is certified in Christ’s own manifestation of itself as love “In-itself”, the 
social bond present when “two or three are gathered in my name.”223 
 Made possible by theology's ideology critique, the subjectivity of the Spirit 
thrives in ‘the empty space’ of the Real, the leftover after Christ’s death, for “the Incarna-
tion is the birth of Christ, and after his death, there is neither Father nor Son, but ‘only’ 
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the Holy Spirit, the spiritual substance of the religious community.”224 The death of God 
is negative, indeed, but as, Žižek insists, “the divine Substance itself (God as a Thing-in-
Itself) which is sublated, negated (what dies on the Cross is the substantial figure of the 
transcendent God), is simultaneously maintained in the transubstantiated form of the 
Holy Spirit, the community of believers which exists only as the virtual presupposition of 
the activity of finite individuals.”225 What is particularly unique about the Holy Spirit, the 
social bond that makes emancipatory political acts possible, is that “it is the ‘spiritual 
substance’ of the individuals who recognizes themselves in it, the ground of their entire 
existence, the point of reference which provides the ultimate horizon of meaning to their 
lives, something for which these individuals are ready to give their lives.”226 Žižek dis-
cerns in the Holy Spirit “a collective not held together by a Master-Signifier, but by a fi-
delity to a Cause, by the effort to draw a new line of separation that runs ‘beyond Good 
and Evil’ that is to say, that runs across and suspends the distinctions of the existing so-
cial body.”227 
 Žižek finds immense political potential in love, which he identifies as the “ele-
mentary Christian gesture” because of the way it directs the subject outside the estab-
lished bounds of political coordinates. When put to use in the right (or left) way, Christi-
anity is uniquely valuable because it gets the violent and subtractive character of love 
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right. This love opts for the sword over peace, the division of family orders and social 
structures, and the hatred and abandonment of one’s family; it is the love that acts not 
through submissive non-resistance, but through “fire, sword, [and] war.”228 Love is that 
political force that acts indiscriminately and unconditionally towards the neighbor, not for 
sentimental or self-interested reasons, but for the brutal and crude fact that the neighbors 
are.229 
 For Žižek, this is a radical break with the logic of the world at present, challeng-
ing the limits of what counts as politically possible. Pauline agape is as thoroughly politi-
cal as it is violent because it “enjoins us to unplug from the organic community into 
which we were born.”230 “Agape as political love means that an unconditional egalitarian 
love for Neighbor can serve as the foundation for a New Order. Love is the force of this 
universal link which, in an emancipatory collective, connects people directly, in their sin-
gularity, bypassing their particular hierarchical determinations.”231 Its break with the 
world takes the form of an “unplugging”, an opting out from “the very vicious cycle”232 
of prohibition and transgression that generates the social game, a refusal to follow the 
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chimeric Big Other, and the Law which serves as its “implicit spectral obscene supple-
ment.”233 Love also rejects the standing and accepted the coordinates of identity and be-
longing that assign established levels and orders of disposability and desire, and invites 
us to withdraw from the hierarchy of the global social order through the “gesture of sepa-
ration, of drawing the line, of clinging to an element that disturbs the balance of all.”234 
This suspension is not roughly anarchic, nor it is a ‘state of exemption’. Rather, it 
is negatively constructive in that it establishes a new kind of community, a new social 
bond, but this time as “a collective of outcasts, the antidote to any established ‘organic’ 
group.”235 This Christoformic “uncoupling” is the direct expression of radically political 
love, and so redefines the parameters of collective belonging and social attachment by 
providing the pathway to opt out of the socio-political game, to own up to the fact that we 
all know that ‘the Big Other does not exist’, and that the only thing left to do is lean into 
“the terrifying violence at work in this ‘uncoupling’, that of the death drive, of the ‘radi-
cal wiping the slate clean’, as the condition of the New Beginning.”236 We are led to do 
this by the radical demands made by love “to disengage ourselves from the inertia that 
constrains us to identify with the particular order we were born into.”237 This requires that 
“one should first renounce the transgressive fantastic supplement that attaches us to it.”238 
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This is best accomplished through the radical gesture of striking at one’s self, “at what it 
most precious to himself”, what God does to Godsself in the incarnation, suffering, and 
death of God in Jesus Christ. This is the condition of subjectivity itself, actually, and so 
also sin qua non of authentic political acts, the most apropos model of which is provided 
by Christianity itself, namely in the divine abandonment of Jesus Christ upon the moment 
of God’s own death.  
Another key political aspect of the Holy Spirit, says Žižek, is that it displays how 
the ‘negation of negation’ works to produce a charged negativity within the traumatic 
Gap left over from ideology critique without replacing with another form of positivity, 
another ‘big Other.’ Describing the connection between ‘the negation of negation’ and 
the Holy Spirit, Žižek suggests that  
the Spirit’s negativity is not relativized, subsumed under an all encompassing pos-
itivity, it is on the contrary the “simple negation” which remains attached to the 
presupposed positivity it negated, the presupposed Otherness for which it alien-
ates itself, and the negation of negation is nothing but the negation of the substan-
tial character of this Otherness itself, the full acceptance of the abyss of the 
Spirit’s self-relating.239 
 
No longer stuck within “the force choice” of the particular coordinates of political possi-
bility, “we catch a glimpse of Another Space which can no longer be dismissed as a fan-
tastic supplement to social reality.”240 This is the Christian legacy of ideology critique 
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that Žižek finds so important. There is a thought-form, a critical rationality, a ‘short cir-
cuit’ within Christianity that promises to bring forth “the brief apparition of a future Uto-
pian Otherness to which every authentic revolutionary stance should cling.”241  
The Limits of Žižek’s Christianity  
 Before moving on, a few closing interpretive notes are in order. Žižek’s theoreti-
cal apparatus presents the theologian with a difficult challenge. The earlier chapters pro-
ceeded with Marx in hand asked both of Eagleton and now Žižek how they maintain both 
their theological turn on political grounds and their unique Marxist  
readings of ideology critique. Žižek accomplishes this through an idiosyncratic and cer-
tainly questionable reading of Christianity as the dialectical materialist core of ideology 
critique because of how it deals with the void, the negativity of Real, the incompleteness 
of ontological reality, and the revolutionary collective, all of which are theologically in-
terpreted as flowing from, and a consequence of, the “death of God.” 
Žižek does this without suggesting that theology is ‘deideological’ or that ideology is 
merely a broad, neutralizing account of how the structures of knowledge and beliefs are 
produced and determined by social context or location. Christianity is a negative and ma-
terialist form of thinking and acting that exemplifies an open and eventful form of criti-
cality.  
 However, the notion of critique itself is unclear. A thick description of what it 
means to be critical gets lost as it is suspended into other concepts like ‘pure difference’, 
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parallax gap, the interpassivity of the subject, and so on. Insofar as Žižek considers ideo-
logies to be the fundamental antagonisms of the symbolic order that social reality, it is the 
actions of political subjects which generate the sutures of ideology, actions that directly 
contradict their beliefs and not the beliefs themselves, that are ideological. The “way out 
of” ideology is the ‘eventfulness’ of the authentic political act: it introduces negativity, 
dissensus, and non-contemporaneity, the vicissitudes offered by critical politics, into a 
situation rife with reasoned and careful acceptance of the global coordinates of capitalist 
and technocratic oppression. And so, while the meaning of critique itself in such a sce-
nario is hard to pin down, Žižek turns to Christianity an an example of such an ideology 
critique. The ‘death of God’ theology that Žižek lifts up to make his case is problematic, 
or at least in need of serious revision, from a strictly theological perspective, leaving us to 
wonder whether it is up to the task that Žižek assigns it. His case is selective, uneven, and 
often times so overwrought with ironic cleverness and disarming comedic allusions that it 
is hard to see its value as an analytic proposal. What precisely constitutes the moment of 
critique gets lost, even with all the examples, jokes, stories, and illustrations that Žižek 
gives us along the way.  
 This is due in large part to the fact that Žižek’s ‘Christianity’ is decidedly superfi-
cial, and based largely on oblique readings of readings, rather than direct engagements 
with the gamut of its polyphonic and multilayered tradition. This leaves it incomplete and 
selective; in the sense that one can certainly say that what Žižek offers is a ‘christianity’, 
but certainly this cannot be said of Christianity in general, much less what it looks like 
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for Christianity (and Christian theology) to become critical, not just political. For exam-
ple, there are many reasons to be skeptical of his narrative of how critique was bestowed 
to Christian theology as it came out through the passage of Judaism, an account that is 
unjust to both religions. In The Fragile Absolute,  Žižek describes the ‘repressed’ within 
Judaism as the “disavowed excessive nature of its own fundamental gesture”, “its own 
‘anthropomorphization’/‘personalization’ of God”, which leads to its iconoclastic ban on 
images.242 Christianity departs from Judaism, not by disagreeing with this repressed truth 
and exposing its fallacy, but by ‘over-identifying’ with its spectral fantasy, “asserting not 
only the likeness of God and man, but their direct identity in the figure of Christ.”243 This 
brute honesty, the willingness to declare “that God is NOTHING BUT the excess of 
man” is the theological model for ideology critique because it lacks the superego supple-
ment expressed in Judaism iconoclasm. As such, there exists no tension between law and 
crime, between transgression and guilt, and so “it is possible to step out…into the Real of 
an act.”244 In trying to articulate what transpired in the ‘Paulinist' move from Judaism to 
Christianity, Žižek stumbles, unable to depart from the not-so-subtle anti-Judaism that 
has haunted psychoanalytic understandings of religion since Freud’s Moses and Mono-
theism. 
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 Žižek is erratic, confusing, and at times, it is hard not to accuse of being disingen-
uous. His theory is hardly systematic and so any attempt to give a structured, plotted ac-
count of his work on any given subject is troublesome. As interested as Žižek is in inter-
preting Christianity as a material religion ‘without the sacred’, he gives us precious little 
in terms of understanding the impact of critique on political theology. Aside from con-
firming the Lacanian psychoanalytic thesis that “the big Other does not exist” through its 
affirmation of the death of God, what exactly does critique mean for the material and sub-
stantive claims of theology, specifically those that concern the immanent relation be-
tween theory and praxis? What impact does the negativity of critique have on theological 
relationship to authentic political action or to transformative praxis?  
 Admittedly, the best we can do at times is gather fragments and piece them to-
gether, which always requires a level of strategic thematization. By trying to schematize 
the relationship that Žižek posits between ideology and theology, I have lifted out of 
Žižek a critical thread: a series of links between fantasy, belief, the act, and Job, the death 
of Christ, and the collective Spirit. The benefit of such a project is that we are able to then 
test this schematic against his theory of political activity, to see where it gets us in terms 
of further understanding the relationship between ideology and theology, and most im-
portantly, the impact of this relationship on practical reasoning, political practices, and 
social arrangements. The result of such a project may well be that conceptual analysis 
ideology as a category is increasingly unhelpful. I believe that ultimately what Žižek clar-
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ifies for us is that the best way to prehend the relationship is through the notion of cri-
tique itself. This is illustrated by how Žižek applies what he has found about the relation 
of ideology and theology to  ideas about the political, and the political Act itself.  
Žižek and Political Theology after Ideology Critique 
In this closing section, I return to one of the haunting questions of the dissertation, 
namely how political theology shapes the relation of theory and practice, especially when 
configured by ideology critique. I discuss Žižek’s controversial “I prefer not to” perspec-
tive here, but will take up the question of theory and praxis (as it concerns the relation of 
political theology and critical theology) in more detail in the final chapter of the disserta-
tion. There I will explain my  position, in conversation with Max Horkheimer and The-
odor Adorno, that is informed by Žižek’s concerns about the complicity of political prac-
tice in ideology, but hopefully sidesteps the many problems with Žižek’s troublesome po-
sition. 
I have argued that, for Žižek, ideology is politically important because of its dele-
terious effect on the viability of an emancipatory subjectivity, most notably in the way it 
naturalizes the current state of affairs as the only possibility, even while all the alarm 
bells are going off, signaling the upcoming apocalyptic ‘zero-point.’245 It is increasingly 
rare that one would dare to dream that a possible alternative to the present social order 
was possible, much less conceivable. Certainly, such a notion may not fit well within the 
parameters of what options are currently available, but is this not the political burden of 
ideology critique? Indeed, the primary obstacle facing a ‘critical political theology’ is that 
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politics is often restricted to what is “realistic”, to what is thought to be possible to 
achieve within the coordinates of political options currently available to us.246 
It is precisely at this juncture that Christianity bursts forth with negative political 
promise. “At the very core of Christianity”, says Žižek, “there is a radically different pro-
ject: that of a destructive negativity which ends not in a chaotic void, but reverts (organ-
izes itself) into a new Order, imposing itself on reality.”247 Christian theology offers a 
uniquely emancipatory ideologico-critical logic because it “madly insists on the impossi-
ble.”248 It is adept at thinking the world apocalyptically249, which we so badly need if we 
have any hope of reaching political actors and transforming them into revolutionary sub-
jects in a context where emergency, crisis, fear, panic, and threat are the basic coordinates 
for the functioning of contemporary ideology.250 Žižek makes his point very clear: “the 
authentic Christian apocalyptic tradition rejects the wisdom according to which some 
kind of hierarchical order is our fate, which means that any attempt to change it or create 
an alternative egalitarian order will necessarily end in destructive horror.”251 It is theol-
ogy’s truth, says Žižek, not its content, that politically matters; its truth is measured in 
politics like it is in psychoanalysis: “‘it is only true insomuch as it is followed’…the ‘test’ 
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of the analyst’s interpretation lies in the truth-effect it unleashes in the patient.”252 As we 
have already seen, the self-emptying of content for the sake of political truth reflects 
Christianity’s own theological Event of divine self-kenosis whereby God empties God’s 
self in death and pours its new life as the Holy Spirit.253 It is a form of collective belief in 
the impossible and absurd that refuses to give in to the suturing impulses of politics. The-
ology is akin to the Hegelian ‘weaving of the spirit’: “that underground work of changing 
the ideological coordinates, most invisible to the public eye, which then suddenly ex-
plodes into view, taking everyone by surprise.”254 It is theology, at least in its atheist, het-
erodox, and materialist form, that keeps politics both critical and negative. 
 So what kind of politics does Žižek’s political theology support and produce? For 
Marx, ideology critique was requisite for the formation of the proletarian and for their 
acts of revolutionary praxis. It cleared the way for political subjects to see their material 
conditions as they actually were, rather than how the ideas of the ruling class made them 
appear. For Eagleton, ideology critique was important for ‘thinking the world otherwise’. 
It diagnosed situations of oppression as evil, giving us all the chance to argue for a differ-
ent world. It was the condition of possibility for radical politics. Žižek’s views on ideol-
ogy are quite different, but it is important to him for some of the same reasons. If the cri-
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tique of ideology is constitutive for Žižek’s “theologico-political suspension of the ethi-
cal”, what is left for the human subject to do? How is the subject to act in praxis? Is there 
not some kind of deadlock here, and does theology become complicit in it?  
 We see Žižek turn to theology (as ideology critique) here, not out of necessity, but 
because his intention is intentionally subversive, like that of a psychoanalyst. He is eager 
to lead the analysand to a “Christian” position whereby she recognizes that her reliance 
on the big Other is faulty and that the authenticity and efficacy of her political acts are 
dependent on the fetishistic disavowal of her belief. John Caputo describes it this way:  
His whole point, as he says elsewhere, is subversive: to build a Trojan-horse the-
ology, to slip the nose of a more radical materialism under the Pauline tent of the-
ology in order to announce the death of God…"Christ" for him is a nickname for 
a way to contract the void, and the Passion story is an allegory or Vorstellung of a 
philosophical point he can make in any number of ways.255  
 
That “point” is the effect that ideology critique can have on establishing the conditions of 
possibility for authentic political acts. In psychoanalytic terms, it insists that until we 
come to grips with this terrifying fact and confront the truth that we are on our own in 
this world, ‘that everything has already happened’, we will never have the actual freedom 
required for ‘Acts’ that are both ruptural and inaugurative. Rather than chaining us to 
some deflated sense of catastrophic fear and anarchic inevitability, this death of the Big 
Other resists the tyranny of forced choices and institutes actual freedom. We are not 
caught in the endless relay between hope and misery, but must insist that: 
the arrangement that has persisted since Antiquity—is not inevitable; it can be 
overcome… that a different collective organization is practicable, one that will 
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eliminate the inequality of wealth and even the division of labour... In fact, what 
we ascribe as a philosophical task, we could even say a duty, is to help a new mo-
dality of existence of the hypothesis to come into being.256 
 
From this, it is clear why no ordinary politics will do. As a Marxist, Žižek lives in con-
stant awareness that “the actual history that we live is itself a kind of realized alternative 
history, the reality we have to live in because, in the past, we failed to seize the moment 
and act.”257 That said, Žižek is equally critical of the anemic left whose “fetishistic” pro-
clivity towards populism produces an truly ideological passage á l’acte, where people cry 
out with frustration, “This cannot go on! It must stop!”, but it never ends. Nothing actu-
ally changes. All action ends up being nothing more than a “depoliticized pseudo-activity 
(new life-styles, etc.), the very form of social passivity”258 that put on full display a reac-
tive and impatient refusal to confront the complexity of the situation. 
What, then, is an “authentic political act”? Speaking about Julian Assuage, Chel-
sea (Brandon) Manning, ‘Wikileaks’, and its relationship to, and role in, the case of Ed-
ward Snowden, Žižek cites his Slovenian colleague Alenka Zupančič:  
Even if Snowden were to sell his informations discreetly to another intelligence 
service, this act would still count as part of the ‘patriotic games’, and if needed 
he would have been liquidated as a ‘traitor’. However, in Snowden's case, we are 
dealing with something entirely different. We are dealing with a gesture which 
questions the very logic, the very status quo, which for quite some time serves as 
the only foundation of all ‘Western’ (non)politics. With a gesture which as it 
were risks everything, with no consideration of profit and without its own stakes: 
it takes the risk because it is based on the conclusion that what is going on is 
simply wrong. Snowden didn't propose any alternative. Snowden, or, rather, the 
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logic of his gesture, like, say, before him, the gesture of Bradley Manning – is the 
alternative.259 
 
For theology to fulfill its function as ideology critique, it must take part in a poli-
tics that, rather than proposes alternatives, actually is the alternative, one that simply 
works to amend the status quo of politics, but rather an alternative to the way that praxis 
often plays into and supports the the status quo despite its subversive and provocative as-
pirations. An authentic political act is always ‘the event’: “the successful imposition of a 
new narrative which makes a historical situation readable again to those caught in it”; it is 
an interruption of the normal flow that brings forth a qualitatively different set or possi-
bilities. This political reality is full of equivocation and ambiguity; its unpredictability 
hardly endears it those for whom the universal demands of ethical judgement and politi-
cal praxis are the instruments of social change and political hope. 
Žižek’s alternative is a “subtractive politics” that expresses its negativity in the 
Bartlebyian phrase, “I would prefer not to”, rather than the ethical demand, “I must.”260 
The best course is a committed stance of aggressive passivity until the condition of possi-
bilities have shifted, to refuse to allow one’s acts to be co-opted by the parameters of cur-
rently existing options. The substantive point of this aggressive passivity is that while 
acts of commitment, resistance, protest and action may seem to be interrupting, subver-
sive, or emancipatory, they may well be protecting the grounding antagonisms of social 
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reality that are the underneath our experiences of injustice, violence, and social inequal-
ity. These acts become the very sutures that ideology critique tears open. The only thing, 
given the established coordinates of political possibility, to do is to do nothing, to insti-
tute a politics of active refusal, with the hope this ‘short-circuits’ the system and insti-
gates an apocalyptic Event.  
For Žižek, this is the political goal of theology as ideology critique: to keep think-
ing openly about an altogether different world, one where the big Other is no longer pre-
sent, and where the field of possibility for political action is interminably open and unde-
termined. The hope of such a world is for the political mobilization of “the Excluded” 
who presently suffer personal disrespect, social discrimination, and denial of rights that 
make their equal and just participation in our social, legal, and political sphere of global 
life appear impossible. Žižek interprets the “death of God” Christianity as ideology cri-
tique because they both share, in his view, a joint goal to keep open this “empty space”, 
the traumatic gap that is continually sutured by the ideologies of the Symbolic, so that 
something like a “different collective organization” can emerge from within the Void as 
an unexpected alternative. This eschatological hope for the genuinely New, promised in 
the Event, is best sustained by the theological vision of Christianity’s “perverse core.” 
 This position is not without its strident critics. Does Žižek overcome the objection 
that this unplugging, this opting out, slides into an apolitical quietism, or worse, a nihilis-
tic and cynical indifference? It is entirely unclear whether his call for a political theology 
that acts as ideology critique that suspends the ethical for the sake of the political Event 
actually opposes ideology or merely allows it to continue. Simon Critchley identifies 
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what he calls, the “obsessional fantasy”, at the core of Žižek’s ideas, which infects both 
his critical politics and its link to theology.261 Žižek seems caught in “a fearful and fateful 
deadlock” between the materialist paralysis of the “(not) to do” and his dreams for an 
amoral ethic of the exception, the sovereign deed of brutal cruelty that radically ruptures 
the ideological sutures and dismantles the very coordinates that cover up our original 
trauma.262 The result: at best “endless postponement and over-production”263 and worst, 
“a nostalgia-which is macho and finally manneristic- for dictatorship, political violence, 
and ruthlessness.”264 The negativity within Žižek’s posture of ‘aggressive passivity’ leads 
him to a political paralysis that just ends up in a cynical and implicit endorsement of the 
status quo because, in the end, nothing really changes.  
Žižek reminds us that what makes his politics of ‘aggressive passivity’ so danger-
ous to the current bourgeoise obsession with acting urgently and immediately in the face 
of global crisis is that “Bartleby couldn’t even hurt a fly - that’s what makes his presence 
so unbearable.”265 What Critchley sees as ‘an internal deadlock’ is really just Žižek’s pa-
tience with history: his openness to the unforeseeable inevitability of change mixed his 
stubborn unwillingness to allow praxis to be mistaken for the Act. The fetishistic disa-
vowal of commitment is not the crude abandonment of belief or action, but rather the 
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subtle preparations of authentic political act, an “politics of love” that Žižek interprets as 
‘divine violence’266 which counters the more insidious ‘systemic violence’: “forms of co-
ercion that sustain relations of domination and exploitation.”267 Žižek clarifies the mean-
ing of this term when he says that “authentic revolutionary liberation is much more di-
rectly identified with violence – it is violence as such (the violent gesture of discarding, 
of establishing a difference, of drawing a line of separation) which liberates. Freedom is 
not a blissfully neutral state of harmony and balance, but the very violent act which dis-
turbs this balance.”268  
Žižek’s position is also not without its theological predecessors. It can be linked 
with a relatively prominent tradition in Protestant ethics that gives theological reasons to 
“opt out” from political acts, even as a form of protest or resistance. Published in the con-
text of the Sino-Japanese War, H. Richard Niebuhr’s essay, “The Grace of Doing Noth-
ing” advocated for a political theology that called for an “active inactivity.”269 Niebuhr 
recognized that “unplugging” from immediate demands for political activity brought 
more attention to that which lay ahead: the weight of the future. Whatever the present 
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conflict may be, it served as an indictment of policy as such, helping to prepare the 
groundwork for a more radical transformation of the future, one that requires something 
else altogether. Niebuhr recognizes that the politics of active refusal, to choice to do noth-
ing, the “I chose not to” of political inactivity was actually an ascesis.270 It taught us how 
to open ourselves up to the invisible, the unexpected, the impossible, to prepare ourselves 
for future action that promises to provide basis for an authentic political act of the Event, 
not unlike the radically emancipatory shift demanded by critical theory and for which 
ideology critique prepares political subjects. Niebuhr argues that “the inactivity of radical 
Christianity is not the inactivity of those who call evil good…It is not the inactivity of a 
resigned patience, but of a patience that is full of hope and is based on faith. It is not the 
inactivity of the non-combatant, for it knows that there are no non-combatants…”271 This 
inactivity is not the indifferent abdication of sitting on one’s hands, the cynical indiffer-
ence too the world because one does not really believe that change is possible. What it 
does involve, however, is an immanent critique that analyzes why we feel so drawn to in-
tervene and why we find political immediate action so compelling and seductive, and 
wonders aloud whose interests are served by that action. 
Conclusion 
 One of the many questions we are left with after exploring Žižek’s understanding 
of political theology as ideology critique is the way it impacts the relation of theory and 
praxis immanent to political theology. Ideology critique directly concerns how political 
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theology takes up the question of how are we able to keep the political-theological efforts 
of love, struggle, resistance, protest, solidarity or advocacy from becoming inevitably 
swallowed up by ideology, sublated and absorbed into its logic?  
 Žižek wants to imagine the possibility of acting in the world, against the order we 
live in and are formed by, in ways that cannot be absorbed, sublated, or recycled into the 
inner contradictions, whether it be of global capital, the deadlocks of liberal democracy, 
or the identitarian problems of multiculturalism. Žižek sets out to articulate a radical po-
litical vision that is capable of thinking towards such a project, and for this he finds 
Christianity and ideology critique to be politically indispensable because of the unique 
way it presents the inescapable truth about the death of God and its implications for polit-
ical activity. Christianity is not merely pragmatically useful in Žižek’s vision, but politi-
cally necessary because it affords us the critical distance between theory and action that 
Žižek considers to be essential for any “really existing change”: namely, the authentic po-
litical Event proleptically announced in the theological figure of the crucified God.  
 Serious problems arise, however, when it comes to the relation of critique and 
practice in Žižek’s political Christianity. First, theologians ought to be wary of how Žižek 
uses Christianity; is the choice to deploy Christianity more than just a convenient oppor-
tunity to ironically use that which is otherwise utterly pointless and vacate, (especially 
when one discovers that the theological idea that Žižek finds to be the most ideologico-
critical is the death of God in the crucified Christ), or is an arbitrary choice that can just 
as easily be substituted or replaced? Žižek is apparently convinced that the gift that Chris-
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tianity gives to ideology critique is its suspension of the ethical for the sake of ‘the au-
thentic political Act’; this “suspension” is most clearly discerned in the traditional theo-
logical scenes of creation, incarnation, crucifixion, namely that these theologies are ex-
emplary sites of ideology critique whose political importance is often overlooked, and so 
indeed possess a critical political legacy worth fighting for? But what is this legacy? And 
does it produce a world that is actually more livable, more suitable to human freedom and 
happiness, one that actually makes sense of and is able to reverse the dark trajectory that 
Žižek is so skilled at bringing into the light: the crises (many of which were produced by 
the very emancipatory politics promised by liberal democracy): economic meltdown, 
ecological disaster, a financial techno-capitalism whose thirst for profit and power is in-
satiable, and the seductive dogmas of neo-liberalism that not even an anemic left seems 
able to escape?  
 Žižek seems content to argue that we ought to suspend normal activity of political 
action for the sake of the Act, which is itself is made possible by the event, that sui gene-
ris experience of apocalyptic disturbance that forces ‘really existing change’ since things 
simply cannot go on as before. He makes this argument by turning to Christianity and to 
ideology critique, insisting that within the latter is the exemplary case of the former: with 
the announcement of the death of God, Christianity waives its claims to orthodoxy and so 
adopts a ‘dialectical materialism’ that repeatedly makes the case, like psychoanalysis, 
that “the big Other does not exist.”  
 This ‘revelation’ is of the apocalyptic kind, and this figures directly into how 
Žižek theorizes critique, specially in relation to how critique is supposed to relate to, and 
  
239 
generate, forms of praxis, in relation to our socio-symbolic order. Žižek works this out, at 
least in word, as a politics of aggressive passivity, the first task of which is to consider 
whether political activity is sublated by the Order we live in, whether it is global capital-
ism, Euro-American neoliberalism, or liberal multiculturalism, among other systems and 
orders, all of which determine the conditions of human being and acting. What is far from 
clear, however, is whether, as theologically grounded argument, this makes sense of the 
Christian framework as expressed by its political theology: the possibility for the world’s 
redemption rests in forms of revenant action (i.e., love, compassion, accompaniment, 
recognition, advocacy) that is grounded and motivated by divine solidarity with the ex-
cluded: the poor, the suffering, and the dead. It appears in the end that Žižek gets neither 
his theology or politics quite right. 
In what follows, I argue that it is the function of immanent critique to disrupt the 
circumscriptions of praxis by the politics of the possible, to get theory involved in a more 
thorough-going break with the way state agencies, capitalist economies, and complex cul-
tural mechanisms control and regulate human being and acting; the extent to which politi-
cal theology can effectively contribute to this work as ideology critique is an open ques-
tion, one that draws us directly into theology and idolatry critique. We turn to idolatry 
critique in the next chapter precisely because it is often thought of as the properly theo-
logical form of immanent critique and so shares a certain homological relationship to ide-
ology critique in philosophy.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE CRITIQUE OF IDOLATRY 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the dissertation takes a decisively theological turn. It takes up the 
question of idolatry and its critique. Why the turn to idolatry? The critique of ideology is 
not only a lesson that philosophy teaches to theology; theology has within itself its own 
version. But when theologians take up ideology, they do through the critique of idolatry 
as if these concepts are terminologically interchangeable, or at least cognate. In my view, 
they are neither and in fact, name very different problems. This problem also touches on 
continued misunderstandings of the Marxian position as stated in the first chapter, a mis-
take that repeatedly takes political theology out of its critical position. And so, after first 
identifying the ambiguous relation of ideology to its theological cognate, ‘idolatry,' I set 
out to clarify the meaning of idolatry in terms of its contemporary usage and significance 
for thinking about the meaning and place of ideology critique within political theology as 
a version of the Bilderverbot. To do so, I need to retrieve the historical emergence of the 
concept of idolatry before moving on to think about the meaning and place of ideology 
critique within political theology, given that the latter frequently links ideology to idola-
try. 
241 
 
This chapter explores the concept of idolatry in theology, starting first with the 
development of aniconistic theology in the Hebrew bible, which originated in the Deca-
logue’s first two commandments. I want to clarify the meaning of idolatry from a theo-
logical perspective, taking its usage in the biblical material as the point of departure and 
then proceed to its reception history in modern theologies. Any theological perspective 
on idolatry must take up its social origins in the Hebrew biblical material, and when we 
do so, we encounter a number of factors, most of which complicate the picture rather than 
clarify it. It shows that idolatry is not solely a theological question (about how best to 
worship the right god), but has significant political and philosophical aspects as well. De-
spite the complexity of the biblical critique of idolatry, we are better prepared to contex-
tualize idolatry critique as a question about the nature of the political in modern theology 
itself with it in hand. This sheds light on the reception history of the Marxist theory of 
ideology as ideology critique in political theology, and sets the stage for the work on ‘cri-
tique’ in the final chapter. 
It also carries forward a thread from the first chapter on Marx where we saw him 
turn to a critique of idolatry as fetishism as an analogue to ideology critique of alienated 
social conditions. From the beginning it seems there has been an ostensible kinship of 
sorts between ideology critique and idolatry critique. And yet, in this chapter, we search 
further for the immanent critical force with Christianity, and in turning to idolatry critique 
as the theological version of immanent critique, we find that the theology of idolatry cri-
tique is too tightly linked to an ethnocratic, identitiarian politics and so reinforces, rather 
than critiques, ideology. 
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Also, the political character of the relation of ideology to idolatry is not immedi-
ately clear. In what follows, I try to make sense of idolatry through the politics of Israelite 
aniconism as well as its iconoclastic theology, explaining the significance of the social 
origins of aniconic theologies as key indicators of major political and theological shifts to 
solidify social cohesion and collective identity during the exilic and post-exilic periods of 
early Judaism. This clarifies the meaning of idolatry as a political gesture, used to both 
explain Israelite/Judaic civil/social divisions, as well as a rallying cry after their defeat, 
occupation, and enslavement during ‘the Babylonian captivity.’ I will argue that the con-
struction and deployment of “idolatry” as ‘perverse or strange worship’ was designed as a 
distinguishing rhetorical ploy to generate and enforce a whole series of social and politi-
cal relations of otherness, establishing ‘self’/'other’ alignments as constitutive of religious 
identities of fidelity, obedience, and allegiance to one god over the other gods. An ac-
count of idolatry as a political polemic used to generate social and religious relations of 
otherness and foreignness resonates with major and ongoing debates about the construc-
tion of politico-religious identity. To counter idolatry critique within theology (as an ex-
ample of the ‘theologization’ of politics), a further account is needed of the ideologico-
critical potential of the prophetic traditions which criticize the theology of idolatry, inter-
preted here as an immanent critique of identity politics. 
Idolatry and its Critics  
I will argue three things in this section: that the problem that idolatry critique 
names is as political as it is theological, that its origins are distinctly material, and finally 
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that the problem it names is different from that of ideology. The term ‘idolatry’ is a criti-
cal concept; it is always essentially defined by its opponents. “Idolatry” typically refers to 
a negative and pejorative critique of a certain set of religious beliefs or practices, usually 
associated, in some form, with image-veneration or ‘false or strange worship’ (e.g., its 
rabbinic term, avodah zarah). I want to argue that ‘idolatry' has persistent value as philo-
sophical and political idea, a characteristic that comes from its early social origins in the 
religion of the biblical Israelites. Idolatry is not simply a critique of ‘false representation,' 
‘bad worship,' or ‘wrong theology.’ I follow Jan Assmann in arguing that idolatry critique 
may end up being a “theologization” of political relations that is engineered to be, at the 
same time, a “discourse of othering” and a political invention. That is, idolatry critique is 
not only or even primarily a claim about how best to speak of God but also an attempt to 
organize and arrange collective attachments. The critique of ideology may not lead us to 
a critique of idolatry, but perhaps to an argument that questions the strong synonymous or 
interchangeable relation between idolatry and ideology in much of theological studies to-
day.  
The General Concept of Idolatry 
What is the exact nature of the problem that is named in and by idolatry? A stand-
ard view of idolatry is that it describes the oppositional relation between monotheism and 
polytheism. Halbertal and Margalit’s classic Idolatry is one such example.1 Halbertal and 
Margalit’s ‘history of ideas’ approach to the study of idolatry examines the different con-
ceptualizations of idolatry in Jewish, Christian, and secular discourses in modernity. This 
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conceptual analysis acknowledges its polemical and contested character, as there are mul-
tiple understandings of idolatry with no universal or common character. Halbertal and 
Margalit typologize the philosophy of idolatry into five different conceptual perspectives: 
idolatry as betrayal, idolatry as rebellion, idolatry as false representation, idolatry as er-
ror, and idolatry as strange, or alien, worship.2 For Halbertal and Margalit, the essence of 
idolatry critique is the way it marks out the space of the strange, the foreign, and the pa-
gan. They delineate the various modes that communities, again self-defined as non-idola-
trous, define their opponents as idolatrous: bad belief (betrayal), wrong belief (error), bad 
worship (mistaking an intermediary for the the real thing), and wrong worship (false rep-
resentation). When speaking from the perspective of the Hebrew Bible, this position is 
derived from the Decalogue’s first and second commandments. From its inception, idola-
try has been a site of an on-going debate about representation, or put differently: what a 
sign is thought to stand for in the minds of those who use the sign. In this way, images 
are false representations and as such, are idols. Idolatry, as an anxiety about false or 
failed images, is based on a set of theological positions about how god and/or the gods 
can and should be be properly represented. But this is only one aspect.  
As a proscription of images, idolatry is a ban on the worship of other gods, which 
presumably involves the use of images, and on certain ways of representing the right god. 
It declares what ways of worship are permitted and which ones are forbidden. Halbertal 
and Margalit define idolatry as an opposition to the use of images as forbidden depictions 
                                                
2 Halbertal and Margalit, Idolatry, 237-244.   
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of deity, based on a specific theory of representation that uses this as a fault line for the 
self-definition of a specific and peculiar community.3 That said, it is a way of identifying 
and correcting improper understandings of god while also critiquing the culture in which 
idolatry was allowed to develop. Whether idolatry is defined as betrayal, error, falsehood, 
or strange, or alien, worship, “the ban is an attempt to dictate exclusivity, to map the 
unique territory of the one god.”4  
The critique of idolatry is often linked to ideology critique. In this view, its aim is 
to correct false theologies, or to name improper concepts of God evinced in the context of 
worship. Halbertal and Margalit link them in precisely this way:  
The critical and liberating role of philosophy is the uncovering of deep illusions. 
Philosophy, by its nature, or at its best, is iconoclastic, in the sense of removing 
ideological masks or breaking idols…The way against idolatry has the same role 
of liberation from error and the attempt to break the bonds of our imagination.5 
 
Halbertal and Margalit, rather than assume some essence of idolatry, acknowledge 
that this ‘powerful category that aspires to establish a firm boundary between God and 
the strange gods’ is marked by ‘astonishing fluidity’6. Yet, it is clear that the practitioners 
of idolatry are defined negatively: they are the non-idolatrous, the non-alien, or the non-
pagan. As Jay Geller notes, “this naming procedure reflects their recognition of the code-
                                                
3 Halbertal and Margalit, Idolatry, 236-237.  
4 Halbertal and Margalit, Idolatry, 5. 
5 Halbertal and Margalit, Idolatry, 6. 
6 Halbertal and Margalit, Idolatry, 250. 
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pendence of any notion of idolatry on the corresponding one of the right and true reli-
gion”, a position that reflects the central point of this chapter, that idolatry negotiates the 
boundary between the other and the self.7 The ascription of idolatry is used to determine 
the boundaries between one community and another community, but is also an immanent 
critique; that it is, it determines boundaries within a presumably singular community, as 
is the case with its biblical form, as I will argue below.  
Idolatry in the Hebrew Bible is represented by social, sexual, and filial metaphors 
that are employed by texts to describe the relations between a cultic community, its God, 
and the god/religion of its ‘enemy’. The work of these metaphors is to generate a politico-
religious identity by operationalizing cultic difference and externalizing its internal non-
conformity into that place that serves as the boundary where identity and difference are 
bound together: ‘the other within’. The point is here is that idolatry critique is not so 
much about naming the beliefs and practices of the other as idolatrous as it is about iden-
tifying the one’s own positions as ‘non-idolatrous’. Namely, idolatry is an essential 
mechanism through which communities will determine the borders of inclusion and ex-
clusion, what and who counts as the other. And yet, Halbertal and Margalit contend that 
the significance of idolatry (and its critique) is not in its theological meaning, but rather 
the way that it negotiates the boundaries between self and other within and between com-
munities. It is naturally a thoroughly political boundary, one that draws the lines of col-
lective belonging and social attachment. This generic definition of how idolatry works 
helps specify its more particular rhetorical, polemical, and historical forms, particularly 
                                                
7 Jay Geller, “Idols, Fetishes and Foreskins: The Other Of Religion,” Religion 27 (1997): 119.  
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given the challenging ambiguities of iconographic and polytheistic context that gave rise 
to biblical idolatry critique.  
The Biblical Critique of Idolatry 
It is difficult to speak of the biblical critique of idolatry, mostly because it is diffi-
cult to speak of a consistent biblical theology (as if there was only one). The multiple 
sources, forms, and agenda of the biblical material and the interwoven layers and threads 
of authorship, redaction, and editions present significant obstacles to any sort of harmoni-
zation or singularity. Without going into each of the sources and redactional schools, it is 
difficult to say much more with any clarity about the specific origin of idolatry critique, 
especially in relations to any specific politics therein. In what follows, I simply want to 
report on the consensus within Hebrew Bible scholarship on the nature and origins of Is-
raelite aniconism, the role that ideology critique appears to have played in the develop-
ment of this characteristic, and the political-theological implications of both the emer-
gence of biblical monotheism and iconoclastic politics.  The benefit of reviewing the bib-
lical critique of idolatry thematically is that we are able to get a sense for how the biblical 
concept is used and received in later systematic and political theologies, rather than how 
it developed textually or historically. The point here is simply to hazard a provisional un-
derstanding of the biblical critique of idolatry that helps us identify the problems with 
modern treatments by much of recent theology that link it too tightly (and in the wrong 
way) to ideology critique.  
Idolatry critique in the Hebrew bible is ambiguous, but a few generalizations are 
helpful. It has to do with the role of divine images in the biblical world, and so it shapes 
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understandings of the ‘orthodox’ representation of the divine life and continues to organ-
ize and regulate doctrines of creation, theological anthropology, the nature of God, and 
faithful theological language. Idolatry is the critical, negative concept that emerges from 
the aniconistic theology of Israelite religion. The biblical material is polyphonic on the 
subject, offering multiple and fluid accounts, but consistently presents idolatry in a criti-
cal fashion. In the most basis sense, idolatry is a critical and pejorative term, used by its 
opponents to describe a certain misuse of images as representations of the divine in reli-
gious practices, broadly defined as ‘false, or strange worship.’8 These images are de-
scribed as ‘eidölay’, a term which conveys the conceit of things that appear to be some-
thing they are not. It expresses falsity, illusion, and deception, and this is given a more 
full, political meaning in iconoclasm. If idolatry (as the worship of strange or ‘foreign’ 
gods) is structurally distinct to iconolatry (as the use of images in worship), the emer-
gence of idolatry critique in the monolatrous rhetoric of exilic and post-exilic biblical 
writings effectively links them together as expressed violations of the Sinaic pact.9 The 
critique of idolatry certainly regulated Israelite worship to the one God, but rather than 
reflecting an inherent and self-conscious monotheism, it reinforced the unique covenantal 
(read: political/cultic) bond between Israel and their god, YHWH.10  
                                                
8 Frederick Greenspahn, “Syncretism and Idolatry in the Bible,” Vetus Testamentum 54.4 (October 2004): 
483-485; Charles A. Kennedy, “The Semantic Field of the Term ‘Idolatry,'” in Uncovering Ancient Stones: 
Essays in Memory of H. Neil Richardson, ed. Lewis M. Hopfe (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1994), 194.  
9 Dt. 31:16, 20; Jer. 11:10. 
10 Johannes Tromp, “The Critique of Idolatry in the Context of Jewish Monotheism,” in Aspects of Reli-
gious Contact and Conflict in the Ancient World, ed. Pieter W. van der Horst (Utrecht : Faculteit der 
Godgeleerdheid Universiteit Utrecht, 1995), 106.  
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But what precisely was being critiqued in the biblical critique of idolatry - and 
why? The critique of idolatry originates in the prohibition of divine images in the Torah, 
most notably in the second commandment of the First and Second commandments in the 
Decalogue.11 The second, “You shall not make for yourself an idol” is a form of observ-
ing the first, “You shall have no other gods before me.”12 Prima facie, the problem of 
idolatry is ‘false worship’. When one commits idolatry, one is either worshipping a false 
god in an apostate fashion, or worshipping the true God incorrectly. It, broadly speaking, 
opposes the use of cultic images in the worship of Yahweh on the basis that such a prac-
tice undermines and misrepresents the uniqueness of Yahweh in relation to other rival, 
cultic gods and so fails to do justice to who God is. 
The biblical critique of idolatry is frequently communicated through two primary 
metaphors: the marital metaphor in which the primary offense is sexual infidelity and be-
trayal13 and the political metaphor stepped in the monarchial systems of the day, in which 
the primary offense is shifting ones allegiance out of lack of trust, obedience, and loy-
alty.14 The practice of idolatry contradicted the religio-political identity of Israel, as it il-
lustrated a fundamental rift in the covenant between Yahweh and the people of Israel. As 
                                                
11 Ex. 20:4, 23; 34:17; Dt. 5:8. 
12 Lev. 19:4, 26:1, Dt. 4:15–19, 5:8-10, 25:5–8, 27:15.  
13 This model is introduced in the Pentateuch (Ex. 34:15-16) and shows up all over the Prophetic literature: 
Ezekiel, Jeremiah, and of course, Hosea. The idea here is that Israel as a people are married to God, who 
demands exclusivity and absolute fidelity, but has been unfaithful in their worship, both by worshipping 
other gods and worshiping God incorrectly, namely with these use of idols.   
14 This model is more prevalent in the Historical books, where God is interpreted as “king," and the people 
of Israel, “his” subjects. As “king," God demands trust, loyalty, and obedience. Both by worshipping other 
gods or worshiping Yahweh incorrectly, the people of Israel demonstrate that they do not believe God’s 
power is capable of protecting and providing for them. The request for a king in 1 Samuel 8 is seen as an 
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such, the consequence of idolatry was severe and unrelenting punishment15 (including the 
fall of the temple, and subsequent exile, diaspora, and finally, displacement from Jerusa-
lem) on account of divine anger and jealousy.16 In a phrase, idolatry hurt God’s feelings 
and the response was often swift and severely violent retribution.17 Idolatry was critiqued 
for being both uselessness and counterproductive, in that it proved to be ineffective in 
terms of procuring divine favor, protection, provision of crops, military victory, and so on 
(Is. 41:23-24; 44:6-21; Jer. 10:15), and often brought with it divine retribution as a dire 
consequence. (Dt. 11:13-18; 18) 
As such, a predominant characteristic of early Israel’s ban on images is its link to 
the ban on the worship of foreign gods on ethical political grounds, a theme we repeated 
in Hosea, but most notably the post-exilic prophets, Ezekiel, Isaiah, and Jeremiah.18 The 
general social critique of the prophets tries to show the links between idolatry and pov-
erty, social injustice, and economic struggle.19 Social injustice and the plight of the poor 
is tied to, and is a consequence of, idolatry. The anti-image rhetoric in Hosea (8:4-8) has 
largely to do with the betrayal of God and God’s ways that is signified in idol-worship, 
                                                
affront to God’s divine kingship. Treaties with Assyria and Egypt are seen by the prophetic texts (Isaiah 30, 
31:57, Jeremiah 2, and Ezekiel 16) as examples of Israel’s lack of trust and belief, and akin to the betrayal 
of loyalty enacted in idol worship.  
15 Lev. 26:27-33; Nu. 33:51-56; Dt. 29:16-28.  
16 Ex. 20:5, 34:14, Deut 5:8-10, Ezekiel 8:3, Nahum 1:2. 
17 Dt. 6:14-15; Joshua 24:19-20; Psalms 78:58-64; Zeph. 1:18.  
18 Hosea 2:15, 8: 4-6, 11:2, 13:1-2, 14:4, 9.; Ez. 16:15-24, 22:4.; Jer, 2: 5-8, 20-26. 5:26-31, 8:8-12.  
19 J. David. Pleins, The Social Visions of the Hebrew Bible (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 
2000), 226-228, 288-289, 324-328, 333-336. 
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issuing a critique of the broken ethical culture that gave rise to idolatry, rather than a cen-
sure of the practices themselves. In Jeremiah (2:26-27), the prophet insists that poverty 
and other social ills have been caused by the ideology of the monarchial establishment. 
The actions of the ruling elite run contrary to the ethical way of life set forth by Yahweh, 
and as a result, injustice, inequality, and exploitation dominate the social landscape rather 
than that peace, abundance, and prosperity promised upon the completion of the rebuild-
ing program. It was God’s moral outrage against the ideology of elite that caused God to 
depart from their midst. Ezekiel (14:1-11; 14:5; 16:6-9, 15-29) echoes the ways that the 
betrayal of God through image worship violates the covenantal pact and so has led to an 
estrangement from God, which has resulted in decline, poverty, and infighting amongst 
the Israelites, further weakening them.  
In the politico-theological context of early Judaism, anti-pagan and anti-idol rhet-
oric are closely linked.20 Idolatry critique pejoratively aligns the accused (unfaithful Isra-
elites) with the false worship of the non-Israelite, who are viewed as “alien” and “pagan," 
and as such, are subjects of divine wrath and violence. Idolatry was a vice of the “hea-
thens," those who did not possess the truth about Yahweh and did not know the covenan-
tal promises. Idols were unclean vices because they were used by pagans. For Ezekiel, 
the worship of idols is linked to alliances with foreign nations and their gods (11:22-33), 
                                                
20 Isa. 14:1, 21:9, 44:9–20; Jer. 10:1–16; Ezek. 20:32, 30:13, and Hosea 13:2. Also, see Dt 7: 5, 25, 12:2-5.; 
For additional commentary on these texts and the way they link anti-idol rhetoric and anti-pagan polemic, 
see Mark S. Smith, The Early History of God: Yahweh and the Other Deities in Ancient Israel (Grand Rap-
ids: MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co, 2002), 19-65.  
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a point echoed in Ezra’s critique of intermarriage (Ezra 7-10) as an idolatrous abandon-
ment both of God and of their distinctiveness as a people.21 The rebuilding of the temple 
and the restoration of the holy land require the absolute commitment of the people of 
God. Marriages, treaties, and other forms of affective attachment outside the Israelite 
community sullies and dilutes its unique, exclusive link to God, and as such, are inter-
preted as idolatry.22 The anti-idol rhetoric plays a particular role in shaping the moral and 
political concerns of exilic and post-exilic Israel, in that it provides significant impetus 
for social cohesion and the maintenance of a distinctively Jewish community, in light of 
the collective social experience of occupation, forced migration, and resettlement. This is 
true, not only of Ezekiel and Ezra/Nehemiah, but also Jeremiah and Isaiah, as Walter 
Brueggemann has persuasively argued.23  
Idolatry critique and its origin was not solely ethical and political, but had a theo-
logical impetus as well. In the Hebrew-biblical perspective, idolatry is a theological issue 
because it rejects ideas about God that are essential to the particularity of Israelite wor-
ship. Usually associated with practices involving images, items, and statutes involving or 
evoking anthropomorphic representations of god/gods, the problem of idolatry is the mis-
take of an image for the real thing, or claiming to represent that which cannot be pre-
sented. The prohibition of the use of images in worship is meant to avoid this error. To 
                                                
21 Andrew Mein, Ezekiel and the Ethics of Exile (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 101-137 and 
174-178.  
22 Mein, Ezekiel and the Ethics of Exile, 198, 256.  
23 Walter Brueggemann, Hopeful Imagination: Prophetic Voices in Exile (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 
1986); Walter Brueggeeman, A Commentary on Jeremiah: Exile and Homecoming (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1998) 
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attempt to represent god with items composed of everyday, ordinary materials and con-
structed by human hands is to completely misunderstand your place in relation to the 
god/gods - with dramatic consequences.  
As the unnameable and ineffable god, ‘YHWH’ is radically mysterious and so be-
yond human comprehensibility and conventional speech. All images fail to tell the truth 
about divine invisibility and god’s metaphysical otherness because they represent god as 
possessing a body, immanently present, and so accessible to human thought and speech. 
And so, to venerate an image thought to be represent God that was fabricated by the work 
of human hands is to elevate a product of human labor as equal and proper to the divine 
nature. The corporeal or material is simply not suitable to properly represent that which is 
always beyond the laws of bodies, motion, and force. In their use of images, idolaters 
demonstrate how little they know of the true nature of god/gods, and so their worship is 
considered to be illegitimate acts of infidelity and betrayal. The biblical argument against 
idolatry insist that true worship is about commitment, loyalty, and fidelity to one’s god 
and the practice of idolatry misconstrues it, shifting its focus from that of commitment to 
representation. The politics of the image then rests on whether the truth about God can be 
accessed, represented, and so experienced, or if it is indeed beyond knowledge, and so 
demands something else, something unbearably demanding from the human being: faith. 
One way of demarcating true worship (that is, of the god of the Israelites) from 
false worship was by forbidding image-veneration altogether. The prohibition seems to 
suggest that the use of images to represent God for worship (or the ascription of divinity 
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to images) is the practice of rival religions and so would be considered an affront to Yah-
weh’s claims to uniqueness and particularity. Biblical narratives that critique sculptures 
or objects are very polemical and are intended to undermine the plausibility of the gods 
of Israel’s political adversaries.24 This theme, which bases the critique of idolatry on the 
basis of Yahweh’s distinctive and unique particularity which calls for a special fidelity 
and loyalty in return, is dominant in the prophetic literature, most notably in Second 
Isaiah where Yahweh is consistently and repeatedly compared to other deities so as to 
highlight their useless, impotent, and empty character.25 Yahweh’s words and deeds are 
incomparable to other deities; they are sui generis, and so the practices and beliefs proper 
to worship of these other gods are simply not acceptable when it comes to Yahweh, spe-
cifically the veneration of images, objects, items, etc, made graven by ritualized conse-
cration. How can the unnameable ‘Yhwh' be properly represented in an image?26 The cri-
tique of idolatry refuses to recognize any authentic divine presence in idols; it dismisses 
them as worthless and mundane objects with no power. The condemnation of images, ob-
                                                
24 Ex. 32, Jg. 8:24-27, 17-18, 1 Kgs. 12. 
25 Second Isaiah 43:8-13, 44:6-8, 45: 18-21. 
26 Joel Marcus, “Idolatry in the New Testament,” Interpretation 60.2 (April 2006): 156. Marcus notes that 
in the ancient Near East context, all those groups or communities who used icons, images, or objects in 
worship, objects made graven by practice and ritual, would have understood them as separate and different 
from the divinities they represented; image-veneration was a question of representation, not identification. 
While iconic cults may have considered images to be imparted with divine power, the images themselves 
were not thought to be divine. As such, the polemic against idol worship was a ‘caricature’ and a ‘distor-
tion’, as if those outside the Israelites literally worshiped their images or icons. In fact, the ‘crass identifica-
tion of the image with the god’ shows how the biblical critique of idolatry was “deliberately” used to define 
the ‘essence of the pagan.’  
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jects, statues, etc. is based on the fact that they are constructed by human hands from nat-
ural, ordinary, and inanimate materials; this can hardly be considered suitable representa-
tion of the one, true and living God.27 
Biblical scholars have been typically assumed that such a prohibition was an ex-
traordinary case in the ancient near east, a context of vapid polytheistic and iconographic 
belief and practice where the worship of gods other than the God of Israel involved ven-
eration of the images, objects, and icons that represented these deities.28 This claim to 
distinctiveness has been reconsidered as of late by scholars of Israelite aniconism who 
see a continuity in the belief and practice of early Israel with its ancient near eastern 
                                                
27 For example, see Jer. 10:10, 12-13. This critique of idolatry is summarized in a problem often cited in 
Mesopotamian literature on the rituals surrounding the veneration of images which emerges when one tries 
to explain how these objects can properly represent deities and their power, given that these normal, banal 
images used as objects of religious worship were very often crafted from normal, banal, everyday materi-
als. What is it about the means or mode of their construction that transforms or converts them from mun-
dane stone, mud, and wood to become appropriate ‘stand-ins’ for God? The biblical critique of idolatry ar-
gues that natural materials cannot be converted into an accurate representation of divine being, and so are 
impotent and false representations of the immaterial by the material. For detailed explainations of this prob-
lem in early Israelite religious belief and practices in the context of the ancient near east religious world, 
see Jacobsen, “The Graven Image,” in Ancient Israelite Religion, eds. P.D. Hanson and S.D. McBride, 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), 23-28.; Tryggve Mettinger, No Graven Images: Israelite Aniconism in 
its Ancient Near Eastern Context (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1995), 21.; Karel van der 
Toorn, “Iconic Book,” in The Image and the Book: Iconic Cults, Aniconism, and the Rise of Book Religion 
Israel and the Ancient Near East, ed. Karel van der Toorn (Leuven: Peeters: 1997), 235-239.; Berlejung, 
“Washing the Mouth,” in The Image and the Book: Iconic Cults, Aniconcism, and the Rise of Book Religion 
Israel and the Ancient Near East, ed. Karel van der Toorn (Leuven: Peeters: 1997), 45-72. 
28 Johannes Tromp, “The Critique of Idolatry in the Context of Jewish Monotheism,” 105-120.;  
David Morgan, “The Vicissitudes of Seeing: Iconoclasm and Idolatry,” Religion 33 (2003): 170-180;  
Robert Carroll, “The Aniconic God and the Cult of Images,” Studia Theologica 31.1 (1977): 51-64; 
J.M. Kennedy, “The Social Background of Early Israel’s Rejection of Cultic Images,” Biblical Theology 
Bulletin 17 (1987): 138-144; C. D. Evans, “Cult Images, Royal Policies and the Origins of Aniconism.” in 
The Pitcher is Broken: Memorial Essays for Gosta W. Ahlstrom JSOTSup 190, ed. S. W. Holloway and LK 
Handy (Sheffield: Sheffield, Academic Press, 1995), 192-212; B. B. Schmidt, “The Aniconic Tradition: On 
Reading Images and Viewing Texts,” in The Triumph of Elohim: From Yahwisms to Judiasms, ed. D. V. 
Edelman (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1995), 75-105. 
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neighbors, with a notable difference in exilic and post-exilic periods that coincide with 
shifts in monarchial attitudes.29 Aniconism, it turns out, is not a uniquely Israelite reli-
gious feature: it appears in neighboring near eastern cults and seems to have coexisted 
with iconic sensibilities, given the absence of any expressed veto or proscription of im-
ages, like what we see developing in early Israel, dating back roughly to redactions taking 
place around sixth century BCE30, but perhaps starting in response to Hoseanic criticism 
of divine images.31 On the related questions whether or not Israelite cult was always ani-
conistic, and whether the prohibition of images was always programmatic or if it was pre-
ceded by a de facto form (an unreflective absence of images), Mettinger32, T.J. Lewis33, 
Hendel34, and others have argued that although Israelite ‘programmatic aniconism’ was 
rather late, there is consistent and sustained evidence of an absence of images in cultic 
                                                
29 Theodore J. Lewis, “Divine Images and Aniconism in Ancient Israel,” Journal of the American Oriental 
Society, Vol. 118.1 (January 1998): 37; Tryggve Mettinger, “The Veto on Images and the Aniconic God in 
Israel,” in Religious Symbols and Their Functions, SIDA 10, ed. H. Biezais (Stockholm, Sweden: Almquist 
& Wiksell International, 1979), 15-29. 
30 Mettinger, No Graven Image, 16, 136.; Also see Mettinger, “Israelite Aniconism: Developments and Ori-
gins,” in The Image and the Book: Iconic Cults, Aniconcism, and the Rise of Book Religion Israel and the 
Ancient Near East, ed. Karel van der Toorn (Leuven: Peeters: 1997), 175-180, 183. 
31
Rainer Albertz, A History of Israelite Religion in the Old Testament Period (Louisville KY: Westminster 
John Knox, 1994), 65. 
32 Mettinger, “Israelite Aniconism: Developments and Origins,” 173-204. and Mettinger, No Graven Im-
ages, 13-58, 135-197. 
33 Lewis, “Divine Images and Aniconism in Ancient Israel,” 36-53.  
34 Ronald S. Hendel, “The Social Origins of the Aniconic Tradition in Early Israel,” The Catholic Biblical 
Quarterly 50 (1988): 365-381.; Ronald S. Hendel, “Aniconism and Anthropomorphism in Ancient Israel,” 
in The Image and the Book: Iconic Cults, Aniconcism, and the Rise of Book Religion Israel and the Ancient 
Near East, ed. Karel van der Toorn (Leuven: Peeters: 1997), 206-228. 
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worship of Yahweh by the Israelites.35 And yet, Mettinger carefully distinguishes be-
tween a late ‘programmatic aniconism’ (a consciously negative attitude that produces an 
expressed proscription and repudiation of images) and an early ‘de facto aniconism’ 
(which lacks a negative attitude, but still shows evidence of an absence of images without 
antagonism).36 The latter form was a response to the anthropomorphic religions of Is-
rael’s neighbors, a sensibility that intensified in exilic conditions, which put the people of 
Israel in much closer contact with iconic cults.37 Hendel surmises that idolatry critique 
became a ‘subject of theological reflection’ whereas before it has simply been a ‘conven-
tional observance’, and was part of a process of reconfiguring the relationship between 
God and humanity after a harrowing experience of radical displacement, collective alien-
ation, and painful exile.38 In its programmatic form, idolatry was defined as the violation 
of the expressed proscription of images; this is the form we find in Exodus and Deuteron-
omy. T. Mettinger argues that this programmatic aniconism, which is a “fairly late liter-
ary formulation”, points to its origins within the late-exilic or early post-exilic circum-
stances of the sixth century BCE.39 What, then, is the reason for this development? What 
might motivate early Israelite religion to deepen and codify their prohibition on divine 
images?  
                                                
35 Hendel, “The Social Origins of the Aniconic Tradition in Early Israel,” 366-368. 
36 Mettinger, “Israelite Aniconism: Developments and Origins,” 178-184, 199-204.  
37 Mettinger, “Israelite Aniconism: Developments and Origins,” 201.  
38 Hendel, “Aniconism and Anthropomorphism in Ancient Israel,” 206ff. 
39 Mettinger, “Israelite Aniconism: Developments and Origins,” 180-183.  
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At this juncture, I want to close by make a few points: first, idolatry critique was 
not only a theological critique of false worship practices, but was also a political way of 
distinguishing between Israelite identity and that of other competitors. The use of images 
as a practice belongs to the worship of other gods, and so cannot be used in the worship 
or representation of Yahweh. The proscription on images issued from idolatry critique 
was used in order to distinguish the God of Israel (for whom images are not necessary 
and are inadequate) from those other foreign divinities who “constituted a clear and pre-
sent danger and therefore were objects of abhorrence and calculated derision.”40 As Isra-
elite religion developed into early Judaism, this critique was increasing applied, not only 
to the images used in worship, but also to the gods they were thought to represent and the 
‘nations’ they patronize. Indeed, anti-image rhetoric and polemic against idolatry become 
a common-place marker of Israelite identity, namely “their imageless worship and stub-
born refusal to revere or even acknowledge the existence of other gods.”41 Rebuking and 
disavowing the legitimacy of cultic images as idols became an effective strategy to attack 
the the foreign religious cults themselves for their theological failure. By this, the wor-
shipping community of Yahweh demonstrates to itself, not only the superiority of their 
god (the One whose greatness cannot be adequately worshiped using material and hu-
man-made cultic images), but of the rightness of their own cultic-nationalist identity. I 
have suggested that aniconistic opposition to idolatry was “an exercise in redrawing 
                                                
40 Marcus, “Idolatry in the New Testament,” 108.  
41 Marcus, “Idolatry in the New Testament,” 110. 
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group boundaries for the people of God”42, especially at significant points in their history: 
the years and periods proceeding or preceding military or political defeat. 
Its aniconistic position is often identified as one of the distinctive and unique the-
ological traits of the Israelite religion and served as an indication of its missional identity 
and agency in sharp contrast to its other cults in their immediate context. But any pro-
grammatic aniconism appears to be a rather late development in the history of Israelite 
religion, even if a ‘de facto aniconism’ preceded it. This means that prior to the sixth cen-
tury BCE, Israelite worship may have looked much more like its neighbors, in both its 
polytheism and use of images in worship. The emergence of idolatry critique, then, sig-
nals a theological shift, but also a political one, grounded in the exilic and post-exilic cir-
cumstances that Israelite community found itself in during this period. In the next section, 
I want to explore the political origins of idolatry critique in the interest of clarifying what 
is meant within theology by idolatry. It is important to show that idolatry and ideology 
have different functions, both politically and theologically. For this, I want to ask a few 
questions: was the aniconism that materialized into idolatry critique a distinctive and 
unique feature of Israelite religion in contrast to its neighbors in the ancient near east? 
What were the key political implications of the development of idolatry as a critical con-
cept in early Judaism? 
The Political Origins of Idolatry Critique 
It should be clear that idolatry is not only about a theological critique about false 
worship. In this section, I want to explore the origins and motivations of idolatry critique, 
                                                
42 Marcus, “Idolatry in the New Testament,” 107. 
260 
 
not the practices themselves. In particular, I am interested in the connection between the 
politics of iconoclast theology and the rise of early Judaic monotheism. What was the 
character of Israelite aniconism - and how is it linked to its monotheism? In what ways 
did the iconoclasm of idolatry critique define the political-theological identity of ancient 
Israel, specifically in relation to its development as a monotheist religion? My hope is 
that we are able to clarify the relation between idolatry and ideology by exploring in 
more detail their respective political-theological significance.  
It is important to carefully distinguish between idolatry as an actual religious 
practice and idolatry as a theological polemic in monotheist discourse. For me, this helps 
us discern in the origins of the critique of idolatry a theopolitical “discourse of othering.” 
For me, this would make the critique of idolatry suspect in itself and would question the 
presumed parallelism between ideology and idolatry that operates prevalently in modern 
political theology. Such a suspicion belongs to ideology critique, and so one must be 
careful not to wholly dispense with the ad intra critique of idolatry for this reason, as if 
the ethical way of life it promotes (an ethics of fidelity and faithfulness to the covenantal 
way of social life called for by those who claim to love and belong to God) loses its in-
herent value once it is shown to have been used ideologically. The iconoclastic tendency 
within Israelite religion is no doubt a theological politics enforced and enacted by its 
idolatry critique. To understand this, we must consider the social origins of these newly 
iconoclastic theologies, rather than looking to their theological assertions alone. There 
were distinct polemical formulations in which the development of idolatry critique as a 
biblical political theology were embedded; this departs in some important ways from the 
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idea that religions like Judaism are natively disposed to reject images, a “myth of ani-
conism” that art historian David Freedberg once called “wholly untenable.”43 Instead, we 
find that idolatry critique emerges on the cultural and political scene in early Judaism at 
an exilic and post-exilic time when Israel is desperately in need of social cohesion and a 
politically distinct Jewish life. Idolatry critique is all about establishing and repairing the 
distinctiveness of Israel’s identity amidst the challenging politics of exile. 
The biblical critique of idolatry has a complicated historical, rhetorical, and po-
lemical context in ancient Near East religious practice. The ancient Near East was 
marked by near universal polytheism that was expressed commonly through many differ-
ent iconographic cultic practices. Israelite religious critique of these practices as “idola-
try” has long been identified as one of the essential unique features of its theology, a re-
sult of its remarkable commitment to monotheism. It is widely assumed that Judaism and 
its religious genealogical antecedents has always been aniconic, and that its monotheism 
left it theologically inclined to reject all use of images in reference to god/gods, making 
its uniquely aniconistic theology a religious and political outliner in the ancient near east-
ern context. Of course, the aforementioned multiplicity within the biblical material makes 
it difficult to make universal claims one way or the other: that the Israelite cult was fully 
aniconic or that it made full use of images, or that it was either universally monotheist or 
frequently worshiped many different gods. There is historical and archaeological evi-
                                                
43 David Freedberg, The Power of Images: Studies in the History and Theory of Response (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1989), 54.  
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dence that points to both the significant use of cultic images and the prevalence of poly-
theist belief in the history of Israelite religion, most prevalent in the pre-exilic period of 
the first temple. In fact, there might not have been much difference between Israel/Judah 
and its neighbors in the first temple period in terms of their aniconism or use of images.44 
The use of anthropomorphic cult-images in First Temple period Israelite religious 
practices appears to be much more widespread, making it clear that aniconism did not de-
marcate Israelite religious belief as much as previously thought. Instead it is shown to be 
something that developed and became prevalent in the years between the exilic and post-
exilic period and the building of the Second Temple.45 Scholars note that the significant 
rise of anti-image rhetoric during these periods suggest not that the cessation of image-
use was widespread, but instead argues in favor of it continuing to some way and form, at 
least to the extent that it was considered necessary to continually oppose it.46 The simul-
taneous presence of both the anti-image polemic of idolatry critique and the rather persis-
tent, wide-spread use of these forbidden images within Israelite communities challenges 
us to better understand the motivations for the anti-image polemic, especially if a de facto 
                                                
44 Herbert Niehr, “In Search of YHWH’s Cult Statue in the First Temple,” in The Image and the Book: 
Iconic Cults, Aniconism, and the Rise of Book Religion in Israel and the Ancient Near East, ed. Karel van 
der Toorn, (Leuven: Peeters, 1997), 73–95.  
45 Naomi Janowitz, “Good Jews Don’t: Historical and Philosophical Constructions of Idolatry,” History of 
Religions Vol. 47. 2/3 (November 2007/February 2008): 237-243. 
46 Janowitz, “Good Jews Don’t: Historical and Philosophical Constructions of Idolatry,” 241. Also, see 
Brian Schmidt, “The Aniconic Tradition: On Reading Images and Viewing Texts,” 75-105.  
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aniconism and iconic cultic practices seemed to have co-existed without too much strug-
gle in pre-exilic, First Temple period.47  
The specific context for the rise of anti-image rhetoric within Israelite political 
theology was decidedly “post-exilic”. This material appears to have linked the critique of 
cultic images with other rhetorical assertions so as to accomplish specific political goals 
related to the new situation that Israel found itself in after the Babylonian captivity that 
followed the fall of the first temple. And so, why the turn to aniconism and its iconoclas-
tic theologies in Israelite religion during the exilic and post-exilic periods? What is clear 
is that Israel’s theological position(s) on images shift, following political patterns that co-
incide with their experiences of exile and diaspora, return and rebuilding. The condemna-
tion of image-veneration as idolatry emerged from within a particular historical and po-
lemical context which the people of Israel were forced to give an account both of their 
political and cultic failures and to rally their communities together after long periods of 
exile, displacement, and diaspora. The years leading up to the Second Temple period left 
Israel very vulnerable and exposed, and so the rise of anti-image rhetoric and iconoclastic 
theology seems connected to the need to reassert Israelite group boundaries as an political 
act of community formation after periods of displacement and disconnection from the 
‘homeland.’ Idolatry critique did not produce anti-image rhetoric itself, but rather de-
ployed it in a distinctly political way to justify specific acts of image-destruction and sub-
sequent punishment for those who used images in worship of Yahweh and other gods, 
                                                
47 Christoph Uehlinger, “Anthropomorphic Cult Statuary in Iron Age Palestine and the Search for Yah-
weh’s Cult Images,” in The Image and the Book: Iconic Cults, Aniconism, and the Rise of Book Religion in 
Israel and the Ancient Near East, ed. Karel van der Toorn, (Leuven: Peeters, 1997), 97–155.  
264 
 
practices that been actively a part of Israelite cultic and religious life in years and periods 
past.  
Whereas R. Hendel and others proffer mostly theological reasons for Israel’s ani-
conism - and there is little doubt such ideas played a major role,48 I want to highlight the 
predominant place that politics had in the rise of the anti-image polemic of idolatry cri-
tique: specifically the use of idolatry critique for the sake of a particular kind of identity 
politics. Hendel makes a similar argument by noting that, “in my view, the prohibition of 
divine images was, in origin, a natural extension of the early Israelite bias against king-
ship in its social and religious dimensions.”49 Hendel elaborates, using the aforemen-
tioned Mettinger and Carroll, but quoting the work of O. Keel: “many Israelites under the 
influence of their nomadic heritage, rejected the excessive richness of the graphic images 
as strange or evil, in the same way that they rejected kingship and other institutions of the 
settled people. In this way, socio-cultural, political, and theological motives are mixed.”50 
To see how and why it is that the aniconic tradition morphed in the exilic and post-exilic 
period, Hendel insists, we must pursue the “principle of patterning” whereby idolatry cri-
tique is seen “as an integral expression of religious and political principles on which the 
universe of early Israel was constructed.”51 The primary principle at work was Israel’s 
opposition to the institution of kingship, based largely on the early covenantal position 
                                                
48 Hendel, “The Social Origins of the Aniconic Tradition in Early Israel,” 368.; Hendel, “Aniconism and 
Anthropomorphism in Ancient Israel,” 228-224.  
49 Hendel, “The Social Origins of the Aniconic Tradition in Early Israel,” 381, note 74.; Hendel, “Ani-
conism and Anthropomorphism in Ancient Israel,” 226-228.  
50 O. Keel, 39-40, as quoted in Hendel, “The Social Origins of the Aniconic Tradition in Early Israel,”  372.  
51 Hendel, “The Social Origins of the Aniconic Tradition in Early Israel,” 373.  
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that Yahweh alone was king, which left no need for early monarchy and posed an antago-
nism between monarchial orders and the early Israel’s theological commitments. The 
theme is repeated frequently in prophets like Hosea (8:4-6) whose anti-kingship senti-
ments are located in close proximity to its critique of idolatry, which makes sense given 
the close link between royal and divine iconography in the ancient near east.52 But, of 
course, Israelite aniconism remains in effect long after the establishment of the monarchy 
and the effect that this aniconism had on the theology of early Israel was significant: the 
relation between Yahweh and the monarchy was covenantal, not iconographic, namely 
because the very unnamable name of ‘Yhwh’ itself had become iconoclastic, and a pro-
gramatic aniconism became the constitutive difference between Israel and its foreign 
‘others.’ 
The purposes of idolatry critique were undeniably political: it was a strategic way 
of solidifying Israelite politico-religious identity while identifying its neighbors as some-
how foreign or alien threats to the vitality of the cultic covenant. It was the fault of these 
neighbors, their gods, and the iconic cults that surrounded them that were to be blamed 
for Israelite exile; intermarriage, military alliances, and image veneration were all types 
of idolatry that lead jeopardized divine protection and provision. As such, the demand for 
                                                
52 Hendel, “The Social Origins of the Aniconic Tradition in Early Israel,” 378-381. Hosea poses the most 
problems for scholars who date the idolatry critique redactions to the 6th century, namely because Hosea’s 
anti-image and anti-foreign rhetoric have the mature elements of a conscious, polemical attempt to demon-
ize a religious adversary, but does not seem to be acting on the basis of an existing prohibition or in light 
“of a programmatic theologically or philosophically ground rejection.” See Wesley Toews, Monarchy and 
Religious Institution in Israel under Jeroboam I (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1993), 168 as cited in 
Mettinger, “Israelite Aniconism: Developments and Origins,” 181, note 31. Also see Peter Machinist, “Lit-
erature as Politics: Tukulti-Ninurta Epic and the Bible,” Catholic Biblical Quarterly 38. 4 (1976): 455-482, 
especially 467ff, and Erik Hornung, Conceptions of God in Ancient Egypt: The One and the Many (Ithaca: 
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iconoclastic reform that characterized Israelite programmatic aniconism was a way to ex-
plain the condition of defeat and exile, and thus to generate the relationships of difference 
that secured the cohesion and distinctiveness requisite for strong notions of identity. This 
gesture organized associations and alignments through systems of boundaries, and posi-
tions relationships within the semiotics of inside/outside, truth/falsehood, one/many: 
one’s own identity and the identity of the other. The partition of politics in this way es-
tablishes (and seeks to normalize) a political logic that emphasizes politics as a matter of 
policing boundaries of identity. Idolatry critique is not primarily a theological critique of 
other religions and their practices or of the use of cultic images within the Israelite reli-
gion(s), but instead came into common use within early Judaism as rhetorical and po-
lemic leverage that was intended to solidify the collective identity of the Israelite people 
in the aftermath of their defeat, occupation, and captivity.  
I am arguing that Hebrew ‘programmatic aniconism’ is a political theology 
whereby exilic and post-exilic voices align themselves with an iconoclastic rhetoric that 
is a product of a historical period where the northern kingdom found itself under enor-
mous political and economic pressure from its Assyrian neighbors, which resulted in the 
migration of Yahwehists into Judah.53 In response, they enacted what Jan Assmann has 
called a ‘theologization’ of politics: the idea that the exclusive worship of one god would 
result in political victory and freedom for the people of Israel, and all those who worship 
                                                
53 For more on how idolatry critique is connected to rise of the ‘Yahweh-alone’ movement which gave birth 
both to the politics of prophetic consciousness as well as its theological monotheism of early Judaism, see 
Bernhard Lang, Monotheism and the Prophetic Minority. An Essay in Biblical History and Sociology 
(Sheffield, England: Almond Press, 1983), 13-56 and Robert Gnuse, “The Emergence of Monotheism in 
Ancient Israel: A Survey of Recent Scholarship,” Religion 29.4 (1999): 315-336. 
267 
 
other gods (and who worship and represent Yahweh through images, icons, idols, etc) 
risk igniting divine anger and retribution. For since Yahweh is indeed the only god with 
real, lasting power, Yahweh would indeed reward their exclusive fidelity with an large-
scale intervention in Israel’s favor. When the exilic prophets invoke Israel’s unfaithful-
ness to Yahweh as a reason for their on-going oppressive and exilic state of affairs, they 
are calling upon the rhetorical power of idolatry critique to link conditions of social injus-
tice and inequality to idol worship, thus blaming elements within Israel, defined as for-
eign or alien. for their downfall, defeat, and displacement. Israel as a people must wor-
ship only Yahweh if Israel expects to experience the kind of freedom and prosperity 
promised to them in the covenantal commitments of monolatry. One of the many pur-
poses of and motives for idolatry critique was to establish a firm boundary between Israel 
(who does not use images in Yahweh-alone worship) and its foreign neighbors, who do 
use images in its polytheistic worship, much like Israel in previous periods prior to fall of 
the first Temple and the exilic Babylonian captivity.  
For me, the critical point here is this: the critique of idolatry was as thoroughly 
political in motivation and consequence as it was theological in substance. To clarify 
these points is to demarcate its differences, then, with ideology, making it very difficult 
to presume that they are as concepts or terms interchangeable within theology. While 
idolatry critique can come from a genuine theological desire to properly represent God, it 
is also necessary to understand idolatry critique as a polemical tactic of the identitarian 
politics within Israel’s developing monotheist theology. One effect of the Decalogue’s 
disavowal of images is iconoclastic politics, produced by the link between monotheism 
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(‘you shall have no other gods before me’) and aniconism (‘you shall not make yourself a 
graven image or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven, or that is in the earth below, 
or that is in the water under the earth’). What idolatry critique tries to maintain as a first 
principle is that images fail to tell the truth when it comes to speaking of or representing 
god/gods - especially when it comes to Yahweh, but this claim was deployed with thor-
oughly political purposes of differencing the theological identity of the Israelite cult from 
that of its iconic and iconophilic neighbors. The critique of idolatry became an Israelite 
theopolitical strategy that used its iconoclasm to justify both the opposition to image-ven-
eration and to generate acts of image-destruction. It presumes a recognizable distinction 
between truth and falsehood; that is, there are right and wrong ways of representing, be-
lieving, and worshipping god/gods, justifying the iconoclastic politics and the aniconistic 
theology that solidified exilic and post-exilic Israelite religion. This link provides the 
‘othering' logic necessary to establish a group community organized around exclusivity 
and singularity, a theo-logic and iconoclastic rhetoric not familiar to the ancient near east 
context prior to its development and usage by certain strands to re-establish early Jewish 
identity after defeat, diaspora, and exile.  The iconoclastic purpose of idolatry critique 
employs iconoclasm is to produce the other against which it operates; without the 
strange, foreign, or alien ‘other’ over against which ‘true’ worship is established, a criti-
cal position on idolatry makes little sense.  
With this understanding ready at hand, it become more difficult to use ideology 
and idolatry interchangeably, as it is clear that they have distinct theological meanings 
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and political functions. This aspect of the difference between idolatry and ideology cri-
tique goes largely unrecognized by theologians who often too quickly mediate the rela-
tion of theology to ideology through idolatry without recognizing the specific function of 
its theopolitical logic as distinct from each other. 
Theologies of Idolatry Critique  
This section looks at how theologians have treated the subject of ideology in rela-
tion to theology as idolatry. This is not an exhaustive, comprehensive or complete ac-
count, but merely a sampling to give us a sense of the trends on the issue. All too often, 
theologians take up the concept of ideology as if it was more or less interchangeable or 
cognate with idolatry, as if their theological meaning or political function were the same, 
or at least, of minimal difference. This attitude usually comes from a rather thin and su-
perficial understanding of ideology critique, but also a over-theologized interpretation of 
idolatry.  I question this relationship, arguing instead that idolatry and ideology are essen-
tially different - and their critiques amount to very different political stances. Theologians 
cannot simply respond to a call for critique within political theology by pointing to inter-
nal traditions of idolatry critique within theology; they must first come to terms with the 
politics of idolatry critique as separate from and subject to the critique of ideology as an 
immanent manner. As will be clear in the next chapter, such a critique is necessary for 
political theology to address the dual negativity of its own immanent critique: a negativ-
ity directed towards the present dynamics of the social conditions and the ideological 
self-sufficiency of its own theological concepts for transformative praxis.  
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This analysis calls upon a major theme in modern political theology, namely the 
implications of the theology of sin and human action for ethics and politics, as proposed 
by political, liberation, and feminist theologians, many of whom take on the questions of 
sin, estrangement, and idolatry in the context of Marxist politics, religious symbols, and 
the ideologies of power undergird patriarchal and heteronormative theological attitudes 
about sexuality and gender identity. These theologians attempted to surface and highlight 
the theological category of sin, perhaps even to the extent of fashioning theology as a 
kind of critical hamartiology. They frequently deploy the critique of idolatry as a theolog-
ical strategy to oppose instances of rebellion, distortion, and false representation, inter-
preting them as idolatry, and as such, as sin, as a way of offering an immanent critique of 
ideology in theological terms. This kind of use of idolatry critique risks overlooking im-
portant political dimensions in the negative reading of the relationship between idolatry 
and ideology critique; more specifically, we will find that these theologians do not attend 
to the tension within the biblical concept between the prophetic understanding and the 
critical understanding of the biblical theology of idolatry, nor do they do not turn to the 
problematic of identity politics. in large part due to the ongoing nature of the biblical 
scholarship on the relation of biblical aniconism and its iconoclastic politics 
Paul Tillich: Religious Socialism and ‘the Protestant Principle’ 
The American reception of Paul Tillich has centered on his tripartite Systematic 
Theology, where there are scant mentions of Marx, ideology, or other socialist ideas or 
themes. As such, it is typical to see him primarily as an existentialist theologian, making 
it difficult to fully appreciate his Marxist political and theoretical leanings. However, in 
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the years between 1912-1933, before his removal from Frankfurt by the National Social-
ists and his subsequent arrival in New York City, Paul Tillich was an active socialist 
committed to critically reinterpreting Marxist ideas with the help of religion, which af-
fords socialism with “theonomous” reason. Following the failure of the 1918-19 Revolu-
tion in Munich, Germany, the reinterpretation of Marxist ideas became imperative, and 
Tillich was among those at the periphery at the Frankfurt School who were hard at work 
at this.54 Tillich shared many of these commitments, but did so by arguing that if religion 
itself could be reinterpreted, it may provide the key to overcoming the limitations of 
Marxist philosophy and its socialist politics: the remnants of liberal, bourgeois positivity, 
its ‘vulgar’ materialism, its mechanized understandings of history, progress, and change, 
as well as its stubborn refusal of the Unconditional.  
Paul Tillich understood religion, if and when interpreted through a theology of 
culture, to be a critique of idolatry within socialism and for the sake of what he called 
‘the proletarian situation’. Rather than the abstract use of ideology either as an critical 
                                                
54 The relationship between Paul Tillich and the Frankfurt school theorists is at last receiving the attention it 
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the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950. Vol. 10. (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1996), 
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category (Marx) or a general, sociological description of ‘knowledge’ (Mannheim), Til-
lich concretizes his concerns within a critical view of ‘religious socialism’ that functioned 
immanently within both religion and socialism to critique and correct what he saw as the 
failure to properly understand human nature: the constitutive essence that links ideology 
to idolatry together. Both religion and socialism sought to ground its critical rationalities 
autonomously. Attempts to do so overlooked the limitations placed on humanity by the 
irreducible and inescapable tension between freedom and finitude. The failure to 
acknowledge these limitations produced by the estrangement and dehumanization that 
marks the modern era.  
Idolatry is Tillich’s way of speaking of the philosophical and political problem of 
ideology - but in specifically theological terms - and by using ‘theonomous’ reason.55 
This, however, requires a reinterpretation of religion itself as an expression of the Uncon-
ditioned, the Ultimate, the Holy as it appears amidst the human experience in culture, lan-
guage, symbols, and so on.56 As such, Tillich does not approach the question of ideology 
directly. Ideology is more a generic name Tillich gives for the demonic character of mod-
ern ‘barbarism’, whereby abuses of rationality are marshaled by social groups to wreck 
havoc on the human being, producing social conditions of alienation and dehumanization, 
                                                
55 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. 1 (Chicago, IL.: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 83-86.  
56 Paul Tillich, “Religion as a Dimension of Man’s Spiritual Life,” in Theology of Culture, trans. Robert C. 
Kimball (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), 3-9. In his essay  “Kairos,” in The Protestant Era, ed. 
James Luther Adams (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 32 n.1., Tillich he notes that: “the un-
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rather than the promised emancipation.57 In his 1926 article “Kairos and Logos”, Tillich 
works through a reconstruction of ideology critique along the lines set forth in his reli-
gious socialism and his reinterpretation of ‘religion.’58 If ideology is is “a designation of 
thoughts that are used by a social group in order to justify its political and economic 
power”, then the critique of ideology is “meant to question the objective truth of con-
cepts.”59 This concerns Tillich, for without truth, there is no basis for critical reason other 
than its selfsame claims to its own autonomy. Ideology critique á la Marx has the unwel-
come effect of deflating the otherwise dynamic character of truth and reality by identify-
ing it first and foremost with social structure.60 While recognizing that “the concept of 
ideology was a weapon for demonic power for the purpose of destroying all the hallowed 
truths of bourgeois and feudal culture”, Tillich found it too generic and overreaching for 
his purposes, arguing that “the assertion of the ideological character of thinking must al-
low at least one exception, namely this assertion itself.”61   
Tillich believed that religion could provide the critical backbone for socialist poli-
tics insofar as it rightly identifies the limits that finite freedom places on the human actor. 
Religion, if reinterpreted, could provide the ‘depth of meaning’ and self-reflexive critique 
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that socialism desperately needed for economic change and social reconstruction. Social-
ism also must be critically reinterpreted, however. It has retained the negative element 
within bourgeois thinking that makes it “exclude the unconditional from the spheres of 
thought and action.”62 This has led socialism to “deprive the spiritual and religions life of 
its intrinsic value, considering it mere ideology”63, and so doing, had failed to recognize 
the practical, political link between ‘the proletarian situation’ and the critique of idolatry, 
or what Tillich called ‘the Protestant Principle.’64 
Here, religion is not a separate sphere of human activity, but is a vector, a dimen-
sion of all aspects and all spheres of human activity, and so can be interpreted and seen 
on display in ethics, aesthetics, social and political action, and indeed, in philosophy. 
Theology, insofar it is properly ‘God-talk’, is the self-reflexive “depth” within religion, 
the direction towards the Unconditional, the “ultimate concern” of human existence: 
“God is the presupposition of every question…the eternal substance of the conditional 
(which is not itself a thing) breaks through everything.” For Tillich, religion is “an aspect 
of the human spirit”, and so is located within human existence as the “dimension of depth 
in all of its functions”, “the aspect of depth in the totality of the human spirit.”65 By 
depth, Tillich means “that which is ultimate, infinite, unconditional in man’s spiritual 
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life.”66 Interpreting religion through the metaphor of ‘depth’ makes it both political and 
existential by identifying it with “ultimate concern”, defined as “that which determines 
our being or not-being.”67 Since “the object of theology is what concerns us ultimately”, 
this reconfiguration positions religion as “the all-determining ground and substance” of 
human life, and not as a privatized and individuated option or institutional apparatus. 
The aim of religious socialism, then, to afford critical thinking with theonomy, a 
mediating position between individualistic isolation (autonomy) and unthinking collectiv-
ism (heteronomy). Tillich insists that “the spiritual situation in which this condition of 
separation is overcome, in which reality again becomes a symbol of the divine ground of 
meaning, where all spheres of life, even the economic, show this depth, where nothing is 
fundamentally unholy, where holy knowledge and holy acts are one, this we call ‘theon-
omy’.”68 This theonomy is not the rigid assertion of the traditional onto-theology of reli-
gion, but rather the practical stance that follow the reinterpretation for theology in/as cul-
ture. Tillich argued that the reinterpretation of religion that religious socialism brings to 
social and political struggles will breakthrough the current socialist limitations and short-
comings, notably its dependence on ‘scientific materialism’, ‘the loss of wholeness and 
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meaning’, rigid determination, empty and flat ontology which short sells human identity 
and destiny, and contributes to estrangement and dehumanization.69 
This ‘theonomous’ reason is a central aspect of ideology critique, for it allows the 
critical element of religion to see the political light of day. Here, Tillich insists that the 
only way to achieve social and political freedom is to prehend the truly finite and contin-
gent character of human existence. It is caught in the unbearable tension between radical 
finitude and creative freedom, which imbues human life with severe and tragic limita-
tions that are the cause of social alienation and dehumanization: the denial of the natural 
right of the human person to actualize and achieve her natural creative freedom. These 
limitations also fuel the predominant human mistake: ‘absolutization.’ This is particularly 
true in theology, and so Tillich turns to idolatry as a way of interpreting ideology critique 
as the act of unveiling all attempts to identify or replace finite realities or sets of symbols 
with the Unconditional as false forms of consciousness that equate or replace being with 
the ground of being.   
Central to this argument is ‘the Protestant Principle’, the call to protest and criti-
cism as the objective criterion of authentic faith. The ‘Protestant Principle’ was Tillich’s 
way of using idolatry critique to frame ‘religion’ itself in service to ‘the proletarian situa-
tion’, and puts his equivocation of ideology and idolatry on full display. For Tillich, the 
connections between ideology and idolatry are existential and symbolic in character. 
They primarily affect the human being’s relation to itself, and are theologically important 
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insofar as they preclude the human person from “the dynamism of faith,” the conduit to 
the transcendence meaning of life itself as human being’s “ultimate concern.” Tillich 
starts from the basic theological axiom that “Mankind universally is in the bondage of 
self-estrangement. Man’s freedom is superseded by his servitude”.70 This idea serves as 
“the guardian against the attempts of finite and conditioned to usurp the place of the un-
conditional in thinking and acting”, thereby brings to light the basic distortion of the hu-
man situation that materializes in ‘the perversion of the social order’ and ‘the demonic 
splitting up of humanity in general’ by capitalism.71 
The ‘Protestant Principle’ is also practical idea insofar as it issues a prophetic pro-
test against every form of self-absolutizing expression, be it creedal, dogmatic, or ethi-
cal.72 While not overlooking the ideologies promoted and supported by Protestantism and 
Protestant churches73, Tillich considered Protestantism itself to be an immanent form of 
idolatry critique: “what makes Protestantism ‘Protestant’ is the fact that it transcends its 
own religious and confessional character, that it cannot be identified wholly with any of 
its particular historical forms.”74  ‘Protestantism’ as a critical term originated within a 
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struggle against the ideologies of Catholicism (‘sacramentalism’) and humanism (‘opti-
mistic individualism’), which were both ideological, in Tillich’s mind, because they tried 
to overcome or ignore the distortions and limitations of human nature by concealing the 
true situation of humanity.75 It was the reformer Martin Luther who infamously identified 
idolatry criticism as the primary function of the biblical doctrine of justification by faith, 
and as such, Protestantism has been a protest of ‘man-made gods’, even against itself. It 
is its ready self-reflexivity - the ease of its self-referring character - that makes it effective 
at unveiling and exposing the non-ideological state of things that resides in the ‘proletar-
ian situation.’76  
The ‘Protestant Principle’ is specifically an ideology critique because it “contains 
the divine and human protest against any absolute claim made for a relative reality, even 
if this claim is made by a Protestant church”, and so is able to act as “the judge of every 
religious and cultural reality” - even itself.77 It is this critical element of ‘the Protestant 
Principle’ that “vindicates” its relationship with Protestantism itself, but also the ‘prole-
tarian situation’: “the proletarian situation, in forcing Protestantism to bring to the fore 
the critical element of its own principle, creates the constant suspicion that Protestation 
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situation’ as the social condition of class struggle within a capitalist system that uses social forms of op-
pression, dehumanization, and alienation, to keep members dependent upon the market and so, forced to 
sell their physical ability as wage labor. He considered the ‘proletarian situation’ to be “objectively an out-
standing instance of an ideology-unveiling situation” insofar as it shows that “‘the needs of man…provide 
the criterion for distinguishing what is real from what is merely ideological.” 
77 Tillich, “The Protestant Principle and the Proletarian Situation,” 163. 
279 
 
has itself become an ideology, the worship of a man-made God. For this reason, the pro-
letarian situation provides a fundamental vindication of the Protestant principle and the 
most serious judgement of historical protestantism.”78 Lest we think Tillich is satisfied 
with a correlation between Protestant Christianity and socialism, he clarifies what its rela-
tionship with the proletarian situation means for the critical character of Protestant theol-
ogy: “The demand should not be made that Protestants subscribe unconditionally to so-
cialism; rather the demand should be that Protestantism subject all its decisions and activ-
ities to the criterion of the Protestant principle in the face of the disturbing and transform-
ing reality of the proletarian situation.”79 
Ultimately, the aim and function of ideology critique and idolatry critique is the 
same: “the individual Protestant should realize that, against his will, he transforms Protes-
tantism, Christianity, and religion into an ideology; that he serves the man-made God of 
his social group, class or nation when he does not take seriously the reality of the prole-
tarian situation as decisive for the future development of Protestantism.”80 The inter-
changeableness of idolatry and ideology in Tillich can be seen clearly when he argues 
that “Protestant orthodoxy and Protestant idealism represent the sacramental and human-
istic forms of the old ideologies. In both forms, a ‘man-made God’ has been substituted 
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for the true God, a God that is either inclosed in a set of doctrine or is believed to be ac-
cessible through morals and education.”81 This relationship is based on the identification 
of the joint of essence of ideology and idolatry as an unconscious mistake whereby the 
human person possesses false beliefs about the truth of reality that must be corrected by 
the critical power of reason.  Tillich links idolatry to ideology even more clearly about in 
reference to religion’s critical character:  
The creation of these ideologies, religiously speaking, idols, representing man’s 
will to power, occurs unconsciously. It is not a conscious falsification or a politi-
cal life. If this were the case, ideologies would not be very dangerous. But they 
are dangerous precisely because they are unconscious and are therefore objects of 
belief and fanaticism. To reveal these concrete ideologies is one of the most im-
portant function of the Protestant Principle, just as it was one of the main points in 
the attacks of the prophets on the religious and social order of their time. Theol-
ogy of course must provide general insight into human nature, into its distorted 
character and its proneness to create ideologies. But that is not enough. A reli-
gious analysis of the creation situation must unveil concrete ideologies, as Luther 
and the reformer did when they unveiled the all-powerful Lutheran ideology.82 
 
In sum, Tillich was interested in idolatry as a theological category with which to 
critique society for its immoral structures and practices. Defining idolatry as “nothing 
else than the absolutizing of symbols of the Holy, and making them identical with the 
Holy itself,”83 he finds a theological appraisal of ideology to be necessary in order to con-
front modern confusion and distortion of religious faith. His approach to the relationship 
between ideology and idolatry is easily mapped onto his ‘method of correlation’ between 
                                                
81 Tillich, “The Protestant Principle and the Proletarian Situation,” 169.  
82 Tillich, “The Protestant Principle and the Proletarian Situation,” 169-170.  
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theology and philosophy whereby theology answers cultural questions, expressed in pri-
marily philosophical terms.84 Theology and philosophy are united in their interest in ulti-
macy as the foundation of reason itself, and as such, the root of all criticism, be it theo-
logical or political. As such, ideology and idolatry are two sides of the same coin; they 
both express and problematize the absolutizing and technicalizing distortion of reason it-
self that objectifies human agency, precluding the collective participation and historical 
praxis that makes human existence properly human. The human person’s authentic exist-
ence is lost in the depersonalizing forces of technical society, further alienating the hu-
man from its actuality, “the ultimate roots of human being.”85 A properly ontological the-
ology resists this idolatry by explicating authentic faith as being of “ultimate concern” to 
human persons: “that which concerns our being or non-being.”86 
In this way, Tillich distinguished between idolatry and authentic faith. Rather than 
identifying religion as ideology, Tillich considered authentic faith to be ideology critique: 
“it is a wrong generalization, derived from a metaphysical materialism, to dismiss reli-
gion itself as ideology. The transformation of philosophy into critical theory does not im-
ply such a consequence at all.”87 Instead, he posits a structural analogy between the pro-
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phetic element of authentic faith and the critical nature of Marxism, meaning that the dis-
cussion of ideology is central to all assessments of theological claims, not in terms of 
their epistemological truth, but rather in terms of their self-assertions of being absolute, 
unconditional, and ultimate. They attempt to set themselves up as the representation of 
the unrepresentable. For Tillich, Marx is right to identify theology with ideology when 
and only when its symbols function idolatrously as “expressions of its will-to-power”88: 
“idolatry is the elevation of a preliminary concern to ultimacy, conditioned taken as un-
conditioned, something essentially partial is boosted into universality, finite is given ulti-
mate significance.”89 The pitfall of idolatry is basically a matter of erroneous claims 
made in and for religious symbols: an identification of a symbol with the thing itself that 
effectively elevates a preliminary concern to ultimacy.90 By being absolutized, symbols 
can become idolatrous formally, but this does not necessarily implicate their material ref-
erent. In fact, idolatry is best theologically defined as the confusion between the symbol 
and that to which it points, leading to the distortions of inauthentic faith that constrain the 
human being from the interface of value and meaning in the ultimate, “in which all criti-
cism is necessarily rooted because reason itself is rooted therein.”91 
Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism  
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Reinhold Niebuhr was not interested in Marxism - in large part because he con-
sidered it to have fallen prey to the very critical insights it marshaled against its supposed 
rivals. “A particularly significant aspect of intellectual pride is the inability of the agent 
to recognize the same or similar intentions of perspective in himself which he has de-
tected in others.”92 (196) The proud achievement of Marxism in discovering the intellec-
tual pride and pretension of previous cultures therefore ends in a pitiful display of the 
same sin.93 ‘Christian Realism’ attempts to respond with balance and approximation to 
the indelible tensions that exist in our social and world: tensions between finite and free-
dom, between choice and necessity, between justice and self-interest. Reinhold Niebuhr 
intended, by developing this position and securing its prominent place in Protestant polit-
ical theology, to afford the social struggle ad political thinking with a dialectical tool that 
would help subjects prevent the pitfalls of cynicism or utopianism, neither of which, in 
his mind, properly account for the theological reality that undergirds our world, that 
makes all our acts intelligible in history. This theological reality is not so much God and 
God’s acts in history, but the nature of human being and acting. If we properly under-
stand what the human is, and what it means for the human persons to act, this better posi-
tion us to make realist political choices.  
What does Niebuhr mean by ‘realist political choices’ and what is the link to idol-
atry and its critique? Reinhold Niebuhr’s interest in idolatry is characterized by an ethical 
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concern for the renewed health of the social existence of human beings, brought solely by 
justice within history.94 Social justice, which seeks the creative political action of libera-
tion, requires a theological foundation, one that seeks to recognize the ambiguity of his-
tory and the limits of social achievement, both of which show the destructive, rather than 
redemptive, possibilities of human power. Niebuhr theorizes modern human society as 
structurally immoral95, which means human agents and the social realities they construct 
are constitutively open to idolatry: the unholy substitution of God with that which is not 
God, a move replicated by immoral societies and so responsible for much of the injustice, 
chaos, and violence what befalls modern politics. Niebuhr takes a critical stance towards 
a ‘developed’ liberal culture that claims to be morally advanced while also incubating 
greed, inequality, oppressive power, viciousness, and cruelty, all of which are forms of 
idolatry, all of which are a consequence of “elevating relative aspects of life to absolute 
status.”96  
This moral interest in idolatry originates within Niebuhr’s theology of human sin 
and societal depravity, which Niebuhr called for as a return to theological discussions on 
social forms of divine judgment. For Niebuhr, for example, idolatry occurs when we 
“make some contingent and relative vitality into the unconditioned principle of mean-
ing.’”97 This is interpreted theologically as the sin of pride, egoism, and pretension, all of 
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which assert human ways of knowing and acting as primary and absolute, rather than un-
derstanding them in relation to the infinite and absolute. The identification of ideology as 
idolatry rests in the way they are both essentially forms of dishonesty, self-deception, and 
ignorance, and wreck havoc on political subjects as they try to be and act in the world. 
The political danger here comes from the actions that human subjects take in these condi-
tions of egoism, pride, and self-certainty, it makes them unchastened, uncritical, and self-
assured, a very dangerous state of affairs in a world increasingly marked by complexity 
that requires flexibility and nuance. Enthusiasm for change through political actions are 
tempered by his deeply Calvinist sympathies: Niebuhr believes it is critical to focus on 
the dark heart of humanity, her natural depravity, and capacity for self-delusion - all of 
which are the cause of ideology in our world - if we are to understand the dangers of hu-
man power. Human nature then imbues all human acting and knowing: “All human 
knowledge is tainted with an ‘ideological’ taint. It pretends to be more true than it is. It is 
finite knowledge, gained from a particular perspective; but it pretends to be final and ulti-
mate knowledge.”98 
Niebuhr defines not just idolatry through this identification with ideology, but 
also sin itself as “the vain imagination by which man [sic] hides the conditioned, contin-
gent and dependent character of his [sic] existence and seeks to give It the appearance of 
unconditioned reality.”99 He wants to interpret idolatry and sin so as to escape the limited 
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classical applications of sin and judgment to moral behavior of single individuals in reli-
gious or spiritual wrongdoing, and so he can apply to the real political problem: collec-
tive egoism of group pride. And so he expresses idolatry in social terms as placing our ul-
timate faith in modern culture and its achievements to overcome the catastrophe of his-
tory and the corruption of society. The political effects of idolatry leave us complacent to 
the corruption of human power and blind to injustice. When prideful self-love and self-
concern identifies itself as a political hierophany, it is idolatrous. Notably, he critiques 
Marxism for engendering this kind of idolatry and pride, faulting Marxists for their phi-
losophy of history and for placing their apocalyptic hope in the revolutionary efforts of 
class struggle. The proletariat is just as prone to idolatry as the bourgeoisie.100 
If ideology is “an attempt to obscure the known conditioned character of human 
knowledge and the taint of self-interest in human truth”101, then idolatry is the theological 
form that the ‘ideological taint’ takes when it attempts to ignore or hide ‘the intellectual 
pride’ and ‘pretension’ from view - usually in the interest of aggrandizing one’s egoist in-
terest or power. 102 Idolatry is ‘the ideological taint’, the primary defect in human life, 
that presents itself “an occasion for man’s assertion of universal significance for his par-
ticular values”103, and shows itself most readily in the idolatry of the church and of the 
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state, where the collective egoism (‘the pride of nations’) leverages the human tendency 
towards ideology (“the tendency to hide egoistic interests behind ideals of supposed gen-
eral validity”104) to “make unconditional claims for their conditional values.”105 In short, 
“the nation pretends to be God.”106 And this is precisely where theology, namely that 
which is expressed in and by prophetic religion, can and should be pressed into political 
service: “Prophetic religion had its very inception in a conflict with national self-deifica-
tion” where it “challenged the simple identification between God and the nation, or the 
naive confidence of a nation in its exclusive relation to God.” The theological realism of 
biblical Christianity affords contemporary political idolatry with a prophetic faith in 
which “a voice of God is heard from beyond all human majesties and a divine power is 
revealed in comparison with which the ‘nations are as a drop of a bucket’ (Is. 40:15).”107 
Theology is shown here to have evaded the ‘false consciousness’ of ideology insofar as 
Niebuhr is convinced that he has demonstrated its character as idolatry critique. “There is 
true consciousness beyond the false consciousness”108, Niebuhr will argue, and that true 
consciousness is found in the human self-understanding provided by the critical perspec-
tive of prophetic religion, and validated by “the adequacy of its answer for human prob-
lems which others have ignored or confused.”109 
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Both Tillich and Niebuhr articulate a structural analogy between ideology and 
idolatry that suggests that theological symbols function in relation to the human being in 
a way similar to how philosophical concepts function in relation to social realities. Ideol-
ogy is to philosophy what idolatry is to theology. They are correlated methodologically, 
but the theological concept of idolatry is not brought to bear politically other than as a 
theological metaphor (sin, pride) for the material cause (the failure to understand human 
nature) of predominantly political problems (imperialism, exceptionalism, isolationism, 
and so on). The theology of idolatry critique functions as a conceptual resource for criti-
cizing ideologies in society, but this assumes that ideologies are homological to idols. IN 
this way, both idols and ideologies are thought to be failures of proper theological self-
understanding about the human as a social actor and political decision-maker, errors that 
can only be rectified by developing better theologies that are closer to reality. Both Til-
lich and Niebuhr display the problematic inadequacies of the transcendental-existentialist 
paradigm that Metz’s ‘new political theology’ is designed to confront in its turn to critical 
theory and to the Frankfurt School. 
Johann Baptist Metz: Critique as Interruption 
Perhaps more than any other late modern theologian, the Catholic Johann Baptist 
Metz’s theological project is stylized as an ideology critique, in dialogue with critical the-
ory of the Frankfurt School, that directly confronted the practical-political relationship of 
Christianity to modernity. Metz proposes a ‘new political theology’ whose primary objec-
tives are two-fold: to offer a critical corrective of theologies whose systems left them 
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closed off to the contradictions of history and of social life110, and to formulate the escha-
tological message of Christian faith under the present conditions of social life.111 This 
‘new political theology’ was designed, in part, as a critique of modern bourgeois religion, 
which he faulted for its existential-transcendental character, its historical reticence re-
garding human suffering, and for furthering the privatization of Christian faith in modern 
society.112 This political theology also features an eschatological turn, a central element 
in Metz’s ideology critique of the bourgeois Enlightenment subject, the product of instru-
mental reason and the cause of the theological crisis of modernity.113 All in all, the emer-
gence (and assemblage) of this post-idealism theological paradigm is the most adequate 
way to speak of God faithfully in the church while facing the new crises of the modern 
era constructively.114  
More specifically, his aim is to counter the ‘transcendental-idealist’ trends in the-
ology with a praxis-oriented method that integrated the eschatological promise of biblical 
religion with the social-historical dimension of knowledge, for the sake of both church 
and society. One of the benefits of Metz’s approach here is that he takes up the question 
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of ideology directly, rather than relating them through the concept of idolatry or its cog-
nates. This due, in large part, to his direct engagement with Frankfurt School theorists 
Adorno, Horkheimer, and their associates Walter Benjamin and Ernst Bloch.115 His un-
derstanding of critique is modeled from their engagement with the practical reasoning of 
the Marxian critique of religion and bourgeoise modernity, rather than that of the biblical 
critique of idolatry - although the ‘messianic religion of discipleship’ plays a substantial 
formal role in the critical position of theology in society.116 And yet, his critique of the 
Enlightenment is dialectical: influenced by Horkheimer and Adorno, Metz emphasizes 
the dominative and exploitative aspects of its technical rationality, while also reminding 
us that there is is a radically emancipatory drive for human freedom in modernity which 
cannot be realized if left to address its immanent crises: of authority, of reason, of reli-
gion, and most importantly, of tradition.  
For theology to respond liberatively to these crises, that is, if the critical advances 
of the Enlightenment are to be saved from themselves, it will require “the primacy of a 
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reason endowed with memory, that is, an anamnestic reason.”117 The interlocking catego-
ries of memory, linked with narrative and solidarity, act as critical elements that have an 
inaugural and ruptural effect on theology, creating space for what Metz refers to “its criti-
cal position” of dangerous memory. How does theology account for the burden of respon-
sibility that necessarily follows ‘dangerous memory’?118 
The formal notion of critique in Metz can best be discerned in his assessment of 
how theology has responded to and engaged with the Enlightenment. Theology has 
largely forgotten how to be critical due to its long history of either outright defensive iso-
lation or unqualified accommodation and adaptation. Modernity in the west learned the 
character of critique from the Enlightenment, but under the pressure of its demands, 
Christianity lost itself, thinking it either had to either oppose modern values (antimodern-
ism, neo-scholasticism) or espouse them as the realization and fulfillment of its own posi-
tions (liberal Protestant, or post-conciliar theologies). This “triumph of the Enlightenment 
over the Christianity of the church”119 is a theological ‘identity crisis’, and a casualty of 
theology’s attempt to respond to what it discerns as the challenge of the Marxian critique 
                                                
117 Metz, “The New Political Theology: The Status Quaestionis,” 25. 
118 Metz, Faith in History and Society, 87-92, 105-106.; Metz, “Communicating a Dangerous Memory,” in 
Love’s Strategy: The Political Theology of Johann Baptist Metz, ed. John K. Downey (Harrisburg, PA: 
Trinity Press International, 1999). 135-149. For Metz, the concept of “dangerous memory” links the reali-
ties of history and the challenges for society in the central declaration of Christian faith: it is in the danger-
ous memory of Jesus Christ’s “cry of dereliction” that we can clearly see divine solidarity and participation 
with and for victims of suffering and death. For an interesting account of the political implications of dan-
gerous memory, see Bruce T. Morrill, Anamnesis As Dangerous Memory: Political and Liturgical Theol-
ogy in Dialogue (Collegeville, Minn: Liturgical Press, 2000).  
119 Metz, Faith in History and Society, 144-150.  
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of ideology. Metz is deeply concerned that, in the malaise of the technicalized and domi-
native ‘process-systems’ of modernity, Christianity and its churches have abandoned the 
critical power that derives from their distinctive identity: who they are ought to be a 
shock, an interruption, of the normal flow of a world structured by accumulation, individ-
ual interest, and technical reason. Modern theology has shown itself ineffective at 
properly countering with its apocalyptic message of universal Christian hope the ideology 
of emancipation opined by ‘enlightenment’ due in large part to the dearth of anamnestic 
reasoning that highlights the facticity of victims in history and the normalization of suf-
fering and oppression. 
This eclipse of critical reason in theology generated a predominant privatizing 
tendency in the twentieth-century, a consequence of its de facto embrace of bourgeois 
subjectivity. The Enlightenment critique of religion, in an effort to liberate human per-
sons from the authoritative dictates and strictures of ‘metaphysical reason’, only instated 
a different ideology. Metz, speaking of Enlightenment critics of religion, writes: “what is 
going on with the critique of metaphysical reason and the robust talk of ‘maturity’ and 
the ‘subject’ is the self-assertion of a new elite. This was a new aristocracy: the mirror 
image of precisely that against which they were struggling.” Metz’s diagnosis of the dis-
solution of the subject has to do with the inability to have genuine critical regard for the 
suffering of the other, inaugurating a catastrophic potential for deep ethical crisis. The 
consciousness of this ‘liberated majority’ is very self-oriented and very privatized. 
 Metz is concerned to root out this ‘privatization’ within theology, described in 
various ways as a privileging of ‘individuation’ (personalist, intimate, private, personal, 
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apolitical sphere) over the collective (social, public, political order). This ‘problematic 
situation’ is the result of the  loss that occurs between the rise of the enlightened, liberal 
subject in modern philosophy and the fragmented, disparate self of postmodern thought. 
Like its pre-critical engagement with ‘enlightenment’, modern theology has tried to re-
solve this by trying to eliminate the problem  through accommodation, adaption, or 
simply “jumped over it and through thus to be down with it.”120  
Instead of addressing this problem through the dissemination of meaning via de-
construction (Derrida), genealogy/archeologies of the self (Foucault), pragmatic cynicism 
(Rorty), or weak thought (Vattimo), Metz opts for something untimely: ideology critique. 
Instead of the more common antimodernist or integralist approaches, Metz prefers ‘cri-
tique’ as a modality understood under the rubric of practical reason), inspired in part by 
his direct engagement with the Marxist legacy represented by the Frankfurt school.121 
Metz defines ideology as the conceptualization of reason as abstract, natural, or universal, 
a political problem that detracts from the modern culture of freedom and threatens the 
‘eschatological proviso’ of theology as the critical force against ideologies in society.122 
                                                
120 Metz, “Religion and Society in the Light of a Political Theology,” 509. 
121 Metz, Faith in History and Society, 57. For more on this relationship, see Joseph A. Colombo, An Essay 
on Theology and History: Studies in Pannenberg, Metz, and the Frankfurt School (Atlanta, Ga: Scholars 
Press, 1990).; Marsha A. Hewitt, “Critical Theory” in The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology ed. 
Peter Scott and W. T. Cavanaugh (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007), 455-470. 
122 Metz, Faith in History and Society, 141.  
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The critique of ideology affords the ‘new political theology’ with the “critique of cri-
tique” that it needs in order ‘think modernity against modernity.’ Metz aligns Frankfurt-
style critical reason and his own ‘apologetic-practical’ theology in this way:  
A critical Enlightenment also actualizes itself by resisting the tendency to de-
nounce as superstition everything in consciousness that is determined by memory 
and tradition, together with whatever does not obey the calculus of scientific-tech-
nical reason, or alternatively by resisting the tendency to abandon all of this to the 
realm of private whim, devoid of any binding character; or the tendency to expose 
it to the suspicion of atheoretical subjectivity.123 
 
Metz argued that the Enlightenment produced a new subject, the bourgeois per-
son, as its formal principle. What is the bourgeois subject and what is its significance for 
Metz’s theological form of ideology critique? More to Metz’s point, why is a ‘new politi-
cal theology’ needed in order to critique the ideologies inherent in the identification of 
this bourgeoisie subject with the religious subject of Christianity? The bourgeois subject 
is considered ideologically problematic for a number of reasons. First, it effectively mar-
ginalized theology as a ‘private’ moral option, subsequent to the formation of the con-
crete identity of the person, rather than as “an expression of a primary need” which is 
constitutive for how persons think and act in history or society.124 Second, it perpetuates 
an assault on tradition (which Metz eventually recalibrates as memory) that trivializes 
history to the impoverishment of society. Tradition is relativized by the exchange society 
of the bourgeois subject because it does not submit itself to the values of the market; it 
cannot be profitably instrumentalized. He aligns himself with the Frankfurt School on 
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this point: “Just as the bourgeois individual turns religion into a service-providing reli-
gion to which he [sic] can turn in privacy, so does he [sic] make tradition into a value 
which he [sic] makes use of privately. The culture industry is the subsequent expression 
of this process.”125 Finally, it establishes a ‘new consensus community’ wherein the bour-
geois subject is defined by its maturity and its willingness to abandon metaphysical rea-
son as the legitimating force for ecclesial, religious, and political authorities, and to re-
place it with the natural and so universal, power of reason. 
One can clearly see the influence of the Frankfurt school and its ideology critique 
of modern society, which Metz translated into theologico-political terms here as the prac-
tical foundations of a fundamental theology of critique. His engagement with the critical 
theory of the Frankfurt School (including a chief associate of the School, Walter Benja-
min) was instrumental in his turn to eschatology and suffering in his ‘new political theol-
ogy.’126 He understands “critical theory” as a critique of ‘enlightenment thinking’ that 
stands in critical-constructive relation to the advances of modernity, the same relation 
that he envisions for the relation between practical reasoning of messianic Christianity, 
and the political engagement of the church in the occasionings of history.127 As such, in 
                                                
125 Metz, Faith in History and Society, 51.  
126 See Metz, “Productive Noncontemporaneity,” in Observations on "the Spiritual Situation of the Age": 
Contemporary German Perspectives, ed. Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), 167-177., 
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Metz’s view, at the center of the Enlightenment is a critique of theology, which is “al-
ready an ideology critique.”128 This must be preserved, absorbed into the practical-funda-
mental stance that political theology takes in the world, in both its negative and positive 
aspects, a critical position that turns the practical reasoning of the church and modern so-
ciety towards ‘God’s preferred ones’: the oppressed, the suffering, and the dead, whose 
collective memories and cries make ongoing and incessant demands for justice, solidarity 
and reparations.129  
Metz believes that the Marxian critique of religion is homological with its critique 
of bourgeois modernity; their joint core is a Kantian ‘post-metaphysical’ concern with 
idealism that, when leveled against an elitist and ahistorical religion, generates the aware-
ness of the social and  historical conditions of knowledge requisite for any and all real po-
litical action. To counter this, Metz emphasized historical praxis as the apologetic-practi-
cal foundation for Christian theology, orienting it towards history and society through the 
tripartite recovery of memory, narrative, and solidarity, all in service to what Lieven 
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Boeve has called, “a theology of interruption.”130 The effect of this material emphases is 
a thorough interruption of theology and how and why it is done.131 This interruption is at 
one, both a critique of ideology and a critique of religion, explicitly acknowledging that 
the ideologies that most threaten to jeopardize the emancipatory potential of Christianity 
come from within.132 These ideologies, many of which originate with the uneven and 
non-dialectical reception of the Enlightenment critique, can only be properly overcome, 
says Metz, by a theology that “describes and advocates a way of being a subject in soli-
darity that is for everyone, something that is possible only if religion does not come to the 
scene subsequent to the social constitution of the subject.”133 It is by offering an alterna-
tive to the bourgeois subject of rational religion that theology becomes critical of (its 
own) ideology and is able to contribute in a constructive way to the critical political dis-
course in society. In this way, attention to idolatry recedes as theology is recognizes its 
“forgetfulness of God”, enacted in its avoidance or amnesia concerning the cries from the 
innumerable victims of history, the living and the dead.  
Juan Luis Segundo and Liberation Theology  
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 In its original and classic variation as a contextually Latin American discourse, 
liberation theology took its point of departure largely from Marxian social analysis, a 
matter that, although it is of historical and theological contention, continues to mark its 
sociopolitical and economic trajectory today.134 This led early liberation thought to artic-
ulate a theo-political partiality towards oppressed and marginalized communities of poor, 
developed in relation to several grassroots social movements. This interpretation of the 
meaning of praxis within the immediate material conditions of Latin American life was 
theologically legitimated in various ways, most commonly through a political hermeneu-
tic that relied heavily on Marxist principles.135 The reception of Marxism, however, was 
uneven from the start, and became a major sticking point as Vatican leaders and other 
critics began their efforts to resistant the growth of liberation theology in Latin American  
communities.136  
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136 Defending Liberation theology from the Vatican critique that it was too aligned with Marxism, the Boff 
brothers argue that Marxism is only helpful for Liberation theology when “submitted to the judgment of the 
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 A primary example of this uneven reception and usage of Marxism by Liberation 
theology is the concept of ideology critique. Even casual observers may note that ideol-
ogy critique ought to be front and center of all liberation theological work, but seems to 
be used in a generic, ad hoc, and unsystematic manner. This is odd, considering the im-
portance role ideology critique has in the Marxist critique of capitalism, specifically the 
bourgeois control over social relations and productive relation. Ideology critique gives 
weight to liberation theology’s landmark characteristics: its prioritization of praxis, its 
suspicion of institutional and structural elements in contemporary society and politics, 
and finally, its desire to realize material conditions of freedom and responsibility for po-
litical subjects, notably the Latin American poor. And yet, the attention to ideology cri-
tique in the first generation of Liberation theologians is cursory at best. 
 One exception is the Uruguayan Jesuit Juan Luis Segundo. A major theme in Se-
gundo’s The Liberation of Theology is a radical “reideologization” that seeks to properly 
link faith to ideology for liberative purposes.137 But this strategy is not meant to liberate 
authentic Christian faith from the clutches of ideology, but rather to argue for its neces-
sity. The only way for a liberative Christian faith to realize itself effectively in history is 
through ideology. It is through ideological means that human social actors gather under a 
                                                
poor and their cause.” Its relationship is one of a “decidedly critical stance.” Since Marx can be a “compan-
ion, but not a guide”, it is treated as an ‘instrument’ and so liberation theologians “feel no obligation to so-
cial sciences for any use it may make, correct or otherwise, of Marxist terminology and ideas.” Liberation 
theology “freely borrows from Marxism certain ‘methodological pointers’, one of which is “the mystifying 
power of ideologies, including religious ones.” Leonardo Boff and Clodovis Boff, Introducing Liberation 
Theology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1987), 28.  
137 Juan Luis Segundo, Liberation of Theology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1976), 116. See also Marsha 
Hewitt, From Theology to Social Theory: Juan Luis Segundo and the Theology of Liberation (New York: 
P. Lang, 1990). 
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common rubric to achieve collective goals. The realization of these goals (‘Christianity’) 
is based on specific values (‘faith’), accomplish a set of effective means (‘ideology’). Se-
gundo contends that the goal of liberation theology vis-à-vis Christian faith is not to di-
vest itself of ideology, but rather to clarify how best to leverage its ideology against oth-
ers, and to deploy its theological resources of its faith to create and sustain new ideolo-
gies that is capable of competing against the ones that are tantamount to domination and 
exploitation. He defines ideology as “all systems of means…that are used to attain some 
end or goal.”138 Ideology is neither false consciousness or illusion, nor an oppressive or 
conspiratorial tool of class struggle. Ideology is the concrete means to achieve and actual-
ize the basic system of goals and values, held by individuals and social groups alike.139 
Without ideology, any real action in history would be impossible. For Segundo, in contra-
distinction to Marx (and Gutierrez for that matter140), the goal of ideology critique is not 
to demolish or destruct ideology, but rather to understand it, to become more self-reflec-
tive about it in order to effectively challenge competing ideologies by creating alterna-
tives. Within liberation theology, the aim of ideology critique is to think ideologically 
better. Put differently, it is to think ideologically in more self-informed way, so as to use 
ideology as a more generative and creative means of efficacy, of actualizing one’s values. 
                                                
138 Segundo, Faith and Ideologies (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1984), 16, 27-28, and 121-122. 
139 Segundo, Liberation of Theology, 154. 
140 Although Gutiérrez does not offer a robust account of ideology critique, he clearly operates with a nega-
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If liberation theology seeks to generate radical and transformative social change, it must 
become more ideological, rather than less.  
 Segundo connects his work to the Marxist legacy by building this theology of lib-
eration on a general philosophical anthropology that emphasizes the natural, creative 
freedoms of the human actor.141 When Segundo agrees with the Marxist axiom that reli-
gion is ideology, he does not mean this pejoratively (but, of course, as we learned from 
chapter 1, neither does Marx necessarily).142 It is not a normative-based critique of reli-
gion, but a description of how faith partners with ideological means to achieve its goals. 
A faith without ideology is dead. It cannot be actualized in history, and so cannot become 
a force for change. It is impractical and in this sense, rendered impotent. This, says Se-
gundo, is part of the problem with western theology that liberation theology rectifies, and 
tries to do so by linking faith to ideology. The ultimate aim of Segundo’s thinking on 
faith and ideology is to reconfigure their relationship in support of a Christianity that is 
socially and politically mediated, the goal of which is historically immanent: the concrete 
transformation of people’s lives through economic liberation. By uniting the values of the 
biblical gospels (faith) with its action-oriented dimensions (ideology), Segundo seeks to 
refashion theology as a critical social theory, with the theological commandment of 
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neighborly love as its normative, ethical undercurrent. To do this, Segundo says, Chris-
tian faith must align itself with an ideology that is up to the task of efficaciously deliver-
ing this neighborly love into the Real.  
Marcella Althaus-Reid and Queer Feminist Theology 
Marcella Althaus-Reid is increasingly recognized as paradigmatic for the latest 
generation of contextual theologies that bring queer, postcolonial, and postmodern theory 
into conversation with Marxist liberation theologies. Her theology, designed as an ideo-
logico-critical strategy, is queer, not only due to its interest in sexuality, but also because 
of her presuppositional conviction that feminist and liberation theology must actively 
take up the issues and questions of poverty and sexuality, not as add-ons to gender analy-
sis, class interests, and the interrogation of race, but as central components of its search 
for God in/as queer life. Althaus-Reid contends that the central weakness of Liberation 
and Feminist theology is that they do not depart far enough from the orthodox consensus 
of the Christian tradition.143 They remain primarily reformist movements that try to re-
construct the tradition, its language, and symbolic systems through its idolatry critique ra-
ther than more radical dismantling called for by the queer critique of ideology. In doing 
so, they are actively “repeating the Law of the Father in their theological reflection, even 
if using political or postcolonial or even gender analysis, by not disarticulating the rela-
tion between the construction of sexuality and systematic theology in depth.”144 This 
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“disarticulation” is the job of queer theology, which acts as an immanent critique of ide-
ology that is at the same time, political while also being self-reflexively theological. Al-
thaus-Reid is of interest here because she introduces queer theory as a critical model that 
takes negativity of immanent critique seriously, even if this might mean that theology 
must put some distance between itself and normative claims that are aimed at promoting 
specific plans or programs for social change.  
She approaches theology with a Marxist class-consciousness and a Foucaultian 
concern with knowledge as power, but is mostly concerned using invisible histories and 
narratives of queer folks as a critical hermeneutics. Althaus-Reid is eager to dismantle the 
social, ecclesial, and political hegemonies that are installed and justified by theological 
means and enforced by theological boundaries. We must go beyond a theology for social 
transformation and enact the disarticulation of the sexual ideology prevalent in the history 
of Christian theology, a task that calls for a theological queering, that highlights inde-
cency, perversion, and deviance at the heart of a libertine theological rationality.145 This 
queer theo-logic rebels against the regulative strictures of heteronormativity and dissents 
from the classical formulations for the sake of the Other, claiming to bring good news to 
the marginalized: the queer, the displaced, the colonialized, the poor. Althaus-Reid names 
“the Other side” as divine, as a political hierophant that appears and enacts itself in a re-
sistant, insurrectionary, and so, non-ideological form:  
The Other side is in reality a pervasive space made up of innumerable Queer reli-
gious and political diasporas, and a space to be considered when doing contextual 
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Queer Theology. The Good News is that at that edge, still talking about the thou-
sands of symbolic Nicaraguans present in every anti-capitalist demonstration, or 
the voices of people who stand up to claim the right to live in an alternative eco-
nomic and spiritual system to the totalitarian globalization which has pervaded 
our lives, there is God…the God who has come out, tired perhaps of being pushed 
to the edge by hegemonic sexual systems in theology, has made God’s sanctuary 
on the Other side.146 
 
Althaus-Reid finds both liberation and feminist theologies to be inadequately se-
vere and insidiously self-aggrandizing, allowing theology to remain complicit while 
championing its already privileged position as the object of the ‘preferential option’. 
Surely, Liberation theology should not be abandoned, for it was among the first to teach 
theology the political virtues of self-reflexivity:   
Liberation theology has helped us unmask political interests masquerading as 
‘God’s will” in theology. This is called ‘ideological suspicion’ in theology. To 
this political suspicion we are adding now a combination of suspicions in the 
making of theology: political, economical, racial, colonial, and also sexual.147 
 
This characterization of critique as ‘suspicion’ comes from Marcella Althaus-
Reid’s tutelage under Paul Ricoeur, for whom the ‘hermeneutic of suspicion’ affords Al-
thaus-Reid the background upon which to build her case for queering theology as a form 
of ideology critique. The primary ideology facing theology today is its sexual ideology, 
not only patriarchy but also heterosexuality. She insists that “queering the Scriptures will 
always be a project related to re-reading the patriarchs, for patriarchy is not a transcen-
dental presence but has agents responsible for its order. To deconstruct the patriarchs 
means to deconstruct their law, for justice requires the vigilant revision (new visions) of 
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the ideological construction of the divine and the social….In this way deconstructing the 
patriarchs becomes part of what we can call a non-essential project of the hermeneutical 
circle of suspicion.”148 
 To counter the economic and political effects of this patriarchy, she calls upon 
liberatine paths discerned within the margins of churchly traditions of the sexually dissi-
dent. She calls this ‘Indecent theology’, and its primary goal is to instigate immanent pro-
cesses of sexual ideological disruption within theology, or a ‘theological queering.’ This 
project requires a certain critical ‘style’, one that “outs” the theologian from positions 
and postures of power and legitimacy, and so guides them and the church to the tender, 
though impolite, demands of the periphery. The aim of this refusal of ecclesial authority 
and traditional legitimacy is not to re-establish the marginal at the center, but questions 
the idea of a normative center of theology at all. The problem with normativity is its idol-
atrous claims: it is “the praxis of specific heterosexual understandings elevated to a sa-
cred level.” This idolatry cannot be remedied by simply incorporating under-priviledged 
perspectives or marginalized sources into the normal flow of theological talk and acts. 
She likens his strategy (associated most closely with first-generation Liberation and se-
cond-wave feminist theologies) to the development strategy of capitalism:  
To try to espouse development according to the logic of capital expansion creates 
the same confusion and contradictions as when theology tries to ‘incorporate’ a 
gender (not even sexual) balance in its discourse. What is urgently required is not 
the improvement of a current theology through some agenda such as gender and 
sexual equality, but a theology with a serious Queer materialist revision of its 
methods and doctrines…The aim of theological and economic reflection should 
not be a new system of distribution, but a different system of production…This 
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includes also consideration of the cost that such a theology must pay for the radi-
cal vision of its production.149 
 
 Althaus-Reid’s understands ideology critique to be a form of queer thought. 
Queer thought subverts, ‘unshapes’, disrupts, and unveils Christianity’s sexual ideology, 
which is the idea that theology supports and reflects the sacralization of heterosexual re-
lations, which is then mapped and redistributed as a ‘whole political project.’ For this to 
work, queer hermeneutics issue “the challenge of a theology where sexuality and loving 
relationships are not only important theological issues but experiences which un-shape 
Totalitarian Theology (T-Theology)
 
while re-shaping the theologians.”150 ’T-Theology’ 
is her shorthand for “theology as ideology, that is, a totalitarian construction of what is 
considered as ‘The One and Only Theology’ which does not admit discussion or chal-
lenges from different perspectives, especially in the area of sexual identity and its close 
relationship with political and racial issues.”151 Theological queering displaces ’T-Theol-
ogy’ from its tropic, corporate sites of economic exchange (the university, the church, ac-
ademic marketplace, heavily policed peer-reviewed journals, et cetera) to the more vul-
gar, dirty, and non-civilized places of public, sexual life: bedrooms, bars, and alleyways. 
Such a dislocation shows that the God of ’T-Theology’ is “the non-relational God which 
does not survive well outside its ideological sites…Impurity may work here as an unveil-
ing of sexual ideology in the construction of God.”  
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Ultimately, the political goal of her theological hermeneutics is critical: to forget 
the forgetting (this is Althaus-Reid’s preferred way to speak of memory, in order to em-
phasize how it negates amnesia) of the political acts of the theological symbols of Christi-
anity which work so as to forget and ignore the sexual dissidents whose love and freedom 
have been actively undermined by the ideological fences of the totalizing heteronorma-
tivity of the theological tradition. In order to break through into the policed boundaries of 
T-Theological discourse, it requires a sort of guerrillera strategy, one that she terms the 
“libertine hermeneutical circle”, whereby she interprets the queer meaning of theological 
symbols, not by “adding queers and stir”, but rather by practicing intertextual readings 
that bring queer texts, narratives, spaces, and histories to the theological foreground for 
the sake of dialogical displacement, to transport readers to perverse spaces of love, free-
dom, and hope: dungeons, bedrooms, and other sexually unusual locations.  
The point is not to merely revel in the sexual fun of it all, to fetishize experimen-
tation, play, and transgression, but instead to unravel the edges of a christian god who 
‘comes out’ from underneath the shadowy restrictions of the heterosexual parental im-
agery, and shows itself to be not only queer, but also libertine. In this way, the intertex-
tual strategy of queering hermeneutics through dialogical displacement moves theology 
into diasporic and exilic spaces, those marginal theological locales where “the libertine is 
amongst us and is buried in us. The theological subjects cross all the sexual constraints of 
ideal heterosexuality.”152 Althaus-Reid invites theological subjects to do what they are al-
ready doing: doing theology with rosaries in one hand and a condom in the other, telling 
                                                
152 Althaus-Reid, The Queer God, 26. 
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the stories and biographies of sexual migrants, whose ‘walking’ brings them to the very 
borders of love, pleasure, and struggle. To do theology indecently is to do theology criti-
cally and this is not limited to expressions of sexual identity, but rather is a particularly 
queer way of understanding, a practice of interpretation, that repositions the queer and in-
decent Subject in theology (not by retaking the center, but by reclaiming the periphery) 
through acts of deviance, dissidence, perversity, and promiscuity.  
Althaus-Reid believes the criticality of theology against itself requires a certain 
indecent  style, both formally and otherwise: “that is the scandalous position of what I 
have previously called Indecent Theology: a theology of liberation which, while exceed-
ing the ideas of colonial liberation, surpasses the discourse of the correct God while 
searching for a more equivocal theological reflection.”153 She disparages a shift in con-
temporary theology that celebrates the emancipatory impulse and contextual particularity 
of liberation theology, but shows more interest in establishing differing norms than the 
negativity of critique, a position incompatible with the queer ways of knowing she privi-
leges.154 The goal of indecent theology is not constructive, but critical: 
after all, even the God at the margins of many radical theologies has become only 
a lateral shadow or God-mirror. But the aim of the corruption of the ideology of 
normativity by sexual contamination, which informs our Queer theological path, 
is to move objects and subjects of theology around, turning points of reference 
and re-positioning bodies of knowledge and revelation in sometimes unsuitable 
ways….The point is that we cannot think a Queer God without understanding dif-
ferent sexual ways of knowing.155 
 
                                                
153 Althaus-Reid, The Queer God, 44.  
154 Elizabeth Phillips, Political Theology: A Guide for the Perplexed (New York: T&T Clark, 2012), 54. 
155 Althaus-Reid, The Queer God, 52.  
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Indecent theology is a critical theology, whose political mode is informed by fugi-
tivity and peripherality, rather than re-centering or acting. Critique is an interpretative ac-
tivity, not a directly actionist one. To queer theology is not to propose new theological 
forms that ought to replace the dominant ones presently at hand, but to question whether 
or not ‘correct’, ‘normative’, or ‘centered’ are properly theological qualities. We must re-
sist the temptation to replace or supplanting the heteronormative ideology by instituting 
the queer as a norming, centering, legitimating discursive regime, which only reinscribes 
the theo-logic of the normal. We do not want to center or norm the queer, says Althaus-
Reid. The only way we get to a truly indecent Christology is if we take up the displace-
ment of marginality, in the “not-normal”. To be centered, to be legitimate, is to accept the 
central authority of heterosexual patriarchalism: this marks the difference between a fem-
inist strategy and a postcolonial one. Althaus-Reid seeks a theology of that is truly mar-
ginal that eschews authority, legitimacy, centeredness, and refuses to be co-opted by cen-
tral discourses of theological power; “Normality… disenfranchises the real life experi-
ence of people by forcing them to adapt to an idealized discourse… theology becomes a 
distorted praxis, which far from liberating, itself enslaves even more.”156 
But what assures that queer theological thinking is exempt from being ideological, 
in Althaus-Reid’s view? What is inherently non-ideological about the concepts of hybrid-
ity, diaspora, or the fetish, or the queer tactics of disruption, hyphenation, or the use of 
autobiographical narratives? How can we be sure that the queer proclivity for deviance, 
                                                
156 Althaus-Reid, The Queer God, 64.  
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subversion, and aberrancy does not slide into an ideological work of its own? What meth-
odological provisions are put into place that restrict Althaus-Reid’s critical categories 
from simply replacing or substituting themselves as ideologies within a queer theology of 
God, of humanity, and of sexuality? Part of the problem with Althaus-Reid’s critique of 
traditional or classical formations of theology is an unspecific, generic reference to ideol-
ogy as if it was simply equivalent to “heteronormative”, “straight”, or “traditional.” This 
kind of vague description given to theological form of ideology plagues most liberation 
theologies, and is a significant matter of interest in this dissertation. Hopefully, by attend-
ing more specifically to philosophical treatments of ideology that give a thicker descrip-
tion, we can become more theologically precise about what it is that political theologies 
claim to be doing in ideology critique – and whether they can do it legitimately at all, 
specifically in reference to the identification and justification of social norms such as jus-
tice, recognition, or equality. These questions will be taken up in the final section where I 
take a constructive position that identifies ideology critique in the Frankfurt School as a 
useful method for thinking political theology in critical-theoretical perspective, even if it 
raises some questions as to whether or not such a political theology can be normative at 
all. 
Conclusion 
This chapter set out to clarify the relation of ideology to idolatry in theology. It 
started from the perspective that theology has its own version of ideology critique, origi-
nating from the prophetic traditions in the Hebrew Bible. It recast these traditions as po-
litical discourses, rather than theological exhortations, aimed at redrawing and shoring up 
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group boundaries in a way akin to contemporary identitarian politics. Upon closer exami-
nation, the critique of idolatry appears to be more different from ideology than initially 
thought, both in terms of their political functions and theological meanings. We must be 
careful when drawing too close a parallel between ideology critique and idolatry critique, 
for it turns out that we need the former to fully understand the problems with the latter. I 
have argued throughout this chapter that the parallel between idolatry and ideology does 
not hold up well for political theology. In many ways, one can look at the way I have laid 
out the theology and politics of idolatry critique (both in the Hebrew Bible and else-
where) and say that idolatry critique is most certainly a supreme example of ‘political 
theology’, a way of speaking of God that is, at the same time, a particular way of organiz-
ing and structuring the associations of human social life.  
And so what do we gain with this short review through theological approaches to 
ideology as idolatry? First, in terms of the biblical material, we consistently find what Jan 
Assmann calls the ‘theologization’ of political into critiques of idolatry. Here political 
differences are identified and analyzed through the categories of pride, individualization, 
bourgeoise privatization, heteronormativity, and so on. As such, these are ‘false represen-
tations’ of the human, her affective attachments, and her social world that misconstrue re-
ality and so forestall the proleptic arrival of God’s good future into the present. Second, it 
is clear that late modern theology continues to depend rather strongly on the associative 
link between ideology and ‘false consciousness’ and so theologically interpreted it as 
idolatry, defined biblically as ‘false or strange worship.’ This homological arrangement 
of ideology and idolatry, in my judgement, has led to a number of missed opportunities to 
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make sense of the politics of idolatry critique. This leaves ‘cognative' relationship be-
tween ideology and idolatry relatively unchallenged, but always presumed. Theology is 
presented as being critical of idolatry rather than representing it or generating it, as if the-
ology itself (interpreted and understood differently, of course, by each of the discourses 
or figures outlined) is distinctly unique in its ruptural and critical qualities. The critique 
of ideology as idolatry is at times deployed as an immanent manner (most explicitly by 
Metz and Althaus-Reid), but of course what is under review here are theological ideas 
that act as modes of ‘false representation’, a conception of ideology that has been thor-
oughly undermined. I have argued so far that the problem with ideology is not that of 
false representation; it is not an illusion that leads the subject to mistake appearance for 
reality. Theological views of idolatry define it as ‘strange worship’ because it mistakes an 
image, an object, for God, and so worships it “as if” it is God; these views miss the point 
about what the social origins of the biblical critique of idolatry critique teach us about the 
relation of theology and politics concerning proscription of images in the cultic practices 
of Israel. From a strictly theological point of view, idolatry might be a problem of ‘false 
representation,’ but to define ideology this way (through its relationship with idolatry) as 
many late modern theologians have done, is to miss the whole political point, naming that 
the problem with ideology and the impetus for its critique is its social impact and political 
function on social conditions, and not due to a failure of representation.  
The problem without how idolatry critique is treated by theologians as more or 
less analogous to ideology critique overlooks its political roots as identity politics. Unless 
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theology is able to provide additional critical analysis of the political dimension of idola-
try critique as ideology, it risks becoming ideological itself, namely because it neither ad-
equately responds to social conditions nor is it directly self-reflexive in its critique of its 
own theological concepts, in this case the theology of idolatry. The prophetic understand-
ing of critique becomes very important here as the one biblical candidate for the theologi-
cal version of ideology critique because it sustains the dual negativity of immanent cri-
tique. However, both in the biblical account and in the work of modern and late modern 
theologians, at least the ones analyzed here, idolatry critique is predominant, which 
leaves the identity politics uninterrogated.  
As such, the politics of idolatry critique are relatively unaddressed by theology. 
As I argued in section 1, idolatry critique has a political history to it that gives us pause 
about its presumed associative relationship with ideology critique. Idolatry critique gen-
erates a ‘theologization’ of politics that turns out to be rather different from what happens 
in and with ideology itself. What then must theology do in order to properly take up the 
practices of ideology critique? Are there any internal resources within political theology 
with which to sketch a way forward? How might political theology integrate ideology cri-
tique and what is the relation of this enterprise with other attempts outlined briefly in this 
chapter? 
In this chapter, I examined the critique of idolatry as an argument for identity pol-
itics in order to argue that ideology and idolatry were not coterminous but that the imma-
nence of ideology critique within theology turns against idolatry critique in a way, dis-
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tancing itself from it identitiarian politics, which its immanent critique names as ideol-
ogy. Indeed, from the perspective of critical theology, it must be considered ideological  
as one example of immanent critique. To address these and other question, in the next 
chapter, I turn my attention to the concept of critique itself. I need clarify what is meant 
by ‘critique,' and what difference such a notion makes, given the current political and eth-
ical challenges we face in our time. 
The call for enhanced attention to the negativity of critique as directed to theol-
ogy’s own ideological presumptions recommends Metz and Althaus Reid for further con-
sideration, namely because they are both the closest to the underutilized prophetic under-
standing of the theology of idolatry. For his part, Metz takes up the prophetic understand-
ing of idolatry critique and directs it both towards a critical of social conditions and an-
immanent critique of bourgeois religion; theology is interruptive of the normal flow of 
the economic and political apparatus held in place by injustice and that includes its own 
concepts. Althaus-Reid’s queering of theology is fully immanent. She is so concerned 
with the immanent critique of sexual ideologies in theology that her theology almost 
lacks the sufficient attention to social conditions abstracted from their support in and by 
the theological powers of the patriarchal magisterial authority.  
The politics of the image have regained considerable attention as of late, in both 
theoretical and political circles, due in large part to the vital role that religious objections 
to media images and artistic depictions have played in rise of the so-called ‘image 
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wars.’157 In this way, theology has taken center stage as a critique of idolatry in contem-
porary politics. For many, the ferocious regulation and disciplining of images on theolog-
ical grounds is a perfect example of theology as ideology, and so, claiming to be the de-
fenders of western liberal values, they are pushing back against the post-secular attempt 
to reframe the role of religion in the global civil society. For them, theology as idolatry 
critique is ideological. As the argument goes, theology is iconoclastic to its core, and so 
poses a threat to the freedom of expression and creativity that drives the critical process 
and open dissent essential to democracy, not to mention the way that ‘things’, objects 
themselves, are excluded from public discussion.158 Many have begun to question cri-
tique itself, including Bruno Latour who has recently taken up both idolatry critique and 
secular critique in order to point out their shared problems.159 Perhaps it is theology’s 
idolatry critique that discredits its political voice, as it apparently leads us into an icono-
clastic violence, but secular critique has also been domesticated into a rote participant in 
the political mainstream, degenerating into a liberal routine. It is not unreasonable to sug-
gest that claims of unveiling veils, destroying idols, discrediting myths, and exposing fet-
ishes generates an unwelcome rhetoric that indeed ought to make all those invested in the 
notion of critique nervous. 
                                                
157 Sven Lutticken, “Idolatry and Its Discontents,” New Left Review 44 (2007): 107-110. 
158Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel. Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy (Cambridge, Mass: 
MIT Press, 2005). See Adam S. Miller, Speculative Grace: Bruno Latour and Object-Oriented Theology 
(New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2013) for a theological treatment of Latour’s overall project. 
159 Bruno Latour, “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern,” 
Critical Inquiry 30.2 (2004): 225-248.; Bruno Latour, “What is Iconoclash? Or Is There a World Beyond 
the Image Wars?” in Iconoclash: Beyond the Image Wars in Science, Religion and Art. eds. Bruno Latour 
and Peter Weibel (Karlsruhe: ZKM, 2002): 14–37. 
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This critique of critique, with its double movement of negativity, sustains theolog-
ical attention on both social conditions and its own theological concepts. Theology must 
become self-reflective; that is, it must turn to its own ideological dimensions as a theo-
logical project, much in the same way that the prophetic consciousness does in reference 
to the theology of idolatry. The features of this critical theology, as well as the character 
of its general and particular agenda, need to be filled out, but the next chapter rather tries 
to think constructively about what happens to both theology and the political when their 
relation is configured critically, that is, in a modality of critique. Critique in this way is 
configured to address the immanent relation of theory and praxis in political theology, 
which interfaces in an important way with the function that major themes like justice, sol-
idarity, and freedom have in securing for political theology a place alongside other dis-
courses advocating for social transformation through emancipatory praxis. 
For me, critical theology is indeed a way of being political in all the ways requi-
site for large scale, collective political struggle: it is negative, dialectical, exilic, imma-
nent, interruptive, and prophetic. If the goal of political theology is action, critical theol-
ogy opts instead for a restrictive pause, a provisional and discriminate suspension of im-
mediate political activity, as to avoid the presumption that action and politics, even when 
geared towards principles of justice, freedom, solidarity and the like, is exempt from be-
ing co-opted into a form of ‘acting out’ of the politics of urgency, fear, crisis, and catas-
trophe. Critical theology interrupts action by installing itself as a self-rupturing critique, 
even if it means halting and problematizing its own political activity. 
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If theology is to offer anything like ‘the New,' the alternative Event that promises 
to generate and reproduce the resources from which to imagine, think, and act in the 
world otherwise, it cannot do this if it takes the form of political theology that tries to 
shape the world as a positive or constructive enterprise. The real political strength of the-
ology is found in its immanently critical dynamic, the negative dialectical ‘Spirit’ at the 
core of its double movement, at the same to social conditions as towards its own theologi-
cal concepts. It proffers a critique of critique and through this, political theology can in-
deed contribute to “creative advance” towards an emancipatory global politics, not as a 
political theology, but instead, as a critical one.160 
To anticipate the argument of the next chapter, critical theology helps moderate 
the relation of theory and praxis within political theology, making it clear to theology that 
it may know less about justice, solidarity, reconciliation, and human happiness than it ap-
pears to believe it does. This is what I believe is important about immanent critique that 
political theology learns from ideology critique; that it is the means of coming to terms 
with the contradictions deficiencies within the object of critique, from the perspective of 
object itself; that is, its standard of immanent critique belongs to and exists in the object 
of its critique. For critical theology, the demand of praxis are the basis for the theological 
critique of the use of justice, freedom, liberation, solidarity as the basis for political theol-
                                                
160 I am not interested so much in contrasting this (potential) form with other options: ’secular theology,' 
‘radical political theology,' ‘postmodern theology,' and so on. In my mind, something like a ‘critical theol-
ogy’ is cooperative, not competitive. With these other forms, though it has a significant impact on how the-
ologies understand their immanent relation to theory and praxis. 
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ogy. At this point, it is not clear what a ‘critical theology’ does or what its exact relation-
ship is to political theology. Attending to the question of ideology critique raises cession 
questions about the character of critique itself, leading us to examine the nature of imma-
nent critique. To insert immanent critique into political theology is to reinterpret it as crit-
ical theology. In taking up political theology as its object, it modifies the posture it takes 
as it prescribes actions and values, whether on the basis of specific theological commit-
ments, or political convictions, even so-called emancipatory ones.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CRITIQUE AND THEOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
 Allow me to recap the direction of the dissertation so far: it investigates the curi-
ous turn to theology from some unlikely corners of philosophy through the lens of ideol-
ogy critique. This, of course, was puzzling, give the dominant narrative about religion 
and theology as ideology, not as ideology critique. The preceding chapters have shown, 
however, that key representatives of this turn only offer rather oblique and selective en-
gagements with theology that prove to be insufficient from a philosophical point of view. 
It is clear that theology can engage in this debate about the task of ideology critique - and 
its political implications - only when it takes up itself – ‘theology’ – as self-reflexive 
work of critique, the goal of which is the (self)alteration of its own values and norms, ex-
pressed in its varying and complex traditions. In order to do so, it needs to be informed 
by its own object, a task that can only be performed by itself. Philosophy paves the way 
and sets the parameters for ideology critique, but how to practice it within theology can 
only be discerned and spelled out immanently. What should theology do with the 'issue' 
of ideology critique, specially given the problems and limitations of its own idolatry cri-
tique? For this, we need more thorough theorization of critique within theology. That is 
the subject of this final chapter.  
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Up to now, the dissertation has concerned itself primarily with the relation be-
tween theology and ideology in modern and contemporary philosophy and theology. This 
inquiry has foregrounded ideology’s character as an “essentially contested concept”, 
prompting us to look closer at the character of critique itself, rather than to thick descrip-
tions of ideology. The impetus for this study is the dearth of attention that ideology cri-
tique has received in political theology as of late, and the apparent ease with which it has 
taken up themes of liberation, emancipation, utopia, and revolution as if they are ‘at 
home’ with them. The eager positivity of political theology’s embrace of eschatological 
themes of hope, utopia, and the inevitability of change has turned theology into a direct 
and immediate form of practical activity, risking the eclipse of critique in theological 
thought and study as well as in how relation of theology to politics is theorized within po-
litical theology itself. I take as axiomatic the emphasis of political theology on ortho-
praxis over orthodoxy, and indeed welcome the turn to the political within theology itself, 
which in many ways has been more productive than the turn to theology with philosophy. 
And yet this chapter goes farther to argue for a critical theology that questions political 
theology in an immanent critique about the relation of theory and praxis. The effect that 
critique has on political theology is admittedly equivocal, but in the very least, I argue for 
the rupture of praxis for the sake of critique in order to provide an immanent ideology cri-
tique. 
 If the critical attitude originates from the critique of religion promulgated by 
Marx’s ‘ruthless critique of everything existing’, it is important to reexamine Marx’s ac-
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tual critique of religion as paradigm of ideology. Marx was not as concerned about theol-
ogy as he was about theology’s social effects and its social function on the material con-
ditions of repressed classes in bourgeois social life, and so left open the possibility of a 
theology that undertook the task of the “criticism of religion as the premise of all criti-
cism.” Eagleton takes this up in service to critical socialism, defending theology against 
its liberal detractors who oppose religion in order to affirm capitalism. He argues that re-
ligion, especially Christianity, offers an alternative way of life that challenges the status 
quo and opens up critical space to imagine the world otherwise. The theology Eagleton 
proffers is rather straight-forward and selective, and while he is effective at exposing the 
impoverished and imprecise interpretation of Christianity as offered by its so-called pro-
gressive, new atheist, and liberal critics, theology is presented as a critique of the social 
world, rather than possessing a self-reflexive critical position towards itself. While Žižek 
and Eagleton’s political goals may, at least in word, be similar, Žižek’s theology is quite 
different - not only in style and substance, but also effect. He reverses Eagleton’s political 
defense of theology as an emancipatory resource, and argues that theology’s greatest trait 
is its willingness to admit to its own impotence: to not only announce the death of God, 
but to instigate its social forms and promulgate the implications of its practical stance of 
aggressive passivity: the “I prefer not to” in terms of social change or political activity. 
Theology is not revolutionary or emancipatory, but rather anarchic in a “last resort” re-
sistance against the ideologies of state-sponsored violence, liberal democracy, capitalism, 
racism, or religious fundamentalism.  
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 It is not quite right to say that critique is theological (any more than it is not theo-
logical), nor is it sufficient to remind political theology to be critically aware of its own 
ideologies. What I am after, it turns out, is ‘critical theology’ that theorizes and interprets 
the critical position as a heuristic for theology’s self-understanding. What are the best 
available candidates? At first glance, there seems to be a solid connection between the 
critique of ideology and the critique of idolatry in the Hebrew Bible, a point made repeat-
edly by political theologians. However, it is clear that something more politically compli-
cated is at stake in the invocation of idolatry critique, which in its appeals for social cohe-
sion and collective belonging legitimate and justify a identity politics that generates ex-
clusionary relations that at times result in violence. As such, the theological approach that 
most approximates the idea of critique I seek, as it turns out, is not the critique of idolatry 
that comes out of the Hebrew Bible, but rather the queer critique of the ideologies within 
idolatry critique that legitimate themselves under the guise of critique. As I have explored 
in the context of biblical concept of idolatry critique, it is an identitarian style of politics 
that motivates the critique of idols, and so is a politics that results from a particular theol-
ogy rather than how it is commonly referred to in theology itself: as a theology that re-
sults in a particular iconoclastic politics. In response to this pattern as ire creates itself 
within political liberation and feminist theologies, the queer critique of theology turns it-
self 'inwards' and exposes the political dynamics within the theological.  
 The remedy for such a thing is a self-reflexive, immanent critique that interro-
gates theology on the basis of its own normative standards, while also critiquing these 
very same standards. Where do we go to learn about such a notion of critique, especially 
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when any discussion of critique is very hard to find in political theology at the moment? 
Is critique even a properly theological attitude? What idea or concept of critique is able to 
form theology in this way? We learn the answers not only by thinking theologically 
through ideology critique (as we have done here), but also by paying closer attention to 
the work of critique itself and its role in ethics and politics, in decision and action. The 
point of all this is to determine whether or not we can speak of political theology as criti-
cal, to clarify what critique means in theological perspective, and to discern what signifi-
cance these matters have for ‘political theology’ as a primary scene of address between 
theology and critical theory today.1 
 As such, this chapter is about envisaging theology as a critical process. Much of 
political theology (indeed, not only philosophy and sociology of religion, but also reli-
gious studies) today is based on the idea that religion has an emancipatory impulse imma-
nent to itself that possesses radical potential for transforming political life - if properly in-
terpreted and put into practice. In this dissertation, I have sought to problematize this the-
sis by turning to ideology critique as a resource to resist this trend and return to critique 
as a practice of political theology. 
                                                
1 Certainly this raises many questions about whether or not secular presumptions are necessary or essential 
to the critical task after enlightenment, as least when Kant heads its genealogy.. The critique of ideology 
has been more or less homologous with the critique of (divine) transcendence, which seems to aligns cri-
tique with a particularly secular form of materialism, politics, and society. In some ways, to call upon mod-
els of critique for the sake of a political theology calls into question the oft-assumed secular alignment with 
critique, a project undertaken by Talal Asad, Judith Butler, and Stathis Gourgouris in ways that overlap 
with my view here. See Talad Asad, ed, et al., Is Critique Secular?: Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2013) and Stathis Gourgouris, Lessons in Secular Criticism (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2013).  
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 Referring to the negativity of critique, I do not claim here that, in following the 
concept of critique in early critical theory, critical theology leads theology to abandon 
ethical commitments or political activity. Neither do I suggest that critical theology es-
chew, in light of critique, the concrete demands that human suffering amidst the struc-
tural and institutional dynamics of evil and power make on us. I make the much more 
modest and restricted point that critical theology is immanent critique of the political 
within theology, not operating as a distinct discipline or method in relation to political, 
systematic, or practical theologies that acts upon them, but rather is an impulse within 
and inherent to theology whose negativity sheds light, not what should be, but rather what 
should not be. While this does chasten or restrict theology in relation to the posture it 
holds in relation to the actionable solutions it offers as consequences of its various theo-
logical positions, it does not oppose practical solutions or social and political action; it is, 
instead, minimalistic in that it provides the practical reasoning for the negation of the bad, 
rather than for ideals, standard, actionable solutions towards the good. 
Problems With the Ideology Concept 
 I have been making the general argument that political theology needs to return to 
the ideology concept in order to revitalize its own forms of immanent critique. This is 
necessary because there are elements within theology (and its relation to both ethics and 
politics) that still require a critique of ideology. But also, as shown in the previous chap-
ter, understandings of ideology and idolatry critique in theology have proven insufficient. 
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And so, after exploring the relation of ideology to theology in both theology and philoso-
phy, it is clear that ideology remains a critical-political problem within theology, rather 
than a problem of theology within politics. 
 The question of ideology critique will often lead to current debates about the na-
ture of ideologies themselves, offering various lists of their essential elements. It is com-
mon to mistake ideology for false beliefs or rather beliefs that are based on appearance 
not reality, or beliefs that may or may not be true but nevertheless conceal their class-
based or power-based interests. This list becomes the standard against which we practice 
social criticism since ideologies are not merely errors, mistakes, illusions, or fantasies - 
they have practical effects and so are thoroughly political. Ideologies constitute how po-
litical subjects relate to the world and also circumscribe and determine how these self-
same subjects interpret and so operate within their social conditions. They are the means 
by which the social conditions are instilled and so absorb political subjects into the pre-
dominant situation, and so it is critique of ideology that is responsible for uncovering, 
laying out for viewing the conditions that facilitate this domination. For an idea or belief 
to become ideology, it must deceive (actively or by consequence) agents of their real and 
true interests, thus limiting or harming their otherwise full capabilities as political sub-
jects. It must functionally support and protect institutions that practice and legitimate re-
pression, oppression, domination, and other dehumanizing forces, the same forces that 
give rise to ideology’s power to persuade, deceive, and neutralize the political energy of 
the potentially dissident. 
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 And yet, there are numerous difficulties with the critique of ideology itself, enu-
merated at greater length in previous chapters. For example, how does one know what 
counts as “real and true” interests? On what basis might a critique of ideology indict an 
institution for permitting oppression? How is one able to pinpoint the genetic origin of 
ideology, especially when political subjects themselves are unable, by definition, to iden-
tify ideologies as ideologies? In the end, the theory of ideology comes down to an under-
standing of immanent critique, its normative basis, and its role in shaping praxis. And so, 
for the sake of simplicity (though at the risk of oversimplification), we can identify three 
prevailing difficulties with the ideology concept. First, ‘the truth problem’: truth is such 
an essentially contested concept that it cannot provide the basis for any claims to un-
masked reality that can serve as the point of reference against which to critique ideology. 
Second, the ‘normative standards problem’: what supplies the standards of the critique of 
ideology? Are they internal, sui generis, or must they be established ‘externally’? Third, 
these two problems are synthesized into the over-arching ‘the practical problem’: what is 
gained practically by the critique of ideology? In what way does critique have transform-
ative, rather than hermeneutic or reconstructive intentions? What is critique and what 
happens to the social conditions of the subject - and the subject itself - after critique? 
What is ethically and/or politically gained and lost? 
 First, ‘the truth problem.’ The critique of ideology is not a matter of establishing 
factual truths about reality, nor it is about discerning the difference between appearance 
and reality. The negative, functionalist account of ideology maintains that ideologies are 
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not merely errors in practice or mistakes in thought, but are always grounded in condi-
tions of reality. In this way, the older Marxist position is updated so that ideologies are 
seen not only as socially embedded but also “socially induced.”2 Critique is not a wholly 
dismantling gesture, but rather is concerned with identifying the deficient realization of 
the truth that devolves into ideology, but nevertheless remains hidden with it. This defi-
ciency involves a false understanding of a social state or its situation and the condition of 
this state or situation itself. Critique lays bare how and why the political subject has been 
led to misunderstand something related to this social state or situation and also makes the 
case why this social state or situation is wrong and so needs to be changed. It stops here, 
however. Critique itself does not supply the norms and values that govern human acts or 
beliefs, but rather tries to set into motion a practical process of transformation that is 
open-ended and undecided - and as such, is consistently unpredictable and unstable. The 
critique of ideology does not provide the political subject with a set guide for actions or a 
positive list of what should be done now, but does supply minimal, negativistic guidance 
as to how not to live, what should not be the case, As Ted Smith writes recently, in refer-
ence to Adorno’s idea of critique: “real hope comes not in our dreams of better worlds, 
but through our shudders at the horrors of this one. It comes through determinate nega-
tion of concrete moments of damaged life.”3 
                                                
2 Rahel Jaeggi, “Rethinking Ideology,” New Waves in Political Philosophy, ed. Boudewijn de Bruin and 
Christopher F. Zurn (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 68.  
3 Ted Smith, Weird John Brown: Divine Violence and the Limits of Ethics (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univer-
sity Press, 2015), 160. While Smith goes on to insist that Adorno’s pessimism is “too complete”, and that 
he “overstates the completeness of human depravity”, he does recognize what I think is a key element of 
the critical theology I am proposing here: “the best responses to ‘wrong life’ involve not moral imperatives 
  
328 
 This leads us to the question of norms and values. It is unclear whether ideology 
critique is able to name or justify its own standards by appealing to some non-ideological 
norm. There are no external place, no site above and beyond ideology from which to de-
clare certain states, ideas, structures, or conditions as ideological. Therefore any norma-
tive position that ideology critique must be immanent - it must proceed from the norms 
provided by the object of critique. Jaeggi describes this problem through the paradox that 
ideology critique claims to be ‘non-normative’ in character, while being ‘normatively sig-
nificant’ in consequence.4 It does not say how something should be, but also does not 
limit itself to asserting how things are. It considers the latter to have a negative bearing 
on how the former is to be formulated, but at the same time, does not allow for a division 
of labor, as if ideology critique does the descriptive analysis of the properties and condi-
tions of social life and something else (pragmatic theory, foreign affairs, ethnography) 
provides the norms. It cannot be critical otherwise.  
 This bleeds into the third point: the ‘practical problem.’ In what way can critique 
be practically oriented through emancipatory practice? The work of critique is not pre-
scriptive and is independent from an external set of standards, but this distinction does 
not necessitate its separation from praxis. If, as a critical-theoretical formulation, ideol-
ogy critique aims to contribute to transformative action, not by prescribing specific 
guides for said action, but by surfacing and specifying the potentialities and obstructions 
                                                
but philosophical histories of how things went wrong” so as to show us all how to avoid reiterating dam-
aged life as theology has often done, even those forms committed to justice, liberation, and happiness. This 
is the negative function of critical theology in relation to political theology. 
4 Jaeggi, “Rethinking Ideology,” 70-71.  
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present in social reality, thought, and even theory, it is at its most practical when it articu-
lates itself, not so much as in direct competition with other lines of thought and study, but 
in negative confrontation of reality so that it may be transformed by practice. It is in this 
way both normatively significant and non-prescriptive.  
 One of the enduring legacies of the Frankfurt School is their insistence that criti-
cal theory remain immanent; that is, rather than starting from an ideal set of practices or 
principles, an idealized situation decided on ahead of time, immanent critique retrieves its 
norms from social practices of its object(s) and then proceeds to critique the shortcom-
ings, problems and contradictions of the present on the basis of the ideals contained there. 
This is certainly a dominant feature of critical theory. For example, when Jaeggi main-
tains that “a critique cannot merely consist of stating what something is like; it must also 
involve a position on how it should be or should not be. It is at the very least unclear what 
can actually normatively follow from its analyses/decodings/exposures.”5, she is express-
ing why this lack of clarity is what makes critique helpful: as social critique, ideology cri-
tique wants to transform the way things are, but does so without relying on any external 
standard or positive alternative. Instead, it proceeds immanently, that is by developing 
standards based on the very situation it critiques. As an immanent critique, it generates 
the standards it needs to in order to critique a given reality from the norms that issue from 
that said reality. 
 While the immanent critique of ideology stands in a negative relation to ethical 
imperatives or actionable political proposals for how to fully realize its object’s values or 
                                                
5 Jaeggi, “Rethinking Ideology,” 70-71.  
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norms, it also calls for and undertakes a critique of the given situation and does so from 
within the historical situation, culture, or context that has failed to live up to its standards. 
The negativity of critique does not mean, however, that the norms and values immanent 
to the given are not important, or that actions (or theologies) which are meant to realize 
these values are not desirable; it only means that critique of ideology cannot generate 
these values or norms itself, only the thick, concrete accounts of the ideologies that pre-
vent their realization. It identifies ideologies as distortions, failures, or deficiencies 
through ‘determinate negation’ of the concrete moments and historical situations of dam-
aged life. If the task of ideology critique is to evaluate systems of social domination, it 
does so, not in light of particular universal or objectified standards of, say, freedom, but 
with the function of unmasking wrong rationalizations or justifications of domination, 
both in history and of the present. In this way, the critique of ideology functions nega-
tively by proposing normative ways for constructing a society of freedom and happiness 
by clarifying what not to do, what should not be the case, how not to act, and so on. In 
this way, the critique of ideology, for all its negativity, participates in praxis by its refusal 
to reiterate damaged life and contributes to a transformed social world by elucidating the 
horrors of factual reality, especially for those who are victims of historical catastrophe. 
By creating an index of the horrors of false life, critique hopes to help theory and praxis 
avoid reiterating and reflecting said horrors.  
 This rendering of the problems moves the argument forward by foregrounding 
how critique is not a closed, procedural process with a clear endgame, namely because 
the concept of ideology is itself a moving target. The whole point of ideology critique can 
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easily be eclipsed or overlooked if the focus remains on ideology rather than critique, as 
has been done most often in theology and philosophical treatments of the topic. It also 
helps us understand why theology needs ideology critique: we do not need to rely on so-
cial theory, philosophy (of religion), critical sociology, or ethnography alone to provide 
the concepts, norms, or frameworks which clarify the problems and contradictions that 
political theology needs to address self-reflexively. A critical theology, informed by ide-
ology critique, does not stand outside of theology, pointing out instances of delusion, dis-
tortion, or deficiency, but rather is part of its own self-reflexive interrogation that con-
fronts its internal inconsistencies and contradictions.  
 What impact then might critique have on the use of theology for praxis and politi-
cal action? So far the relationship between theology and ideology critique has been con-
sidered a boon for emancipatory political action. Both Eagleton and Žižek found some-
thing ‘radical’ or ‘perverse’ in Christianity that can serve as a resource for thinking politi-
cally amidst our present malaise precisely because theology in one way or another has a 
critical attitude about it that can be applied towards ideology - with liberating effects on 
political subjects. Take for instance, when Eagleton says that one of the effects of late 
modern capitalism on thought itself is that even thinking must have a point; it must pro-
duce something of value to be exchanged. But this, Eagleton insists, is one of the many 
things that is so radical and disruptive about the idea of God: “God” is utterly pointless 
and so theology (as ‘God-talk’)  issues a “perpetual critique of the instrumental reason”6 
where everything has to have a point, it has make or do something, accomplish something 
                                                
6 Eagleton, Reason, Faith, and Revolution, 10.  
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actual, tangible, or measurable to have any meaning. The political appeal of Christianity 
in this context is that its god is literally “good for nothing.” It does not serve any actual 
purpose; it is only good-in-itself.7 This extends to divine creation, namely humanity: “to 
say of the world that it is ‘created’ is for classical theology to say that it is pointless. Like 
God, and like humanity, it exists purely for its own delight…Creation is a scandal to the 
sharp-faced stockbrokers from whom everything must have a point.”8 Like jazz or litera-
ture, Eagleton says, God “needs no justification beyond its own existence” because “God, 
too, is his (sic) own end, ground, origin, reason, and self-delight, and only by living this 
way can human beings be said to share in this life.”9  
 Žižek also speaks about the value of ‘useless' theory in a context of austerity, cuts 
to public funding of social welfare programs, and academia’s affair with vocational and 
STEM subjects; theory that makes no claims to do anything is a significant moment of 
dissent in an highly instrumental social world in which thought and activity are both 
turned into practicalities that have to do something, that have to make points.10 For Eagle-
ton, and perhaps even more for Žižek, theology has great political promise as critique be-
                                                
7 This is spelled out in classical theological terms as divine aseity.  
8 Eagleton, Sweet Violence, 182; Eagleton, After Theory, 128.  
9 Eagleton, The Meaning of Life, 174-175.  
10 Žižek stylizes this as a ‘Leninist’ plea to betray Marx’s “transformative” impulse towards praxis, in order 
to clear the way for interventionist ways of acting that do not require an revolutionary subject (since ideo-
logical conditions make this impossible). Slavoj Žižek, ed. Revolution at the Gates: A Selection of Writings 
from February to October 1917 (London: Verso, 2002); Slavoj Žižek, "A Plea for Leninist Intolerance,” 
Critical Inquiry. 28.2 (2002): 542-566.; Slavoj Žižek, "What can Lenin tell us about freedom today?,” Re-
thinking Marxism 13.2 (2001): 1-9. 
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cause, within a capitalist matrix that privileges success, it is an embarrassment, an aberra-
tion, for its apparent instrumental pointlessness. In this way too, the kinds of acts, the 
style of praxis, that critique directs political theology towards are the types that share in, 
make visible, and enunciate this same gratuity that promises to break open the instrumen-
tal system: acts that may or may not end up changing something but nevertheless take up 
“the risk of elaborating a positive livable project.” 11 Arguably, the particularity of Chris-
tian ethics is far more striking and has a much higher bar. The demands are greater, the 
costs higher, and the rewards fewer. Christian identity is predicated on taking upon one-
self a vocation of compassion, solidarity, and accompaniment with and for suffering, one 
modeled on Jesus Christ’s own way of being the suffering and dying one who charts a 
path of resistance and justice. If critique is to play a role in Christian political theology, it 
must contribute to the missional identity of Christianity which is justified on the basis of 
its own immanent critique which, in turn, authorizes its norms and values. What practical 
effect does critique have, then, on theology and why is such effect desirable, from a cri-
tique of ideology perspective? In what way does critique make way for political action 
and ethical judgement and decision: the absolute necessity of praxis? 
On Critique 
 In what follows, I will try to answer two important questions: (1) what does it 
mean to be critical? and (2) why is it helpful for thinking through to critical theology and 
its relation to political theology? To bring critique and political theology together here 
                                                
11” For an example, see Paul Anthony Taylor, "The Just Do It riots: A critical interpretation of the media’s 
violence,” Capital & Class 36.3 (2012): 393-399. 
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immediately foregrounds the relationship of theory to praxis, and the specific way that 
critique mediates this relationship in early critical theory, and so, to critical theology. By 
taking up the question of critique’s relationship to praxis with respect to theology, we are 
able to foreground the nature of critique itself, giving us a better sense of what is politi-
cally gained - and lost - by envisaging and recasting political theology as critical theol-
ogy.  
 I turn here to Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, who as early members of 
the Frankfurt School, formulated theory in a way that sharpened its diagnostic and de-
scriptive power of critique while refusing to allow theory to fall into the trap of what 
Adorno called “pseudo-activity”: praxis disguised as liberalism, democracy, or protest, or 
perhaps for our own time, morality, humanitarianism, philanthropy, liberation. and so on. 
I cannot properly account all of the complexities of Adorno’s or Horkheimer’s thought 
(much less their differences or the differences between them and other Frankfurt School 
figures), but simply want to argue that there are aspects of their work on critique that I 
find both insightful and instructive for thinking about critical theology, namely the con-
cept of negative critique.  
Max Horkheimer and the ‘Immanent Method’ of Critique 
 Up to this point, I have assumed, but not argued directly for, one of the original 
theses of early generation of the Frankfurt School: what distinguishes critical theory from 
other forms of theory is the primacy of the task of ideology critique. This ‘critical theory’ 
integrates a materialist social analysis, robust scientific inquiry (checked against a nega-
tive concept of truth pace ‘the sociology of knowledge’), and a profound moral interest. 
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Marx Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, as the theorists of the Frankfurt School, along 
with their Western Marxist associates, sought a new interdisciplinary form of social re-
search capable of re-examining historical materialism and utilizing social psychology so 
that the rational concept of society and its empirical reality could be studied, analyzed, 
and duly critiqued.12 They developed a critical theory of society, designed so as to avoid 
the positivist pitfalls of “traditional theories” and the perils of Marxist dogmatism, which 
reduced itself to ‘scientific socialism’, opting instead for a negative and immanent 
method with which to critique social practices for instrumentalizing and mechanizing rea-
son itself as ideology.   
 In his 1937 essay “Traditional and Critical Theory”, Horkheimer argued that the 
problem with traditional theory was its non-reflexive assumptions about the role of the 
subject in understandings of social knowledge and scientific explanation.13 As a result, its 
conclusions uncritically mirror social reality, confirming the particulars whilst endorsing 
knowledge as the neutral product of passive records and detached observations of objec-
tive and general reality.14 It is ideology insofar as it both naturalizes and legitimate the 
conditions of things - what Žižek would have called ‘the normal flow’ - while also aiding 
the powerful elite with technical information that helps it control and manipulate social 
relations and productive forces. The knowledge generated by traditional theory is not 
                                                
12 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments (Stan-
ford, Calif: Stanford Univ. Press, 2007).  
13 Max Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory”, Critical Theory: Selected Essays. Matthew J. 
O’Connell, trans. New York, NY: Continuum, 1972, 188-243.  
14 Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” 191-198.  
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neutral as it claims, but ideological in its affirmation of the status quo and its assistance to 
the elite, ruling powers.15 The specific methods of critical theory emerged in contradis-
tinction to what Max Horkheimer called ‘traditional scientific theories’ which substantial-
ized the link between the wretched, dehumanizing reality of social life and “industrial 
productive techniques” such as classification, calculation, and enforcement, the predomi-
nant categories of which were “better, useful, appropriate, productive, and valuable.”16 
By contrast, the attitude of critical theology was thoroughly negative, designed to counter 
the apologetic and pragmatic sensibilities of instrumentalized rationality.  
 For Horkheimer. traditional theory unquestioningly mobilizes and deploys reason 
as a technique, divesting it of its critical character, pushing its ideologies beneath the sur-
face of actuality, making them invisible and so unquestioned. The effect its that its domi-
nating and classifying impulses are seen then as justified, legitimated as natural, scien-
tific, neutral and so useful, turning reason and the knowledge it produces into “a reified, 
ideological category.”17 Their primary objective is to flatten reality out in generic catego-
ries that can be studied, classified, and compartmentalized according to their usefulness 
and their amenability to mechanization. 
  In contrast, “critical theory”, then, is interested in exposing both knowledge and 
history as social, historical, and ‘interested’, rather than objective, blind, and universal. 
The political effect of this is that subjects encounter their world and their conditions as 
                                                
15 Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” 203ff.  
16 Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” 207, 208.  
17 Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” 194.  
  
337 
something that can change, that can be otherwise. Once the subject sees that their activity 
need not be reduced to “a possible object of planful decision and rational determination 
of goals”18 and so locked into the determination of history or fate, it restores the ‘possibil-
ity’ into a social order whose irrationality, and dehumanization effectively has immobi-
lizes any politically meaningful agency.  
 Whereas traditional theory effectively confirms and justifies the dominative sys-
tem, in contrast, Horkheimer describes ‘critical theory’ as ideology critique; that is, it dis-
cerns within the ideas of social life the specific ways they function in relation to their so-
cial context to conceal their own social origins and underlying antagonisms. By disposing 
and liquifying the false sense of inevitability and necessity of what is - the false sense that 
what is cannot be otherwise - it then opens up genuinely new coordinates for how the po-
litical subject can think, act, and relate to the given conditions of her life. 
Critical theory has no material accomplishments to show for itself. The change 
which it seeks to bring about is not effected gradually, so that success even if slow 
might be steady…. The first consequence of the theory which urges a transfor-
mation of society as a whole is only an intensification of the struggle with which 
the theory is connected.19 
 
Critical theory, then works to instigate this ‘intensification.’  It accomplishes this, not by 
observation, descriptive analysis, or by gathering and explaining data, but by exposing 
the inherent contradictions within cultural ideas that bourgeois society uses ideology to 
suture and conceal. This method of critique is not just directed to social and historical re-
                                                
18 Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” 207.  
19 Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” 218-219.  
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ality, but also by this reality and its ‘thought-forms’. Critical theory is an ‘immanent’ cri-
tique, meaning that it proceeds not from external standards - rational or otherwise - but 
from “an image of the future which springs indeed from a deep understanding of the pre-
sent.”20 It does not make judgements about particular ideas based on their deviation from 
universal, general ideals as if these particular albeit ideological ideas have no true content 
themselves. Critical theory is critical insofar as it is instinctively self-reflexive; it is im-
manently critical in its eschewal of appeals to knowledge derived from necessary, univer-
sal, or invariant positions or orientations. Horkheimer acknowledges this, admitting that 
there is no general criteria for judging the critical theory as a whole, for it is al-
ways based on the recurrence of events and thus on a self-reproducing totality. 
Nor is there a social class by whose acceptance of the theory one could be guided. 
It is possible for the consciousness of every social stratum today to be limited and 
corrupted by ideology, however much, for its circumstances, it may be bent on 
truth…. the critical theory has no specific influence on its side, except concern for 
the abolition of social injustice. This negative formulation, if we wish to express it 
abstractly is the materialist content of the idealist concept of reason.21 
 
Lacking external criteria, critique takes shape as an ‘immanentizing’ process that can 
only be discerned though an self-reflexive method that challenges both the reifying and 
totalizing gestures of reason. Horkheimer knew this would limit critical theory’s political 
appeal, admitting that “the concepts which emerge under its influence are critical of the 
present…Consequently, although critical theory at no point proceeds arbitrarily and in 
                                                
20 Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” 220. 
21 Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” 242.  
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chance fashion, it appears, to prevailing modes of thought, to be subjective and specula-
tive, one-sided and useless…it appears to be biased and unjust.”22 The consolation of cri-
tique when faced with this “hostility to theory”23 is that it seeks the “transformation of so-
ciety as a whole” through “a changing of history and the establishment of justice among 
men (sic)”24, and so cannot be satisfied with the small “successes [which] may even 
prove, later on, to have been only apparent victories and really blunders.”25  
Adorno and Horkheimer: Critique of ‘Enlightenment’ 
 Adorno and Horkheimer took the critique of ideology very seriously because, un-
like other more orthodox Marxists of the time, they were not at all confident of the col-
lapse of capitalism or the rise of an emancipated, and so revolutionary, class. They 
strongly insisted that the hold of ideology in society, on reason, on thought itself, was 
more strong, entrenched, and resilient than previously suspected.26 As such, critical the-
ory must be developed in order to expose the inherent contradictions at the heart of the 
current social order, enacted by instrumental reason through domination and mystifica-
tion. It suppresses difference and heterogeneity and promotes productivity and efficiency 
as the highest of values. ‘Mass culture’ kept any subversion, resistance, or protest of capi-
                                                
22 Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” 218.  
23 Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” 232. 
24 Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” 243. 
25 Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” 219. 
26 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 6, 42-43, 89-93.  
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talism, of racism, of cultural propaganda, at bay by distracting political subjects with bu-
reaucracy, routine, and amusement, lulling them into indifference and passivity.27 With 
this in mind, the goal of ideology critique was not to fully dismantle ideas, practices, or 
institutions deemed to be ideological, but rather to find the truth, the emancipatory poten-
tial latent and hidden with them, and to preserve and protect it, so that it might be used to 
drive a wedge between a repressive and dominative system or thought and the social 
agents attached and determined by it.  
 This is both a historical argument and a moral one: the effect of the modern ideol-
ogy in history has produced the real suffering of “damaged human life.” Critical theory 
keeps open the possibility that the increasingly ‘barbaric’ world can become otherwise, 
refusing to acquiesce to the inevitability of the present or the failure to recognize that it 
should be otherwise. Given the conditions of ideology, the point was not to inaugurate 
something revolutionary, but something much more radical and elementary at the same 
time: a realistic and materialist assessment of ‘what is going on’, a task that could only be 
accomplished by the interdisciplinary synthesis of empirical research, historical analysis, 
and social scientific studies that came to characterize the methods of the Frankfurt 
School’s stye of critique. 
 Horkheimer and Adorno set out to clarify the dialectical meaning of enlighten-
ment so as to demystify its function within modern social life. They argued that human 
happiness, which is possible only when justice and freedom are in play, is dependent on 
                                                
27 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectics of Enlightenment, 94-104.  
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emancipation from social reality as it currently stands, a reality which itself claims ‘en-
lightenment’. Emancipation itself depends on enlightenment, a state of social maturity 
that calls for and enacts a discontinuity, a radical break with a present diagnosed as 
‘wrong’, ’damaged’ by the catastrophic tendencies of Western societies. For Adorno and 
Horkheimer, this ‘enlightenment’ however is thoroughly dialectical; it has within it domi-
native tendencies that contribute to, rather than combat, the cultural values, social prac-
tices, and political institutions responsible for ‘damaged human life.’28 This assortment is 
ideological in the sense that they do not represent human person’s best interests and so 
are not to be trusted, but neither are the standards of rationality upon which the critique of 
ideology is often grounded. It is the responsibility of ideology to maintain the conditions, 
relations and forces that keep reification of social relations, the instrumentalization of 
reason, and the industrialization of culture unchecked; but perhaps more important than 
this, it is the function of ideology to implicate reason itself in this task.  
 There were many reasons for this pessimism, but paramount was the stern belief 
that even reason itself had become implicated in ‘the total integration’, what Horkheimer 
                                                
28 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia, trans. Edmund Jephcott (London: Verso, 1978), 30; Theodor Adorno, 
Problems in Moral Philosophy, ed. Thomas Schröder (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2000), 
158. The facticity of ‘damaged human life’ limits human ability and capacity to discern the good life, to 
figure out how best to act in a social world that is thoroughly permuted by the reifying effects of capitalist 
economy on social and political systems. This is discerned in Adorno’s thesis that “wronged life cannot be 
lived rightly.” This is related to the oft-repeated idea that “there is no good life in false life” or put differ-
ently, “there is no way of living a false life correctly.” In a false world, there is no way of doing (or even 
recognizing or knowing) the morally or politically right thing; it also means that there is no real living in a 
false life. There is just survival and persistence, and this is horrifically inhumane because it does violence 
to the natural freedom and happiness of the human being.  
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called the ‘eclipse of reason’ itself. As Horkheimer and Adorno insist in Dialectic of En-
lightenment, “reason serves as a universal tool for the fabrication of all other tools, rigidly 
purpose-directed and as calamitous as the precisely calculated operations of material pro-
duction, the results of which for human beings escape all calculation.”29 With the spread 
of administrative systems and commodifying processes, the social world has been 
stripped of ends that are intrinsically valuable, in and of themselves worthwhile or benefi-
cial for human freedom and happiness. Everything within the social world (cultural, intel-
lectual, religious) exists for the sake of something else; it is instrumentalized into a ‘use’, 
a ‘point’ - packaged and reified for the sake of controlling nature and self-preservation.30 
Adorno calls this ‘universal fungibility’31 and argues that it extends all the way to reason 
itself. If even reason could become co-opted and so be made uncritical, what hope might 
there be to extend and expand the small glimpses of freedom and happiness seen at the 
extreme edges of the modern social order? 
 This social emphasis on the dialectical self-betrayal of ‘enlightenment’ sharpened 
the edge of critical theory, for its objectives became more negativistic and less overtly 
political. One cannot hope to simply explain ‘what’s going on’ and then proceed from 
there to articulate normative prescriptions of what ought to be, namely because social 
facts themselves are ideologies: products of manipulation, propaganda, and social con-
trol, aimed that producing uniform and reliable political subjects programmed to desire 
                                                
29 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectics of Enlightenment, 23.  
30 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectics of Enlightenment, 9-48. 
31 Adorno, Problems in Moral Philosophy, 228. 
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and value according to the dictates of ‘mass culture.’ The ‘technicalization’ of reason, 
Adorno and Horkheimer maintained, can be shown to be responsible for the emergence 
and success of not only late advanced capitalism, namely its emergent technological 
forms, but also facism and state socialism. Reason can produce irrationality when reduc-
tively practiced, an inverted dynamic that played a major role in maintaining dominative 
and totalitarian patterns of thought and action and so can not be trusted or called upon to 
provide emancipatory agendas. Rationality cannot be trusted to provide the standards 
against which ideology are critiqued, and so on what basis can critique hope to declare 
the best interests of the political subject when even the self-actualization of ‘enlighten-
ment’ in modernity is actually its self-betrayal? 
 This deeply pessimistic appraisal of the prospects of critique in modern society, 
grounded in Horkheimer and Adorno’s thesis about the totalitarian nature of instrumen-
talized reason - led to a negativistic and immanent theory of critique itself. But where is 
critique to be found? Even as the late Adorno - and a lesser extent, the late Horkheimer 
(who became more directly interested in religious themes) - eventually turned to the aes-
thetic imaginary as the incubator of critical remnants of reason, the expectations were 
modest, timid even. Any conception of the good (that the critique might be thought to 
serve) cannot be trusted in the context of a social world that is radically evil, the cause of 
which resides in the form of rationality itself. There can be no right life within it, namely 
because all the available options are caught up within the furtive and nefarious tactics of 
internal and external domination and control. Whether by the good, Adorno means ‘re-
demption’, ‘freedom’ ‘happiness’, or ‘utopia’, it cannot be thought without ‘the concept’, 
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the tool of identity-thinkings that constitution the object in the interests of controlling ex-
ternal nature. When read through Marx’s theory of value, to form a concept of the good is 
to transform its intrinsic ‘use-value’ (what  is good in and of itself, which has no point 
outside itself) into that which is only good for something, which has a point for which it 
labors, namely self preservation.  
  The work of critique in this instance is to expose the inhumanity and irrationality 
of the social relations that produce and sustain these exploitative class interests, to bring 
to light the aggregate negativity - the injustice, the exploitation, the domination, the 
mechanization - of human life. In doing so, critique hopes to indirectly reveal the ‘mirror-
image’ of its opposite.32 This negative rendering of reality is practically significant, 
though not directly actionable, in that by presenting the contradictions and antagonisms at 
work against the vitality of human life, it both expressed the concrete historical state of 
affairs, but also functioned as an immanent force that kept open the possibility of change, 
even if it self-consciously refuses to offer idealist alternatives for what this may look like. 
James Gordon Finlayson is right to argue that what “Adorno calls variously ‘emancipa-
tion’, ‘redemption’, ‘utopia’ and ‘reconciliation’ is a hidden good and so resides in what 
is ineffable, i.e. in whatever cannot be thought by concepts.”33 Critique, in shielding the 
ineffable ‘non-identity’ from the clutches of identity-thinking, aims ultimately at this hid-
                                                
32 Adorno, Minima Moralia, 247.  
33 James Gordon Finlayson, “Adorno on the Ethical and the Ineffable,” European Journal of Philosophy 
10.1 (2002): 11.  
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den, but inaccessible good. As such, the negativity of critique is the means by which phi-
losophy shows how the non-identity of the object is made invisible by the concept in 
identity-thinking. So, instead of bringing non-identity into clear view, critique actively 
preserves its unnamed character, shielding it, in a way, from the violence of thought it-
self.   
 For instance, Patrice Haynes identifies two key ways that Adorno practices nega-
tive critique: ‘constellations’ and ‘naming’, both of which are negative and non-identify-
ing in that they focus on identifying contradictions and fissures between what thought 
claims to do and what it actually has done, affording the critic with an index, a carto-
graphic rendering of “an ontology of the wrong state of things”; it is, as Haynes poign-
antly describes, “a testament to its own ruin and disenchantment by instrumental reason: 
the terrible history sedimented with it…it manifests only darkness, namely, the object as 
a text to its own suffering.”34 Critique, then, presents itself as negative image of the social 
world that is as perpetually self-interrogative as it is self-indicting; that is, it affords an 
incessant and interminable picture what has gone wrong with the world, and in doing so, 
brings to light this negative state of affairs so that it can be be prehended by conscience 
and inquiry. This is what I envision ‘critique’ doing for political theology: allowing it to 
think with alongside itself, against itself for its own sake. This self-altering critique is 
radically self-reflexive, and so immanent. But if theology itself also suffers ‘total integra-
tion’, the reifying effects of instrumental reason that identifies the object with the concept 
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(identity-thinking), how could immanent critique be thought to be helpful and productive, 
much less emancipatory? How can it hope to get outside itself enough to be able to offer 
any substantive alterations without reinscribing the very problems that critique sets itself 
against to begin with? 
 Adorno’s ethical and political vision endures, however, albeit in critical form. By 
this, Adorno follows Horkheimer’s insistence that critical theory be “grounded on the 
mystery of the present”, which stops short of telling what “the right conditions” of social 
justice or economic freedom might look like, but offers us, through determine negation, 
directions as to how to come to terms with the current state of affairs. By critiquing social 
reality on the basis of the evils it produces, the dark effects it has human life, Adorno 
hopes to contribute to a radical transformation that is as discontinuous with the values 
and norms we currently subscribe to as it is with present, historical catastrophe. Modern 
society inscribes political subjects to act in ways that only promise to repeat and deepen 
the grave dangers of human life, and so critique labors to surface these forces and pow-
ers, clarifying what must be avoided and why. This critical, negative orientation is still a 
practical and political one, in that Adorno tells us why one ought not to live in a certain 
way. Speaking in strictly historical terms, Adorno suggests that the negativity of critique 
is necessary if political subjects are to understand how: “to order their thought and ac-
tions such that Auschwitz never reoccur, nothing similar ever happen.”35 The negativity 
of critique develops into an ethical and political perspective that wants to prevent the 
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worst, where the worst is the repetition of Auschwitz.36 The practical criterium for cri-
tique is that it must help guide political acts in such a way that subjects are able to to 
avoid, or minimize, reproducing ‘the wrong.’  
 Of interest to me at this juncture is the complex place that theology, inverted by 
the immanence of critique, plays in Adorno’s negative critique. If critique clears the so-
cial space of ‘the bad’, so the way forward appears only in its absence, the negation of the 
wrong or ‘the false thing’, theology seems related to this self-reflexivity, insofar as “it re-
fuses to align itself with what exists, always seeking transcendence” through rigorous cri-
tique of itself. Of course, the traditional forms of theology - positive, apologetic, dog-
matic, orthodox, doctrinally focused - are not capable of this, any more than any other 
fungible cultural good that more or less ‘embellishes’ and confirms what is of this world, 
even if it, in word, protests and opposes it. But as Brittain says well: “In the similar way 
that Adorno’s injunction against writing becomes an imperative for the importance of 
such poetry, one might add - albeit in a highly qualified sense - his injunction against em-
ploying theological language sublates into a recognition of the need for such language.”37 
 In summary, Horkheimer and Adorno’s work is important of framing the methods 
of the Frankfurt school as a critical project, one designed to identify the distinction be-
tween genuinely transformative praxis (which Adorno strongly believed in) and ‘pseudo-
activity’: the capitulated and resigned sloganeering of policies, procedures, and practice 
                                                
36 Adorno, Minima Moralia, 53-56; Also, see Adorno, Metaphysics: Concepts and Problems, trans. E. 
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(that Adorno argued is often mistaken for really existing praxis).  As such, the stated goal 
of critical theory was thoroughly critical: to identify the social causes of evil, attested to 
in the past and present cries of suffering persons who indict history and society: “dam-
aged human life.” This is reflected in Horkheimer’s early statement of the object of criti-
cal theory in the 1937 essay, which captures the real benefit of critique for political theol-
ogy as whole. Speaking of ‘the critical activity’ that is “an essential aspect of the dialecti-
cal theory of society”, Horkheimer insists that:  
The aim of this activity is not simply to eliminate one or other abuse, for it re-
gards such abuses as necessary connected with the way in which the usual struc-
ture is organized. Although it itself emerges form the social structure, its purpose 
is not either in its conscious intention or in its objective significance. On the con-
trary, it is suspicious of the very categories of better, useful, appropriate, produc-
tive, and valuable as these are understood in the present order and refuses to take 
them as non-scientific presuppositions about which one can do nothing.38 
 
It may appear that their own analysis of the totality of social reality makes it difficult to 
see how such a critical perspective on the whole modern social structure can be gained. 
And yet, this negativity and minimalism (how not to act, what not to do, what should not 
be) must be understood in light of their broader utopian commitment, their hope that the 
present conditions harbor the seeds of a transformed world, and that critique can be lever-
aged as a way to think against the current realities shaping human life.  
 In closing, why turn to early critical theory here? Why be concerned at all with 
Horkheimer’s contrast of critical theory with traditional theory or with Adorno’s negative 
theory of critique or his analysis of actionism and resignation? What does this method of 
immanent critique mean for political theology? Alessandro Ferrara. (among others) has 
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recently argued that immanent critique is unique in its ability to bring its object out be-
yond itself by attending to what lies within, or as Ferrara says, it brings the object “be-
yond its present state or predicate, turning it into something that projects a significance 
that can be appraised by others who were not in the original circle of habits and critique. 
Immanent critique offers its object a chance to become an embodiment of justice, of free-
dom, of human dignity or of some other similar value.”39 It is clear that immanent cri-
tique goes beyond demanding theology to be aware of its own faults, contradiction, and 
inconsistencies. This relegation of critique to judgments of internal coherence make it 
seem rather conventional and obvious, a common tactic of modern reason’s internal con-
tradictions, and as such necessitates the full updating and reception of immanent ideology 
critique into political theology in the form of a critical theology. It is, after all, critical 
theory that foregrounds ideology critique as the central task of philosophy under the par-
ticular conditions of modernity. This objective can only be realized with the advent of 
‘critical thinking’ and its immanent method, since both the thinking individual and her 
society are predisposed to conformism in thought that is regulatively enclosed and so, 
structurally self-affirming. 
Praxis versus Actionism 
 In what follows, I will outline the impact of critique on political theology, so as to 
mark out a distinct critical approach within political theology. I want to argue here that 
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the effect of the turn to ideology critique is the taking up of the critical attitude in politi-
cal theory, or if you will, the development and practice of a critical theology. The original 
use of the term “ideology” to critique various critiques of religion was meant to help clar-
ify the relation that Marx thought was a necessary condition of possibility for revolution-
ary praxis: namely the dissolution of the false dualism between theory and practice, be-
tween understanding and interpretation and change and action. The critique of religion as 
ideology was designed in part to combat this, to bind thought and action together in a ma-
terialist reflection of history and of human activity. 
 The original political goal of ideology critique was to shift how political subjects 
understand their relation to reality, not objectively, but as human activity, subjectively, as 
praxis. Ideology critique then served the major critical thesis of materialism: that reality 
is a subjective product of human labor (praxis) and sensory activity, not of pure thinking. 
The materialist thesis (that material reality, and as such, history is neither fixed or stable, 
but always in becoming) is politicized when it is joined to the principle of practical activ-
ity: that human beings are responsible for our conditions, that we imagine, create, and de-
stroy the conditions of our own unhappiness and domination, and so much act collec-
tively in efforts to shift the coordinates of possibility. Praxis is the means by which the 
political subject actively imagines and  creates the world, not merely through idealist cat-
egories but through actual material activity that transforms the world. 
 But what directs praxis? How do we avoid, given our alienated and reified status 
in advanced modern societies, becoming ‘a plaything of alien forces’ that, in a sick twist 
in the inner logic of capital, are themselves the product of human labor? Not all practical 
  
351 
activity is authentic praxis, for human action is always under threat of being circum-
scribed and unwillfully conscripted by the limits established by the institutions of capital-
ism that come back to structure even our most subversive impulses and desires. The urge 
to transcend this condition, to dismantle the irrationalities and contradictions that make it 
possible, is one of the motivating and defining elements of praxis in the ideology critique 
tradition, but it is important for the argument of this chapter to see that this notion of cri-
tique is both negative and immanent, and that adopting critique in this way has significant 
implications for what it means for political theology to be practical.  
 A critical theology does not compete, replace, or oppose political theology, but 
rather attempts to point out and correct what I will call ‘actionist’ tendencies within it. I 
do not take this to mean that critique forestalls or occludes action or politics, but only that 
introduces a negative perspective on its own ideological self-sufficiency, both its theolog-
ical and it political presumptions. Critique is critical of action in order to create the space 
to think otherwise than in the ideological system that we, as political subjects, are con-
scripted into. Being politically oriented - claims made by theology to be for justice and 
against oppression, for freedom and against oppression, for equality and against heter-
onormativity, racism, and patriarchy, for planetary health and against practices of ecolog-
ical denigration - does not secure for one’s self the vaunted security of an anti-ideological 
position. To raise these questions, a critical theology introduces a an immanent critique of 
“dual negativity” that points to both the negativity of the predominant social order in 
which we live in and the negativity of theology’s own claims of presumptive self-suffi-
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ciency. To be clear: the immanent negativity of the relation of critical theology to politi-
cal theology does not result in a dismissal of action or politics, but only insists that the 
negative critique that political theology directs towards social and political problems also 
be directed towards itself immanently, which will indeed impact how political theology 
comports itself politically and theologically. What good is critique if everything stays the 
same afterwards?  
 In the late 1960’s, Adorno explained his infamous refusal to endorse the student 
protest movements in a defense of critique as that which stands between ‘actionism’ and 
praxis. Historically speaking, Adorno’s critical statements about actionism was occa-
sioned by his disagreement with and refusal to endorse the student and antiwar move-
ments of the late 1960s, which he faulted for displaying what he thought as an unreflec-
tive  “collective compulsion for positivity that allows its immediate translation into prac-
tice”40 despite the fact that so many of them were acting in response to his own work! 
The critique of actionism also occurs along a long-standing fault line between Adorno 
and other early critical theorists, most notably Herbert Marcuse, specially in terms of 
their differing philosophies of history and how those differences play our in their political 
expectations of liberation - and indeed, for revolution.41 I cannot lay out the complex his-
torical and factual details that led up to this dispute or to the way it deeply divided early 
critical theorists in regards to the late 1960’s student and antiwar movement in Germany, 
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which has much to do with the struggles and shifts within the democratic state of Ger-
many after the great war.42  All I intend to do here is lay out Adorno’s critical analysis of 
actionism as example of critical impulse of ‘dual negativity’ that informs critical theol-
ogy, and then to describe the impact that the critique of actionism has on the immanent 
relation of theory and praxis in political theology. 
 . Adorno faulted the protestors, demonstrators, and organizers for taking actions 
for ‘the sake of doing something’, an urgency that has more to do with sublimating their 
frustration and anxiety about the condition of their social world and overcoming their ex-
perience of helplessness, weakness, and alienation in the face of anti-democratic techno-
cratic and economic power taking control of both the university and the state. Too 
quickly, Adorno said, theory was being mobilized for what was thought to be the revolu-
tion, without regard for the constraints of the historical situation or without consideration 
of whether the activities were in fact discontinuous with the present system. This cer-
tainly makes the line between praxis and ‘actionism’: authentic praxis institutes and 
brings into being a material reality discontinuous with the predominant system, some-
thing that Adorno did not see happening as a result of the student movement’s presump-
tions to have inaugurated such a break.  
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 Taking up Adorno’s distinction between mere actionism and revolutionary praxis 
gives us an opportunity to clarify Adorno’s prospects for political action. Adorno’s repu-
tation, outlined most famously by Perry Anderson, is that his the negative charger of his 
theory is resigned to defeat and political isolation and despair. The idea there there is no 
way to live rightly in the conditions of false life leaves no other option than the renuncia-
tion of politics and a retreat into abstraction and pessimism. Adorno’s theory of critique 
then leads to nothing more than complicit dormancy.43 Andrew Feenberg makes a similar 
argument about the role of critique Adorno’s grim views on prospects for social change, 
determined in large part by his negative philosophy of history, leading him to eschew the 
possibility of emancipation, progress, or revolution, the conditions of modernity being as 
reified as they are. Instead, the goal of critique is thoroughly immanent to modernity, and 
so abstains from formulating positive alternative or constructive responses to reification 
of reason and relations in the capitalist social order.44 But neither Adorno nor the early 
critical theorists were quietist, but rather utopian thinkers who are starkly committed to 
remaking the world through materialist practices: that unity of theory and praxis. Admit-
tedly this has as much to do with his philosophy of history, articulated in distinction to 
both Marx and Hegel, as it does with critique, but it is nevertheless important to better 
understand Adorno’s views on how critique restricted the prospects for political action.45 
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 Given Adorno’s views about the total integration of consciousness and rationality 
into the dominative system, it is easy to see why he thought the conditions were not right 
for genuine praxis, which required a dramatic, radical shift in the social order, not just 
changes in the form of government or social values. In this context, authentic political ac-
tion can morph into ‘pseudo-activities’ that actually help and perpetuate the existing sys-
tem that is explicitly being opposed by protest, demonstration, and organization. Action-
ism distracts political subjects with the cathartic effects of struggle, helps feeling as if 
they are doing something important and alleviates their own sense of complicity or pow-
erlessness.  
 To flesh this out a bit more, I turn here to the essays ‘Critique’ and ‘Resignation', 
both of which were radio addresses that take up directly the question of theory’s relation 
to praxis with a situation of actionism. Adorno counters what he saw as “pseudo-activi-
ties” of student protest and demonstrations against the university system in Germany and 
what they saw as the anti-democratic, authoritarian, and technocratic government. Far 
from being the vestiges of revolution or conduits of serious, radical social change neces-
sary for praxis to take hold in social order, Adorno considered actionist protest and re-
sistance to be themselves byproducts of reified consciousness that only sustained and pro-
tected structures of domination rather than introduce the possibility of genuine human re-
lations necessary for collective attachments and political arrangements that give rise to 
freedom, happiness, and well-being. In some ways, this was not surprising to Adorno. 
False life limits and restricts our political options and our struggle for praxis. The lack of 
correct forms of life, of consciousness, circumscribes our political choices, leading to an 
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existential anxiety, an urgency about our present uncertainty, that itself leads to a  privi-
leging of practical life and so to a resentment towards thinking in response to the demand 
for a false clarity. 
 This is expanded by Adorno is his seminal essay, “Critique” where he distances 
critical theory from the jargon of social change or abstract revolutionary rhetoric.46 While 
he falls far short of offering anything like political perspective based on  critique, he does 
offer a minimalistic praxis that is guided by the negative image of the world provided by 
immanent critique. Critique is political in the sense that it directs our us towards from 
particular social forms, only for the sake of their negation: it gives us guidance about how 
not to live, how not to think or act. Despite its negativity, this immanent critique of praxis 
as actionism is indeed social criticism; its method lays out how we can best start to spec-
ify the relations and patterns of oppression in institutions, structures, and policies, by ana-
lyzing the situation and identifying the fundamental antagonisms at its base. This critical 
work far precedes that of practical activity, and is itself a form of praxis. If political theol-
ogy aims to take up and apply to itself the Marxian thesis that the point of philosophy is 
to change the world, not only to interpret it, then it must come to terms with the way that 
critique relates immanently to praxis by trying to make sense of the world. This is the 
task of critique, and it is as far as we can go at this point in history. 
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 This position is further justified in the essay “Resignation”, in which he rebuffs 
detractors who dismiss his critical perspective on the grounds that it is negative, pessimis-
tic, and non-normative. He admits that the refusal to directly link critical theory to a spe-
cific program for political action has often led to him being charged with political passiv-
ity or resignation, as if “by leaving the conditions untouched, he condones them without 
admitting it.”47 Adorno’s concern is that this obsession with activity is actionistic and so 
precludes the full commitment to thought that authentic praxis requires: “the much in-
voked unity of theory and praxis has the tendency of slipping into the predominance of 
praxis.”48 Adorno further defines actionism as “the repressive intolerance to the thought 
that is not immediately accomplished by instructions for action””49 in contrast to praxis to 
which theory is not merely a counterpart that was once helpful, but is now no longer 
needed now that the revolution is in place. 
  For Adorno, the near immediate demand for practical activity was the most apa-
thetic, the most resigned to the current configuration of political possibilities. Actionism, 
despite its rowdy insistence otherwise, ended up merely endorsing “the pseudo-reality 
within which actionism moves.”50 It displayed the inherent belief that the options before 
us are the best or only ones that we could think of and that any suspension of action was 
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not worth it; nothing really could ever change. The immediacy, the urgency, the unmedi-
ated rush to act - the ‘do it yourself’ slogan (‘be the change you want to see in the 
world!’) stifles creativity and spontaneity, and its its disregard for the art of political pa-
tience, becomes moralized, sentimental theater with the positive in a starring role. For 
Adorno, the problem with this is that “the craving for the positive is a screen-image of the 
destructive instinct working under a thin veil. Those talking the most about the positive 
are in agreement with destructive power. The collective compulsion for a positivity that 
allows its immediate translation into practice… fits so smoothly into society’s prevailing 
trend.”51   
 By concluding that “actionism is regressive [because] it refuses to reflect on its 
own impotence”, Adorno notes his concern that political subjects who see themselves as 
radical agitators of the dominating system actually end up living out the pragmatic empir-
icism of the dominant culture; in this way, “actionism fits so smoothly into society's pre-
vailing trend.”52 The corrective antidote for this false and complicit positivity was the 
negativity of immanent critique, not an critical abandonment of praxis. It is the responsi-
bility of critique “not to accept the situation as final.”53 Just because Adorno’s sense was 
that any serious prospects for political action were far off, a sensibility driven by his neg-
ative, immanent concept of critique, did not mean that his critique left his practical phi-
losophy naturally opposed to any concrete, historical struggles.  
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 According to Adorno, ‘actionism’ is ideology because it discourages negative dis-
cussion of positive ideas or beliefs (justice, equality, reconciliation, solidarity), and so 
stymies both thought and praxis with its preference for activities and tactics. It is averse 
to any kind of thinking that may or may not necessarily produce something (which it 
deems to ‘deconstructive’, ‘critical’, ‘negative’, or ‘abstract’), even if its direct practical 
impact may still be far off. Their preference is, as Adorno notes, for thought that conven-
iently produces “ideologies for their own accommodation, like lucidity, objectivity and 
precision.”54 “One clings to action for the sake of action”, quipped Adorno, and this only 
produces a “forced primary of praxis” that devolves into a ‘pseudo-activity’: “action that 
overdoes and aggravates itself for the sake of its own publicity.”55 
 The characteristics of actionism include a temperamental, defensive reflex, a hy-
per-pragmatism that favors gradualist, short-term change, rather that the dramatic sys-
temic shifts favored by Adorno and the early Frankfurters, and hostility towards theory, 
all of which justifies their activism through the moralization of orthopraxy. whereas the 
one who acts is the most virtuous, the one most committed to the cause of justice, solidar-
ity, emancipation and so on.’ It is precisely this kind of self-assurance and unreflexive 
modesty that leads Adorno to resist the idea that immediate activity as a necessary, uni-
versal condition of praxis. Adorno insists that the critical work of understanding and 
changing deep structures usually will not be resolved through reactionary policy changes, 
public demonstrations, or protest movements, whose proclivities for  were most likely to 
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simply reinscribe the same irrational, dominative logics at heart of the dehumanizing and 
authoritarian system they want to resist. 
 Given its immanent and negative character, does critique seal theory (and so, as it 
concerns us here, theology) off from practical, ethical, social transformative praxis? Does 
its negativity, its minimalist strategy of denunciation, preclude the judgement and deci-
sion requisite for ethics and politics? Adorno (and again, to a lesser extent, Horkheimer) 
is often faulted for producing a social theory so critical that it was resigned to the givens 
of modern social formulations, content to offer a negative image of the social world with-
out proffering positive solutions or practical programs. As the charge goes, this intermi-
nable critique of domination, suffering, damage, and injustice does not deliver any real 
transformation of the material conditions that produce them. The immanent context of 
thinking prevents even discursive, practical reason from proffering anything trustworthy 
other than inverted images of reality: ‘that which ought to be but is.’ Critique does not 
proffer alternative visions of the world, ways that lead political subjects out of damaged 
life, towards some ideal future, leaving us with no recourse but to interminably negate the 
actual, or as Horkheimer would later complain, “All we can do is say ‘no’ to every-
thing!”56  
 This does not mean that critique fully dispenses or divests itself from interest in 
the direct activity of praxis. Adorno does not dismiss praxis in favor of critique, but ra-
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ther raises the threshold for praxis beyond that of the student protestors and demonstra-
tors. When Adorno insisted that “critique is essential for all democracy”57, he was point-
ing to how its work is to resist the established positions, existing institutions, predomi-
nant frameworks of thought (unity, identity, harmony, authority), all of which that posits 
itself as self-justified, natural, or university: in a word, it is to counter ideology. This is 
the resistance, not of judgement, but of final decision that keeps open the possibility of 
being wrong, of being misguided, of not quite having it all right. Adorno critiqued the 
1960s student movements for being ‘actionists' because their efforts at protest and re-
sistance lacked this self-reflexivity of critique; they considered themselves inoculated and 
exempt on account of their vocal and active opposition to an exploitative, unjust and in-
human social system, and their commitments to democracy, equality, and liberation, as of 
those concepts and ideals themselves are free from the same dialectical demons that pos-
sess ‘enlightenment.’  
 Adorno further insists that the most serious threat to critique is “the appeal to the 
positive.”58 Adorno bemoans this fact, concerned  about a sublation of critique by praxis 
of ‘positivity’: “One continually finds the word critique, if it is tolerated at all, accompa-
nied by the word constructive. The insinuation is that only someone can practice critique 
who can propose something better than what is being criticized… By making the positive 
a condition for it, critique is tamed from the very beginning and loses its vehemence.”59 
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Adorno goes on to say that “it is by no means always possible to add to critique the im-
mediate practical recommendation of something better, although in many cases critique 
can proceed by way of confronting realities with the norms to which these realities appeal 
following the norms would already by better.”60  
 It is clear that Adorno’s theory of the total integration of the social world with 
radical evil overstated the completeness of damaged life. Ted Smith says it well, speaking 
about the early Frankfurt School: “Their own arguments are the best arguments against 
their understandings of the world, for they both do much more than trace the outlines of 
the fractures of our lives, and they do so in ways that are not only intelligible but even 
beautiful. The fact that they can think such thoughts at all is the best argument against the 
totality of their despair.”61 To be sure, critique is necessary in order to get access to ‘the 
damaged life’ that makes the way towards correct forms of life hard to discern; only after 
disrupting these conditions will we be able to conceive ideas of truth, justice, and the 
good, and so be able to articulate and put into practice what it would look like to live an 
ethically and morally right form of life.  
 How is critique able to disclose the negative image of the existing order as an im-
manent method?  What is revealed in the negative light of critique is not only greed, 
alienation, unchecked selfishness, injustice, and systemic dehumanization for the sake of 
profit and pleasure, but all the resultant pain, fear, suffering, and terror that the ideology 
of mass-produced culture tries to hide and anesthetize, leaving political subjects with just 
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enough amnesia and exhaustion to ensure that they do not pose a serious threat to the nor-
mal flow of things. This is how critical theology may contribute to political theology’s 
privilege of praxis while its negativity always hedges against its actionism. Rather than 
all too quick dismissal of action and politics, critical theology proceeds negativity in rela-
tion to political theology with the conviction that “the false, once determinately known 
and precisely expressed, is already an index of what is right and better.”62 
 Praxis guided by critique is always motivated by what the Frankfurt School, and 
political theology, and eventually feminist and liberationist theologies, called “negative 
contrast experiences.”63 The experience of history as history of suffering, nonsense, and 
misery is not enough to generate the kind of praxis necessary to overcome and counter it. 
Critique insists that any and all outrage at what is and should not be, provided by these 
selfsame negative contrast experiences, is not enough to give us knowledge of what 
should be; it is not enough to convince us all to look beyond what it is and towards some-
thing new. Encountering really existing conditions of poverty, experiencing authentic 
compassion and grief, and coming to terms one’s complicity in the capitalist system of 
success, profit, and consumption that requires poverty is not enough to generate the kind 
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63 The term “negative contrast experiences” often refers to those dehumanizing experiences of injustice, 
suffering, and oppression that result in protest and activate the ethical imperative toward active transfor-
mation of the conditions that made these experiences possible. Take for example, Edward Schillebeeckx, 
who writes, “Ideas and expectations of salvation and human happiness are invariably projected from within 
concrete experience and the pondered fact of calamity, pain, misery and alienation from within negative 
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Christology, trans. Hubert Hoskins (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 19. Negative contrast experiences 
are, in this way, decisively critical in ‘the double movement’ I am suggesting here in that they always prob-
lematize any and all claims to realized praxis, any declaration to have arrived with the concepts of justice, 
solidarity, love and forgiveness, to name a few, already in hand. 
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of praxis that will dismantle its real social causes. And yet, the goal of much of libera-
tionist and political theologies is precisely this: consciousness-raising, often times inter-
preted as co-terminus with ideology critique. 
 The double movement of immanent critique insists that any attempt to indicate 
something determine as a result of critique is problematized by the false character of the 
reality it is opposing. Elizabeth Pritchard explains it this way: “To elevate negativity into 
an existing positive is to pretend that the longed-for reconciliation is an extension of the 
status quo; alternately stated, it is to mistake critical insight for the achievement of lived 
reconciliation.” Critical theology reminds political, in its second, self-reflective direction, 
that being able to see that things should not be as they are does not thereby allow one to 
produce a picture of the way things should be or will be. This would amount to a eleva-
tion of negativity into positivity, and this is precisely that which critical theology finds 
problematic and troublesome. Critical theology is uncertain whether the better future is in 
fact indicated in negative experiences of the world and surfaced by its ideology critique, 
and so taking up political theology as its object, it modifies the posture it takes as it pre-
scribes actions and values, whether on the basis of specific theological commitments, or 
political convictions, even so-called emancipatory ones. In this way, a critical theology is 
tasked with moderating the relation of theory and praxis within political theology. 
 Critical theology’s most urgent or pressuring goal is not to put theology to work, 
but to practice theology with a critical spirit of immanent, negative self-reflexivity, sub-
mitting itself and all the practices, policies, solutions, and proposals it suggests as a result 
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of its own discourse to incessant immanent ideology critique, both towards social condi-
tions and towards its own positivity. It does this not in order to forestall praxis, but tries 
to ensure that political activities, with all their claims to subversive protest, revolutionary 
resistance, and practical change, only play right into the hands of an oppressive and dom-
inative system well skilled at converting opposition into fuel.64 It starts from the concrete, 
historical situation of our lifeworld, and from there analyzes theology’s entanglement 
within this world, especially the ways it cirucmscribes theology, determining the ethical, 
social, and political choices available to it, the ways we think and consider this choices, 
and how we configure our political subjectivity in relation to theological commitment. 
When Raymond Geuss warned that, speaking about Adorno’s view of the total integra-
tion of the world with radical evil, all “demands that philosophy be connected with any 
kind of injunction to perform specific actions are themselves both forms of repression 
and an incitement to evil”65, he is referring to what I think should be political theology’s 
critical relation to praxis.  
 The value of Adorno’s critique of actionism is that it articulates the difference be-
tween a critical position and an actionist position on the relation of theory to praxis. The 
kind of theology sought for by a critical theology is not theory void of action, divorced 
from any sort of transformative or ethical consideration, but rather the kind of thought 
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that, again to quote Adorno, “remains loyal to itself by negating itself from these mo-
ments. That is the critical form of thought. Critical thought alone, not thought’s compla-
cent agreement with itself, may help bring about change.”66  A critical theology, in rela-
tion to political theology, attempts to mark the trap laid by the politics of urgency and im-
mediacy that does not take seriously the constraints of its own thought, that gets too 
caught up in the frenzy of activity that it fails to account for its immanent contradictions 
and antagonisms, its ideological presumptions that hide under its claims to being trans-
formative, subversive, and the like. A critical theology based upon a critique of actionism 
is not a critique of the practical solutions provided by political theology tout court, nor is 
it an unequivocally strict restriction of how practical critical theology can be. The pur-
pose for doing political theology through the prism of critique is to self-consciously prac-
tice an immanent critique of dual negativity both of its own false clarity and sham re-
sistance, for fear of actually playing into the hands of a dominative system that has 
proved itself to be adept at inoculating subversion and opposition, and of the social 
world.  
 My point is not that there should be less activism, less practical action, less con-
crete struggle taken up by political theology. Nor am I suggesting that theology ought to 
abandon the hard political work of struggling for and with those who suffer and die at the 
hands of social injustice, economic inequality, authoritarian power, and the contradictions 
of capital. The practical, transformative force of political theology is nothing without vis-
ible, disruptive, interruptive displays of protest, resistance, and indeed, praxis; political 
                                                
66 Adorno, “Opinion Delusion Society,” in Critical Models, 122.  
  
367 
theology would cease to be either theological or political in this case, for it is clear to me, 
at least from the Christian perspective, any theology that does not account for the de-
mands placed upon it by God’s own prescribed solidarity with the unheard and unre-
deemed memories of the suffering and the dead is not indeed a theo-logos, but has be-
come something else entirely. In closing, why turn to early critical theory here? Why be 
concerned at all with Horkheimer’s contrast of critical theory with traditional theory or 
with Adorno’s negative theory of critique or his analysis of actionism and resignation? 
What does this method of immanent critique mean for political theology? Alessandro 
Ferrara. (among others) has recently argued that immanent critique is unique in its ability 
to bring its object out beyond itself by attending to what lies within, or as Ferrara says, it 
brings the object “beyond its present state or predicate, turning it into something that pro-
jects a significance that can be appraised by others who were not in the original circle of 
habits and critique. Immanent critique offers its object a chance to become an embodi-
ment of justice, of freedom, of human dignity or of some other similar value.”67 It is clear 
that immanent critique goes beyond demanding theology to be aware of its own faults, 
contradiction, and inconsistencies. This relegation of critique to judgments of internal co-
herence make it seem rather conventional and obvious, a common tactic of modern rea-
son’s internal contradictions, and as such necessitates the full updating and reception of 
ideology critique. It is, after all, critical theory that foregrounds ideology critique as the 
central task of philosophy under the particular conditions of modernity. This objective 
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(New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 134.  
  
368 
can only be realized with the advent of ‘critical thinking’ and its immanent method, since 
both the thinking individual and her society are predisposed to conformism in thought 
that is regulatively enclosed and so, structurally self-affirming. 
Political Theology? 
 What I hope to avoid here is merely suggesting that what theology stands to learn 
from ideology critique is that it needs to be more critically self-aware, conscientious, of 
its own errors, mistakes, and short-sightedness. Nor do I want to integrate ideology cri-
tique into theology for the purpose of better positioning theology (and/or religious 
thought) as “a conceptual resource for theoretical innovation.” This amounts to an instru-
mentalization of theology for the purpose of politics, whether they be critical, as in 
Žižek’s case, or radical, as in Eagleton’s. I find these approaches to be insufficient re-
sponses to ideology critique within critical theory because neither of them take on ‘cri-
tique’ as their primary modality, but maintain an allegiance to a higher goal: the creative 
appropriation and use of religious and theological ideas in the practical tropes of judge-
ment, decision, and action. Instead of rushing to put religious and theological notions, 
themes, and ideas to new uses, critique sobers the immanent relation between theology 
and politics, but not because all use of theology for political reason is ideological. Indeed 
this must happen, and yet what is needed is a dual negative perspective that applies cri-
tique to both the political and to the theological.  
 The main point of theorizing political theology as critique is not to develop a 
methodology from which to derive what our social and/or political order ought to be like, 
but rather to establish that there is always a potential for improvement immanent to, and 
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contained within, our thoughts and practices. But the need for critique is not just a politi-
cal demand made against theology so as to clear away the ever-present ‘ideological taint’, 
but is instead what Adorno called ‘an immanent method’ that theology itself must learn to 
practice, not something that is practiced against theology by philosophy, sociology, or 
science. Critical theology is justified theologically - even though it is carried out for ethi-
cal grounds or political reasons. For political theology, critique is the political means to 
its properly theological end. 
 What concerns me, however, about political theology is not so much that we lack 
a comprehensive, rigorous definition for it (a troublesome situation that admittedly allows 
for it to be used indiscriminately, leaving it wide open to confusion and abuse). Too of-
ten, the idea that “as there is no theology without political implications, there is no politi-
cal theory without theological presuppositions” leads to a dangerous presumption that the 
proper task of theology is to lead the world out of its damaged state, that theology paves 
the way to the good through liberation and freedom. As a result, political theology all too 
often sublimates political philosophy into itself on account of the immense practical force 
it enjoys when it puts its theological ideas into political practice. By stylizing itself as 
praxis, political theology awards itself all too quickly with a self-satisfaction about practi-
cal importance, relevance, and usefulness. This practical emphasis on the part of some 
political theologies is often used to seal itself off against critique on the basis that it is the 
position most committed to the social causes of justice, reconciliation, human rights, or 
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liberation; the fact that action is being taken inoculates it from critique, and so it consid-
ers itself immunizes from an immanent critique of its own presumptive self-sufficiency 
that betrays its interruptive and emancipatory reason.  
 In the absence of this dual perspective, political theology responds to the negativ-
ity of a present social conditions and so sublimates the critical, self-reflexive, and nega-
tive demands of praxis into ‘activities’, meaning that political theology is meaningful, 
useful, and worthwhile only insofar as it has a point. And so, what critical theology chal-
lenges in political theology is not the practical impulse that drives the concern for social 
change via transformative praxis, but the way that this impulse enforces a decidedly anti-
critical spirit that seemingly inoculates political theology’s stated commitment to oppos-
ing oppressive, dominating, and authoritarian orders from any need for self-reflexive ex-
amination, allowing itself to be applied straightaway.  
 The need for critical theology comes from a lack of confidence that Christian the-
ology is quite as reliable or trustworthy as political theology seems to think it is - or that 
our theologies are so unqualifiedly good for the world. These misgivings are supplied by 
the negativity of immanent critique and should be folded into its own theological and po-
litical commitments. Critical theology helps political theology avoid becoming merely a 
practiced rehearsal of well-worn scripts, a pattern, perhaps unconsciously, that is always 
protected so as to avoid any kind of rupture and negativity. 
 Constructively, what critique offers to political theology is a shift in perspective 
in terms of how it envisions how and why it is political; that is, that critical theory takes 
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political theology as its own object, as an immanent critique. In doing so, political theol-
ogy becomes a critical discourse about how to undertake concrete practices in the context 
of a broken, damaged, social world in which political activity and practical programs can 
often be inverted by dominative and alienating forces within the social order; when this 
happens, truly political concerns, understood simply as the struggle to ascertain how best 
to arrange ourselves in collective associations for human well-being and freedom, be-
comes sublated into ‘policy’ or the activities of ‘policing’, reduced to the struggle to pos-
sess and distribute power. Jacques Ranciere articulates upon the difference this way: 
What is proper to politics is thus lost at the outset if politics is thought of as a 
specific way of living. Politics is specifically opposed to the police. The police is 
a 'partition of the sensible' [le partage du sensible] whose principle is the absence 
of a void and of a supplement. The police is not a social function but a symbolic 
constitution of the social. The essence of the police is neither repression nor even 
control over the living. Its essence is a certain manner of partitioning the sensi-
ble. We will call 'partition of the sensible' a general law that defines the forms of 
part-taking by first defining the modes of perception in which they are inscribed. 
The partition of the sensible is the cutting-up of the world and of ‘world…68 
 
 The essence of politics, then, is radically disturbing in its insistence to bring to the 
field of constitution that which the field itself has little room for. It introduces into this 
‘partition' precisely what it was designed to keep out: “a part of the no-part.” In a milieu 
saturated by sloganeering and calls to action, all of which appear to make very little im-
pact on the normal flow of things, the work of critique is to interrupt this, to call forth the 
possibility of the otherwise. It is to remind us that things should not be as they are, but 
stops short of prescribing how things ought to be. It does this because of its eminently 
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political interests and commitments, not because of an abandonment of social transfor-
mation, political activity, or concrete concerns. Any allergy critique may have to judge-
ment and activity is a question of division of labor, rather than a principled objection. 
Again, Ranciere echoes how it is that politics attempts to overcome the partitioning of 
policy and the police from politics: 
Political litigiousness/struggle is that which brings politics into being by separat-
ing it from the police that is, in turn, always attempting its disappearance either by 
crudely denying it, or by subsuming that logic to its own. Politics is first and fore-
most an intervention upon the visible and the sayable.69 
 
My interest in a critical theology stems from a desire to clarify exactly how and why the 
theory of the political modifies the theological; it does this by seeing a homology be-
tween the “intervention upon the visible and the sayable” and the negativity of the imma-
nently critical position in relation to the normativity of praxis. A critical theology expli-
cates how it is that political theology itself leads directly neither to a specific ethics nor to 
a politics, but is at its immanent best when it is ‘en-framed’, limited, by its own critical-
ity; that is, when it disavows the dual temptations of technical (whereby it attempts to 
find the best means to a given end) and/or practical reason (which determines whether a 
prospective course of action is worth pursuing) even if the telos itself is desirable (non-
statist, anti-racist, feminist, anti-capitalist, and so on).  
 Political theology, then, is not against praxis, but rather approaches it critically, 
that is, negatively with a minimalist attitude towards ethical and political action; in this 
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way, it sides with praxis against what Adorno called ‘pseudo-activities’, which, when ap-
plied to political theology, can be discerned in the frequent appeals to ethical and political 
categories of justice, liberation, reconciliation, resistance, consensus and so on, appeals 
that show themselves to be as innocuous to the established order as they are common-
place in the culture of the literature of political theology. The appeals themselves are not 
problematic; it is that these appeals and the commitments they necessitate are not held 
critically; that is, they act as exemptions for further critical consideration. In this way, cri-
tique reshapes the immanent relation within political theology of theory to praxis through 
a dual movement of negativity, directed at once at both 
a thorough critique of social conditions (ad extra) immanent critique of theological con-
cepts (intra).  
 This double movement is something more in line with Metz and Althaus-Reid 
than with Tillich, Niebuhr, liberation theology, or even the biblical theology of idolatry, 
namely because both Metz and Althaus-Reid clearly saw the need to establish theology in 
a critical position both towards social conditions (e.g., heteronormativity, sexual vio-
lence) and in relation to theological concepts (e.g., theologies that authorize and justify 
patriarchal ecclesial forces, privatization of theology, the bourgeois religious subject). 
And yet even if this critical perspective do not reflexively turn, in an immanent way, to 
itself, either to the new political theology or the indecent theologies they developed, re-
spectively.  
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 This dual negativity critical theology further specifies what it means for theology 
to be both critical and political; that is, committed to supporting and fostering transforma-
tive praxis, while also fostering an immanent critique of dual negativity,  both of the pre-
sent social order and its own self-sufficiency. In this way, critical theology is, as Mendi-
eta suggests, “a cipher of negativity”: a deliberate attempt to think theologically with the-
ology and also against it, to rescue praxis from theology for the sake of each other. The 
goal of critical theology, in relation to political theology, to is produce theologies that act 
as critical, negative elements with which to criticize a broken world replete with damage 
life, and its own ideological presumptions to be on emancipatory praxis. 
 In this way, the longing inherent to critical theology is a yearning for the just soci-
ety that is the condition of possibility for truth and reason. Critical theology is at the ser-
vice of political theology as its immanent critique of ideology, and such converts itself 
into a source of social and political critique that self-reflexively considers itself to both a 
source of alienation and negation in the world, but also potentially of freedom, redemp-
tion and happiness that may, from within itself, instigate new forms of political possibili-
ties. This dual perspective wants to make explicit the ways that theology and the political 
are not at odds, and cannot become what they both need to be (according to the norms of 
justice, equality, recognition, freedom and the like), and so explicitly takes up lines of ar-
gument that position theology critically in relation to itself and its social world. 
 That critical theology may only take an inverse or negative form is something we 
learn from Adorno. By this, Adorno meant a theology that begins from, and does not ex-
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ceed beyond, the absence of God. “Negative theology” is not apophatic strategy of theo-
logical naming, but rather is a philosophy of history, one that understands progress, ful-
fillment and expectation not as triumphant, but rather as that ridden with calamity, and so 
flashes back analeptically to the beginning,so as to bring the misery and the suffering of 
the world into view. This negativity of critical theology, however, does not forestall re-
demption or hope but rather conditions the context in which Christianity, its theologies, 
and its communities turn still to the impossibility of love, forgiveness, reparations, 
memory, and perhaps, even utopia, but now sobered by the selfsame gesture of its imma-
nent critique that uncovers its delusions, blind spots, and perhaps its errors. 
 In this way, the longing inherent to critical theology is a yearning for the just soci-
ety that is the condition of possibility for truth and reason. Critical theology is at the ser-
vice of political theology as its immanent critique of ideology, and such converts itself 
into a source of social and political critique that self-reflexively considers itself to both a 
source of alienation and negation in the world, but also potentially of freedom, redemp-
tion and happiness that may, from within itself, instigate new forms of political possibili-
ties. This dual perspective wants to make explicit the ways that theology and the political 
are not at odds, and cannot become what they both need to be (according to the norms of 
justice, equality, recognition, freedom and the like), and so explicitly takes up lines of ar-
gument that position theology critically in relation to itself and its social world. 
Critical Theology? 
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 I cannot be exhaustive or comprehensive in what follows, but I do hope to provide 
some clarifying examples of the use of critique in theology that understands itself in dif-
fering ways as political theology. I do this in order to clarify where I think these perspec-
tives fall short and how their shortcomings may be ameliorated by a return of sorts to the 
conception of critique articulated by the early critical theory of the Frankfurt School. It is 
fairly common in late modern discussions of theological method for theologians to pro-
pose multiple tasks for theology, criticism primary among them. Since the rise of modern 
theology, criticism is seen as the negative or deconstructive element of a broader, more 
comprehensive picture of theological labor, something that theologians do on the way to 
something else, something more desirable. Criticism was often the posture that theology 
is to take to its own history, its tradition, its own religious practices, institutions or be-
liefs; many theological reasons are given for this reflexivity, namely that insofar as the 
most direct theological question is that of God, it is clear that divine love and grace points 
us back to the human condition, calling us to consider human purposes and needs para-
mount to the vocation of theology as it performs specific functions in the course of hu-
man life. In this material, criticism was often paired with other more affirmative tasks, 
such as constructive, contextualizing, or application. This task is often directed to the var-
ious forms of human experience, whether it be individual, social, political, scientific, aes-
thetic, linguistic, or moral, whereby theologians are to connect the traditions’s under-
standing of God to the various segments or aspects of contemporary human life. This se-
cures for theology a claim to relevance, to public significance, to being meaningful be-
yond the specific confines of its particular community.  
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 This general pattern varies significantly from tradition to tradition not only be-
tween Protestant and Catholic traditions but within them. Liberal, narrative, public, radi-
cal, and practical theological approaches (along with some variants of Catholic modern-
ists) will all stray at some point from this general structure, but it stands as a working ru-
bric for how criticism has been woven into theological method but its critical impact was 
not sustained but was taken over by instrumentalizing impulses to put theology to work. 
My sense that critique, which is always self-reflexively interrogative, does in fact place 
some significant limits on how and why theology can be used for praxis. Whether cri-
tique has ever been allowed to have this effect on theology, especially theologies that un-
derstand themselves to be directly political in nature, remains to be seen. To get a sense 
of major trends, we will quickly look at a few examples as starting points for how cri-
tique ought to function in political theology moving forward.  
 We saw in the preceding chapters that the turn to theology for ideology critique 
was politically motivated, in that they saw in Christianity a critical wedge to hold against 
the powers of liberal democracy and the contradictions of capital. The politicalization of 
theology for ideology critique, evinced in the work of Terry Eagleton and Slavoj Žižek, 
seemed to counter or reverse a long-held suspicion associated with the Marxist tradition 
that theology, although it arose from the material struggles of human beings, precluded 
transformative praxis because of its ideological status; that is, its social impact universal-
ized and naturalized explanations of the world and of history and so shielded political 
subjects from the reality of their oppression, making it harder for the processes of prole-
  
378 
tarianization to take effect. I have noted throughout the dissertation that one way to un-
derstand and identify ideology is to explore its social impact, the way it interfaces with 
the collective lives of political subjects. Both Eagleton and Žižek mostly considered the-
ology to be ‘false’ but happily employed it for political purposes so as to counter the ide-
ologies of liberalism, capital, postmodernity, and so on. In the end, they instrumentalized 
theology for their own purposes, turning Christianity into mere political site. It was the 
politics of theology that attracted them; they found theology in this way to be useful, even 
if in the end of the day, none of it was true. Žižek’s Christianity is a self-consciously 
atheistic one, after all.  
 By and large, political theology has celebrated this turn to theology for ideology 
critique, for it too considers itself an emancipatory resource for ethics and politics. It 
looks to its traditions and sources and finds there enormous material upon which to think 
about debt, labor, poverty, human dignity, divine solidarity with the poor, law, sacrifice, 
theologies of suffering, challenges to authoritarianism, imperialism and nationalism, em-
bodiment, critiques of violence, alternative theories of power and sovereignty, as well as 
social issues such as racism and gender justice. As the recent interest in theological gene-
alogies has shown, much of that has always trickled down into the most basic of demo-
cratic principles and liberal values: human rights, consensus, toleration, the sacred/secu-
lar distinction, and representational governance. In contrast to this, how does critical the-
ology flesh out what theology should actually be about and how it should understand and 
theorize its immanent relation to praxis?  
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 ‘Critical theology’ is not a theological appropriation of critical theory that at-
tempts to integrate or correlate its methods or analysis in order to ‘modernize’, update, or 
otherwise correct problems within theology on ethical or political grounds.70 Marsha 
Hewitt attempts this by correlating critical theory’s utopian ideals for human emancipa-
tion from dehumanizing and reifying structures of domination with feminist critiques of 
patriarchy and gender injustice, as they appear in both the contemporary social world and 
religious traditions. Her overall argument is that critical theory and feminist criticism 
work in tandem in relation to society and religion to offer a holistic critique that also sus-
tains utopic expectations for transformative praxis.71 Hewitt suggests this is prefigured in 
how Horkheimer and Adorno (to a letter extent, admittedly) preserve a “kind of non-the-
istic religious longing” through a sustained negative confrontation with the world as it is, 
without prescribing how the world ought to be, or how best to live as individuals in the 
world.72 And yet, elsewhere Hewitt is dismissive  of political theology (as well as libera-
tion and public theology), and argues against the application of critical theory to political 
theology, deeming them incompatible. She accuses political theologians of being “unable 
to sustain or develop their critical impact”, evinced in their near universal commitment to 
“the universal validity of Christian values and truth claims in their efforts to privilege 
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Christian sensibility and political values in public, political life.”73 This makes them una-
ble to interface with complex modern societies in global, pluralistic, and multicultural 
contexts. Though I share Hewitt’s concern that political theology can, at times, be too un-
critical and unreflective about the applications of its theological values to public life, it is 
not at all obvious that political theology cannot account for and respond to an ambiguous 
and pluralist global context, or that all political theologies make these claims about the 
universality of Christian truth claims.  In fact, part of the benefit of political theology’s 
diffusive character is its ability to engage various contexts and social worlds in meaning-
ful and impactful ways; its undecidability leaves it flexible, malleable, and open to an in-
creasingly pluralistic and global social order.  
 Hewitt also sets aside attempts to use notions of critique in critical theory rethink 
the meaning and use of religion by critically relating to theological claims and religious 
ideas to sociology.74 This general aim governs the “critical theory of religion” perspective 
that seeks to integrate critical studies of religion (as sociological phenomena) into theo-
logical perspectives stylized as “critical social theology.” In the work of Charles Davis, 
this amounts to more of an un-dialectical ‘theologization’ of society than a critique of the 
social impact of theology, in my judgement. Integrating critical theory into theology 
means studying the function of religion in society. The result is a ‘social’ theology that, 
as a distinct form of social theory, takes its starting point from social and political life. In 
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this view, critical theology is an effort to defend the present social function of religion, 
and so dubiously develops Habermas’ notion of communicative rationality as the ground 
and means of religious hope, rather than turning to Adorno and Horkheimer’s negative 
critique.75  
 Likewise, Gregory Baum uses ‘critical theology’ “to designate a theology that 
uses critical social theory to uncover the emancipatory meaning of the Christian gospel”, 
and so is generally indistinguishable (by his own admission) to liberation theology in 
Latin America or the new political theology in Germany.76 The fundamental goal of criti-
cal theology to defend the preferential option for the poor as a distinctly Catholic posi-
tion, represented in and defended by Vatican documents and other ecclesiastic teachings; 
it has a certain affinity for the critical ideas of early Frankfurt School, mostly notably in 
its purported primacy of action and its commitment to the negation of structures that pro-
duce victims of history, which Baum interprets as a biblically grounded option for the 
perspective of the victims. But it is also has shortcomings which theology can ameliorate. 
It is elitist, lacks “a rich, value tradition” capable of forming social bonds, and failed to 
take the retrieval of ethics seriously enough; in this way, critical theory is “unable to give 
a reason for the hope that dwells within it” and so is forever hampered by its “secular hu-
manistic beliefs.” What “critical theology" marks, then, in relation to critical theory is the 
biblical, theological, and ecclesial supplement needed to realize critical theory’s desire to 
                                                
75 Charles Davis, Religion and the Making of Society: Essays in Social Theology (New York, NY: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1993), 188-205.  
76 Gregory Baum, Essays in Critical Theology (Kansas City, MO: Sheed & Ward, 1994), 5, 8ff.  
  
382 
free humanity from ideologies’ even critical theory itself lacks the self-reflexivity it 
sought to generate in other forms of thought and practice.77 In my view, this is a rather 
triumphalist account of what critical theology is able to offer critical theory, and I think 
overlooks the complexity which which the early critical theology engaged religion and 
theology. It also rather unaware of how incompatible its embrace and endorsement of the 
authority of the official church teachings is with critical theory’s ideology critique. The 
demands of critique are is not limited to the idea that Christianity must admit that it too is 
subject to ideology and that there is not innocence to its theological or political positions; 
appealing to this admission as evidence of its critical posture of theology underestimates 
how thoroughly dismantling and interruptive the demands of ideology critique are.  
 Related to this is the work of Michael Ott, Rudolf Siebert, and Warren Goldstein, 
whose ‘Critical Theory of Society and Religion’ school contends that the Frankfurt 
School’s critical social theory and religious thought are each other’s missing pieces.78 By 
critically correlating religion to social theory, the specific role of religion in the struggle 
of human emancipation is brought into clear relief in ways that were not clear to the orig-
inal theorists, who were convinced of the total integration and reification of the world as 
an effect of instrumantalized reason. While the future of religion is indeed as a critical 
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theory of society, the future of critical theory is not ‘religious’ as much as it is a critical 
theory of religious insight. This final position seems justified on the basis of how early 
theorists of the Frankfurt School itself engaged religious and theological themes.79 
 Gordon Kaufman argues in his God, Mystery, and Diversity for a qualitative dis-
tinction between “authoritarian Christian theologies” and what he calls, “critical theol-
ogy”, the latter of which is tasked with “the cultivation and development of the critical 
potential of theological symbols and modes of reflection” so as to secure theology’s cred-
ibility as a contributing voice to major intellectual issues of modernity.80 For Kaufman 
the distinction between authoritarian theologies “that refuse to take a critical stance to-
wards their own religious beliefs - holding them, on dogmatic grounds, to be beyond 
questioning- can play only a very limited role” in the life of modern society and critical 
theology “that opens itself willingly to severe criticism from outside perspectives (as well 
as from within).”81 The criterion for narrowing the field of what theologies ought to have 
a role to play in adjudicating serious intellectual, moral, cultural and political questions of 
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modern life and which ones should not is whether or not they possess a ‘critical con-
sciousness’, presumably which means they are willing to find fault with themselves and 
accept the fault-findings of others. 
 What authorizes the publicness of critical theology is “the most radical sort of 
questioning of its own commitments”, allowing it to be “a contribution to a conversation 
in which similar radical exploration and question of other living orientations of life…was 
also being carried one.”82 It does not practice “the most penetrating scrutiny” for its own 
sake, but rather “could in turn lead to the development of proposals for significant recon-
struction of some (or all) of [its] perspectives.”83 Critical theology, then requires the com-
mitment of faith, but this is not understood in an exclusive way, but in light of studies of 
faith as a broad, universal human quality. As such, Kaufmann insists that critical theology 
“is to be seen, rather, as a pluralist discipline that attempts to investigate and understand, 
and to find ways of assessing and reconstructing, the actual orientational commitments to 
which women and men today give themselves.”84 (211) What drives this critical activity 
is praxis: it places an unbearable pressure of responsibility upon theology to exceed itself 
and its orientations for the sake of broader values. Critical theology then is always plural-
ist, dialogical, and polysemic in terms of its own self-articulation - and this instability and 
openness ensures its ongoing critical character. However, for Kaufmann, it is critique that 
authorizes theology to submit its practices, concerns, and interests for consideration in 
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political life, whereas for me, the effect of critique on theology may well the converse. In 
my view, critical theology may in fact chose, because of its self-reflexive positions, to re-
strict itself from asserting its voice into political debate, whether at the official level of 
legislative bodies/decision-making or that of practical reasoning of subjects in the public 
sphere.  
 In contrast, Edmund Arens finds the shared concerns between critical theory and 
political theology to be indexed in relation to their respective situation between moder-
nity and postmodernity.85 Both the Frankfurt School and the early political theologians of 
the post-war period in Germany, (but, as Arens, notes also in the U.S.) articulated their 
shared critical concerns with to modern dynamics, but neither of them proposed postmod-
ern answers. It is critique namely that critical theory and political theology share, not only 
in terms of the objects of their critique (idealism, positivism, and capitalism), but the seri-
ous praxis concerns that center and ground their theoretical and theological work, 
whether it be theologia crucis, divine solidarity with the suffering and the dead, and an-
amnestic reasoning, or the irrationality of reason, reification of social relations into cul-
ture, and utopian flashes of aesthetic experience.86 
 That this critique is immanent is often unrecognized, nor are its implications often 
fully explored. The early critical theory (Horkheimer and Adorno) saw little chance, 
given the destructive potential of modern irrationality, for modern societies to rescue 
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themselves from their own domination, and yet also resisted ways of thinking that were 
too optimistic. Nevertheless, the “standpoint of redemption” gave philosophy a base from 
which to imagine and so create the world otherwise. This standpoint can only be a nega-
tive image of the present, giving praxis the historically concrete point from which to 
work; this point is picked up and developed at great length in J.B. Metz’s notion of anam-
nestic reasoning.87 Here, remembering the stories and cries of the suffering and dead re-
mind us all that the victims of history still demand to be vindicated, which can only hap-
pen if the universal values of justice, solidarity, and the recognition of the voice of the 
other are realized first within Christianity, its theology, and the lives of its communities; 
only then the apocalyptic-prophetic potential of its eschatological vision of hope can be 
realized within modernity. Arens proposes that what political theology learns the most 
from the emphasis on immanent critique by the early Frankfurt School is the fact that we 
cannot simple escape the pitfalls and abuses of modernity instead of taking up ‘post-‘ 
forms of thinking, which only work to suture its fundamental contradictions and antago-
nisms. What it means for political theology to convert itself to a critical theology in 
Arens’ view is to take up a fully dialectical posture in relation to dehumanizing structures 
of power, authority, and domination, many of which are immanent to itself, instead of 
trying to transgress them by appealing to a new era, postmodern, post-secular, or other-
wise.88  
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 Eduardo Mendieta writes: “at the heart of the Frankfurt School critical theory we 
find not just an incidental or ancillary attention to religion, but a central, deliberate, and 
explicit confrontation with both religion and theology.”89 The objective of the Frankfurt 
School concerning religion was not the same as the Enlightenment which oversaw the 
victory of reason over theology by gerrymandering religion into subjectivity, effectively 
privatizing it as one consoling and therapeutic option among many. The Frankfurt School 
by and large saw that the way to secure religion, to protect it against itself, is by means of 
the relentless critique of religion, or what Mendieta calls “a non-secular critique of reli-
gion for the sake of religion.”90 It is a critique that uses reason against religion, not as to 
reject religion, for reason can no more do this than it can reject itself, but for the sake of 
reason itself. This critique is animated by the urge to rescue religion for the sake of rea-
son, for “theology is reason in search of itself by way of the demystification of social re-
ality.” Religion then is a source of social critique that is freed to confront its own sources 
with the same critical drive that that seeks “to rescue what makes the religious not just a 
source of alienation and negation of the world, but also of remembrance, hope, redemp-
tive, and utopia.”91 The way to the truth of religion is not through theology, but through 
critique. This generates a theology that is always a negative theology; it starts not only 
with the absence of God, a God that is not just hidden, but a God that is still on its way 
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and so is yet to be. A critical theology then is “a cipher of dual negativity”: the negativity 
of the present horror (society) and the negativity of its own ideological self-sufficiency, 
its presumptions to be able to name God, much less, justice, freedom or happiness.92 
 There has been much discussion in recent years about Adorno, Horkheimer, and 
the role of religion or theology in their critical social theory overall, with a specific inter-
est in how theology figures into their ethical and political perspectives. New attention has 
been paid to the unique way that Adorno especially blends and integrates theology (or in 
the very least religious allusions and theological terms) into his concept of critique. What 
I venture to say here is that we can discern in Adorno’s “use of theology” (not in what 
Adorno thought of theology itself) as a model for a critical task that attends to the serious 
human needs that make it necessary through negativity. For Adorno, theology articulates, 
or perhaps more passively illustrates, the political point of critique’s negative vector: its 
task is to struggle to achieve and to articulate an utopic position, supplied by the ‘stand-
point of redemption’ that remains beyond reach.93 
 But lest Adorno’s critical negativity be mistaken as an instance of ‘negative theol-
ogy’94, it is important to point out that Adorno was wary of this way of thinking as yet 
another undialectical, affirmative tactic of identity-thinking that snuck in positive 
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knowledge of God through the backdoor under guise of negation, losing all its validity. 
He contrasted this approach with his own “‘inverse’ theology.” The metaphorical use of 
‘inversion’, or ‘reversal’ is meant to illustrate the negative image of reality supplied by 
the double movement of immanent critique. This stands in sharp contrast to the positivity 
and affirmative tendencies inherent even within so-called “negative theologies”, theolo-
gies that try to gain affirmative, determinate knowledge of God through negation and so 
bring God back in under the auspices of negativity and denial, as the positing of a third, 
positive term in the Denysian negation of negation: “being, non-being, supra-being.” To 
counter this, Adorno proposes that critique insists that while ‘perspectives must be fash-
ioned that displace and estrange the world’, the ‘messianic light’ in which the world will 
‘one day’ appear will not come from an outside stance, “a standpoint removed (…) from 
the (…) sphere of existence.”95 A negativity of ‘inverse theology’ emphasizes the failure 
of social reality to live up to the utopian expectations. It looks ‘beyond the immediate’ at 
what-is-hoped-for: ‘the messianic standpoint of redemption.’ When it is inverse, dialecti-
cal, and negative, theology can be one such perspective.96 
 This helps explain the ‘critical’ promise of theology: namely, as negative critique 
of oppression and injustice in present social existence that also resists the practicalities of 
a ‘historical project’ or the immediacy of actionable solutions, is large part due to its 
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utopic thinking. Critical thought resists system-building whose desire for totality and 
completeness gives way to the conformism, exclusivity, and coherence of identity-think-
ing, all of which end up masking the antagonism that give rise to our present wretched 
conditions of social life. Adorno sees in ‘inverse’ theology an illustration of the critical 
approach to politics, in that it is a form of thought or rationality that sustains the negativ-
ity and immanence of critique: “certainly a ratio that does not wantonly absolute itself as 
a rigid means of domination requires self-reflection, some of which is expressed in the 
need for religion today.”97 Theology, in this way, is related to the immanent critique of 
reason itself that keep its attention on the particulars of damaged human life, and away 
from systems of thought and activity, easily reducible (in today’s culture) to the consola-
tions of sentimentality.98 It supplies us with a sense that unjust social life should and can 
be otherwise without telling us exactly what this otherwise ought to look like. It does this 
by supplying an utopic vision that is both immanent and negative (and so critical), but 
only as a result of its own ‘inversion.' 
 Adorno was ruthlessly critical of the positive claims made by Jewish and Chris-
tian religious traditions. Nevertheless, theology plays a surprising role in his articulation 
of Marxist philosophy, both in terms of the ‘dialectic of enlightenment’ within modernity 
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and the negative dialectics at work within his critical response to it.99 While Adorno re-
jects theological appeals to traditional notions of God, he nevertheless utilizes religion as 
an element of his overall critique of our rationalized and technicalized world - and indeed 
sees it as a part of the critical labor of the negative. There is something critical within the 
theological, insofar as theology negatively invokes the divine transcendence of God as 
the absolutely other, it installs a non-dialectical positivity that keeps social antimonies 
from being exposed to thought. This non-dialectical positivity is responsible for repro-
ducing the totalizing logic of integration and identity, which naturalizes and universalizes 
the socio-historical processes that condition the relations between persons and between 
persons and objects, and so to the extent to which theology can counter this as an imma-
nent force within religion, it can be thought of as critical by revealing the subjugated of 
thought and practice. By bringing the suppressed and occluded to the surface of what is, 
one is able to negatively introduce the possibility of the world existing otherwise. 
 If the political task of critical theory is to keep rationality from closing in on itself, 
remaining open to “suffering [as the] objectivity that weighs upon the subject”, then 
Adorno assigns this task to the impulse of ‘dual negativity’ in theology, the inverse form 
of which turns to both a critique of social conditions and to its own theological concepts. 
‘Negative’ theology, in this way, reveals important insights on existing social conditions 
by probing the wounds of human suffering, in order to reach beyond the ideology that the 
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actuality is the real and instead articulates a utopic, but negative, hope for an alternative 
possibility.100 The utopic, for Adorno, is the conviction that the world can be otherwise 
than its currently wretched, damaged, corrupt state. Sustained attention to the fallenness 
of the world is what is needed, however, not aspirational longings for an eschatological 
futurity; this is the negativity of utopia, and of ‘inverted’ theology. The truth of this world 
is elusive, and so Adorno calls for thought to ‘ruthless criticize itself’ in order to better 
understand its fallen state. 
 This critical perspective nevertheless requires “the perspective of the redeemed”, 
which is utopic (and so critical) in that it is not actualized, nor even possible, but always 
already negative. Theology can become critical only through its own negation, metaphor-
ically described by Adorno through the proscription, or ban, on divine images: 
The materialist longing to conceive the thing wants the opposite: the complete ob-
ject is to be thought only in the absence of images. Such an absence converges 
with the theological ban on graven images. Materialism secularises it, by not per-
mitting utopia to be pictured positively; that is the content of its negativity.101 
 
Adorno’s use of theological concepts illustrates the reversal and negation necessary to 
maintain the paradox: theology is inverted when it is developed from the “perspective of 
the redeemed”, but also when it attends to unrealized possibilities while also eschewing 
the seductions of immediacy and utility. This critical inversion extends beyond the idea 
of God as theology’s proper object, but also shapes theology’s immanent relation to 
praxis. Theological concepts from Judaism (and to a much lesser extent, Christianity), 
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such as redemption, the messianic, and the Bilderverbot102, confront and question society, 
keeping open the potential for new insights into the current social order by resisting to ac-
quiesce to the ideology of ‘what is current and possible’: the idolatry of naming the state, 
the market, or ‘culture industry’ as total, absolute, or transcendent; in a word, divine.103 
Adorno and Horkheimer write in the Dialectic of Enlightenment about the importance of 
Jewish theologies of idolatry for understanding what theology should not be, relating it 
directly to ideology critique as a critique of positivity, actuality, and identity-thinking. 
For this, Adorno says, critique learns from “the absence of images” proscribed by the im-
age ban, or the the Bilderverbot, which may be adapted into a potential inverse theology 
of  ideology critique: 
The Jewish religion brooks no words which might bring solace to the despair of 
all mortality. It places all hope in the prohibition against invoking falsity as God, 
the finite as the infinite, the lie as the truth. The pledge of salvation lies in the re-
jection of any faith which claims to depict it, knowledge in the denunciation of il-
lusion.104 
 
 Theology’s “ban of images” aids critical theory as a dialectical form of negative 
thinking. Theology is ideology critique in Adorno’s critical theory of society, but only in 
its inverse form as an ‘empty- shell’ that resists ‘identity-thinking’ and the easy positivity 
of political immediacy, both of which seek immediate practical solutions to political 
problems. Critical theory turns to a negative concept of truth in order to hold open the 
possibility of something between immediacy and pessimism. Take for example, Max 
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Horkheimer, who finds in the theology of Jewish and Christian religions both a negative 
concept of truth that keeps the world open for criticism and the moral longing for the 
“wholly Other.” These are both vital for protecting theory from idealism, absolutism, and 
positivism: simply put, ideology. In his essay “Thoughts on Religion”, Horkheimer con-
tends there are aspects of theology, despite its metaphysical beliefs, that are invaluable 
for critical theory:  
[Humanity] loses religion as it moves through history, but the loss leaves its mark 
behind. Part of the drives and desires which religious belief preserved and kept 
alive are detached from the inhibiting religious form and become productive 
forces in social practice...the concept of infinity is preserved in an awareness of 
the finality of human life and of the inalterable aloneness of [human beings], and 
it keeps society from indulging in a thoughtless optimism, an inflation of its own 
knowledge into a new religion.105 
 
The kind of negativity in theological thought resembles the struggles and goals of Marx-
ist social theory, and so Horkheimer observes in theology “the image of a perfect jus-
tice”: a resilient (though not always consistent) moral vision for society and a commit-
ment “to sustain, not to let reality stifle, the impulse for change.”106 Theology incubates 
‘the longing for the Wholly Other’, meaning that “theology means here the awareness 
that the world is appearance, that it is not the absolute truth, the last [word].” The ‘wholly 
other’ for Horkheimer is the “most perfect justice”, which always already lies beyond the 
actual in the potential which cannot be transcribed, blueprinted, and enacted.107 The 
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Christian theological idea of God as infinite alterity is paired with the Jewish critique of 
idolatry, which prohibits the figurative naming or portrayal of the divine; as such the lim-
its to political knowledge and action are the same in reference to theological knowledge 
and action. One cannot know and speak authoritatively what justice is, only what injus-
tice is. Idolatry, the theological critique of graven images, serves as a negative concept 
that prevents reason from foreclosing itself into ideology, thereby preserving the critical 
element of theory. This safeguards the substantive form of rationality sought by a nega-
tive dialectics and keeps it from becoming co-opted or compromised into an affirmation 
of existing society and what is actual, rather what it ought to be, its possibility.  
 One place where the discussion about critique and praxis interfaces directly with 
theological questions is utopia. Utopia is an important and challenging question for theol-
ogy, namely because of the role that eschatological expectations has played in the con-
cepts of the kingdom of God and the redemption of human beings from wretchedness, 
both their own and that of the world. What ought Christians to expect, given their theo-
logical predilection for futurity over the present stage of history and society? Take for ex-
ample, a discussion between Adorno and Ernst Bloch where Adorno argues, along with 
Bloch, that the critical position is utopic while also remaining negative and immanent, 
and that it receives this character from theology.108 Departing from deprecated and 
shrinking misconception of utopia as “illusionary dreams”, “wishes for a better life” that 
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would apparently link utopia more to ideology than to its critique, Adorno argues that 
“one can actually talk about utopia in a negative way.”109 “Utopia refers to what is miss-
ing”, Adorno says, and so “what is essential about the concept of utopia is that it does not 
consist of a certain, single selected category that changes itself, and from which every-
thing constitutes itself.”110 He further links utopic thinking to critique by insisting that 
“utopia is essentially in the determined negation, in the determined negation of what 
which merely is and by concretizing itself as something false, it always points at the same 
time to what should be”111; in this way, “the essential function of utopia is a critique of 
what is present”112, aligning utopic politics with the ‘false thing’ that is both the ‘sign of 
itself’ and “the correct”: index sui et veri113:  
Utopia is the false thing…that means that the true thing determines itself via the 
false thing, via that which makes itself falsely known. And insofar as we are not 
allowed to cast the picture of utopia, insofar as we do not know what the correct 
thing would be, we know exactly to be sure what the false thing is. That is actu-
ally the only form in which utopia is given to us at all.114 
 
This critical negativity of utopia stands in sharp contrast to the ‘the wishful striving for 
some impossible state of perfection and idealism’, a caricature supplied by those parties 
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who have a very clear interest in making sure that the seemingly impossible remains so. 
Adorno elaborates why it is that utopic thinking has deprecated into ideology: 
what people have lost subjectively in regard to consciousness is very simply the 
capability to imagine the totality as something that could be very different. That 
people are sworn to the world as it is and have this blocked consciousness vis a 
vis possibility, all this has a very deep cause, a cause that I would think is very 
much connected exactly to the proximity of utopia…My thesis about this would 
be that all humans deep down, whether they admit this or not, know that it would 
be possible or it could be different.115 
 
In this way, we can see how the messianic light (illustrated by inverse theology) is both 
critical and negative, while also remaining thoroughly politically oriented. The ‘messi-
anic light’ shines through the “cracks and deformations of the modern age” in order to 
rouse considerations of world being imagined and so made to be otherwise.116 The messi-
anic light is a negative light that does not supply redemption, freedom, happiness, or the 
good, but rather “wrenches” reality apart” to reveal its depravity and its perversion. The 
“refuse” of the world, what Eagleton calls the biblical anawim, is brought to our attention 
by critique, and so it becomes ‘a reverse light’, what Adorno and Horkheimer called in 
the Dialectic of Enlightenment, ‘the light of inversion.’117  
 The negative images supplied by ‘the messianic light’, when dialectically ren-
dered, turn theological thought against itself: “Dialectics discloses (…) every image as 
script. It teaches us to read from its features the admission of falseness which cancels its 
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power and hands it over to truth.”118 For Adorno, this particular kind of reversal seems to 
be “the position of ‘theology”. at least as it concerns how Adorno understands his rap-
prochement with Benjamin): “[their] agreement in philosophical fundamentals…could 
indeed be called ‘inverse’ theology.”119 An ‘inverse theology’, then, illustrates how cri-
tique works; it entails and enacts a particular kind of reversal that is emblematic or repre-
sentative of the ‘critical position’ or gesture, in that an inverse theology is an immanent 
gesture that negates itself, supplying a view of itself that does not include redemption or 
reconciliation, but rather the gnarled and monstrous effects of its wretchedness. The light 
of inverted theology is a critical, and so, negative light, but is oriented toward praxis nev-
ertheless.  As Mendieta suggests, “in an age in which religion itself is continuously se-
questered into the service of totalitarian ends, only that religion which is useless is true, 
and if it is useful it is not true.”120 
 This exploration of critique in relation to political theology has returned us the 
original questions of the dissertation: namely what is theology to do with ideology cri-
tique. Instead of sublimating or absorbing ideology critique in to itself (as Eagleton and 
Žižek call for) or turning to its own tradition of idolatry critique (as we saw happen re-
peatedly in chapter 4). By coaxing political theology towards critique, I have tried to 
show how important critique is as the key to emancipatory praxis, not in the sense that 
critique provides practical solutions to be acted upon, but how essential critique is for 
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how political theology understands its immanent relation to praxis. The purpose here is to 
help theology see and acknowledge that it may not possess the resources required to ful-
fill its own internally binding demands of praxis, and as such needs further theory, and so 
critique, ideology critique especially.  
 Although this critique may call the practicality of theology into question, at least 
provisionally, this is nevertheless thoroughly praxis in that critical theology is always 
motivated by the unbearable and incessant demands made upon it by the memory of the 
suffering and the dead: demands to heed their cries, to alleviate their injustice, to vindi-
cate them by furthering happiness and freedom amidst the challenges of damaged life. 
Careful attention to where theology has failed, a task of critical theology certainly, both 
discloses what leads to shortcomings, and also highlights resources immanent to theology 
that can offer more critical clarity, all the while potentially chastening current proposals 
for action. As it was with Adorno, this kind of critique cannot mean, however, leaving 
behind one’s theological traditions any more than it can mean an abandonment of praxis. 
This kind of non-dialectical critical posture is as cheap and easy as it is socially and polit-
ically harmful. Rather, the more difficult critical posture to maintain (and to describe) is 
self-reflexive; theology must be critiqued from within and as such, the results and the ef-
fects will always be equivocal, uncertain, and non-scripted. This is close to what Adorno 
means when he insists that “one must have the tradition in oneself, to hate it properly.”121 
Critique inhabits this sense of hating one’s tradition properly as the very thing that gives 
it any life at all; only in showing to itself that it presently incapable of achieving its own 
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potential, its own promise, its own aspiration, that it is but ‘a shell’122, can theology point 
beyond itself to anything just, free, or utopic; that is, can it become praxis.  
 By adopting an immanent and critical perspective, critical theology does not di-
rect political theology to recommend solutions to social or political crises. The critical ex-
pression of theology, albeit in inverse and negative form, express its own relation to truth 
and as such, is part of praxis’ struggle to end of human misery. It does not seek a theolog-
ical justification for political projects, nor a theological justification for political endeav-
ors. The emancipatory moment in critical theology, its anticipatory utopian character, re-
veals only a negative appraisal of its immanent relation to praxis, seeking to do justice to 
the idea of God, the eschatological status of human person, the church’s relation to the 
state, graced nature of divine love, and so on, from the starting point of negativity, that 
starts from the grotesque facticity of our broken and depraved conditions.  
Conclusion 
 The objective of this dissertation was to study ideology critique from the lens of 
political theology, with the final goal of reinterpreting it via an immanent “dual negativ-
ity” that directed it both towards a critique of social conditions and an immanent critique 
of theological concepts and their immanent relation to action and politics. For this, we 
needed the Marx’s critique of religion as ideology at the outset, so as to position this 
study within that tradition. I continued by exploring the turn to theology in philosophy, 
done under the heading of ideology critique by both Terry Eagleton and Slavoj Žižek, all 
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in service to a radical and critical politics, respectively. What I have done here is to take 
up theology and ideology critique as spelled out by significant representative voices in 
the discussion in order to gain clarity about how might ideology critique be integrated 
into political-theological work more thoroughly - and indeed, more critically. Philosophy 
paves the way for ideology critique, but how to do it within theology can only be dis-
cerned and articulated immanently. Both Eagleton and Žižek mostly considered theology 
to be ‘false’ but happily employed it for political purposes so as to counter the contempo-
rary political ideologies and to defend their respective political responses, anti-capitalist 
critique of social order, in the case of Eagleton, and an aggressively “unplugged” politics, 
in the work of Žižek. However, it was the politics of theology that attracted them; they 
found theology in this way to be useful, even if in the end of the day, none of it was true. 
By 'instrumentalizing' theology for their own purposes, they made theology merely a po-
litical site, self-consciously emptying theology of its proper concepts and ideas.  
 From these previous chapters, we learned that the positive relation of theology to 
ideology critique (‘theology as ideology critique’) is often motivated by the interest to put 
theology to work for a specific program of politics, and as such, often slides into ideol-
ogy, a propensity that Žižek is admittedly more prone to than Eagleton. This instrumen-
talization of theology leads to serious questions as to whether or not theology does the 
same thing to itself and so is equally as ideological. Part of what motivates the turn to a 
critique of critique here, as applied to the immanent relation of theory to praxis in politi-
cal theology, is an attempt to avoid this particular problem. A critical theology reconfig-
ures political theology so that it is not a practical theology but is still distinctly political, 
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meaning that it works to create space to dismantle and transform an economic and politi-
cal order structurally governed by injustice. It however insists that to do this requires a 
return to thinking, indeed a recovery of deep theory, which may for a time, mean a ‘sus-
pension of the ethical’ for the sake of political possibility. If the point of political theol-
ogy is to change the world through action, the point of critical political theology is to 
change the world by first critiquing itself (as it interfaces with its social conditions.  
 And yet, of course the turn to critique here does not abandon, or leave behind, the 
theory of ideology anymore than it eschews consideration of emancipatory political ob-
jectives as part of what theology tries to achieve: justice, human freedom, happiness, well 
being, and so on. What it means to employ ideology critique as a theological concept can-
not be clarified by studying ideology alone, but calls for focused consideration of the crit-
ical position itself, especially with respect to what impact it has on the practices of politi-
cal theology itself. I suggest here that the tendency to relegate critique as something aux-
iliary or a counterpart to praxis, as having to do with the luxury and privilege of theory, 
and so which poses a threat to practical, actionable responses to the serious, concrete de-
mands of the present speaks to the need for the dual negativity of immanent critique.  
 This negativity has a double movement. First, immanent critique concerns the re-
lationship between theology and present social conditions, a dynamic with which political 
theology, as well as its liberationist, feminist, and queer counterparts, is quite familiar. It 
presents this relationship in a negative fashion that is distinct from, but not opposed to, 
other ways of configuring this relationship in modern theology, whether it be correlative, 
dialectical, or constructive. Its primary concern is to bring to the surface the negativity of 
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the present horror in an ongoing critique of social conditions. Second, it directs the nega-
tivity of immanent critique towards own ideological self-sufficiency with regard to praxis 
and political action. This concerns both its theological and political presumptions towards 
justice, solidarity, freedom, antiracism, and the like, and as such, will have a critical im-
pact on the ease with which political theology is accustomed to prescribing action, turn-
ing theology back to itself in an effort to return to theory, not as divorced from praxis (as 
if true theory can ever be!), but a return to thinking. The dual negativity at work within 
critical theology offers a way to uncover, according to its immanent norms and values, 
the specific limitations and relative pitfalls of the assumed unity and univocity between 
Christianity and liberation, freedom, happiness as well as specific social identity and 
emancipatory movements like anti-racism, gender justice, and economic struggle of the 
working class against wage labor, crushing debt, and other processes of subjection like 
desire, consumption, and the privatization of common, public resources.123  
 I argue then that ideology critique places a certain limiting or restricting demand 
on political activity; it places it under the double movement of negativity within imma-
nent critique that brings together the critique of social conditions and immanent critique 
of theological concepts under the rubric of political theology. In this way, critical theol-
ogy remains political in that it considers the condition of possibility for intelligibility, 
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recognition, and visibility in the present ordering of the world: the object-field of contes-
tation in which subjectivity, agency, and action are made possible. Judith Butler, when 
discussing Foucault’s view of critique, suggests that 
not only is it necessary to isolate and identify the peculiar nexus of power and 
knowledge that gives rise to the field of intelligible things, but also to track the 
way in which that field meets its breaking point, the moments of its discontinui-
ties, the sites where it fails to constitute the intelligibility for which it stands. 
What this means is that one looks both for the conditions by which the object field 
is constituted, but also for the limits of those conditions, the moments where they 
point up their contingency and their transformability.124 
 
Critique is a political practice in the sense that it aims to “offer a new practice of values” 
that are possible precisely because such judgments are actively suspended for the sake of 
something more politically fundamental, but difficult to always discern, to see, in the 
context of already existing coordinates that condition and circumscribe human action. 
Butler further argues that Adorno does something parallel: as a form of identity-thinking, 
judgement precludes and overdetermines the critical gesture of exposure, effective sepa-
rating critique from praxis in the name of ‘revolutionary activity.’ To counter this, cri-
tique seeks “to apprehend the ways in which categories are themselves instituted, how the 
field of knowledge is ordered, and how what it suppresses returns, as it were, as its own 
constitutive occlusion.”125 In this way, critique is not judgement, but an inquiry into the 
conditions that make judgement possible. Critique is prior to judgement, but also places a 
difficult burden on judgement and action. Politics, however, require not only judgement, 
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but also decisions about what kind of arrangements and attachments we want to pursue, 
what values we will struggle for, and what norms we will use and how we will use them. 
Critique is not opposed to all this nor is not an operation separate from political action, 
but an immanent, self-reflexive force within politics, interminably bringing itself into the 
field of contestation. 
 I hope this adequately explains why I do not think that critique separates theory 
from praxis, furcating it from its transformative, practical, or ethical role, even while it 
raises certain difficult questions as whether our ideals, our commitments really are what 
they claim to be. It may appear to be an abstract claim, but it is true to the instability and 
undecided equivocation of praxis. Even though critical theory wishes to resist certain 
claims made by political theology that justifies itself by linking itself to certain moral and 
political claims, i.e., advocating for justice, participating in solidarity, struggling for the 
good, opting for the marginal, and so on, the task of critique in relation to political theol-
ogy is to point out “its breaking point, the moments of its discontinuities, the sites where 
it fails to constitute the intelligibility for which it stands.” As it turns out, the unbearable 
demands of praxis are the site of theology’s breaking point, the moment of its failure. The 
immanent ideology critique in critical theology helps to correct this over-determination of 
theology by activity and aids political theology by establishing for itself a critical position 
that opens its own political commitment and theological concepts up to a reconfiguration 
and assessment that is directed towards its socio-historical context and governed by its 
own political impulse. In this way, critical theology concerns the immanent relation of 
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theory and praxis within political theology, and in a gesture of dual negativity, takes up 
immanent critique, applied both to the political and to theology. 
 It is here that political theology is able to become ideologico-critical; that is, ac-
tively engaged in serious questions and concrete analyzes concerning human well-being, 
freedom, and happiness while also restricting itself from privileging action, spelling out 
the theological grounds for the perfect social state, or recommending itself as the basis 
for social renewal and political hope, all in light of its immanent theological and political 
demands. Rather, seeing rupture as the dominant force of the theological, in reference to 
both social conditions and its own concepts, the critical force is a practice of resistance, at 
times even against actionism, but always for and on behalf of praxis. It always keeps the 
Marxian accusation front and center: theology will always risk ideology, no matter how 
attached or grounded it is to justice, freedom, solidarity and the like.  
 The concept of critique in ‘critical theology’ is not merely the inherent element of 
self-interrogation that ideally catalyzes action and transformative change, nor is it the 
correlative dynamic within theology per se that makes all theology political. In the view 
of critique, political theology in this context means neither the contestation of sover-
eignty, theological genealogy of political ideas, justification of power, nor is it a postsec-
ular attempt to supersede the modern secular-religious divide or acts of political self-defi-
nition (whether it be in the case of the various religious motivations of nationalism or of 
the religious dimensions of the ‘secular’). It is rather concerned with explicating the vari-
ous forces and factors (many of them as philosophical and political as they are religious 
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and theology) involved in the turn of religion to politics and the use of theological rea-
soning and values in the course of collective political life and the everyday struggles of 
public affairs, including its various practices, systems, and institutions.  
 A critical theology, as an immanent force within political theology, does not ap-
peal directly to emancipation, progress, or revolution, but instead makes political theol-
ogy (which does take up positions along these lines) its central object, submitting its ethi-
cal, moral, and political claims to immanent critique. In this way, Christianity is shown to 
be an agent in promoting social and individual liberation and how faith and politics posi-
tively relate in contemporary society, but also needs the negative self-reflexivity neces-
sary to regulate the equivocation of theory and praxis, effectively exempting itself on the 
account of its stated emancipatory and progressive ethical and political agendas.  
 In this way, a critical theology is neither disinterested in practical activities nor is 
it opposed to praxis, understood as transformative action in history by the material prac-
tices of political subjects, but rather considers the relation of theology and action with the 
negativity of its double movement. This negative critical position is immanent to theol-
ogy, not operating as a distinct discipline or method in relation to political, systematic, or 
practical theologies that acts upon them, but rather is an impulse within and inherent to 
theology whose negativity sheds light not what should be, but rather what should not be. 
While this does chasten or restrict theology in relation to the actionable solutions it offers 
as consequences of its various theological positions, it does not oppose practical solutions 
or social and political action; it is, instead, minimalistic in that it provides the practical 
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reasoning for the negation of the bad, rather than for ideals, standard, actionable solutions 
towards the good. 
 To say more would require sketching out the more positive agenda of a critical 
theology. What comes next for a critical theology that has determined, as a political the-
ology, that the task of theology nows shifts away from spelling out the distinctions of na-
ture/grace in ‘la nouvelle theologie,’ the state of gender in Barth’s doctrine of creation, or 
responding to debates about ecological health by reciting the Thomistic virtues (as basic 
examples)?  It abdicates the work of charting out the parameters of perfect social order, 
and for a moment perhaps, suspends efforts to prescribe sets of actions based on theologi-
cal concepts. Indeed, further work is required to spell out the exact consequences of a 
critical theology on political theology, especially its use of major concepts like justice, 
reconciliation, compassion, and solidarity. It would require spelling out each of these 
concepts, making use of the double movement of critical theology, and clarifying what 
difference this makes for the overall agenda of political theology in relation to our social 
world. This work lies ahead.  
 I do believe, however, that in taking up political theology as its object, critical 
theology modifies the posture it takes as it prescribes actions and values, whether on the 
basis of specific theological commitments, or political convictions, even so-called eman-
cipatory ones. A critical theology helps moderate the relation of theory and praxis within 
political theology, making it clear to theology that it may know less about justice, solidar-
ity, reconciliation, and human happiness than it appears to, or believe it does. This high-
lights again what is most important about the dual negativity of immanent critique, that it 
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is the means of coming to terms with contradictions/deficiencies within the object of cri-
tique, from the perspective of object itself; that is, its standard of immanent critique be-
longs to and exists in the object of its critique. For critical theology, it is the relentless de-
mand of praxis that becomes the basis for the theological critique of the use of justice, 
freedom, liberation, solidarity, and the like as the basis for political theology. 
 This is what it means for the critical position of political theology, as Judith But-
ler, says “to look both for the conditions by which the object field is constituted, but also 
for the limits of those conditions, the moments where they point out their contingency 
and their transformability.”126 As it turns out, praxis emerges at ‘the limits of the condi-
tions’ in which theology is constituted; it is a moment by which theology’s ‘contingency 
and transformability’ is made visible and for this, theology needs critique as much as it is 
need praxis; or closer to the point, it needs to be critique in order to become praxis.
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CONCLUSION 
 This dissertation began with a question: what does ideology critique have to do 
with political theology? Since ideology critique originates from within modern philoso-
phy, it is sensible, although not natural, to begin there; but more specifically, we begin 
with the turn to theology in philosophy. This is itself an odd starting point, given the 
complex way that philosophy has, from its side, positioned itself in relation to theology, 
at least in modernity. A distinctive feature of modern philosophy’s indebtedness to the 
Enlightenment tradition is its critique of religion. Karl Marx, one of the modern “masters 
of suspicion,” encapsulates what has become the classic critique of religion as ideology, 
and in turn, has fueled the secular critique of religion that it has become politically prob-
lematic and intellectually outdated. And so, when we encounter the turn to religion and to 
theology that occurs within the postmodern intellectual shift in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, we find that it is motivated in large part by a desire to undo the modern foreclo-
sure of religion and its emancipatory potential, not only for thought but also for action: 
that is, for both theory and praxis. In this way, theology has become interesting once 
again for theorists and philosophers on the ‘left’; what is all the more surprising, after ex-
amining it more closely, is that this interest in theology is shown to be concurrent with a 
return to ideology critique, both of which are motivated by political concerns. And so this 
creates an opportunity for both philosophy and theology to reconsider their mutual rela-
tionship to ideology critique, and as such, their relationship to each other.  
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This reconsideration has raised many questions, not only for political theology but 
also for ideology critique. Can theology be ideology critique, especially considering the 
long established tradition of the Marxist critique of religion as ideology? How is one able 
to satisfactorily respond to Marx’s critique of religion as ideology in such a way as to po-
sition political theology, not only as learning from or being subject to ideology critique, 
but also interpreted as ideology critique? Certainly, this must come from within theol-
ogy’s own traditions and sources, otherwise political theology would simply become sub-
limated into ideology critique, and so lose intelligibility as a separate and distinct disci-
pline. At the outset, it would seem as if the most likely candidate for this would be the an-
alogue between ideology critique and biblical critique of idolatry, which is itself a cri-
tique of appearance and representation that directly concerns the material difference be-
tween that which appears to be and that which is. 
 After setting the stage in the first chapter which reviewed the relationship between 
theology and ideology critique in Marx’s critique of religion, the first part of the disserta-
tion proceeded to take up these questions in chapters on British Marxist literary critic 
Terry Eagleton, and Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek, both of whom are devoted to 
philosophies of ideology critique that turn to theology and interpret it as critique. In 
Chapter 1, I argued that both the Marxian critique of religion and the critique of ideology 
centered not so much on the material or substantive theological content of religion as ide-
ology, but was far more concerned with the social impact of theology and its function in 
and on the material reality of social conditions that shape the consciousness of political 
subjects. Marx’s interest was not to abolish religion because it was ideological; rather he 
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sought to abolish the conditions under which religion emerged a necessity for human be-
ings whose experience of alienation and exploitation cut them off from their own practi-
cal activities. For instance, Marx’s critique of the fetish in religion serves as an analogy 
for his critique of commodifies in the capitalist political economy; his intention is to use 
religious metaphors and theological allusions to illustrate the social impact and function 
of ideologies in society, not to identify religion as ideology tout court or calls for the end 
of religion tout court as a necessary byproduct of and condition for revolutionary praxis.  
 Terry Eagleton also takes up a functionalist account of Christianity as ideology 
critique, pointing to the way that traditional theological concepts such as sin, creation, 
love, Christology, even the idea of God, preserves a way of thinking against the capitalist 
grain, and so resists both the instrumentalization of thought and the commodification of 
critique. Its normative commitments to justice, equality, and radical acts of other-regard 
can also be counted on to generate an actionable alternative to the social injustice pro-
duced by neoliberal and postmodernist approaches to theory; its preference for the ana-
wim, its practice of love, and its materialist consideration of human well-being (feeding 
the hungry, caring for the sick, meeting the needs of the poor, valorizing self-sacrifice, 
associating with scapegoats) all afford us an incessant ideology critique of a left-liberal 
politics that shows little interest in any of these normative criteria, all of which are seen 
by Eagleton as essential to any anti-capitalist alternative to the social order worthy of the 
Marxist name. The critical answer, then, is not to marginalize theology, but rather to put 
it to use as a Marxist ideology critique of social conditions, which is only but a single part 
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of a larger, pragmatic, diverse, and pluralist strategy to contend with secularization, post-
modernism, and an anemic left. 
 Radical politics is ‘a politics of the possible’ for Eagleton, and so the eschatologi-
cal futurity of the Christian socio-political vision of the Jesuanic tradition energizes the 
struggle of theology as ideology critique towards a better future. Slavoj Žižek, however, 
is unsure whether such a future is possible or even desirable. Recalling the Marxist tradi-
tion that calls for, and seeks to bring into existence, the condition of possibility for the 
revolutionary subject, Žižek turns to Lacanian psychoanalysis in order to contend with 
the eclipse of ideology critique by politics in late modern philosophy. He blames the end 
of thinking in politics on the ‘vuglarized’ Marxist preference for action that has produced 
the hyper-pressurized kind of acts that effectively substantialize the void of the originary 
trauma of becoming a subject. In this way, action becomes the symbolic force that covers 
up the unbearable demands of the Real, and for Žižek, the task of critique in this context 
is to tear open the ideological sutures and to expose once again the dark negativity that 
lies beneath and behind all of our cherished political values and struggles, even democ-
racy, freedom, love, equality, and justice. Christianity, it turns out, is particularly helpful 
for this kind of work; its brash admission to God’s impotence and indeed God’s eventual 
death in Jesus’ crucification, effectively renounces the sacred and unplugs itself from the 
social order, and so can become a model for the kind of ideology critique captured in the 
psychoanalytic slogan, “the big Other does not exist.” 
 In this way, theology is Eventful in its ruptural and inaugurative force. Its apoca-
lyptic rupture, modeled on the divine death by the cross, is the condition of possibility for 
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the authentic political Act that stands outside the coordinates of action laid out by ideol-
ogy. This takes theological form in the divine resurrection of ‘the Spirit,’ the ‘unplugged’ 
community of believers who are not liberated to act, but freed from action, at least action 
as we currently understand it; that is, they are freed to be passively resistant to the dic-
tates of the social order, opting out of, rather than struggling against, the order. In all this, 
Žižek shows us not only how ideologies are subject-forming realities (this argument was 
made quite persuasively by Louis Althusser) or how theology is both complicit in and 
also resistant to this malformation, but he goes further in taking yet another approach, al-
beit a more troublesome and complicated one, that sees Christianity not as ideology, but 
interprets it as ideology critique. Žižek explicates a materialist understanding of Christi-
anity’s social impact as a radical political alternative, not only to ideological practices 
that masquerade as justice or freedom or multiculturalism, but to political theologies that 
consider themselves to be resistant or subversive. The “death of God” theology that Žižek 
adopts has a distinctive dual negativity attached to it: it is not only a critique of social 
conditions, but also a critique of its own theological concepts: the truth of God must be a 
negative concept, an inversion of false claims that keeps us from spelling out what ‘God’ 
may mean positively, much less politically. This was an important building block for the 
dissertation as it turns to theology and ideology critique in search of what can only be 
gestured towards here in the final part: critical theology.  
 As Christian theology has sought to respond to the modern critiques of religion, it 
has attempted to heed Marx’s accusations, not always by integrating them into its rules, 
language, and discourse, but by turning instead to the critique of idolatry as analogous to 
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Marx’s ideology critique of the fetish. The biblical critique of idolatry, however, presents 
a problem because, after consideration of major trajectories in the biblical scholarship 
and the archaeological record, we find that it functions as a theological support for iden-
tity politics in the context of religious and political struggle in the ancient near east. Idol-
atry critique itself is not an analogy to ideology critique, but is caught within the ambit of 
ideology itself. Furthermore, even when theologians take up the concept of idolatry cri-
tique as ideology critique, this gets lost, in large part due to the emerging and ongoing na-
ture of the biblical scholarship that inform my reading of the biblical theology.  
 Take, for instance, the Protestants Paul Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr, both of 
whom are eager to rescue theology from the Marxist critique, not by dismissing the cri-
tique, but by active responding to it by adjusting and repositioning theology so as to free 
itself from the critique; this positions theology within social conditions (Tillich’s ‘theol-
ogy of culture’) or ad extra in such a way that they are strategically positioned to be an-
tagonistic, as is the case with Niebuhr’s Christian realism. In contrast, the Catholics Jo-
hann Baptist Metz and Marcella Althaus-Reid align themselves respectively with the dia-
lectical lineage of prophetic dissent also present in the Hebrew bible; this argues that for 
theology to be itself, namely for it to speak of God, it must be interruptive, both towards 
itself (privatization of theology, the bourgeois subject, heteronormativity), and towards 
social conditions (indifference towards suffering, historical amnesia, systemic injustice); 
it maintains the dual movement of negativity that uniquely belongs to immanent ideology 
critique but is lacking in idolatry critique, both in its original form in the biblical theology 
and its use by political theologians. Even Metz and Althaus-Reid utilize and call upon 
  
416 
theology of the biblical critique of idolatry, but so do without addressing or critiquing the 
politics behind it.  
 What we have learned from this analysis is that ‘a critique of critique’ is needed 
within political theology, one that is able to bring to the surface the social impact and po-
litical function of idolatry critique which feeds off the tension between the different con-
cepts at odds with each other in the biblical theology, and sustains the negativity of the 
critique of ethical and practical concept immanent to theology itself. For this, we turn, at 
last, to the question of theory as critique of praxis, which I argue, may take theological 
form as a critical theology whose negative ‘double movement’ may prove capable of 
such a ‘critique of critique’ without falling to the trap of either the quietism of Žižek’s ac-
tive passivity or the pseudo-activist pressure of fully praxis-oriented theologies. 
 The mutual engagement between critical theory and political theology has a long 
history and is still on-going; from Johann Baptist Metz’s new political theology, to Mar-
sha Hewitt’s feminist critical theory of religion to Gregory Baum’s critical social theol-
ogy, political theology has long recognized in the shadow of critical theory a demand to 
account for itself as ideology critique. But it has struggled to do this for a number of rea-
sons. First, critical theory configures ideology critique as immanent critique and so calls 
for a kind of negativity that is difficult to sustain by political theology’s own methods; 
that is, it calls for a negative concept of truth but cannot become, as Adorno has convinc-
ingly argued, a “negative theology.” Second, attention to the ‘dialectic of enlightenment’ 
implicates theology directly as an agent and site of commodification that plagues modern 
social conditions. It is clear that, as Adorno memorably phrased it, “religion is for sale,” 
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and political theology seems unable to forestall its deleterious effect on theology. Third, 
the appeal of political theology lies in its the invigoration of the practical impulse essen-
tial to the normative vision of Christianity’s political desire, much which is desirable in 
our contemporary context because of its attention to suffering, its commitment to 
memory, and its stubborn insistence upon that which appears to be impossible: for-
giveness, reparations, non-violence, the end of authoritarian power, and the ethics of the 
“grand reversal”: the elevation of ‘the least of these’ as God’s preferred ones.   
 And yet critical theory calls upon ideology critique to question and problematize, 
not the norms inherent to this theolgico-political impulse per se, but the apparent immedi-
ate link between theological concepts, these norms, and praxis. A critical theology, which 
adopts the dual negativity of immanent critique, is always a ruptural and inaugurative 
thinking that interrogates “that which is” in order to bring into being “that which is cur-
rently not present” in our social conditions. Its project is not amelioration, but transfor-
mation; the Christian theological imagination is stubbornly utopic in this way, meaning 
that it privileges both the directions of the negativity of critique because it recognizes that 
only by negating ‘the false’ will ‘the true’ appear, whether ‘the false’ resides in social 
conditions or within itself. It does not presume to be able to bring to being that which lies 
beyond, but rather tries to fracture the present, and in this way, sustain the eschatological 
expectation for something other than what currently is. In this way, critical theology 
hopes to be a practice of resistance, but one that cannot offer prescriptive ways forward.  
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 This critical theology is presented as an immanent critique of political theology, 
in that it takes up political theology as its object. This self-reflexivity completes the dou-
ble movement of negativity that enables it to remain critique of ideologies, whether they 
concern social conditions or the political functions of its own theological concepts. It can-
not in this way be considered a practical theology, but rather focuses its work on naming 
the problems as they exist in the normative orders and structures that govern human being 
and acting. Political theology as critical theology can only do so however when it takes 
itself as ideology; in this way, it is more Marxist that the ‘left’ philosophies of Eagleton 
and Žižek whose political uses of Christianity conveniently skip over the critique of reli-
gion as ideology, effectively instrumentalizing theological concepts to fit their respective 
political programs. Critical theology resists this, knowing full well that the work that lies 
ahead of itself is only possible if and when it stays focused on its own propensity for ide-
ology. It knows that it is not inoculated from ideology by its stated commitments to jus-
tice, equality, solidarity and the like, as long as the social conditions of the inverted world  
remain in effect.
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EPILOGUE 
OPEN QUESTIONS, FURTHER DIRECTIONS 
 Projects such as this one present a significant challenge in that the questions they 
raise and the directions they point to are not easily recognized or programmatically 
sketched out. The work here in many ways to struggle, and admittedly stumble, towards a 
formulation of a complex question, one that we may not know to ask quite yet. But, as an 
attempt at a final word, I hope to say a bit more about where I hope this attempt at a criti-
cal theology might go in the future and how I expect my own research agenda to be 
shaped by it.  
 Within the dissertation itself, there are many open questions. The interruptive 
negativity of immanent critique plays such a dominant role in critical theology, and yet in 
order for it to be theo-logical, it must have something to say about God, in the very least. 
It is insufficient and perhaps even dangerous to follow Žižek completely and concede that 
the crucified Christ is the final political-theological word and the divine, as a result of the 
incarnation, has been fully sublimated into the revolutionary community of unplugged 
subjects. In Žižek’s vision, the rupture here is complete; the Void it creates, or rather re-
veals from underneath the sutures of the Symbolic order, is total and so it remains to be 
seen how critical theology can rely so heavily on the critical formula of dual negativity 
while also still remaining a theology. Can critical theology sustain the heavy demands of 
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negativity before it breaks apart and is sublimated into a sociology of religion, or worse, a 
philosophy of religion? 
 More work must also be done to distinguish between the two critical lines of 
thought in the biblical theology of idolatry: the prophetic understanding and the critique 
of idolatry. A more theologically grounded “critique of critique” will required to address 
this tension and its implications for political theology. One possible way forward here is 
further attention to whether this identity politics of idolatry critique endures in the New 
Testament version, especially considering the central role that the theological and politi-
cal theme of community plays in early Christian ecclesiology and soteriology. Žižek in-
sists that the decentralized and diffused presence of the Spirit reveals itself in the life of a 
community that, in light of the “death of God” as the big Other, is freed from ethical and 
political constraints, and so is freed to act outside the social order and to resist it in ways 
presently unknown and unthought. Eagleton opposes Žižek here, namely because the 
Christian community is ideologico-critical precisely because of the norms it insists must 
be in place for redemption, which is always social and universalist, to occur. How is the 
Christian community to act out of its theological bearings if its effect on social reality, as 
the ruptural Event, is precisely meant to foreclose the kind of acting it seems called to?  
 Further clarification on this matter might be reached through a stricter analysis of 
the relationship of ideology critique and utopia, now from the perspective of what I have 
been calling ‘critical theology.’ This would help widen the project to include more philo-
sophical treatments of ideology critique with respective to theology from figures like Paul 
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Ricoeur and Jürgen Habermas, whose respective work on tradition, conviction, and com-
municative action would balance out the emphasis on negativity maintained here, concre-
tize the argument with more political specifics, while also updating the conversation from 
the 1970s and 1980s with respect to recent debates about religion, the secularization, and 
post-secular politics.  
 Oddly enough, the long theoretical detour taken in this dissertation actually leads 
back towards theology. For the theoretical questions to be answered, and their practical 
implications to be fully understood, the theologian must return home to concepts within 
the various Christian traditions in order to explore their potential as resources for this 
dual negativity, and also to reshape said themes in accordance to the critical attitudes to-
wards political action taken here. Certainly one could easily start with Marcella Althaus-
Reid whose interaction with and movement in-between political, liberationist, queer, and 
postcolonial theologies offers much to think about and work through in reference to the 
relationships between critique, theory, praxis, and action. In this way, a critical theology 
quickly becomes a queer theology, but one that resists the temptation to adopt the ‘prefer-
ential option for the queer’ as an ideology free perspective, one that is immunized in light 
of its resistance to and struggle against heteronormative orders of normalization and legi-
bility. It also reshapes entirely, in my view, the perspective on utopia and politics in polit-
ical theology, which changes the discussion on dialectical ‘crisis’ theology and the theol-
ogy of hope that followed it. What happens, for example, to apocalyptic theology and de-
mythologization under the rubric of critical theology? Does it strengthen the critical per-
spective on action and politics that the dual negativity of critical theology insists upon, 
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only now coming from the theological, rather than the theoretical, perspective? Or does it 
raise questions about whether the strictures of critique placed on action and politics in 
this vision are tenable as theological positions?  
 Perhaps the most important and pressing of the further directions for critical theol-
ogy concern the pressure that critical theology places on the relationship between philos-
ophy and theology. Correlation and dialogue have been productive metaphors for the re-
lationship over the last half century, and yet the future of the relationship will largely de-
pend on how they can help each other with accurate, timely, and productive political re-
sponses to the predominant social order. It is understandable that the turn to theology by 
philosophy has been lauded by theologians who feel vindicated to be at the table once 
again, and yet this dissertation gives several reasons why theology must find the courage 
to assert its own resources and define itself and the critical parameters of its negativity. 
Perhaps Christianity can find this courage in its utopic thinking, which is supplied by the 
dual negativity of its immanent critique. When Christianity takes itself as the object of its 
own ideology critique — that is, as a critical theology — the negative truth behind its 
stubbornly utopic expectations is able to emerge. It is this negativity that fuels its critical 
engagement with its social conditions and the relationship of its theologies to these condi-
tions. It does this because it actually expects that a new world is possible, even if it may 
not know what it looks like or how to bring it into being. Meanwhile, a critical theology 
directs Christianity and Christian communities to seek to instigate the critical ruptures 
necessary to see the world and ourselves differently.
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